

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S
DHVANYĀLOKA-LOCANA

with an anonymous Sanskrit Commentary

Chapter First

*Critically edited
with a complete English translation
by*

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MEHARCHAND LACHHMANDAS PUBLICATIONS.
New Delhi 110 002 **India**

अभिनवगुप्तविरचितं
ध्वन्यालोक-लोचनम्
(प्रथमोद्घोतः)

अज्ञातकर्तृकप्राचीनव्याख्यानेन आङ्ग्लानुवादेन च समन्वितम्।
पाठसंशोधनविधानेन परिष्कृतम्।

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FIRST EDITION: 1988

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*Published by Meharchand Lachhmandas Publications, 1 Ansari Road,
Daryaganj, New Delhi*

Phototypeset by S.M.N. Phototypesetters, Lajpat Nagar, N. Delhi

Printed at Oxford Printcraft India Pvt. Ltd., N. Delhi-2

PREFACE

It is with a sense of fulfilment of a long-cherished desire that I am bringing out this edition of Abhinavagupta's *Locana* on the *Dhvanyāloka* of Ānandavardhana with my English translation, encouraged by the warm response of scholars to my studies and edition of the latter with my translation published a dozen years ago.

For the first time is being published a very concise and clear commentary in Sanskrit on the *Locana* by one who has left us no clue either about his place or region or time. But we have a hint from him that he commented only on the first chapter in his declaration after the invocation—"ekasya dīṅgmātram abhivyāntum upakrame".

I have been engaged for over three decades in the study of this text and the text presented here embodies the result of my ceaseless efforts to get at the most meaningful and authentic text in the light of not only Mss. but also citations — these are often quite extensive as in the anonymous *Kalpalatāvivēka* (L.D. Institute publication) —available up to date.

My object in the translation has been to give the spirit of the original in a readable and reasonably acceptable English; and not to be too literal and pedantic.

Abhinavagupta is a great thinker; and he has practically given us in a nutshell the entire argument of all the four chapters of the *Dhvanyāloka* within the span of the first chapter itself, so that the reader is fully acquainted with the core concept of *dhvani* in all its dimensions. Need I add that for a proper understanding of Ānandavardhana in the right perspective, the study of the *Locana* is a must; not only because it explicates complex ideas, but also adds to them considerably by noting important objections and answering them pointedly. Thus it is both a summary and an enlargement of Ānandavardhana's aesthetics.

The prestigious publisher has left nothing to be desired in making the edition at once elegant and accurate. I thank him heartily for all his kindnesses.

— K. Krishnamoorthy

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INTRODUCTION

I

This edition is a landmark so to say in the history of text-critical editions and English translations of classics in Indian aesthetics and criticism.

Over these four decades, my involvement in *Dhvani* studies or Indian aesthetics as propounded by the classical masters, viz., Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, has made me realise that even for Sanskritists a good English translation is a felt necessity, not to speak of non-Sanskritists. This is so because the two classical authors mentioned were great thinkers in the traditional disciplines (*śāstras*) of grammar, logic and Vedic hermeneutics, besides being creative poets of a high order and very sensitive or perceptive literary critics. Their expositions often bristle with technical terms and turns of thought beyond the reach of a general Sanskritist today. And, more often than not, renderings of stray citations from them, torn out of their context, become more confusing than clarifying. Hence I have often felt the need of a helpful and dependable translation of their entire work in readable English. And I am so happy to see that my translation of at least the most important first chapter of Abhinavagupta's celebrated *Locana* on the *Dhvanyāloka* is seeing the light of day now, on the eve of my retirement.

The task of an ideal translation of the *Locana* is virtually nullified by the corrupt nature of the text that has come down to us with all types of variants, good, bad and indifferent. Among the several editions of the *Locana* available now, the first issued by the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay (1st edn. 1891; 3rd revised edn. 1935) is so far from making sense that my esteemed mentor, M. Hiriyanra of Mysore did not allow his M.A. dissertation on the *Dhvanyāloka* to be published by the Madras University in the first decade of this century. It was much better presented in the Kashi Sanskrit Series edition accompanied by *Bālapriyā*, a modern commentary in

Sanskrit by Pandit Rāma Shāraṅka and issued in 1940. By far, the best edition is that of S. Kuppuswami Sastri with *Kaumudī* commentary by Uttuṅḡodaya, published from Madras in 1944. But it extends only up to the end of the first chapter and offers no help in English.*

As far as I know, the very ambitious project by K. Rama Pisharoti to publish an English version of the entire *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana* in the second decade of this century in the volumes of the now defunct journal from Allahabad, *Indian Thought*, could only cover an infinitely small portion and was never completed.

My first task thus came to be the determination of a dependable and definitive text of the *Locana* before I could proceed to translate it into English. Towards this end, I procured from several Mss. Libraries, xeroxed copies or transcripts of *Locana* on the first *Uddyota*,+ and of Sanskrit commentaries available on the *Locana*, though in fragmentary form. It took me quite some time in the midst of my other academic duties to complete even the work on the selected first *Uddyota* portion of the *Locana*. Luckily, I could also complete the text-editing of one unpublished commentary on the above *Locana* text from a transcript of it I obtained by the courtesy of the authorities of the Govt. Oriental Manuscripts Library, Madras (numbered R 2680), about a dozen years ago. This commentary is published here for the first time along with the critically edited *Locana* text. The very first verse of the anonymous commentary contains a veiled hint that it was written only upon one chapter (viz., the first) :

“tadapyekasya dīnāmātraṁ abhivyañktumupakrame”

In all humility, he says : “Who will ever understand the thought running through the entire text of the *Locana* ? My object is to offer broad guidelines for only the first chapter.”

Yet scholarly readers will see for themselves how, in spite of all his humility, his work is often brilliant, sometimes penetrating and mostly perceptive. It came to me as a godsend in fixing *Locana*

* These three printed editions have been respectively designated as ‘Ni’, ‘Kā’ and ‘Ke’ in the footnotes of our printed text.

+ The first *Uddyota* portion of the *Locana* is indeed self-complete in a sense because it ably summarises all the arguments for establishing the thesis of *dhvani* and silencing plausible objections as developed by Ānandavardhana in the three later chapters also. Even the divisions, illustrations and demonstrations of the *dhvani* concept have been ably, though briefly, indicated. Thus this may be regarded as an able synopsis of *dhvani* aesthetics, complete in itself.

text-readings in some of the most difficult passages. Naturally, I have deemed it my duty to adopt his text as authentic in this edition. To give an example at random, words meaning the opposite of what is intended in the text are often given as right readings in the popular editions of the *Locana* :—

p. 12, 1.7 -we read 'vīpsayā sambhramam sūcayan ādaraṇ darśayati' where we should have 'anādaram' ('shows regard' in place of the required 'shows disregard').

p. 34, 1.9 -we read 'tadaṅgikāriṇi' in place of 'tadanaṅgikāriṇi' (O lady, 'who accepted our helpful advice' in place of 'who rejected our helpful advice').

p. 46, 1.1 -we read 'lakṣaṇakāra-prasiddhatā, or 'popularity with theoreticians' when the sense required is its opposite, viz. 'a-prasiddhatā' or 'absence of familiarity'.

For the purposes of this edition, I was also able to secure a copy of a palm-leaf Ms. of *Locana* in the Sarada script from the Rajasthan Research Institute, Jodhpur (acquired from Jaisalmer) and also a palm-leaf Ms. of *Locana* in the Kannada script from the Jaina Dānaśālā Math, Mūdabidre (South Kanara District, Karnataka State). I have utilized them also while fixing the text along with noting down the variants given by all previous editors. To facilitate reference, I have retained the designations 'ka', 'kha', 'ga' described and used first by the Nirnayasagar Press editors and 'gha', 'ña', 'ca' and 'ta' used by Kuppuswami Sastri in his 1944 edition from Madras; my only additional abbreviations are : 'Ni' for Nirnayasagar edn., 'Ka' for Kashi Sanskrit Series edition with *Bālapriyā* and 'Ke' for Kuppuswami Sastri's edition from Madras; 'Kau' is the abbreviation for *Kaumudī*, also included in the last edition. Hence I am not giving my duplicate description of these here. I might add that generally my Kannada Ms. agrees with 'ga' of Nirnayasagar and my Jodhpur Ms. with 'gha' of Kuppuswami Sastri's edition. But no pains have been spared to record all variants in the text of the *Locana* published here, so that scholars are left free to draw their own conclusions.*

So far as the English translation is concerned, it remains for me to state that I have struggled hard to present the spirit rather than the letter of Abhinavagupta's argument. I have aimed at readability, lucidity and elegance in my rendering; and I can only hope and trust

* '*Locana*' in Sanskrit has the double meaning of 'sight' (or eye) as well as insight (or insightful discussion).

that I have attained at least some measure of success. But it is of course for readers to judge. Originally, my intention was to give the Sanskrit matter and English matter on pages facing each other as in my Dharwad edition of the *Dhvanyāloka*. But the unequal length of the two led to insuperable difficulties in the press, and we had to content ourselves with a running English translation following the Sanskrit text. Perhaps this might be of some help to general readers.

Originally, I had thought of printing extracts from other fragmentary commentaries on the *Locana* also which I have with me; but one of them, *Añjana*, by one Dāśarathi, ostensibly a Nambūdiri Brahmin from Kerala of the 16th century, is like a dissertation on the deep philosophy embedded in the first verse of the *Locana*, and it is very casual and scrappy in its notes on other portions (the fragment extends only up to I. 4 of the text). The second is also far too brief and covers only a very small portion. Hence I dropped that idea; and I am giving here, instead, some select extracts from them which might be of some help to readers in providing a right perspective to Abhinavagupta's aesthetics in the light of Indian traditional scholarship.

Before proceeding to do so, it remains for me to add that the anonymous commentary now published contains little which helps us to fix his name, place or date. We find him citing well-known passages from the *śāstras* of *tarka*, *vyākaraṇa* and *mīmāṃsā*, besides celebrated classical poets. He has also referred to Bhoja's grammar (p. 13) and Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka* (p. 45), and to an untraced work on Musicology (p. 42). All that we can say with certainty is that he was not earlier than 1200 A.D. He has not quoted any late author or work. All this leaves us in the dark about his life and times. But his work, as already indicated, is a very valuable, dependable and scholarly aid in removing many a difficulty in our attempt to understand Abhinavagupta's *Locana* in the Indian milieu.

II

NEW LIGHT ON 'LOCANA' IN THE LIGHT OF SOME UNPUBLISHED COMMENTARIES

The text of Abhinavagupta's *Locana* is so condensed and crammed with significance that often we are likely to misunderstand it in the absence of traditional explanations as recorded

and banded down to us in commentaries. I have been able to secure some two of these from Madras and Tirupati Oriental Mss. Libraries and below are set out a few specimens of the new light thrown on the most fundamental ideas in the very invocatory verse of the *Locana*; viz,

apūrvam yad vastu prathayati vinā kāranakalāṁ
jagad grāvaprakhyam nijarasabharāt sārāyati ca |
kramāt prakhyopākhyāprasara-subhagaṁ bhāsyati yat- *et*
sarasvatyāstattvaṁ kavisahṛdayākhyam vijayate ||

The principal subject in the sentence is of course “*sarasvātyāḥ-tattvam*” and the predicate is ‘*vijayate*’. What exactly does *tattvam* mean? We should know Bharṛhari’s *Kārikā* —

ātrāṇā vastu svabhāvaśca śarīraṁ tattvamityapi |
dravyamityasya paryāyāḥ tacca nityamiti sthitam |

(*Vākyapadīya*, III. ii. 1)

to understand its right implication as ‘essential nature’. It is qualified by the adjective *Kavisahṛdayākhyam*. It looks rather puzzling. How is the essential nature of *sarasvatī* or *Vāk* or Logos itself be equated with either the poet or the critic who are, after all, persons who may serve as media for the production of effective *Vāk*, but who cannot be identified with *Vāk* itself by any stretch of imagination. The three, namely, *Kavi*, *sahṛdaya* and *sarasvatī* or *Vāk* — should be deemed different from one another. Such is the *prima facie* view or *pūrvapakṣa* :—

nanu kavi-sahṛdayayoḥ sarasvatyāśca
bhedaḥ sarvatra prasiddhaḥ : yaduktam :
“brahmāṇḍaketakīṣaṇḍe saha-kārayuvā kaviḥ |
tadupaghnū jayatyekā mādha-vīva sarasvatī” ||
“vande kavīndravaktrendu-lāśya-mandira-nartakīm |
devīṁ śaktipariśpanda-sundarābhinayojjvalām” ||

(*Vakroktijīvitā*, I, 1)

anunaiva cāthihitamabhinavabhāratyām :—
“kavirapi svahṛdayāyatana-satatodita-pratibhā-
bhidhāna-paravāgdevatān-ugrahotthita — vicitrā-
pūrva-nirmāṇa-śakti-śālinaḥ . . .” iti. Evaṁ.
ohede prasiddhe kathamiyamābhedoktiḥ ?

It deserves to be noted here that in the *Abhinavabhāratī* text now available to us in print, this citation is not traceable. Anyway, what is the way out? The answer proposed by one of these commentators is —

uktādeva sambandhādupacārāśrayeṇa;
upacāraprayojanaṁ tu vivecakairūhanīyam.

“Our answer is simple. It is a loose or secondary usage which justifies the three being identified as they share common qualities. The purpose served by such a secondary usage may be easily imagined by sensitive critics.”

From the point of view of grammatical explanation, however, the same commentator adds :—

iha kavi-saṁdayaśabdayostu svarūpamevā-
bhidheyam, nārtharūpamapi; yathā gavitya-
yamāhetyatra gośabdasya. śabdasvarūpameva
hi ākhyā; kavi-saṁdayau = kavi-saṁdayaśabdau
ityākhye = saṁjñe yasya iti bahuvrīhiḥ.

This is indeed clinching and decisive. *Kavi-saṁdayākhyā* is a possessive or *bahuvrīhi* compound. The words *Kavi* and *saṁdaya* do not connote their meanings; but only describe their verbal form; just as when we say — “He is shouting *“gauḥ”*”, we only refer to the sound uttered by the man and not its sense. The two symbols ‘*Kavi*’ and ‘*Saṁdaya*’ are given to the single principle of ‘*Vāk*’. This removes the difficulty noticed.

At this stage, one might urge from the perspective of *Pratyabhijñā* philosophy that Abhinavagupta himself has proved in that context that the real knower (*pramātā*) is non-distinct from the Supreme God (*Īśvara*) because the ultimate truth happens to be one absolute knowledge, illumining itself as well as all else. Extending the same reasoning to poetry here, he might possibly hold that *Vāk*, the ultimate Absolute, is truly identical with the poet and the critic :—

nanu yathā anenaiva prasaṅgāntare—
pramātaiva . . . svātantrya — prakāśātmatayā
tāvat bhāṣate; tathā bhāṣamānāścāsāvīśvara
eva; tasyāpi tatsvabhāvatvāditi pramātu-
rīśvarasya cābhedaḥ sādhitāḥ. Tathā nirūp-
yamāṇe sati kavi-saṁdayayoḥ sarasvatī-
tattvasya cābhedo mukhya eva, kiṁ
upacāreṇa aparijñātaprayojanena ?

This is indeed a major consideration which deserves more than a passing notice. Several scholars of repute like K.C. Pandey and Dr. Suntharlingam would like us to understand the aesthetic thought of Abhinavagupta only in the light of his metaphysics.

Indeed, I have great regard for their insights and in-depth studies. But the seminal question is whether poetry should be interpreted through the channel of philosophy. Now our old commentator has no doubt that the two are distinct disciplines and should not be mixed up. Poetry, admittedly, is an empirical experience (*Vyavahāra*); it should be interpreted only in terms of *laukika* or worldly criteria and not in terms of *paramārtha* or ontological reality. He observes as follows :—

tādṛṣesu śāstrēṣu tadvyākhyāneṣu ca
paramārtha-dṛṣṭyavaṣṭambhena tathocyatām;
kūvyaḍiṣu tu laukikapratītyānusāreṇaiva
vaktavyam.

This serves as a well-sounded caution to modern interpreters also.

A still further objection may be raised to the interpretation suggested above, viz, that the terms 'Kavi' and 'sahṛdaya' denote only their sound-form and do not connote the meanings concerned. 'Ākhyā' in its root-sense can mean also 'sphuraṇa' or apprehension in general. Therefore, both the poet and the critic can equally share in such poetic 'apprehension'. Therefore, we may take the words to convey their usual meanings in the expression 'Kavi-sahṛdayākhyam' :—

nanu kavi-sahṛdaya śabdāvarthaparau,
na svarūpaparau; kavi-sahṛdayayorākhyā
"ābhikṣṇyena hi sarvo vaktā kaviḥ" ityādi-nyāyāt
vaktṛśāinānyavailakṣaṇyena khyānam = sphuranam
yasyeti vyadhikaraṇo bahuvrīhiḥ, iti
bheda eva vāstavo yojanīyaḥ.

Similar far-fetched interpretations are possible, but not acceptable for the simple reason that *ākhyā* cannot be interpreted in the sense of *prākhyā* which alone is *sphuraṇa* or apprehension in a flash :—

Etadayuktameva, Ākhyāśabdasya prakhyā—
śabdavat sphuraṇārthatvādikalpanāyām
asamarthatvādi-doṣa-prasaṅgāt.

What exactly is the connotation of *sarasvatī* in this verse ? Is it the goddess of speech in her *parā* form or in other forms like *paśyanti*, *madhyantā* and *vaikhari* ? Apparently, *parā* seems to be the main intended sense, because Mahima Bhaṭṭa and others have expressly said so. We might compare his statement here — "Pṛaṇamiya Mahimā parām vācam" at the beginning of his work;

and Ruyyaka's invocation, viz., "namaskṛtya parāṁ vācaṁ devīm trividhavigrahāṁ" at the commencement of his *Alaṅkārasarvasva*. The commentator agrees that this is intended all right by Abhinavagupta too in reference to convention; but he gives it a new relevance by relating it to both 'kavi' and 'sahṛdaya'. At this point it might be urged that while speech is related to the poet directly, it is not related to the critic directly and hence their mention together is pointless :—

nanu evamvidhe viṣaye sarasvatyāḥ
kavi-sambandhitvaṁ kvacitsākṣādūcyate,
kvacidarthādāyāti, na sahṛdaya-saṁ -
bandhitvaṁ; tat kuto'tra sahṛdaya-grahaṇam ?

The only justification one can offer is that without the critic's word of generous appreciation and explication, the word of the poet would remain ineffective and obscure. Further, the critic is no less a scholar than the poet himself. The poet's word will be like an old lack-lustre painting; it is the critic's word which makes it shine in newer colours by the touch of his artistic brush. It is because of the generous praise of critics that the poets attain popularity. Hence, both are equally important and relevant :

"kaverapi vidagdho'sau sūktimudrā -
vicāraḥ" iti nayena, sahṛdaya -
sarasvatī — kṛtopaskārā satī tūlikonmīlita -
citrakāyavat susampūrṇaśobhā sampadyate.
. . . kiṁ ca kavi-sarasvatyāḥ khalu
samvartitasya arthasya tadabhiprāyānurodhinā
sahṛdayena vyākhyāne prasāraṇāya vivartanā kriyate.

This is the explanation offered when the terms 'kavi' and 'sahṛdaya' are taken in their general sense. But the commentator suggests an alternative explanation too which is immediate and specific :—

athavā kavīśabdena tāvat sāmānyena
kavaya uktāḥ. sahṛdayaśabdena tu
sāmānyavācīnāpi sahṛdayaviśeṣaḥ
Ānandavardhanācāryo'tra vivakṣitaḥ
. . . kavīsarasvatī kāvya-rūpā vyavahānena
prakṛtatvāt samucitā. Ānandavardhanācārya-
sarasvatī tu lakṣaṇagrantharūpā sāksāt.

While we may understand 'kavīsarasvatī' to mean the poetic speech of all poets in a general way, 'sahṛdaya-sarasvatī' may be

taken in the restricted sense of Ānandavardhana's *sarasvatī* or the treatise Dhvanyāloka itself; since Abhinavagupta has left us in no doubt that he regarded Ānandavardhana himself as a 'sahṛdaya' par excellence (cf. *sahṛdayacakravartī khalvayaṁ granthakāraḥ — Locana*, p. 17).

Even Ānandavardhana has hinted at it (IV Uddyota, 17) in the remark — "*sarasvatyaivaiśā ghaṭayati yatheṣṭaṁ bhagavatī*".

The very first phrase in the verse under discussion happens to be : "*apūrvam vastu*", One would usually take it to mean a fresh or novel subject chosen for treatment. But it is again a *non sequitur*. It does not follow from the premises we actually find in the text to follow. *Vastu* is not any restricted subject or theme, not just a *padārtha*, but it has a very comprehensive scope including the entire *vākyārtha* or purport of a whole sentence or work. The adjective *apūrva* ('unknown before') indeed is used to cover all creative products of a poet's genius, technically classed as *kavipraudhokti-siddha*. It does not exclude either subjects technically classed as 'naturally possible' (*svataḥ-sambhavi*) because the very nature of imagination is such that it endows a touch of novelty even to familiar things :—

vastuśabdena padārtha iva vākyārtho'pi
vācyaḥ, yathā prativastūpamā ityādau.
kim bahunā — praudhoktimātra — niṣpanna -
śarīraḥ sarvo'pyarthaḥ iha udāharaṇī -
karaṇīyaḥ. kim ca utpādyam vastu
svataḥsambhavi-rūpamapī bhavati;
yaduktam :— "prasiddhyupajīvanī hi
kalpanā vastusambhavānubhavamūlatvāt tasyāḥ".

This reminds us of Aristotle's remark that the poet deals with probable impossibilities rather than improbable possibilities. This is indeed a metalogic which explains best the magic of poetry, though paradoxical at first sight.

The correlative terms *prakhyā* and *upākhyā* again require a clear exegesis. The word *nirupākhyā* is well known in Indian philosophy as a term for what is totally indescribable because it is utterly non-existent. *Upākhyā*, its opposite should mean what is describable by words. The feminine form *upākhyā* can thus mean the process of description by means of words. *Prakhyā* also is a philosophical term found in yoga philosophy for an inner experience or consciousness. These are best explained in the commentary as self-illumination (*prakhyā*) and illumination of

others' minds (*upākhyā*) to suit the context of the world of poetry on the basis of Abhinavagupta's own usage elsewhere :—

uktam hyamunaivānyatra—"tathāvidhaṃ
rūpaṃ prakhyopākhyākrameṇa = svātma-
parāvabhāsa—visayabhāva-jigamiṣayā
viśeṣotkarṣābhidhāyi jayatyādiśabdānu-
vedhena parāmarśanīyam" iti

In fact, the word *upākhyā* here stands for the creative speech itself of the poet i.e. *kavi-sarasvatī* as such. This is indeed a very subtle point which we are likely to miss ordinarily. In the poetic process, *Upākhyā* is not something external; since the act of poetic creation is itself *upākhyā*, involving aesthetic word-usage. Abhinava himself makes this clear later on, while commenting on the definition of *dhvani* :

śabdanam śabdaḥ = śabdavyāpāraḥ. Na cāsau
abhidhādirūpaḥ, api tu ātmabhūtaḥ.

In the light of this one should not mistake *Upākhyā* to be a function like connotation of the poet's language. On the other hand, it is poetic language itself which spontaneously accompanies his *prakhyā* or illumining experience of beauty :—

atra ca upākhyā-padena kavi-sarasvatyāḥ svātmā
grhyate, svayaṃ śabda-rūpāyāstasyāḥ śabdāntara-
vacanāsambhavāt. Yathāyameva vakṣyati.

The second commentator, however, offers an entirely different explication. He takes *prakhyā* as referring to the poet's cognition of beauty and *upākhyā* as the perceptive comment thereon by the critic :—

prakhyā = jñānam kaveḥ; upākhyā = śabdaḥ,
sahṛdayasya. Kaverhi apūrvārthadarśanam
kavitvam; sahṛdayasya catura-madhura —
pravakṛtvaṃ sahṛdayatvam.

However close this might be to the Western idea of the activities of the poet and the critic, it is not as revealing and profound as the first already noticed.

I *Kārikā* : 'Kāvyaśāstram . . .

1) *ātmā* means only the incontrovertible essential nature synonymous with its *tattva* or essential being; and not exactly 'soul' :

ātmā hyabādhitam svarūpam. Atāścātmaśabdasya
tattvaśabdenābādhitam svarūpavācīnārthavivaraṇam kṛtam.

2) The negativists (abhāvavādins) denied only 'dhvani' and not the *ātman* or essential core of poetry itself. Hence Kāvyaśyātmā is to be taken as a two-word sentence, complete in sense :

atra ca vākyaṁ kāvyasyātmēti padadvayasvarūpameva;
dhvanilakṣaṇo 'arthah' ityasya tu na vākyaṅtarbhūtatvaṁ
api tu tadbahirbhūtatvameva. Yo hi dhvanilakṣaṇo'rthah
budhah samāmnātapūrvah iti sambandhah.

The term 'dhvani' here also relates only to the technical name, not its content :

śabdasvarūpameva dhvanipadārthah, na tu pratipādyarūpo-
'rthopi.

So also is the term *Bhākta* which apparently signifies secondary sense :

"bhakterāgato gaṇo lākṣaṇikaśceti." Śabda iti śeṣah.

Yattu kenacidartha iti vākhyānaṁ kṛtaṁ tadayuktameva.

Xārikā I.6 : . . . pratibhāviṣeṣam.

Locana : pratibhā = apūrvavastunirmāṇakṣamā prajñā. This is quite clear. But the next sentence is not. It reads : tasyā viṣeṣah : rasāveśavaiśadya-saundaryakāvyanirmāṇakṣamatvam. For 'vaiśadya' we have also a variant 'vaiśādyā'. Still, the clumsy syntax is not avoided in this most crucial definition of the poetic vision and its function. New light comes here only from the old Ms. of *Locana* preserved in Jodhpur Research Institute which reads *vaivaśya* in place of *vaiśadya*. But the *Locana*-commentary seen in I. (5) above seems to add *hr̥dyā* in between *saundarya* and *kāvya* which would completely remove the clumsiness :

rasāveśa-vaivaśya-saundarya-hr̥dyakāvyanirmāṇakṣamatvam.

Someśvara's *saṅketa* on *Kāvya prakāśa* preserves the still better original reading, viz.,

rasāveśa — vaivaśya — sundara-kāvya-nirmāṇakṣamatvam

(Ed. R.C. Parikh, Jodhpur, 1959, P. 4).

(Tr.: The specific creative aspect we are concerned with is the ability of creating poetry which is beautiful because of the poet's complete self-surrender to the pressure of *rasa*).

III

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S INTEGRAL VIEW OF AESTHETIC CONCEPTS

It is well known that virtually all aesthetic concepts — *Rasa*,

Guṇa, *Alaṅkāra*, *Bandha* and *Vṛtti* — were familiar to all literary theorists from Bharata down to Jagannātha. Yet every writer has his own way of defining, classifying and illustrating them that leads to lopsided emphasis on one of them at the cost of the others. This was sought to be remedied by Ānandavardhana in his *Dhvanyāloka*. Yet how exactly it could integrate every concept into a unified whole philosophy of beauty in literature and art was left to be explained in the two major works of Abhinavagupta — the *Locana* and the *Abhinavabhāratī*. Unfortunately, the misreadings in both these important contexts have impeded even our best scholars from getting at the crucial thought of Abhinavagupta.

This study fixes correct readings in a few specimen passages of Abhinavagupta on the basis of unpublished manuscripts' testimonia and highlight how Abhinavagupta was a thinker who went beyond even Ānandavardhana and Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka in his aesthetics and how he explained, for the first time, the precise part played by each of the aesthetic concepts in a given poem or play.

Usually, we take for granted the meanings of key terms *śabda*, *artha*, *bhāva*, *rasa*, *bandha*, *guṇa*, *lakṣaṇa* and *alaṅkāra* without any serious thought about their deep implications or relative status. A close study of Abhinavagupta alone can bring clarity into our confused theorisings.

Let us start with *śabda*. It is not mere sound; not even mere units of spoken language such as syllable, base, affix, word, phrase and sentence. It is these and something infinitely more in poetry. It is the whole poem which is heard by our outer ear in recitation or inner ear in silent reading. The poem is an essentially organised or patterned linguistic sound-symbol, *vācya-vācaka-sammiśraḥ śabdātmā kāvyamīti vyapadeśyaḥ..dhvanirityuktaḥ* as Ānandavardhana would say.¹ If Bhartṛhari can speak of *śabda-brahman*, Ānandavardhana talks of all poetic language as *Dhvani* in his all comprehensive aesthetics. In this sense only can poetic language be differentiated from other uses of language—the empirical and the scientific. *Dhvani* thus is primarily *kāvya-viśeṣa* or *śabda*. Its differentiation or *ātman* is *pradhāna-vyaṅgyārtha*.

Let us now turn to *artha*. It is not dictionary meanings of particular words or even direct import of individual sentences or paragraphs or even whole works. The word *artha* does not mean

'sense' or meaning as usually misunderstood. It means aesthetic value only as Abhinavagupta rightly points out :—

koh kavatervā kavanīyam kāvyam;
tatra ca padārtha-vākyārthau rase-
ṣveva paryavasyatiḥ ityasādhāranyāt
prādhānyācca kāvyasyārthāḥ rasāḥ.
arthyanṭe prādhānyenetyarthāḥ. na
tvārthāśabdo'bhidheyavācī, kim tu prayojanavācī.²

(Earlier editions read 'sa' instead of 'na'). This is also echoed by the *Locana* often. For example, while commenting on *kāv्यārtha* (*Dhvanyaloka*, I. 7) Abhinavagupta states—*kāvyaśya tattvabhūto yorṭi aḥ*³ and the *Kaumudī* clarifies it further as—

iha sarvatra arthāśabdo nābhidheyavaacanah,
svaśabdābhidheyatvasya nirastatvāt; kim tu
arthyanṭe prādhānyena ityarthāḥ, vācyaśvārthasya
tam prati sarvathā paryavasānāt.⁴

In this integral view, only *rasa* is *kāv्यārtha* and *kāvya* is *śabda* intended by the poet to result in *rasa*. Such a creative use of *śabda* or *dhvanana-vyāpāra* indicates the genius of the poet (*kavipratibhā*) on the one hand and the sensitive imagination of the reader (*pratipatti-pratibhā*) on the other, which can go beyond the referential meanings of a poem :—

tacchaktitraya (= abhīdāhā-lakṣaṇā-tātparya-śakti-
traya) — upajānita — arthāvagamanūla — tatpratibhā-
pavitrita — pratipatti-pratibhāśahāya — arthadyotana-
śaktiḥ dhvananavyāpārah.⁴

Thus understood, the evocative power of a poem itself becomes *Dhvanana* or *Dhvani*, a power *sui generis* to poetic language as such. The form of a poem is termed its *śarīra* or body; and the unique value-content, viz. *rasa* its soul or *ātman*.

It is this focal point of *rasa* towards which all elements of formal beauty, viz. *alanṅkāra* and *guṇa* converge. All aspects of poetic content like *vastu* also get their entry into the portals of poetry only to the extent they serve the end of *rasa*, first visualised

2. Abhinavabhārati, G.O.S. Edn., Vol. I (2nd edn.) p. 343.

3. *Locana* and *Kaumudī*, KSRI., Edn., p. 172.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 1, 7.

by the poet at one end and intended to be actualised by the *sah-ṛdaya* at the other end. *Rasa* is aesthetic experience in leading to which the story, the characters, and style of a poem—all contribute in their own way. Therefore poetic content or *artha*, even when considered objectively, can only be envisaged in relation to *rasa*. Hence Abhinavagupta rightly regards all objective content of poetry as coming under the category of *vibhāvādi*. Any object in the world of nature or in the world of a poet's imagination (even if it be non-existent in the hard world of reality), is grist to the mill of the poet if it partakes of the power to induce *rasa* in the reader by becoming *vibhāva* or stimulant, *anubhāva* or ensuant and *vyābhicāribhāva* or accessory of an emotional nucleus, which alone has the capacity to be transmuted into *rasa*. The poet's art of plot-construction and characterisation, as well as diction and style are determined thus by the singular norm of *rasaucitya* which is exclusively aesthetic and a-moral. Thus the scope of the term *rasa*, considered objectively, is extended to include its semblances (*ābhāsas*) and variations in intensity (*udaya*, *śānti*) and admixtures (*śabalatā*) with other emotional shades as well. Emotions described may be either permanent ones (*sthāyi*) or transitory (*vyābhicāri*). Both are *bhāvas* because they are mental states described in poetry. The former alone are regarded as *rasas* proper, viz. *śṛṅgāra*, the erotic, etc., while the latter are designated only as *bhāvas*. Though aesthetic experience or *rasa* is such as an undifferentiated (*akhaṇḍa*) experience of bliss within the heart of the reader, its *viśaya* or referential counterpart in the poem, that is to say, the pivotal emotion around which all descriptions revolve as *vibhāvādis*, may include eight or nine distinguishable *rasas* and thirty-three distinguishable *bhāvas*. In short, poetic content (*kāvyaārtha*) is distinguished from prosaic content (*śāstrārtha*) only by reason of its *vibhāvādi* — *artha* converging to a *rasa* or *bhāva* which evokes aesthetic experience immediately in the sensitive reader. All this and much more is suggested by Abhinavagupta in the initial verse itself of his *Locana*.

apūrvam yadvastu prathayati vinā kāraṇakalām
jagad grāvaprakhyam nijarasabharātsārayati ca
kramāt prakhyopākhyāprasarasubhagam bhāsayati yat
Sarasvatyāstattvam kavi-sahṛdayākhyam vijayate.

We are able to envisage the comprehensive significance of key-terms like *śabda*, *artha*, *lakṣaṇa*, *guṇa*, *alaṅkāra*, *dhvani*, *rasa*, *bhāva*, *vaṣṭu* and *aucitya* only because of Abhinavagupta's integral

approach to poetic theory as a systematic philosopher. Explaining *Kāvya-bandha*,⁵ he states that just as an engineer interested in building a palace, starts by levelling the ground, designing the lay-out and goes on to raise walls, with room for windows etc., so too a poet's starting point in his work is selection of proper words and verse-forms, *lakṣaṇas* or interesting aspects of plot constitute the walls, *gūṇas* and *alāṅkāras* serve as paintings decorating the wall, and literary genres are like lovely windows etc.⁶ He clearly mentions later on that the poetic process itself is variously termed by different theorists and *bandha*, *gūṇa*, *bhāṇitī*, *vakrokti*, *kāvīvyāpūra* are all synonyms.⁷ We can easily see how *rīti* is synonymous with *bandha* and *dhvani* with *kāvī-vyāpūra*. Thus the seeming diversity of opinion among literary theorists is dispelled in Abhinavagupta's integral approach. His philosophy is spelt out by Abhinavagupta as follows :—

yathā paramātmā svacaitanyaprakāśamatyajannapi dehakañcukocita-cittavṛttirūpitaniva svarūpamādersayati, . . . prekṣakapakṣe na natābhimānaḥ, tatra rāmābhimānaḥ iti darsayati, tathā nato'pi. etadāśayenaiva asmābhiḥ tatra tatra pratī-tireva vyākhyātā rasādhyāyadau.⁸

"Just as even God might choose to play the role of man, conditioned by mental states limited by the human body, without losing his illumined self-awareness, so too an actor plays the role of characters without shedding his individuality. Therefore, throughout our exposition, we have interpreted *rasa* only as a *pratīti* or experience of something as it appears : Art is an appearance or illusion which can lead to real bliss : that is the magic of *rasa*. Acting (*abhinaya*) in drama and description (*varṇanā*) in poetry are illusions devised skilfully to evoke self-experience of joy :

abhinayanam hi cittavṛttisādhāraṇatāpatti-prāṇa-sākṣāt-karaka-
kalpa-adhyavasāya-sampādanam.⁹

The secret of the alchemy of art-experience is unerringly highlighted as *sādhāraṇatāpatti*. This is very often wrongly understood as generalisation or universalization by scholars. It is explained

5. Nāṭya-śāstra, XV. 227.

6. Abhinavabhāratī, G.O.S. Edn., Vol. II, p. 292.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 322.

8. Abhinavabhāratī, G.O.S. Edn. Vol. III, p. 124.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 150.

pointedly as *sādhāraṇānyonyanupraveśa* under XXXII.299 of Bharata's text which is indeed famous :

pitā-putra-snuṣā-śvaśrū-dṛśyaṁ yasmāttu nāṭakam;
tasmādetāni sarvāṇi varjanīyāni yatnataḥ.

Kissing, embracing, sleeping, loosening of garments etc. are disallowed on the stage by Bharata because a play is an entertainment to be seen by a whole family including one's father, son, daughter-in-law, mother-in-law, etc. A spectacle whose *rasa* can be shared by one with every member of his family without embarrassment, is spoken of as having *sādhāraṇa-anyonyānupraveśa* or commonly shared entertainment. If in a scene, the elderly members or ladies cannot participate freely, one should take it as an instance of *rasabhaṅga*.

tataśca raso bhajyeta.sa hi sādharmaṇa-anyonyānupraveśa-prāṇaḥ
iti pratipadaṁ vadāmaḥ.¹⁰

It is indeed a mistake to think that either poets or critics are having identical tastes. The adage '*loko bhinnaruciḥ*' is true in the world of literature also. To satisfy equally the readers with diverse tastes, poets embody diverse *rasas* and *bhāvas*. As Bharata says—"na hye-karasajam kāvyam kimcidasti prayogataḥ, bhāvo vāpi raso vāpi..."¹¹ But the resultant joy or delight in the readers is common, though the factors that lead up to it might be different from reader to reader. It is this aspect of *rasa* as a common communal or social entertainment that is emphasized by the term *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa*.

The stimuli of *vibhāvādis* in plays and poems are common to all spectators and readers. And hence the *rasa* arising from their contemplation also is felt as freed from personal feelings arising from locating it either as one's own, or another's, as a friend's or a foe's or a neutral person's, in any given time or place. The fear which is felt as *rasa* on listening to the verse *grīvabhāṅgābhīramam*... in *Śākuntala* is fear, pure and simple, freed from all limitations of time, place, subject and object—

aśyaṁ ca yo mṛgapotakādirbhāti, tasya viśeṣarūpatvābhāvād...
bhāyameva param deśakālādyanālīngitam, tata eva bhīto'ham
bhīto'yaṁ śatrurvayasya madhyastho vā ityādipratyaeyebhyo
duḥkha-sukhādi-kṛtāhānādibuddhyantarodaya-niyamavattayā
vighnabahulebhyo vilakṣaṇam..¹²

10. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

11. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VII, 119. G.O.S. Edn., Vol. I, p. 379.

12. *Abhinavabhāratī*. G.O.S. Edn., Vol. I, p. 279.

The young deer is not a particular deer. It is a symbol of fear universal, irrespective of time, place, and circumstance, man, bird and beast. This is another kind of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* which is neither idealization nor generalisation in a reasoned manner. The emotion aesthetically contemplated and enjoyed as *rasa* is neither objective nor subjective but symbolic of the emotion of oneself as well as of all others seeing the same *viohāvādis*. (svasambandhitvena anyasambandhitvena ca sādharmaṇyāt pratītaiḥ abhivṛtyābhūto vāsānātmatayā sthitaḥ sthāyī pānakā-rasa-nyāyena carvyamāṇo.. rasarūpatāmāpnoti..¹³ If it is not acceptable to a wide public, but appealing only to a microscopic minority at any given period, the poem or play may be deemed to be a failure. The secret of classical literary works is that they can appeal to large sections of cultivated readers, transcending the boundaries of time and place. The concept of *anauṇīya* or *rasadoṣa* is clearly pinpointed here.

It follows as a corollary from the above that ethically offensive features and evil are to be located only in villains whose ultimate annihilation at the hands of heroes representing good, can be widely appreciated. This is one of the reasons for the absence of tragedy in Indian literature. Heroes may be of several kinds, *udāta*, *uddhata*, *lalita*, *śānta* etc; but they all share the common quality of *dhīratva* or nobility. As Abhinava says :—

sarveṣveva nāyakaḥedeṣu dhīratvameva viśeṣaṇatayoktam.¹⁴

He also gives for the first time the rationale behind the dictum that the ruling *rasa* in a major work must either be *śṛṅgāra* or *vīra*. He says—

strīṇāmuttamatvaṁ śṛṅgārarasaparyantameva : puruṣāṇāṁ to
vīrarasaviśrāntam.¹⁵

The best in women is represented in love, while the best in men in their heroic exploits for achieving goals of national or universal importance.

Hṛdaya-saṁvāda or empathy is the term popularised by Abhinavagupta to explain aesthetic psychology, though it was already found in Bharata's text :

yo'rtho hṛdayasaṁvādī
tasya bhāvo rasodbhavaḥ;

13. Cf. Rasāṅgasudhākara, Ed., T. Venkatadārya, Aṣyaḥ, Madras, 1979, p. 252.

14. Abhinavabharati, G.O.S. Edn. Vol. III, p. 153

15. Op. cit., p. 153.

śarīraṁ vyāpyate tena
śuṣkaṁ kāṣṭhamivāgninā.¹⁶

Abhinava's commentary on this portion is lost : it is quoted by him in the *Locana* without any explanation. Fortunately, an unpublished commentary on the *Locana* cites here the explanation of Abhinavagupta presumably from his lost *Abhinavabhāraṭī*. Many other citations herein expressly state the name of this source : though here it is just implicit :

arthaḥ = vibhāvādirūpaḥ. Hṛdayasamvādi = hṛdayatanmayī-bhavanaśīlaḥ ityārthaḥ. tasya bhāvaḥ = udayaḥ, athavā bhāvo camatkāraḥ rasodbhavaḥ = rasotpattisthāna — bhūtaḥ. Tena śarīraṁ — arthāt śrotuḥ vyāpyate, śroturhṛdaya-vyāpti-pūrvakam śarīramapi-vyāpyate. Eka eva hi śarīre pulakādyudayaḥ.¹⁷

The published commentary, *Kāumudī* also is similar :

yo vibhāvādi — rūpaḥ satkavi-varṇanādhi — rūḍho'rthaḥ. Hṛdayasamvādi = hṛdaya — samvāda — viśayībhavana — śīlaḥ. Tasya arthasya bhāvaḥ = nirmalahṛdayamañimukurasīmni samunmeṣaḥ : rasodbhavaḥ = rasotpattiheturbhavati. Tena ca tathā bhūtena arthena na kevalam hṛdayameva vyāpyate : tadvyāpti-pūrvakam śarīraṁ vyāpnoti. Tatra kārtsnyena jhaṭityeva tadaikarūpyeṇa ca vyāptau dṛṣṭāntaḥ — “śuṣkaṁ kāṣṭhamivāgninā” iti. Kāṣṭhameva ca vyāpyate, na śilādikam : tena cā dārṣṭāntike ratyādivāsanāvirahitahṛdayasya śrotriyādeḥ sahrdayatvābhāvaḥ. śuṣkamiti kāvyānu-śīlanakṛta-mano-vaiśadya-śālitvaṁ sūcitam. Agnineti guṇāṅkārāsambandha-saundarya-nibandhanam vibhāvataḥ darśitam.¹⁸

I have given this long extract because its exact meaning has been missed by modern translators of Bharata like the late Dr. Manmohan Ghose. His translation is—

The psychological state proceeding from the thing which is congenial to the heart, is the source of the sentiment and it pervades the body just as fire spreads over dry wood.¹⁹

It should have been

The presence or contemplation of a *vibhāva*, capable of finding a

16. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Vol. I, G.O.S. Edn., VII. 7.

17. Adyar Library Ms. No. 7471, Madras, p. 181. The author says he hails from Dāśarathi-kula.

18. Dhvanyāloka, KSRI Edn., Madras, p. 78.

19. *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Manisha Publications, II Edn., Calcutta, 1967.

ready echo in the responsive heart of a connoisseur, becomes an immediate stimulant of *rasa* or aesthetic experience. One's whole frame becomes suffused with it even like dry wood that has caught fire.

And it also shows how in Abhinavagupta's integral aesthetics, *hṛdayasaṁvāda* or *tanmayībhāvana* is an essential constituent of *rasāsvāda*. Incidentally, it dovetails deftly into this scheme the concepts of *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* also. Those who think that Abhinavagupta underrated traditionally recognised beauties of *guṇa* and *alaṅkāra* are misinterpreting Abhinava. The term *vibhāva* is semantically related to the evoking of *rasa*; yet its occurrence in poetry is only by way of the language medium which is made poetic only by a proper use of *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*. This patterned structure or poetry is called *saṅghaṭanā* or *racanā* or *bandha*; and figurative turns that adorn *vācaka-śabdas* and *vācyārthas* are *alaṅkāras*. That is why the *vibhāvas* etc. are all regarded as *alaukika* or super-normal, in their structure as well as end-value of *rasa*. If the experience (*sarīvedana*) of *rasa* is not immediate, then they cease to be *vibhāvādīs*. That is why *rasādi* is described as *asamlakṣyakrama-vyaṅgya-chvani*.

The same anonymous commentator on the *Locana* gives another long extract from *Abhinavabhāratī* on the *āryā* describing *vīrarasa* in the *Nāṭyaśāstra*, viz.,

utsāhādhyavasāyādaṁviśāditvādvismayaṁmohāt
vividhādarthaviśeṣādvīra-raso nāma sambhavati (VI. 67)

This portion is not traceable in the present printed edition :

tatrāmunākṛtaṁ vyākhyānaṁ :— arthyate ityārthaḥ (karmaṇi ghaṇ) = dharmādi cāturvargaḥ. Karmaṇyutpattyaiiva hi dharmādayaḥ. puruṣārthaḥ ityucyante, puruṣeṇārthanīyatvāt. Artha-viśeṣasya vividhatvaṁ dharmādi-bhedāt. Tadayam arthaḥ : Vividhaṁ = dharmādirūpaṁ artha-mabhisandhāya aṁviśāditvāt avismaya-saṁmohasceti dvandve ekavadbhāvaḥ. Avismayaḍasa-mmohācca hetoryo'dhyavasāyo niścayaḥ sa cotsāhayati iti ōijantāt pacādyajantatvena vyutpattyā utsāhahetuḥ. Etaduktam bhavati. Apadi hṛdayasya nimagnatvaṁ tatparavaśatvaṁ viśāditvaṁ. Svalpe'pi saṁtoso vismayaḥ. Mithyājñānaṁ mohāḥ. Etatrayamapāsya yastattvaniścayarūpō'dhyavasāyaḥ sa utsāhahetuḥ. Evaṁ ca viśāditvāditrayāpāsanapūrvakamudbhūtena adhyavasāyena hetunā ya utsāha utpadyate sa vīra-raso nāma

How Abhinavagūpta clearly integrated the pursuit of recognised life-values of *puruṣārthas* under *vīra-rasa*; and how great literature was thus set in clear relation to life as inculcating right attitudes—covertly though — is self-evident in this extract. There are a number of such extracts untraceable in the present text of the *Abhinavabhāratī* which I might highlight on another occasion. We said that only great literature combined this didactic purpose, because Abhinava clearly states that there are minor literary forms like *bhāna* whose goal is just popular entertainment (*rañjanā-phala*, *Ibid.* p. 67).

Now I should like to conclude that Abhinavagūpta is the foremost thinker who integrates for the first time virtually all the disparate concepts of Indian poetics into a well-organised aesthetic philosophy. This aspect of his contribution has not received sufficient attention in modern studies of his idea of *rasa* in general and of *śāntarasa* in particular. This anonymous commentator's mouthful praise is worth quotation :—

Eṣa hi vyākhyātā Nārāyaṇa ivāparimeya-
śaktiśālī, mūlagranthaṁ kṣīrasāgaramiva
gambhīraṁ nijamatibalena mandareṇeva nirinathya
tatra nigūḍhamarthaviśeṣaṁ pīyūṣarasamiva
sphuṭaṁ prakāśamānatāmāṇīya vibudhai—
rāsvādyamānaṁ vidadhāti.²¹

20. Loc. cit. pp. 95-96.

21. Loc. cit. p. 204.

SANSKRIT TEXT
AND
COMMENTARY

अभिनवगुप्ताचार्यविरचितं

ध्वन्यालोक-लोचनम्

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तु प्रथयति विना कारणकलां

जगद्ग्रावप्रख्यं निजरसभरात्सारयति^१ च ।

ध्वन्यालोकलोचनव्याख्या

कारुण्यस्फुरणं चन्द्रकलापुष्पजटावनम् ।

समग्रमृगशाबाक्ष्याः सर्वस्योपरि वर्तते ॥

को नामात्र परिच्छिन्द्याल्लोचनप्रसराशयम् ।

तदप्येकस्य दिङ्मात्रमभिव्यङ्क्तुमुपक्रमे ॥

अयामी श्रीमदभिनवगुप्ताचार्यपादाः ध्वनिग्रन्थव्याख्यानारम्भे मङ्गलमाचरन्ति ॥

अपूर्वं यद्वस्तुत्यादिना । अत्र द्वितीये वाक्ये तृतीये च यद्वत्तमनुषञ्जनीयं चशब्दस्तृतीये निवेशनीयः ॥

“एको द्योतको बहुषु द्योत्येष्वन्त्ये” इति न्यायात् अन्त्यनिविष्टोऽभ्यमर्थात् पूर्वत्र संबध्यते यथा—

“एकातपत्रं जगतः प्रभुत्वं नवं वयःकान्तमिदं वपुश्च” इति ॥ सरस्वत्यास्तत्कविसहृदयाख्यं तत्त्वं स्वरूपं विजयते; विजयतामिति वा पाठः । सरस्वतीतत्त्वं सर्वोत्कर्षेण वर्तत इति यावत् । जयतिरत्रोत्कर्षवचनः । अत एवाकर्मकत्वम् । स्तौति चाभिहितोत्कर्षोपपादनमुखेन । यत्कारणकलामुपादानादिकारणकणिकामपि विना । अपूर्वं विधातृविहितनियमराहित्येनाभिनवमाश्वचर्यभूतं वा वस्तु प्रथयति, सृष्ट्वा विस्तारयति । ‘कमलग्नम्भसी’त्यादौ खल्वदृष्टपूर्वं कमलादिपदार्थप्रथनम् । अयं प्रकारः कवेः प्रधानतया । सहृदयस्य त्वप्रधानतया । सहृदयोऽपि काव्यं भावयन्पुक्तिबलात् कविनाप्यदृष्टपूर्वानर्थान् प्रथयति” । यदुक्तम्—

विरोधिवचसो मूकान् वागीशानपि कुर्वते ।

जडानप्यनुलोमार्थान् प्रवाचः कृतिनां गिरः ॥

इति । अनेन कारणनियमसत्यपेक्षं जगत् सृजन्तं ब्रह्माणमपेक्ष्य सरस्वतीतत्त्वसृष्टेरुत्कर्षः प्रकाश्यते । यच्च निजरसभरात् निजमनःकुहरप्रदेशभरितरससरस्वद्वीचीसंस्लवाप्लावनेन ग्राह्यप्रख्यं नीरसतया प्रस्तर-प्रस्तारदेशीयं जगत्सारयति सारं करोति, सरसयतीति यावत् ।

‘अङ्गुलीभिरिव केशसञ्चयमि’त्यादौ निशाप्रारम्भादिकं शृंगारानुकूलतया सरसीकृतं भवति । एतदुभयोः समानम् । सहृदयोऽपि काव्यार्थाभिधाने पदार्थान् सरसीकरोति । अनेन च विरसजगद्विधायि-विध्यपेक्षया सरस्वतीतत्त्वस्य जगत्सारस्य विधायिनोऽतिशयः प्रद्योतितः ।

क्रमात्प्रख्योपाख्याप्रसरसुभगं भासयति त-

त्परस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयारण्यं विजयते॥

भट्टेन्दुराजचरणभाजकृताधिवासहृद्यश्रुतोऽभिनवगुप्तपदाभिधोऽहम् ।

यत्किञ्चिदप्यनुरणनस्फुटयामि काव्यालोकं स्वलोचननियोजनया जनस्य ॥

स्वयमव्युच्छिन्न^२ परमेश्वरनमस्कारमम्पत्तिचरितार्थोऽपि^३ व्याख्यातृ^४ श्रोतृणा-
मविघ्नेनाभीष्टव्याख्याश्रवणलक्षणफलसम्पत्तये समुचिताशीः प्रकटनद्वारेण^५
परमेश्वरसामुद्र्यं करंति वृत्तिकारः स्वेच्छेति^६॥ अघुरिपोर्नखा वो^७ युष्मान् व्या-
ख्यातृश्रोतृ^८ त्रयन्ताम् । तेषामेव^९ सम्बोधनयोग्यत्वात् । सम्बोधनसारो हि युष्मदर्थः ।
त्राणं चाभीष्ट^{१०}लाभं प्रति ^{११}साहायकाचरणम्; तच्च तत्प्रतिद्वन्द्वविघ्नापसरणादिना

क्रमादिति = यच्च प्रख्या ज्ञानं कवेः उपाख्या 'शब्दः सहृदयादुपाख्ये'ति तस्य। कवेर्हि अपूर्वार्थदर्शनं
कवित्वम्,

सहृदयस्य चतुरं मधुरं प्रवक्तृत्वं सहृदयत्वम्। अश्वः द्वयोरप्येते। प्रथमं प्रख्या, पश्चादुपाख्येति
तयोः प्रसरेण रुभां हृद्यमास्वाद्यं यथा भवति तथा प्रकाशयति। तदुक्तम्—

स्वभावश्चायः^{१२} र्थानां यत्र साक्षादमी तथा।

स्वदन्ते सत्कविगिरां गता गोचरतां यथा। (व्यक्तिविवेकः, 1.44)

इति। अनेनापि स्वग्रहणवचनस्फुटस्य सौभाग्यविधानाकुशलो ग्रन्थेति प्रकृततत्त्वस्य प्रकर्ष एवोक्तः। तत्र
न केवलं शुभगत्वस्यैव प्रख्योपाख्याप्रसरोऽदेक्षितः। अपि तु प्रथनप्रसारणयोरपीत्यवसेयम्॥

अत्र प्रथमेन वाक्येन यद्वृत्तं स्वलक्षणेनापूर्वनिर्माणं, द्वितीयेन पूर्वं सतः सरसात्वापादनं
तृतीयेनोभयस्यापि हृद्यतया प्रकाशनमुक्तम्॥

अथ चिकीर्षितं प्रतिजानीते— भट्टेन्दुराजेति। अभिनवगुप्तपदाभिधोऽहं जनस्य श्रोतृजनस्य
काव्यालोकं काव्यालोकनामानं ध्वनिलक्षणग्रन्थं स्फुटयामि अभिव्यक्ततया विवृणोमि। यत्किञ्चिद-
नुरणनपि स्तोकं वदन्मपि। स्वलोचननियोजनया स्वबोधसमर्पणेन नेत्रनियोजनया। यथा प्रकाशं
स्फुटयतीत्यादि स्फुरति। भट्टेन्दुराजस्य परमगुरोश्चरणभाजे कृते। योऽधिवासः सुरभीकरणं तेन हृद्यं श्रुतं
यस्य स तथा। “स्वयमव्युच्छिन्नपरमेश्वरेत्यादि—वृत्तिकार” इत्यनेन “स्वेच्छाकेसरी” इति पद्यं न
सूत्रमिति दर्शयति। तथा च वक्ष्यति— आदिमयाक्यमाहेति ।

कथमिव? मधुरिभोः नखा इत्यादि। कथं व इत्यनेन व्याख्यातृश्रोतारः परामृशेरत्रित्यत्र हेतुमाह— तेषां-
शेवेति। तेषां व्याख्यातृश्रोतृणां कथमत्र संबोधनप्रसङ्गः इत्याशङ्क्याह—सम्बोधनसार इति।
संबोधनसारः संबोधनाविनाभूतः। अथ यद्यपि त्राणमापदो विनिर्वर्तनं प्रसिद्धं तथापि प्रस्तावौचित्येन

^१क.ख.ग.(नि) विजयतात्। ^२क.ख.ग.(नि) अविच्छिन्न। ^३क.ग.'अपि' नास्ति। ^४घ. श्रोतृणामपि अवि०। ^५(कौ) द्वारा।

^६(कौ) स्वेच्छेत्यादिना। ^७ग.घ.ङ.(नि) 'व' इति नास्ति। ^८(कौ) श्रोतृव्याख्यातृन्। ^९(कौ) अत्र। ^{१०}(कौ) फललाभं।

^{११}ह.ख.(नि) साहाय्यकाचरणं।

भवतीति इयदत्र त्राणं विवक्षितम्। नित्योद्योगिनश्च भगवतः ¹असंमोहाध्यवसाय²-योगित्वेनोत्साहप्रतीतेर्वीररसो ध्वन्यते। नखानां प्रहरणत्वे, प्रहरणेन च रक्षणे कर्तव्ये नखानामव्यतिरिक्तत्वेन करणत्वात्, सातिशयशक्तिः कर्तृत्वेन सूचिता। ध्वनितश्च परमेश्वरस्य व्यतिरिक्तकरणपेक्षाविरहः। मधुरिपोरित्यनेन तस्य सदैव जगत्त्रासापसारणोद्यम उक्तः। कीदृशस्य मधुरिपोः? स्वेच्छया केसरिणः; न तु कर्मपारतन्त्र्येण, नाप्यन्यदीयेच्छया; अपितु विशिष्टदानवहननोचिततथाविधेच्छा-परिग्रहौचित्यादेव स्वीकृतसिंहरूपस्येत्यर्थः। कीदृशा नखाः? प्रपन्नानामार्तिं ये छिन्दन्ति। नखानां हि छेदकत्वमुचितम्; आर्तेः पुनश्छेद्यत्वं नखान्प्रत्यसंभाषनीयमपि तदीयानां नखानां स्वेछानिर्माणौचित्यात्संभाव्यत एवेति यावत्। अथवा त्रिजगत्पाटको हिरण्य-कशिपुर्विश्वस्य क्लेशकार³ इति स एव दस्तुतः प्रपन्नानां भगवदेकशरणस्थितानां जनानामार्तिकारित्वान्मूर्तेर्वार्तिः; तं दिनाशयाद्भिरार्तिरिवोच्छिन्ना भवतीति परमेश्वरस्य तस्यामप्यवस्थायां परमकारुणिकत्वमुक्तम्। किं च ते नखाः किं ⁴किमुणाः? स्वच्छेन स्वच्छतागुणेन नैर्मल्येन; स्वच्छमृदुप्रभृतयो हि मुख्यतया भाववृत्तय एव; स्वच्छायया च वक्रहृद्यरूपया आकृत्या आयासितः खेदित इन्दुर्यैः। अत्रार्थशक्तिमूलेन ध्वनिना

विवक्षितं त्राणं व्याचष्टे—त्राणं चेति। नित्योद्योगिन इति। असंमोहाध्यवसायादेरुत्साहसंपद्यते। स प्रकृष्टो वीररसः। यदुक्तम्—

वीरः प्रतापविनयाध्यवसायसत्त्वामोहाविषादनयविस्मयविक्रमाद्यैः।

उत्साहमूरिति॥ (दशरूपकम्, IV. 73) ध्वन्यते अभिव्यज्यते। नखानां प्रहरणत्वेनेति। नखाः प्रहरणानि भवन्ति॥

यदाह—अयःकुशीभिः कवयो न शस्त्रिणस्तलाश्च दन्ताश्च नखाश्च सन्ति नः॥ इति।

प्रहरणेन च रक्षणे कर्तव्ये इति। प्रहरणं खलु स्वस्य वा अन्यस्य वा रक्षणं कर्तुमुपादीयते। नखाः प्रहरणं भवति। प्रहरणेन च रक्षा कर्तव्या यतः तत इत्यर्थः।

अव्यतिरिक्तत्वेन अबाह्यत्वेन आभ्यन्तरत्वेनेति यावत्। द्विविधं हि कारणमाभ्यन्तरं बाह्यं च। बाह्यं प्रदीपादि। अन्यच्चक्षुरादि। कर्तृत्वेनेति। नखा इति करणे कर्तृत्वोपचारात्। ध्वनितश्चेति। व्यतिरिक्तकरणं बाह्यकरणं खट्वादिकम्। मधुरिपोरिति। मधुरिपुश्चब्दस्तावत् संज्ञिनं धर्मिणमभिधायति। व्यनक्ति च सदातनं जगत्त्रासापसारणोद्यमम्। विशिष्टेति। अतिवेत्तं जगदुपद्रवकारित्वात् सद्योऽतिदारुणं निहन्तव्यत्वविशिष्टम्।

आर्तेः पुनरित्यादि स्वेछानिर्माणौचित्यात् स्वेच्छया निर्माणे आर्तिच्छेदकशक्तिनिर्माणे योग्यत्वात् सामर्थ्यात्। अथवेत्यादि। तस्यामप्यवस्थायां नखविदारणेन हननावस्थायामपि कारुणिकत्वं आर्तिमेव छिन्दन्ति न तु कश्चित् प्राणिनमिति। किं चेत्यादि भाववृत्तयः धर्मप्रदानाः आक्षेपास्तु द्वयं

बालचन्द्रत्वं ध्वन्यते। आयासनेन तत्सन्निधौ चन्द्रस्य विच्छायात्वप्रतीतिरहृद्यत्वप्रतीतिश्च ध्वन्यते; १ आयासकारित्वं च नखानां सुप्रसिद्धम्; नरहरिनखानां तच्च लोकोत्तरेण रूपेण प्रतिपादितम्। किं च तदीयां स्वच्छतां कुटिलिमानं चावलोक्य बालचन्द्रः स्वात्मनि खेदमनुभवति—तुल्येऽपि स्वच्छकुटिलाकारयोगे भ्रमी प्रपन्नार्तिनिवारणकुशलाः न त्वहम्—इति व्यतिरेकालङ्कारो ध्वनितः २। किं चाहं पूर्वमेक एवासाधारणवैशद्यहृद्याकार-योगात्समस्तजनभिरुपणीयताभाजनमभूवम्, अद्य पुनरेवंविधा नखा दश बालचन्द्राकाराः संतापार्तिच्छेदकुशलाश्चेति तानेव ३ लोको बालेन्दुबहुमानेन पश्यति, न तु मामित्याकल्पन्बालेन्दुरविरतमायासमनुभवतीवेत्युत्प्रेक्षापस्तुतिध्वनिरपि। एवं वत्स्वलंकार-रसभेदेन त्रिधा ध्वनिरत्र श्लोके अस्मद्गुरुभिर्व्याख्यातः ॥

अथ प्राधान्येनाभिधेयस्वरूपमभिदधत्, अप्रधानतया प्रयोजनप्रयोजनम्, I.1 तत्सम्बद्धं ४ प्रयोजनं च सामर्थ्यात् प्रकटयन् आदिवाक्यमाह काव्यस्थात्मेति ॥ काव्यत्वशब्दसंनिधानाद्बुधशब्दोऽत्र काव्यात्मावबोधनिमित्तकः ५ इत्यभिप्रायेण विवृणोति काव्यत्वविधिधिरिति ॥ आत्मशब्दस्य तत्त्वशब्देनार्थं विवृण्वानः सारत्वमपरशब्द-वैलक्षण्यकारित्वं च दर्शयति। इतिशब्दः स्वरूपपरत्वं ध्वनिशब्दस्याचष्टे। तदर्थस्य विवादास्पदोभूततया—निश्चायभावेनार्थत्वायोगात्। एतद्विवृणोति—संज्ञित इति ॥

वर्नन्ते शुक्लदिवत्। बालचन्द्रत्वं नखानामित्यर्थत् प्रकरणाद्वा। आयासकारित्वं चेत्यादि। लोकोत्तरेण रूपेण निर्मलवद्बृहत्कृत्या। तुल्येऽपीत्यादि। नैर्मल्यादिगुणसाधर्म्येऽपि नखानामुपमेयानामुपमानत् बालचन्द्रात् प्रपन्नार्तिच्छित्तमाधिव्यमस्तीति व्यतिरेकालङ्कारः।

१ अहं पूर्वमिति। उत्प्रेक्षापस्तुतिरिति। उत्प्रेक्षाया अपस्तुतिः उत्प्रेक्षार्था वा अपस्तुतिरिति यावत्। बालेन्दुरविरतमायासमनुभवतीवेत्युत्प्रेक्षाया विशिष्टाकलंकरणम्। तच्च तानेव लोको बालेन्दु-बहुमानेन पश्यति न मामित्येवं रूपम्। तत्र हि स्पष्टा अपस्तुतिः।

लोकोद्दृष्ट्या नायं बालेन्दुः, नखा एव बालेन्दव इति प्रतिमाभात्, न नखा एते, किं तर्हि बालेन्दव इति वा प्रतीतिः। सर्वथा सापस्तुतिरुत्प्रेक्षा समुत्पापनीया। अथेत्यादि। ध्वनिस्वरूपं प्रधानतया अभिधेयम्। सहृदयमनःप्रीतिरूपं प्रयोजनप्रयोजनमप्रणयनम्, तत्सम्बद्धं प्रयोजनं प्रयोजनसंबद्धं प्रयोजनम्। मुख्यप्रयोजनम् ध्वनिस्वरूपज्ञानात्मकं, प्रयोजनप्रयोजनस्य प्रयोजनपूर्वकत्वात्। सहृदयमनःप्रीतय इति शब्दत्वात् प्रयोजनप्रयोजनस्याप्रधान्यमुच्यते; आर्थत्वात् प्रयोजनस्याप्राधान्यम् ॥

वस्तुतस्तु ध्वनिस्वरूपकथनस्य ध्वनिस्वरूपपरिज्ञानं मुख्यं प्रयोजनम्। तस्य प्रदीपजनं मनः-ममाह्लादः ॥ अथ संग्रहविदरणयोरुभयोरपि यथायां गं युगादेव व्याख्यानं चिकीर्षन्नाह—काव्यशब्दसंनिधानादित्यादिना।

अत्र शब्दवैलक्षण्यकारित्वं जीवितानि शब्दभेदकारित्वं, जीवितानि शब्दादात्मशब्द एवास्य वाचक

वस्तुतस्तु न तत्संज्ञामात्रेणोक्तम्। अपि त्वस्त्येव ध्वनिशब्दवाच्यं प्रत्युत समस्तसारभूतम्। न ह्यन्यथा बुधास्तादृशमामनेयुरित्यभिप्रायेण विवृणोति— तस्य सहृदयेत्यादिना॥ एवं तु युक्ततरम्— इतिशब्दो भिन्नक्रमो वाक्यार्थपरामर्शकः; ध्वनिलक्षणोऽर्थः काव्यस्यात्मेति यः सामानात् इति। शब्दपदार्थकत्वे हि ध्वनिसंज्ञितोऽर्थ इति का सङ्गतिः? एवं हि ध्वनिशब्दः काव्यस्यात्मेत्युक्तं भवेत्, 'गवित्ययमाह' इति यथा। न च विप्रतिपत्तिस्थानमसदेव, प्रत्युत सत्येव धर्मिणि धर्ममात्रकृता विप्रतिपत्तिः— इत्यलम्¹ अप्रस्तुतेन भूयसा सहृदयजनोद्वेजेन। बुधस्यैकस्य प्रामादिकमपि तथाभिधानं स्यात्, न तु भूयसां तद्युक्तम्। तेन बुधैरिति बहुवचनम्।² तदेव व्याचष्टे—परम्परयेति॥ अविच्छिन्नेन प्रवाहेण तैरेतदुक्तम्, विनापि विशिष्टपुस्तक³ निवेशनादित्यभिप्रायः। न च बुधा भूयांसोऽनादरेणीयं वस्त्वादरेणोपदिश्युः। एतच्चादरेणोपदिष्टम्। तदाह— सम्यगाम्नात्पूर्व इति॥ पूर्वग्रहणेनेदं प्रथमता नात्र सम्भाव्यत इत्याह। व्याचष्टे च सम्यक् आ समन्ताद्गमात्⁴ प्रकटित इत्यनेन॥ तस्मेति॥ यस्याधिगमाय प्रत्युत यतनीयं का⁵ तत्राभावसम्भावना? अतः किं कुर्मः? अपारं मौर्ख्यमभाववादिनामिति भावः। न चास्माभिरभाववादिनां विकल्पाः श्रुताः; किं तु सम्भाव्य दूष्यन्ते; अतः परोक्षत्वम्। न च भविष्यद्भूतं दूषयितुं युक्तम्⁶। अनुपपन्नत्वादेव। तदपि बुद्ध्यारोपितं दूषयिष्यत्⁷ इति चेत्, बुद्ध्यारोपितत्वादेव भविष्यत्त्वहानिः। अतो भूतकालोन्मेष⁸ त्वारोक्ष्याद्विशिष्टाद्यतनत्वप्रतिभानाच्च लिट्⁹ प्रयोगः कृतः—जगदुरिति॥ तद्व्याख्यानायैव सम्भाव्यदूषणं प्रकटयिष्यति। सम्भावनापि

उत्कृष्टतया युक्त इति। इति शब्द इत्यादि यथा दिलीप इतीत्यत्र। एवं तु युक्ततरमिति। एवं ध्वनिशब्दस्यार्थपरत्वं स्वस्वरूपपरत्वाद्युक्ततरमित्यर्थः॥ एतदेव स्फुटयति—इतिशब्दो। भिन्नक्रम इत्यादिना। एवं पुनरत्र इतिशब्दस्य स्वरूपपरत्वाभिसन्धिना ध्वनिसंज्ञित इति विवरणं कृतमिति परिकल्पनं न युक्तमित्याह— शब्दपदार्थकत्वे हीत्यादि॥ तेन बुधैरिति बहुवचनमिति सूत्रगतबुधशब्दार्थनिरूपणं तत्स्थिरीकरणार्थम्। तदेव व्याचष्टे परम्परयेति विवरणप्रदर्शनम्। एतच्चादरेणोपदिष्टमित्यत्र संवादतया सम्यगाम्नात्पूर्व इति संग्रहग्रहणम्। तत्र दर्शितपूर्वग्रहणाभिप्रायप्रसाधनार्थं विवरणं प्रदर्शयति— व्याचष्टे चेत्यादिना—

तत्रैव तस्य सम्यगाम्नातः प्रकटित इति व्याख्यानं कृतम्। संभाव्य दूष्यन्त इति। एवं बभूवुरिति संभाव्य दूष्यन्ते। यदप्युक्तमित्यादिना अनुभाष्य तदप्ययुक्तमित्यादियुक्तिबलेन खण्डयन्ते, अतः परोक्षतेति। अतः संभावनया बुद्ध्यारोपितत्वादेव भविष्यत्त्वहानिरिति। बुद्ध्यारोपितमिति खलु ब्रूषे, न तु बुद्ध्यारोपयिष्यमाणमिति आरोप्यमाणमिति वा, अतो निष्ठाप्रत्ययवशात् भूतत्वमेवेत्यर्थः।

विशिष्टाद्यतनत्वं बहिः सत्ताविशिष्टाद्यतनत्वम्। तद्व्याख्यानायैव संभाव्य दूषणं

¹(कौ) अतिविस्तरेण. ²क.ख. एतदेव. ³क.ख. (का) पुस्तकेषु विनिवेश. ⁴क.ख. समाख्यातः सम्यगासमन्तात् ख्यातः. ⁵क.ख. तत्रासम्भावना. ⁶क.ख.ग. शक्यम्. ⁷क.ख. दूष्यते. ⁸क.ख.ग. परोक्ष. ⁹क.ख.ग. लिटा प्रयोगः.

नेयमसम्भावतो युक्ता, अपि तु सम्भवत एव। अन्यथा सम्भावनानामपर्यवसानं स्यात्, 'तद्वृषणां च। अतः सम्भावनाभि²धायिष्यगाणां समर्थयितुं पूर्वं³ सम्भवन्ती-
त्याह। सम्भाव्यन्त इति तूच्यमानं पुनरुक्तार्थमेव स्यात्। न च सम्भवस्यासम्भावना⁴,
अपि तु सा वर्तमानतैव स्फुटेति वर्तमानेनैव निर्देशः। 'ननु सम्भवद्वस्तुमूलया सम्भावनया
यत्सम्भावितं तद्वृषयितुमशक्यमित्याशङ्क्याह--विकल्पा इति॥ न तु वस्तु सम्भवति
तादृक् यत् इयं सम्भावना। अपितु विकल्पा एव। ते च तत्त्वावबोधवन्ध्यतया स्फुरंयुरपि।
अत एव 'आवक्षीरन्' इत्यादयोऽत्र सम्भावनाविषया लिङ्प्रयोगा अतीतपरमार्थत्व एव
पर्यवस्यन्ति। यथा--

‘यदि नामास्य कायस्य यदन्तस्तद्विभवेत् ।

दण्डमादाय लोकोऽयं शुनः काकांश्च वारयेत् ॥’

इत्यत्रार्थाद्यधेवं कायस्य दुष्टता स्यात्तदैवमवलोक्येतैवेति भूतप्राणतैव। यदि नस्यात्ततः
किं स्यादित्यत्रापि किं वृत्तम्, यदि पूर्ववत्र भवनस्य सम्भावनेत्ययमेवार्थः; इत्यलम-
प्रकृतेन बहुना॥

तत्र समयापेक्षणेन शब्दोऽर्थप्रतिपादक इति कृत्वा वाच्यव्यतिरिक्तं नास्ति
व्यङ्ग्यम्। सदपि वा तदभिधावृत्त्याक्षिप्तं⁸ शब्दावगतार्थबलाकृष्टत्वाद्भाक्तम्।
तदनाक्षिप्तमपि दा न यत्तुं शक्यम्। कुमारीष्विव भर्तुसुखमतद्वित्तु इति त्रय एवेति
प्रकटयिष्यतीति। तद्व्याख्यानायैव जगदुरिति सूत्रपदव्याख्यानायैव दूषणम्। तत्र केचिदावक्षीरन्मित्यदि
परमतं प्रकटयिष्यतीति। वृत्तिकृदिति शेषः। अतः संभावनामित्यादि। आवक्षीरन् ब्रूयुः, कथयेयुरिति
संभावनैवाभिधास्यते।

समर्थयितुमिति। यत्संभवति तत्संभाव्यत इति व्याख्या समर्थनम्। संभाव्यन्त इति
तूच्यमानमिति। संभावनासंभाव्यन्त इति हि पुनरुक्तम्। न च संभवस्यासंभावेति। केन
संभवस्यासंभावना। नेत्येवेत्यर्थः। अपि त्वित्यादि। वर्तमानतैवापीत्यर्थः। ननु संभवदित्यादि। संभावितं
संभवद्वस्तुचेत्यर्थः। विकल्पाः वस्तुशून्यः प्रत्ययाः न तु भेदाः। न तु दस्त्वित्यादिना विकल्पशब्दार्थ
विवृणोति। “शब्दानुपाती वस्तुशून्यः प्रत्ययो विकल्पः” एतदुक्तं भवति--अत्र विकल्पा एव संभाव्यन्ते, न
ग्रहणं स्मरणं वा। एते वस्तुमर्थिनी भवतः। विकल्पास्तु वस्तुरहिता एव स्युः। तेषां संभावनायां कथं
तद्विषयो वस्तु संभवतीति। तर्हि कथं संभावनायासंभवद्वस्तुमूलत्वमुक्तमिति चेत्, विकल्पाः स्वयं
संभवतीति कृत्वोक्तम्। तेषां विषयभूतं वस्तु नास्तीत्येवोच्यते॥ यदि नामेत्यादि।

अथ सामान्येनाभाववादस्य भावतवादस्यानिर्वचनीयवादस्य च स्वरूपं प्रकाशयति--तत्र
समयापेक्षणेने यादिना॥

¹क.ख.ग. 'तत्' नास्ति. ²क.ख.ग.(नि) सम्भावनानामभिधायिष्यगाणानाम्. ³ग.घ.(नि) सम्भवति. ⁴(नि) सम्भवत्य,
घ.च. सम्भवस्यासंभावना. ⁵क.ख.(नि) नन्वसम्भवः. ⁶(नि) काव्यस्य. ⁷क.ख.(नि) यदि न पूर्वं भवनस्य.
⁸अभिधाक्षिप्तम्.

प्रधानविप्रतिपत्तिप्रकारः। तत्राभावविकल्पस्य त्रयः प्रकाराः। शब्दार्थगुणालङ्काराणामेव शब्दार्थशोभाकारित्वाल्लोकशास्त्रातिरिक्तसुन्दरशब्दार्थमयस्य काव्यस्य न शोभाहेतुः कश्चिदन्योऽस्ति योऽस्माभिर्न गणित इत्येकः प्रकारः। यो वा न^१ गणितः स शोभाकार्येव न^१ भवतीति द्वितीयः प्रकारः। अथ शोभाकारी भवति तर्हि अस्मदुक्त एव गुणे वा अलङ्कारे वा अन्तर्भवति; नामान्तरकरणे तु किर्याददं पाण्डित्यम्; अथापि गुणेष्वलङ्कारेषु वा^२ नान्तर्भावः, किञ्चिद्विशेषलेशमाश्रित्य नामान्तरकरणम्, उपमा-विच्छित्तिप्रकाराणामसंख्यत्वात्; तथापि गुणालंकारव्यतिरिक्तत्वाभाव एव; तावन्मात्रेण च किं कृतम्^३, अन्यस्यापि वैचित्र्यस्य शक्योत्प्रेक्षत्वात्। चिरन्तनैर्हि भरत-मुनिप्रभृतिभिर्ममकोपमे शब्दार्थालंकारत्वेनेष्टे तत्प्रपञ्चदिव्यप्रदर्शनं त्वन्यैरलंकारकारैः कृतम्; तत्र यथा 'कर्मण्यण्' इत्यत्र कुम्भकाराद्युदाहरणं श्रुत्वा स्वयं नगरकारादिशब्दा उत्प्रेक्ष्यन्ते; तावता क आत्मनि बहुमानः? एवं प्रकृतेऽपीति तृतीयः प्रकारः। एवमेकस्त्रिधा विकल्पः अन्यौ च द्वौ इति पञ्च विकल्पा इति तात्पर्यार्थः। तानेव क्रमेणाह—**शब्दार्थशरीरं तावदित्यादिना॥** तावद्ग्रहणे कस्याप्यत्र न विप्रतिपत्तिरिति दर्शयति॥ तत्र शब्दार्थौ^४ तावन्न ध्वनिः। संज्ञामात्रे हि को गुणः। अथ शब्दार्थयोर्यत्^५श्चारुत्वं स ध्वनिः, तथापि द्विविधं चारुत्वम्—स्वरूपमात्रकृतं चारुत्वं शब्दालंकारेभ्यः, संघटनाश्रितं तु शब्दगुणेभ्यः, एवमर्थानां चारुत्वं स्वरूपमात्रनिष्ठमुपमादिभ्यः संघटनापर्यवसितं त्वर्थगुणेभ्य इति न गुणालंकारव्यतिरिक्तो ध्वनिः कश्चित्। **संघटनाधर्मा इति।** शब्दार्थयोरिति शेषः। यद्गुणालंकारव्यतिरिक्तं तच्चारुत्वकारि न भवति, नित्यानित्यदोषा असाधुदुःश्रवादादय इव। चारुत्वहेतुश्च ध्वनिः। तत्र तद्व्यतिरिक्त इति व्यतिरेकी हेतुः। ननु वृत्तयो रीतयश्च यथा गुणालंकारव्यतिरिक्ताश्चारुत्वहेतवश्च तथा ध्वनिरपि तद्व्यतिरिक्तश्च चारुत्वहेतुश्च भविष्यतीत्यसिद्धौ व्यतिरेक इत्यनेनाभिप्रायेणाह— **तदनतिरिक्तवृत्तय**

अथाभावविकल्पस्य त्रिप्रकारत्वं तत्तात्पर्यं च पर्यालोचयति— **तत्राभावविकल्पस्येत्यादिना॥**

अथवा ध्वनिनादिनोऽपि नात्र विमतिरित्याशयेनेदमुच्यते इत्यभिप्रायेण प्रतीकमुपादत्ते— **शब्दार्थशरीरं तावदित्यादिनेति॥**

इह विधेयमेव वक्तव्यं न व्यावर्त्य, अनाशङ्कनीयत्वादित्याशयेनेदं पदमुक्तमित्यभिसन्धिनाह— **तत्रेति—** शब्दगुणा माधुर्यादयः अर्थगुणाश्च त एवोभयेऽपि नामनोक्ता अत्र गृह्यन्ते। अभिहितेऽर्थे सौगतनीत्या व्यतिरेक्यनुमानमाह— **यद्गुणालङ्कारेत्यादि।** अथ विवरणवाराभिप्रायेणोक्तानुमानस्या-

^१ 'यो वा न गणितः' इत्यञ्जानुसारीपाठः. ^२ (नि) वान्तर्भावः. ^३ क.ख.ङ. (नि) कृत्यम्. ^४ क.ख.ग.ङ.च. (नि) शब्दार्थौ.

^५ क.ग.घ. (नि) 'यत्' नास्ति.

इति॥ नैव वृत्तिरीतिनां तद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वमसिद्धम्। तथा हि— अनुप्रासानामेव दीप्तमसृणमध्यमवर्णनीयोपयोगिताया परुषत्वललितत्वमध्यमत्वस्वरूपविवेचनाय वर्ग-त्रयसम्पादनार्थं तिस्रोऽनुप्रासजातयो वृत्तय इत्युक्ताः, 'वर्तन्ते अनुप्रासभेदा आसु' इति। यदाह— "सरूपव्यञ्जनन्यासं तिभृष्वेतासु वृत्तिषु। पृथक् पृथगनुप्रासमुशन्ति कवयस्तथा॥" इति। पृथक् पृथगिति। परुषानुप्रासा^१ नागरिका; मसृणा^२नुप्रासा उपनागरिका, ललित-नागरिकया विदध्या उपमितेति कृत्वा; मध्यमं अकोमलम् अपरुषमित्यर्थः। अत एव वैदग्ध्यविहीनस्वभावसुकुमारापरुषग्राम्यवनितासादृश्यादियं वृत्तिर्ग्राम्येति। तत्र तृतीयः कोमलानुप्रासः—इति वृत्तयोऽनुप्रासजातय एव। न चेह वैशेषिकवद्वृत्तिर्विवक्षिता, येन जातौ जातिमतो धर्तृगं न स्यात्; तदनुग्रह एव हि तत्र धर्तमानत्वम्। यदा^३ ह कश्चित्—
"लोकोत्तरं हि गाम्भीर्यं वर्तन्ते पृथिवीभुजः"

इति। तस्माद्वृत्तयोऽनुप्रासेभ्यो^४ व्यतिरिक्तवृत्तयः नाभ्यधिकव्यापाराः। अत एव व्यापारभेदाभावात् पृथगनुमेय^५स्वरूपा अपीति वृत्तिशब्दस्य व्यापारवाचिनोऽभिप्रायः।

सिद्धत्वमाशङ्क्य परिहर्तुमाह— नैवेत्यादितद्व्यतिरिक्तत्वमसिद्धमिति गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरिक्तत्वं, गुणा माधुर्यादयः, अलङ्कारा अनुप्रासादयः इत्युक्तम्। प्रतिज्ञातमुपपादयति— तथा हीत्यादिना। अनुप्रासानामेव दीप्तमसृणमध्यमवर्णनीयोपयोगिताया परुषत्वललितमध्यमभेदेन त्रयोऽनुप्रासाः। तत्र दीप्तैर्वर्णैराशः परुषानुप्रासः, मसृणैर्ललितः, मध्यमैर्मध्यमः, इत्यस्ति प्रदर्शनीयो नियमः। तादृश-नियमार्थतया तेषां स्वरूपविभागप्रदर्शनाय यद्वर्त्मत्रयसंपादनं धर्तृत्रयसंपादनं वा। पाठभेदेन, तदर्थगनुप्रासजातयः अनुप्रासभेदाः वृत्तित्वेनोक्ता इत्यर्थः॥ सरूपेत्यादि॥

सरूपभूतो व्यञ्जनन्यासो यत्र तं एतासु नागरिकोपनागरिकाग्राम्यासु। परुषानुप्रासे नागरिका वृत्तिः। मसृणानुप्रासे उपनागरिका। मध्यमानुप्रासे ग्राम्या। तत्र प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमाह— नागरिकयेति, मध्यमकोमलमपरुषमिति। ये दीप्ताश्च मसृणाश्च न भवन्ति तैरादयो मध्यमानुप्रास इत्यर्थः। निगमयति— वृत्तयोऽनुप्रासजातय एवेति॥ ननु अनुप्रासजातय एव वृत्तयः। तास्वनुप्रासा वर्तन्ते। तज्जातौ जातिमद्वर्तत इति स्यात्। नैतद्युक्तं वैपरीत्यस्योपपत्तेः। एतदेवोपपदार्थविदामभिमतमित्यत्राह— न चेहेत्यादि।

वैशेषिकैस्तावज्जातिमति जातेवृत्तिरुच्यते। सा तु नात्र दिवक्षिता। तदा खलु वृत्तिषु अनुप्रासानां वृत्तिर्न जायतीतीति। किं तर्हि अनुग्रहरूपेण विवक्षितेत्यर्थः। वृत्तिरनुग्राहिका। तस्माद्वृत्तय इत्यादि। वृत्तिनां न पृथग्व्यापारः स्वयमेव वृत्तयो व्यापारा इत्यर्थः।

१ग.(नि) परुषानुप्रासः. २ग.(नि) मसृणानुप्रासः. ३क.ख.ग.घ.(नि) गथाह. ४क.ख.घ.ङ.(क) अनुप्रासादियः. ५(कौ)म. अभिप्रेयः.

अनतिरिक्तत्वादेव वृत्तिव्यवहारो भामहादिभिर्न कृतः। उद्भटादिभिः प्रयुक्तेऽपि तस्मिन्नार्थः कश्चिदधिको हृदयपथमवतीर्ण इत्यभिप्रायेणाह— गताः श्रवणगोचरमिति। रीतयश्चेति। तदनतिरिक्तवृत्तयोऽपि गताः श्रवणगोचरमिति सम्बन्धः। तच्छब्देनात्र माधुर्यादयो गुणाः। तेषां च ¹समुचितवृत्त्यर्पणे यदन्योन्यमेलनक्षमत्वेन पानक इव गुडमरिचादिरसानां संग्रातरूपतागमनं दीप्तललितमध्यमवर्णनीयविषयं गौडवैदर्भ-पाञ्चालदेशहेवाकप्राचुर्यदृशा तदेव त्रिविधं रीतिरित्युक्तम्। जातिर्जातिमतो नान्या समुदायश्च समुदायिनो नान्य इति वृत्तिरोतयो न गुणालंकारव्यतिरेक्ता इति स्थित एवासौ व्यतिरेकी हेतुः। तदाह— कोऽयं ध्वनिरिति॥ नैष चारुत्वस्थानम्, शब्दार्थरूपत्वाभावात् ; नापि चारुत्वहेतुः, गुणालंकारव्यतिरिक्तत्वात्। तेनाखण्डबुद्धिसमास्वाद्यमपि काव्यमपोद्धारबुद्ध्या यदि विभज्यते तथाप्यत्र ध्वनिशब्दवाच्यो न कश्चिदतिरिक्तोऽर्थो लभ्यत इति नामशब्देनाह॥

ननु मा भूदसौ शब्दार्थस्वभावः, मा च भूतच्चारुत्वहेतुः; तेन गुणालंकारव्यति-रिक्तोऽसौ स्यादित्याशङ्क्य द्वितीयमभाववादप्रकारमाह—अन्य इति॥ भवत्वेवम्, तथापि नास्त्येव ध्वनिर्यादृशस्तव लिलक्षयि²षितः। काव्यस्य ह्यसौ कश्चिद्वक्तव्यः; न चासौ गीतनृत्तवाद्यादिस्थानीयः काव्यस्य कश्चित्। कवनीयं काव्यम्, तस्य भावः काव्यत्वम्। न च नृत्तगीतादि कवनीयमित्युच्यते॥ प्रसिद्धेति॥ प्रसिद्धं प्रस्थानं शब्दार्थौ तद्गुणालङ्काराश्चेति। प्रतिष्ठन्ते परम्परया वि³हरन्ति येन मार्गेण तत्प्रस्थानम्।

उक्तार्थे प्रमाणं दर्शयति। अनतिरिक्तत्वादेवेत्यादि। ता अपि गताः श्रवणगोचरमिति। अनुप्रासव्यतिरिक्तत्वेन हृदयपथमवतीर्णा इत्याशयः॥ वैदर्भी गौडीया पाञ्चालीति रीतयोऽपि माधुर्या-दिगुणाविनाभावादनुप्रासव्यतिरिक्ता एवेत्याह— रीतयश्च वैदर्भीप्रभृतय इति॥ तत्रानुषङ्गाद्वाक्यपूरणं प्रकाशयति—तदनतिरिक्तवृत्तयो गताः श्रवणगोचरमिति संबन्धः इति। तत्रानुषङ्गसिद्धस्य तच्छब्दस्य परामृश्य भेदं दर्शयति। तच्छब्देनात्र माधुर्यादयो गुणा इति। माधुर्यादीनां रीत्यात्मकत्वं प्रकटयति— तेषां चेत्यादि। वर्णनीयशब्देन वर्ण उच्यते। पानक इवेति। गुडमरिचशुण्ठ्यादिकृतो दाहतृष्णानिवारकः पेयविशेषः पानकम्। वैदर्भ्यादिशब्दानां प्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमाह गौडवैदर्भ्यादि— हेवाकः स्वाच्छन्दम्, वृत्तेरलङ्कारस्य चानुप्रासरूपस्य जातिजातिमद्भावः। रीतिगुणयो समुदायसमुदायिभावः। एवं प्रकृतं व्यतिरेकिणं स्थापयति— स्थित एवेत्यादि।

ध्वनिर्नामेत्यत्र नामशब्देन सूचितमर्थं विवृणोति— नैष चारुत्वस्थानमित्यादि। अयं द्वितीयस्या-भाववादप्रकारस्योत्थापनं करोति— ननु मा भूदित्यादिना। भवत्वेवमिति। एवं गुणालङ्कार-व्यतिरिक्तस्वभाव इत्यर्थः। न चासावित्यादि। अकवनीयत्वात् नृत्तादिसदृशो भवन्नसौ ध्वनिरूपः प्रकारो न काव्यस्य युक्त इत्यर्थः॥ तत्र हेतुमाह—कवनीयमित्यादीति। प्रसिद्धेत्यादीति॥ प्रसिद्धप्रस्थान-व्यतिरेकिण इत्यस्य पदस्य प्रसिद्धशब्दार्थतद्गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरेकिण इत्यर्थ इति भावः। मार्गस्य

काव्यप्रकारस्येति॥ काव्यप्रकारत्वेन हि तव स मार्गाभिप्रेतः, 'काव्यस्यात्मा' इत्युक्तत्वात्। ननु कस्मात्तत्काव्यं न भवतीत्याह—सहृदयेति॥ मार्गस्येति॥ नृत-गीताक्षिनिकोचादिप्रायस्येत्यर्थः। तर्दिति॥ सहृदयेत्यादिकाव्यलक्षणमित्यर्थः। ननु ये तादृशमपूर्वं काव्यरूपतया जानन्ति त एव सहृदयाः। तदभिमतत्वं च नाम काव्य-लक्षणमुक्तप्रस्थानान्तरेकिण एव भविष्यतीत्याशङ्क्याह— न चेति॥ यथा हि खड्गलक्षणं करोमीत्युक्त्वा आतानवितानात्मा प्राप्त्रियमाणस्वरूपः सकलदेहाच्छादकः सुकुमार-श्चित्रतन्तुदिरवितः संवर्तनविदर्तनसहिष्णुरच्छेदकः सुच्छेद उत्कृष्टः खड्ग इति ब्रुवाणः, परैः पटः खल्वेवंविधो भवति न खड्ग इत्युक्ततया पर्यनुयुज्यमान एवं ब्रूयात्— ईदृश एव खड्गो ममाभिमत इति, तादृगेवैतत्। प्रसिद्धं हि लक्ष्यं भवति न कल्पितमिति भावः। तदाह—सकलविद्धिति॥ विद्वांसोऽपि तत्समयज्ञा एव भविष्यन्तीति आशङ्कां सकलशब्देन निराकरोति। एवं हि कृतेऽपि न किञ्चित्कृतं स्यात्; तस्मादुन्मत्तता परं प्रकटितेति भावः॥

यस्त्वत्राभिप्रायं व्याचष्टे—जीवितभूतो ध्वनिस्तावत्तवाभिमतः; जीवितं च नाम प्रसिद्धप्रस्थानातिरिक्तम्, अलंकारकारैरनुक्तत्वात्; तच्च न काव्यमिति लोके प्रसिद्ध-मिति—तस्येदं सर्वं स्ववचनविरुद्धम्। यदि हि तत्काव्यस्यानुप्राणकं तेनाङ्गीकृतं पूर्वपक्षवादिनः तच्चिरन्तनैरनुक्तमिति प्रत्युत लक्षणार्हमेव भवति। तस्मात्प्राक्तन एवा-त्राभिप्रायः॥

ननु भवत्वसौ चारुत्वहेतुः शब्दार्थगुणालंकारान्तर्भूतश्च, तथापि ध्वनिरित्यमुया भाषया जीवितमित्यसौ न केनचिदुक्त इत्यभिप्रायमाशङ्क्य तृतीयमभाववादप्रकारमुपन्य-स्यति— पुनरप इति॥ कामनीयकमिति कमनीयस्य कर्म, चारुत्वशी^१हेतुतेति यावत्। ननु विच्छिन्तीनामसंख्येयत्वात् काचित्तादृशी विच्छित्तिस्माभिर्दृष्टा या नानुप्रासादौ नापि

तत्संभवतीत्यत्र तच्छब्देन समनन्तरोक्तं काव्यलक्षणं परामृश्यतः इति दर्शयति— तदित्यादिना। तत्समयान्तःपातिनः ध्वनिदर्शनान्तःपातिन इत्यादिकं व्याख्यातुमाह— ननु ये तादृशमपूर्वीभित्यादि। खड्गलक्षणं करोमि। खड्गलक्षणमुपदिशामि। अत्र ततान्तरमुपन्यस्य दूषयति— यस्त्वत्राभिप्रायमित्यादि। तच्चिरन्तनैरित्यादि। ध्वनिर्न लक्षणार्ह इति खल्वभाववादिनोऽभिप्रायः॥ त तु विपरीतः कृतः लक्षणार्हः इत्यभिप्रायापादनात्। जीवितभूतं सच्चिरन्तनैर्नोक्तं, तस्मादवश्यं वक्तव्यं तदित्युक्तेरिति। अयं तृतीयाभाववादोपन्यासस्य पीठिकां रचयति। ननु भवत्वसाधित्यादिना॥

'चारुत्वहेतुर्हि' इत्युक्तेश्चारुत्वहेतुरेव कमनीयशब्देनाभिप्रेत इत्याह— चारुत्वशीहेतुतेति।

माधुर्यादावुक्तलक्षणेऽन्तर्भवेदित्याशङ्क्याभ्युपगमपूर्वकं परिहरति—**वाग्विकल्पा-
नामिति॥** वक्तीति वाक् शब्दः, उच्यत इति वागर्थः; उच्यतेऽनयेति वागभिधाव्यापारः;
तत्र शब्दार्थवैचित्र्यप्रकारोऽनन्तः; अभिधावैचित्र्यप्रकारोऽप्यसंख्येयः॥ **प्रकारलेश इति॥**
स हि चारुत्वहेतुर्गुणो वालङ्कारो वा। स च सामान्यलक्षणेन संगृहीत एव। यदाह—
'काव्यशोभायाः कर्तारो धर्मा गुणाः, तदतिशयहेतवस्त्वलङ्काराः' इति। तथा
“वक्राभिधेयशब्दोक्तिरिष्टा वाचामलङ्कृतिः” इति। ध्वनिध्वनिरिति वीप्सया¹ संप्रभं
सूचयन्न²नादरं दर्शयति॥ **नृत्यत इति॥** तल्लक्षणकृद्भिस्त³द्युक्तकाव्यविधातृभिस्तच्छू-
वणोद्भूतचमत्कारैश्च तत्प्रतिपत्तृभिरिति शेषः। ध्वनिशब्दे कोऽस्यादर इति भावः॥
एषा दशेति॥ स्वयं दर्पः परैश्च स्तूयमानतेत्यर्थः। वाग्विकल्पा वाक्प्रवृत्तिहेतु-
प्रतिभाव्यापारप्रकारा इति वा। तस्मात्प्रवादमात्रमिति सर्वेषामभाववादिनां साधारण
उपसंहारः। यतः शोभाहेतुत्वे गुणालङ्कारेभ्यो न व्यतिरिक्तः, यतश्च व्यतिरिक्तत्वे न
शोभाहेतुः, यतश्च शोभाहेतुत्वेऽपि नादरास्पदं तस्मादित्यर्थः। न चेषामभावसंभावना
निर्मूलैव दूषितेत्याह—**तथा चान्येनेति॥** ग्रन्थकृत्समानकालभाविनैव मनोरथनाम्ना
ऋविना। यतो न सालङ्कृति अतो न मनःप्रह्लादि। अनेनार्थालङ्काराणामभाव उक्तः।
व्युत्पन्नै रचितं च यत्र वचनैरिति शब्दालङ्काराणाम्। वक्रोक्तिरुत्कृष्टा संघटना,
तच्छून्यमिति शब्दार्थगुणानाम्। वक्रोक्तिशून्यशब्देन सामान्यलक्षणभावेन सर्वालङ्काराभाव
उक्त इति केचित्। तैः पुनरुक्तं न परिहृतमेवेत्यलम्॥ **प्रीत्येति॥** गतानुगतिकानुरागेणेत्यर्थः
॥सुमितनेति॥ जडेन तु पृष्ठो भूभङ्गकटाक्षैरेवोत्तरं ददत्तत्स्वरूपं काममाचक्षीतेति भावः॥
⁶ एते चाभावविकल्पाः शृङ्खलाक्रमेणागताः, न त्वन्योन्यमसंबद्धा एव। तथा हि
तृतीयाभावप्रकारनिरूपणोपक्रमे पुनःशब्दस्यायमेवाभिप्रायः, उपसंहारैक्यं च रुङ्गच्छते।

‘वाक्’शब्देन शब्दश्चार्थश्चाभिधा च कथ्यत इति प्रदर्शयितुं निरुक्तिमाह। गुणानामलङ्काराणां च
चारुत्वहेतुत्वं सामान्येनोक्तमित्यत्र संवादमाह— ‘काव्यशोभायाः’ इत्यादि। वक्राभिधेयशब्दोक्तिरिति
वक्रोक्तिरित्यर्थः॥ **मुकुलितलोचनैरित्यस्य** विशेष्यं सामर्थ्यसिद्धमिति दर्शयति— **तल्लक्षणकृद्भिरित्यादि॥**
एषा दशेत्यस्य विकल्पेनार्थान्तरमाह—**वाग्विकल्पा** इत्यादि। उपसंहारासाधारण्यं स्पष्टयति— **यतः
शोभाहेतुत्वे** इत्यादि। **समानकालभाविना**— समानकालभवेन। **यस्मिन्स्तीत्यादि।**

अत्र वक्रोक्तिशब्देन शब्दार्थगुणालङ्काराणां त्रयाणामप्यवरोधे पौनरुक्त्यमिति पक्षान्तरो-
पन्यासपुरःसरमाह— **वक्रोक्तिशून्यशब्देनेत्यादि॥** एषां अभावविकल्पानां यः परस्परं संबन्ध उद्घाटितः।
तत्र प्रमाणमाह— **तथाहि तृतीयेत्यादि॥**

¹क.ख.ग.(नि) वीप्सायाम्. ²क.ख.ग.ङ.घ.(नि) (का) आदरम्. ³अतद्युक्त. ⁴(का) विषयिभिः। अतच्छ्रवण—इति
कौमुद्यनुसारी पाठः. ⁵ग. शब्दालङ्कारो. ⁶क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.घ.(नि) (का) एवमेते.

अभावाद्वादस्य संभावनाप्राणत्वेन भूतत्वमुक्तम्। भाक्तवादस्त्वविच्छिन्नः पुस्तकेष्वित्यभि-
प्रायेण, भाक्तमाहुरिति नित्यप्रवृत्तवर्तमानापेक्षयाभिधानम्। भज्यते सेव्यते पदार्थेन
प्रसिद्धतयोत्प्रेक्ष्यत इति भक्तिर्धर्मः, अभिधेयेन सामीप्यादिः; तत आगतो भाक्तः
लाक्षणिकोर्थः। गदाह—

“अभिधेयेन सामीप्यात्सारूप्यात्समवायतः।

वैरीत्यात्क्रियायोगाल्लक्षणा पञ्चधा मता॥”

इति। गुणसमुदायवृत्तेश्च शब्दस्यार्थभागस्तैक्ष्ण्यादेर्भक्तिः; तत आगतो गौणोऽर्थो
भाक्तः। भक्तिः प्रतिपाद्ये सामीप्यतैक्ष्ण्यादौ श्रद्धातिशयः; तां प्रयोजनत्वेनोद्दिश्य तत
आगतो भाक्त इति गौणो लाक्षणिकश्च; मुख्यस्य चार्थस्य भङ्गो भक्तिः — इति; एवं
मुख्यार्थबाधा निमित्तं प्रयोजनमिति त्रयसद्भाव उपचारवीजमित्युक्तं भवति॥ काव्यात्मानं
गुणवृत्तिमिति॥ सामानाधिकरण्यस्यायं भावः—यद्यप्यविवक्षितवाच्ये ध्वनिभेदे
“निःश्वासान्ध इवादशः” इत्यादावुपचारोऽस्ति, तथापि न तदात्मैव ध्वनिः, तद्व्य-
तिरेकेणापि भावात् विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यभेदादौ; अविवक्षितवाच्येऽप्युपचार एव न
ध्वनिरिति वक्ष्यामः। तथा च वक्ष्यति—

“भक्त्या विभर्ति नैकत्वं रूपभेदादयं ध्वनिः।

अतिव्यतिरेकाव्याप्तेर्न चासी लक्ष्यते तया ॥”

“कस्यचिद्ध्वानेभेदस्य सा तु स्यादुपलक्षणम्” इति च।

गुणाः सामीप्यादयः, धर्मस्तैक्ष्ण्यादयश्च; तैरुपायैर्वृत्तिरर्थान्तरे यस्य, तैरुपायैर्वृत्तिर्वा,
शब्दस्य यत्र स गुणवृत्तिः शब्दोऽर्थो वा; गुणद्वारेण वा वर्तनं गुणवृत्तिरमुख्योऽभिधा-

नन्वयमभाववादो नास्त्येव परैः कृतः। कथं पुनस्तस्य प्रकारोपपत्त्याः क्रियते इत्यत्राह—
अभाववादेत्यादिः। भूतत्वं वस्तुवृत्तत्वं। अथ भाक्ततावादः पुनरयं न संभावनामाश्रयण इत्याह—
भाक्ततेत्यादि। नित्यप्रवृत्तवर्तमानेति। “तिष्ठन्ति पर्वताः, स्यन्दन्ते नद्यः” इत्यत्र यथा लट् तथाज्जापि
इति भावः। नित्यप्रवृत्त इति भोजसूत्रम्। भाक्तशब्दस्य निरुक्तिमाह— भज्यत इत्यादि। अयमर्थः।
भक्तिशब्दश्च चतुर्धा— भवेनभङ्गश्रद्धातिशयभागार्थवृत्तिभेदेन। तत्र भङ्गार्थो भजिप्रकृतिः। अन्ये
भजिप्रकृतयः। ‘गङ्गायां घोष’ इत्यादौ लाक्षणिके अर्थे सामीप्यादिधर्मो भक्तिरुच्यते। ‘सिंहो देवदत्त’
इत्यादौ गौणे शौर्यात्मकतैक्ष्ण्यादेर्भक्तिः॥ एतौ संबन्धात्मकौ। उभयत्र प्रयोजनमपि भक्तिः।
मुख्यार्थबाधांषि भक्तिः। तत आगतो भक्तः औपचारिक इति। काव्यात्मा न गुणवृत्तिरित्यादि।
उपचार एव न ध्वनिरिति। उपचारो गुणवृत्तिः। ध्वनिरर्थः प्रयोजनरूपः। अत उपचारस्य ध्वनेश्च परस्परं
भेदः, न त्वैकात्म्यम्। तत उपचारो ध्वनेरुपलक्षणमेव भवतीति भावः। वक्ष्याम इति।

रामादिशब्दार्थभेदनिरूपणे इति शेषः॥ गुणा इत्यादिः। गुणवृत्तिः शब्दश्चार्थश्च भवति। तत्र
वृत्तिशब्दः स्वैव नार्थत्येत्युक्तं भवति। व्यापारोऽपि गुणवृत्तिर्भवतीति दर्शयति— गुणद्वारेण वेत्यादि॥ १८८

व्यापारः। एतदुक्तं भवति—ध्वनतीति वा, ध्वन्यते इति वा, ध्वननमिति वा यदि ध्वनिस्तथाप्युपचरितशब्दार्थव्यापारातिरिक्तो नासौ कश्चित्। मुख्येऽर्थे ह्यभिधैवेति पारिशेष्यादमुख्य एव ध्वनिः, तृतीयराश्यभावात्। ननु केनैतदुक्तम् ‘ध्वनिगुणवृत्तिः’ इत्याशङ्क्याह—**यद्यपि चेति॥ अन्यो वेति॥** गुणालंकारप्रकार इति यावत् ॥दर्शयतेति॥ भट्टोद्भटवामनादिना। भामहोक्तम् “शब्दःछन्दोऽभिधानार्थाः” इत्यभिधानशब्दस्य शब्दाद्भेदं व्याख्यातुं भट्टोद्भटो बभाषे—

“शब्दानामभिधानमभिधाव्यापारो मुख्यो गुणवृत्तिश्च” इति। वामनोऽपि “सादृश्याल्लक्षणा वक्रोक्तिः” इति॥ **मनाक्स्पृष्ट इति॥** तैस्तावद्ध्वनिदिगुन्मीलिता। यथालिखितपाठैस्तु स्वरूपविवेकं कर्तुमशक्नुवद्भक्तिस्त्वरूपविवेको न कृतः, प्रत्युतोपालभ्यते, अभग्ननारिकेलकल्पः यथाश्रुततद्ग्रन्थोद्ग्रहणमात्रेणेति। अत एवाह—**परिकल्प्यैव-मुक्तमिति॥** यद्येवं न योज्यते तदा ध्वनिमार्गः स्पृष्ट इति पूर्वपक्षविधानं विरुध्यते॥ **शालीनबुद्धय इति॥** अप्रगल्भमतय इत्यर्थः। एते च त्रय उत्तरोत्तरं भव्यबुद्ध्यः। प्राच्या हि

ध्वनतीति गुणवृत्तेः शब्दत्वमवलम्ब्योच्यते। ध्वन्यत इत्यर्थत्वं ध्वननमिति व्यापारत्वम्। **तथापीत्यादि--** य उपचरितः शब्दः अर्थश्च यः व्यापारश्च यः तेभ्योऽन्यो नासौ कश्चिद्गुणवृत्तिरूपोऽर्थ इत्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह—**मुख्ये ह्यभिधैवेति।** फलितमर्थमाह—**पारिशेष्यादिति॥** मुख्यामुख्यव्यतिरिक्तस्तृतीयराशिः॥ अथोक्तस्य निर्विषयमाशङ्काकलुषीक्रियमाणं परिहर्तुमाह—**नन्वित्यादि॥** “शब्दः छन्दोऽभिधानार्थाः”— इति। “शब्दछन्दोभिधानार्था इतिहासाश्रयाः कथाः। लोको युक्तिः कलाश्चेति मन्तव्याः काव्यहेतवः” इति। ननु केन प्रकारेणात्र गुणवृत्त्या काव्यव्यवहारो दर्शितो भामहेन? अभिधानशब्देनेति चेत्। अभिधानशब्देन नामशासनमुच्यते न गुणवृत्तिरित्याशङ्क्य, मैवम् अभिधानशब्देनात्र गुणवृत्तिरप्युक्तेत्येतत् विवरणच्छलेन संवादान्तरमाह— **अभिधानशब्दस्येत्यादि — यथा लिखितपाठैः** अविशेषज्ञैः॥ **अभनन्त्यादि—** अभग्ननारिकेलकल्पः निगूढान्तःसारः यथाश्रुतं श्रवणानुसारेण तद्ग्रन्थः ध्वनियुक्तपदबन्धः उद्ग्रहणं ग्रहणम्। उक्तं समर्थयति। अत एवाहेति। **यद्येवं न योज्यत इति॥ एवमिति।** तैर्ध्वनिदिगुन्मीलितेति च ध्वनिस्वरूपविवेको न कृत इति च प्रत्युत उपालभ्यत इति चेत्पर्यः। तदा **ध्वनिमार्गेत्यादि।** ध्वनिमार्गः स्पृष्ट इत्यनेन खलु पूर्वपक्षो विधीयते। भक्तिपरिग्रहेण ध्वनिमार्गः स्पृष्टः लक्षणाकरणेन पृथङ्नोक्तः॥ अतो भक्तिरेव ध्वनिः न त्वन्यः कश्चिदिति बलादुक्तमेव भवति

विपर्यस्ता एव सर्वथा; मध्यास्तास्तु तद्रूपं जानाना अपि संदेहेन निह्नुवते; अन्त्यास्तु अनिह्नुवाना अपि लक्षयितुं न जानत इति क्रमेण विपर्ययः सन्देहाज्ञानप्राधान्यमेषाम्^२॥ तेनेति॥ एकैकोऽप्ययं विप्रतिपत्तिरूपो वाक्यार्थो निरूपणे हेतुत्वं प्रतिपद्यत इत्येकवचनम्। एवंविधासु विमतिस्थिति निर्धारणे सप्तमी। आसु मध्ये एकोऽपि यो विमतिप्रकारस्तेनैव हेतुना तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूम इति ध्वनिस्वरूपमभिधेयम्। अभिधानाभिधेयलक्षणयोर्ध्वनिशास्त्रयोर्वक्तृश्रोत्रोर्व्युत्पाद्यव्युत्पादकभावः संबन्धः। विमतिनिवृत्त्या तत्स्वरूपज्ञानं प्रयोजनम्, शास्त्रप्रयोजनयोः साध्यसाधनभावः संबन्ध इत्युक्तम्। अथ श्रोतृगतप्रयोजन^३ प्रतिपादकं^४ 'सहृदयमनःप्रीतये' इति भागं व्याख्यातुंगाह— तस्य हीति॥ विमतिपदपतितस्येत्यर्थः। ध्वनेः स्वरूपं लक्षयतां संबन्धिनि मनसि हृदये आनन्दो निर्वृत्त्यात्मा चमत्कारापरपर्यायः प्रतिष्ठां परैर्विपर्यासाद्युपहतैरनुन्मील्यमानत्वेन स्थेमानं लभतामिति प्रयोजनं संपादयितुं तत्स्वरूपं प्रकाशयत इति संगतिः। प्रयोजनं च नाम तत्संपादकवस्तुप्रयोक्तृताप्राणतयैव तथा भवतीत्याशयेन प्रीतये तत्स्वरूपम्^५ इत्येकवाक्यतया व्याख्येयम्। तत्स्वरूपशब्दं व्याचक्षाणः संक्षेपेण तावत्पूर्वादीरितविकल्पपञ्चकोद्धरणं प्रथयति— सकलेत्यादिना॥ सकलशब्देन सत्कविशब्देन च प्रकारलेशे कस्मिंश्चिदिति निराकरोति। अतिरमणीयमिति

इति। एवं पूर्वपक्षाविधाने भाक्तवादप्रतिक्षेपो निर्विषयः स्यात्। षट्कोद्भवादिभिः स्वग्रन्थेषु ध्वनिप्रसंगो न कृतः, केवलमभिप्रायगुणवृत्तिव्यवहार एव कृत इति। अथ तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूम इत्यनेन विषयश्च संबन्धश्च प्रयोजनं च मुख्यं ग्रादशिष्यतेत्याह— तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूम इत्यादि।

अभिधानाभिधेय इत्यत्र व्युत्क्रमो द्रष्टव्यः। सहृदयमनःप्रीतये इत्येतत् प्रयोजनप्रयोजन-प्रतिपादकमित्याह— अथ श्रोतृगतेत्यादि॥ पदार्थसङ्गतिर्भाह— ध्वनेः स्वरूपमित्यादिना।

ननु कारिकायां चतुर्थः पादः एकवाक्यतया प्रतीयते। न तु 'सहृदयमनःप्रीतये' इत्येतत् प्रयोजनप्रयोजनप्रतिपादकतया पृथग्वाक्यत्वेन प्रतीयते। ध्वनिस्वरूपवचनेन विशिष्टप्रीतेः प्रयोक्तृतया संबन्ध्यात् स्वसंवादकस्य वस्तुनः प्रयोक्तुः खलु प्रयोजनं भवति। तदिह प्रीतिरेव। तत्कथं वाक्यभेद इत्याशङ्क्य, सत्यं कारिकायामेवं योजना कार्येत्याह— प्रयोजनं च नाशेत्यादि।

इत्याशयेन इत्यभिप्रायेण। प्रीतेः प्रयोजनमिति रूपेणेत्यर्थः। एकवाक्यतया व्याख्येयमिति कारिकायामिति शेषः॥

विवरणकारस्तु प्रयोजनप्रयोजनं प्रयोजनात् पृथगेवेति मन्यमानो वाक्यभेदं कृतवानिति तात्पर्यम्। अथोक्तां विकल्पपञ्चकोद्धरणसूचनां उपपादयति सकलशब्देन इत्यादिना।

प्रकारलेशे कस्मिंश्चिदिति। तृतीयाभावनादे हि संभवत्यपि कस्मिंश्चित् काव्यलक्ष्मिद्वयाभिभिः

^१क.ख.ग.घ.नि(का) विपर्यासः. ^२क.ख.ग.नि(का) एतेषाम्. ^३(ही) प्रयोजनप्रयोजन. ^४(की) प्रतिपादनम्. ^५क.ख. ग.(का) तत्स्वरूपं ब्रूमः.

भाक्ताद्वयतिरेकमाह^१। न.हि 'सिंहो वटुः,' 'गङ्गायां घोषः' इत्यत्र रम्यता काचित्। उपनिषद्भूतशब्देन तु अपूर्वसमाख्यामात्रकरण इत्यादि निराकृतम्। अणीयसीभिरित्यादिना गुणालंकारानन्तर्भूतत्वं सूचयति। अथ चेत्यादिना तत्समयान्तःपातिन इत्यादि यत्सामयिकत्वं शङ्कितं तन्निवकाशीकरोति। रामायणमहाभारतशब्देनादिकवेः प्रभृति सर्वैरेव सूरिभिरस्यादरः कृत इति दर्शयति। लक्षयतामित्यनेन वाचां स्थितमविषय इति परास्यति। लक्ष्यतेऽनेनेति लक्षो^२ लक्षणम्। ^३लक्षणे निरूपयन्ति लक्षयन्ति तेषाम्, लक्षणद्वारेण निरूपयतामित्यर्थः॥ सहृदयानामिति॥ येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशा-
द्विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवादभाजः सहृदयाः।
यथोक्तम्—

“योऽर्थो हृदयसंवादी तस्य भावो रसोद्भवः।

शरीरं व्याप्यते तेन शुष्कं काष्ठमिवाग्निना॥” इति।

आनन्द इति॥ रसस्य चर्वणात्मनः प्राधान्यं दर्शयन् रसध्वनेरेव सर्वत्र मुख्यभूतमात्मत्वं^४
दर्शयति। तेन यदुक्तम्—

“ध्वनिर्नामापरो योऽसौ व्यापारो व्यञ्जनात्मकः।

तस्य सिद्धेऽपि भेदे स्यात् काव्येऽंशत्वं न रूपता॥” इति।

तदपहस्तितं भवति। तथा हि अभिधाभावनारसचर्वणात्मकेऽपि त्र्यंशे काव्ये
रसचर्वणा तावज्जीवितभूतेति भवतोऽप्यविवादः। यथोक्तं त्वयैव—

“काव्ये रसयिता सर्वो न बोद्धा न नियोगभाक्” इति।

तद्वस्त्वलंकारध्वन्यभिप्रायेणांशमात्रत्वमिति सिद्धसाधनम्। रसध्वन्यभिप्रायेण तु

प्रसिद्धैः प्रदर्शितेत्युक्तम्। अपूर्वसमाख्यामात्रकरणे तृतीयाभाववादे हि तेषामन्यतमस्यैव वा समाख्या-
मात्रकरणे यत्किञ्चन कथितं स्यादित्युक्तम्॥

वाग्विषयस्थितिप्रतिपादकस्य लक्षयता— पदस्य निरुक्तिपूर्वकं व्याख्यानं करोति— लक्ष्यतेऽनेनेति।

सहृदयशब्दं व्याचष्टे। येषामित्यादि—“योऽर्थः” इत्यादि। सः हृदयसंवादी हृदये तन्मयीभवनशीलः।
ध्वनिर्नामेत्यादि। व्यापारः रसचर्वणात्मा। भेदे भोगात्मनो व्यापारादित्यर्थात् काव्ये अंशत्वं, न रूपतेति
नार्थशिवमित्यर्थः॥ तदिति।

तद्वद्वनेः रसचर्वणात्मनः काव्यात्मतया अंशित्वेन स्थितस्य कथितमंशत्वं विरुद्धं स्यादित्यर्थः।
तद्वस्त्वलङ्कारेत्यादि। तदंशत्वं वस्तुध्वनेरलङ्कारध्वनेश्च कथ्यमानं सिद्धसाधनं रसध्वनेरुच्यमानं
स्वमतविरुद्धमित्यर्थः।

स्वाभ्युपगमप्रसिद्धसंवेदनविरुद्धमिति॥

तत्र कवेस्तावत्कीर्त्यापि प्रीतिरेव सम्पाद्या। यदाह—“कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलामाहुः”
—इत्यादि। श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिप्रीति यद्यपि स्तः, यथोक्तम्—

“धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।

करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम्॥” इति।

तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम्। अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेतिहासा-
दिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायासंयितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति
प्राधान्येनानन्द एवोक्तः। चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम्। आनन्द
इति च ग्रन्थकृतो नाम। तेन स आनन्दवर्धनाचार्यः एतच्छास्त्रद्वारेण सहृदयहृदयेषु प्रतिष्ठां
देवताग्रतनादिन्दनश्वरीं स्थितिं लभताम् गच्छत्विति भावः। यथोक्तम्—

“उपेयुषामपि दिवं सन्निबन्धविधायिनाम् ।

आस्त एव निरातङ्कं कान्तं काव्यमयं वपुः॥” इति।

तथा—मनसि प्रतिष्ठामिति॥ एवंविधमस्य मनः। सहृदयचक्रवर्ती खल्वयं ग्रन्थकृदिति
यावत्। यथा—

“युद्धे प्रतिष्ठा परमार्जुनस्य” इति।

स्वाभ्युपगमप्रसिद्धसंवेदनविरुद्धमिति। तथा च भट्टनायकमतम्। काव्ये दोषाभावगुणालङ्कारा-
मयत्वलक्षणेन नाट्ये चतुर्गुणधिनयरूपेण निबिडनिजमोहसङ्कटतानिवारणकारिणा विभावादिसाधारणी-
करणात्मनाशिधातो द्वितीयेनांशेन भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिविलक्षणेन
रजसामोऽभिव्यक्त्यादिविलक्षणेन सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्धिश्चान्ति-
लक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन भुज्यत इति परब्रह्मास्वादवत्पतया परिपूर्णस्य रसास्वादस्य
कथमश्वत्वमिति विरोधः॥ तत्र कवेस्तावदित्यादि

कीर्तिं सत्यां कवेस्तावदानन्दफलम्, श्रोतुश्च व्युत्पत्तौ सत्यामन्ततो गत्या आनन्द एव
फलमित्यर्थः॥

आनन्द इति ग्रन्थकृतो नामेति॥ एकदेशलक्षणयेति शेषः॥

अनश्वरी स्थितिं गच्छत्विति भाव इति। गच्छत्विति प्रार्थनायां लोट्। स्थितिं बहुमानात्मिका।
प्रार्थित। स्थितिरवशंभाविनीति अभिप्रायेणाह— यथा मनसीति॥ यथा सहृदयमनसि प्रतिष्ठा
स्थिरस्थितिर्भवेत्, तथाविधमस्याचार्यस्य मनः वैदुष्यातिशयः इत्यर्थः।

दैदुषामेव प्रकटयति— सहृदयेत्यादि। संवादयति— युद्ध इति॥ प्रतिष्ठा बहुमानमयी स्थितिः।

स्वनामप्रकटीकरणं श्रोतॄणां प्रवृत्त्यङ्गमेव सम्भावनाप्रत्ययोत्पादनमुख्येनेति ग्रन्थान्ते वक्ष्यामः। एवं ग्रन्थकृतः कवेः श्रोतुश्च मुख्यं प्रयोजनमुक्तम्॥

तत्रेति॥ एवंभूतेऽभिधेये प्रयोजने च स्थिते इत्यर्थः। ननु 'ध्वनिस्वरूपं भूमिः' इति प्रतिज्ञाय वाच्यप्रतीयमानाख्यौ द्वौ भेदावर्थस्येति व्याख्याभिधाने का संगतिः कारिकाया इत्याशङ्क्य संगतिं कर्तुमवतरणिकां करोति— **ध्वनेरेवेत्यादिना॥** भूमिरिव^१ भूमिका। यथा अपूर्वनिर्माणे चिकीर्षिते पूर्वं भूमिरेव विरच्यते तथा ध्वनिस्वरूपे प्रतीयमानाख्ये निरूपायेतस्य निर्विवादसिद्धवाच्याभिधानं भूमिः, तत्पृष्ठोऽस्थितप्रतीयमानांशोल्लिङ्गनात्। वाच्येन समशीर्षिकागणनं तस्याप्यनपस्नवनीयत्वं प्रतिपादयितुम्। स्मृतावित्यनेन 'यः समाम्नातपूर्वः', इति द्रढयति। 'शब्दार्थशरीरं काव्यम्' इति यदुक्तं तत्र शरीरग्रहणादेव केनचिदात्मना तदनुप्राणकेन भाव्यमेव। तत्र शब्दस्तावच्छरीरभाग एव संनिविशते, सर्वजनसंवेद्यधर्मत्वात् स्थूलकृशादिवत्। अर्थः पुनः सकलजनसंवेद्यो न भवति। न ह्यर्थमात्रेण काव्यव्यपदेशः, लौकिकवैदिकवाक्येषु तदभावात्।

- 1.2 तदाह— **सहृदयश्लाघ्य इति॥** स एक एवार्थो द्विशाखतया विवेकिभिर्विभागबुद्ध्या विभज्यते। तथा हि— तुल्येऽर्थरूपत्वे किमिति कस्मैचित् सहृदयाः श्लाघन्ते। तद्भवितव्यं तत्र केनचिद्विशेषेण। यो विशेषः स प्रतीयमानभागे विवेकिभिर्विशेषहेतुत्वादात्मेति व्यवस्थाप्यते। वाच्यसंवलनाविमोहितहृदयैस्तु तत्पृथग्भावे विप्रतिपद्यते चार्वाकैरिवात्म-पृथग्भावे। अत एवार्थ इत्येकतयोपक्रम्य सहृदयश्लाघ्य इति विशेषणद्वारा हेतुमभिधायपोद्धारदृशा तस्य द्वौ भेदावशावित्युक्तम्, न तु द्वावप्यात्मानौ काव्यस्येति। कारिकागतं काव्यशब्दं व्याकर्तुमाह— **काव्यस्य हीति॥** ललितशब्देन गुणालङ्कारानु-ग्रहमाह। उचितशब्देन रसविषयमेवौचित्यं भवतीति दर्शयन् रसध्वनेः जीवितत्वं सूचयति। तदभावे हि किमपेक्षयेदमौचित्यं नाम सर्वत्रोद्धोष्यत इति भावः। योऽर्थ इति यदा अनुवदन्

ग्रन्थकृतः लक्षणग्रन्थकृतः, अवतरणिकां पीठिकां भूमिकामित्यर्थः। भूमिरिव भूमिकेति इवार्थे कः। निर्विवादसिद्धवाच्याभिधानं भूमिरिति। अत्र हेतुमाह— तत्पृष्ठोऽस्थितप्रतीयमानांशोल्लिङ्गनादिति। किञ्च वाच्यप्रतीयमानाख्याविति समतया परिगणने प्रयोजनान्तरमप्यस्तीत्याह— **वाच्येनेत्यादि॥**

शब्दार्थशरीरं काव्यमिति यदुक्तमिति। अभाववादिनेत्यर्थात् सिद्धयति। अर्थः पुनरिति। सहृदयव्यतिरेकेण व्युत्पन्नमात्रनिखिलजनसंवेद्यः सामान्यरूपो नाऽर्थः काव्ये इत्यर्थः।

तत्र व्यतिरेकिणं हेतुमाह— न ह्यर्थेत्यादि। **वाच्यसंवलनेति।** वाच्ये नित्यसाहाय्यं विशेषणद्वारा हेतुमिति सहृदयश्लाघ्यत्वं काव्यार्थस्यार्थमिति स्वरूपसाधको हेतुः। **अपोद्धारदृशा विभागदृशा,** यदा

परेणाप्येतत्तावदुपगतमिति दर्शयति। तस्येत्यादिना तदभ्युपगम एव द्व्यंशत्वे सत्युपपद्यत इति दर्शयति। तेन यदुक्तम्—‘चारुत्वहेतुत्वात् गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरिक्तो न ध्वनिः’ इति, तत्र ध्वनेरात्मरूपत्वाद्धेतुरसिद्ध इति दर्शितम्। न ह्यात्मा चारुत्वहेतुः देहस्येति भवति। अथाप्येवं स्यात्, तथापि वच्येनानैकान्तिको हेतुः, न ह्यलङ्कार्य एवालङ्कारः, गुणी वा गुणः एतदर्थमपि वाच्यांशोपक्षेपः। अत एव वक्ष्यति “वाच्यः प्रसिद्धः” इति॥

I.3 तत्रेति॥ त्वंशकत्वे¹ सत्यपीत्यर्थः॥ प्रसिद्ध इति॥ वनितावदनोद्यानेन्दूदया-
दिवल्लौकिक एवेत्यर्थः। उपमादिभिः प्रकारैः स व्याकृतो बहुधा इति सङ्गतिः।
अन्यैरिति कारिकाभागं काव्येत्यादिना व्याचष्टे। “ततो नेह प्रतन्यते” इति विशेषप्रतिषेधेन
शेषाभ्यनुज्ञा इति दर्शयति— केवलमित्यादिना॥

I.4 पुनःशब्दो वाच्यांशाद्विशेषद्योतकः॥ अन्यदेव वस्त्विति॥ तद्व्यतिरिक्तं सारभूतं
चेत्यर्थः। महाकदीनामिति बहुवचनमशेषविषयव्यापकत्वमाह। एतदभिधास्यमान-
प्रतीप्रमानानुप्राणितत्वाच्चनिर्माणनिपुणप्रतिभाभाजनत्वेनैव महाकविव्यपदेशो भवतीति
भावः। यदेवंविधमस्ति तद्भाति; न ह्यत्यन्तासतो भानमुपपन्नम्; रजताद्यपि
नात्यन्तमसद्भाति; अनेन सत्त्वप्रयुक्तं तावद्भानमिति भानात् सत्त्वमवगम्यते; तेन
यद्भाति तदस्ति तथेत्युक्तं भवति। तेनायं प्रयोगार्थः²— प्रसिद्धं वाच्यं धर्मि प्रतीयमानेन
व्यतिरिक्तेन तद्वत्, तथा भासमानत्वात्, लावण्योपेताङ्गनाङ्गवत्। प्रसिद्धशब्दस्य सर्व-
प्रतीतत्वं तदङ्गकृतत्वं चार्थः। यत्तदिति सर्वगामसमुदायः चमत्कारसारताप्रकटीकरणार्थ-
मव्यपदेश्यताम् अन्योन्यसंवलनाकृतं चाव्यतिरेकभ्रमं दृष्टान्तदाष्टान्तिकयोर्दर्शयति।
एतच्च किमपीत्यनेन व्याचष्टे। लावण्यं हि नामावयवसंस्थानाभिव्यङ्ग्यमवयवव्यतिरिक्तं
धर्मान्तरमेव; न चावयवानामेव निर्दोषता वा भूषणयोगो वा लावण्यम्। पृथक्पृथङ्निर्वण्य-

यच्छब्देनानुवाक इति यावत्। तदभ्युपगम एवेति तस्यार्थश्लाघ्यत्वस्याभ्युपगमः।

द्व्यंशत्वे सतीति॥ सहृदयश्लाघ्योऽर्थ इत्युक्ते— ‘संभवे व्यभिचारे च स्याद्विशेषणमर्थवत्’ इति
न्यायेन सहृदयश्लाघ्योऽपि कश्चिदर्थोऽस्ति इति द्व्यंशत्वमर्थस्य सिद्धमित्यर्थः।

तेन यदुक्तमित्यादि॥ ध्वनिर्गुणालङ्कारव्यतिरिक्तः। चारुत्वहेतुत्वात्, उपमावदित्यनै-
कान्तिकः। एतदर्थमपि वाच्यांशोपक्षेप इति। न केवलं ध्वनेर्भूमिकार्थमेव वाच्यांशोपक्षेपः। किं तर्हि,
ध्वन्यात्मनः शरीरभूतशब्दार्थचारुत्वहेतुभ्यो गुणालङ्कारेभ्यो व्यतिरेकं द्योतयितुमपीत्यर्थः।

अथ ‘प्रतीयमानमि’त्यादिकां टीकां व्याचष्टे— पुनः शब्देनेत्यादि— एतदभिधास्येत्यादि। एतेन
वक्ष्यमाणप्रतीयमानेन अनुप्राणितं प्रोज्जीवितमिति यावत्।

प्रयोगार्थ इति॥ अनुमानमिति यावत्। प्रसिद्धमित्यादि। प्रसिद्धं वाच्यं व्यतिरिक्तप्रतीय-

मानकाणादिदोषशून्यशरीरावयवयोगिन्यामलङ्कृतायामपि 'लावण्यशून्येयम्' इति, अतथाभूतायामपि कस्यांचित् 'लावण्यामृतचन्द्रिकेयम्' इति च सहृदयानां व्यवहारात्। ननु लावण्यं तावत् व्यतिरिक्तं प्रथितम्; प्रतीयमानं किं तदित्येव न जानीमः। दूरे व्यतिरेकप्रथेति तथा भासमानत्वमसिद्धो हेतुः इत्याशङ्क्य "स ह्यर्थः" इत्यादिना स्वरूपं तस्याभिधत्ते। सर्वेष्वेवेत्यादिना च व्यतिरेकप्रथां साधयति। तत्र प्रतीयमानस्य तावत् द्वौ भेदौ, लौकिकः काव्यव्यापारगोचरश्च। लौकिको यः स्वशब्दवाच्यतां कदाचिदध्यशेत, स च विधिनिषेधाद्यनेकप्रकारो वस्तुशब्देनोच्यते। सोऽपि द्विविधः; यः पूर्वं क्वापि वाक्यार्थेऽलङ्कारभावमुपमादिरूपतयान्वभूत्, इदानीं तु अनलङ्काररूप एवान्यत्र गुणीभावाच्चाभावात्, स पूर्वप्रत्यभिज्ञानबलात् अलङ्कारध्वनिरिति व्यपदिश्यते ब्राह्मण-श्रमणन्यायेन; द्वितीयस्तु तद्रूपताभावेन तूपलक्षितं वस्तुमात्रमुच्यते; मात्रग्रहणेन हि रूपान्तरं निराकृतम्। यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारणतितः किन्तु शब्दसमर्थमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुचितप्राग्निविष्टरत्यादिवासनानुराग-सुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापाररसनीयरूपो रसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसध्वनिरिति; स च ध्वनिरेवेति, स एव मुख्यतयात्मेति॥

यदूचे¹ भट्टनायकेन— "अंशत्वं न रूपता" इति तत् वस्त्वलङ्कारध्वन्योरेव यदि नामोपालम्भः, रसध्वनिस्तु तेनैवात्मतयाङ्गीकृतः, रसचर्वणात्मनः तृतीयस्यांशस्याभिधा-भावनांशद्वयोत्तीर्णत्वेन निर्णयात्। वस्त्वलङ्कारध्वन्योः रसध्वनिपर्यन्तत्वमेवेति वयमेव

मानयुक्तं, तथा भासमानत्वादिति यावत्। लावण्यस्यावयवव्यतिरिक्तत्वे अन्यव्यतिरेकौ प्रदर्शयति— न चेत्यादिना।

अतथाभूतायामपि अनलङ्कृतायामपि। अथ दृष्टान्तवैषम्येन हेतोरसिद्धताशङ्कामवतारयितुमाह— ननु चेत्यादि—॥ व्यतिरेकप्रथां व्यतिरेकप्रतीतिं अध्यशेतेति भूतप्रत्ययनिर्देशः। पूर्वं लोक एव दृष्टोऽप्यमर्थ इति लौकिकत्वं प्रकटयितुं, अन्यत्र गुणीभावाच्चाभावादिति। अन्यमर्थं वाच्यं प्रति-अप्रधानत्वाभावादित्यर्थः॥

अतद्रूपताभावेनानलङ्कारतया शब्दसमर्थमाणेत्यादिना वाच्यत्वमलौकिकत्वं च रसस्य समर्थयति। यदूचे इत्यादि॥

भट्टनायको हि 'तस्य सिद्धेऽपि भेदे स्यात्काव्येऽंशत्वं न रूपते'त्यवोचत्। तद्वस्त्वलङ्कारध्वनि-विषयमेवावतिष्ठते, न रसध्वनिविषयमित्यर्थः। यदि नामोपालम्भ इति। यदि नाम तादृशांशिनिरूपणेन ध्वन्युपालम्भोऽभिमतः तर्हीत्यर्थः। अन्यथा स्वसिद्धान्तविरोध एवेत्याह— रसध्वनिस्तिर्यादि।

¹(कौ) यच्चोच्यते, घ. यत्तुचे.

वक्ष्यामस्तत्र तत्र इत्यास्तां तावत् । 'वाच्यसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तम्' इति भेदत्रयव्यापकं सामान्यलक्षणम् । यद्यपि हि ध्वननं शब्दस्यैव व्यापारः, तथाप्यर्थसामर्थ्यस्य सहकारिणः सर्वज्ञानपायात् वाच्यसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तत्वम् । शब्दशक्तिमूलानुरणनरूपव्यङ्ग्येऽप्यर्थसामर्थ्यादेव प्रतीयमानावगतिः, शब्दशक्तिः केवलमवान्तरसहकारिणीति वक्ष्यामः ॥ दूरं विभेदयानिति ॥ त्रिधिनिषेधौ विरुद्धाविति न कस्यापि¹ विभक्तिः । एतदर्थं प्रथमं तावेवोदाहरति— भ्रम धम्मिअ इति ॥

“भ्रम धार्मिक विप्रब्धः स शुनकोऽद्य² मारितस्तेन ।

गंदावरीनदीकूललतागहनवासिना दृप्तसिंहेन ॥”

कस्याश्चित् राङ्केतस्थानं जीवितसर्वस्वायमानं धार्मिकसंचरणान्तरायदोषात्तदवलुप्यमान-
पल्लवकुसुमादिच्छायाीकरणाच्च परित्रातुमियमुक्तिः । तत्र स्वतस्सिद्धमपि भ्रमणं
श्वभरोनापोदितमिति प्रतिप्रसवात्मको निषेधाभावरूपः न तु नियोगः प्रैषादिरूपः अत्र
विधिः । अतिसर्गप्राप्तकालयोर्हि अयं लोट् ; तत्र भावतदभावयोर्विरोधात् द्वयोस्तावन्न
युगपद्वाच्यता ; न क्रमेण, विरम्यव्यापाराभावात्, “विशेष्यं नाभिधा गच्छेत्”
इत्यादिनाभिधाव्यापास्य विरम्यासंभवाभिधानात् । ननु तात्पर्यशक्तिरपर्यवसिता विवक्षया

यथपीत्यादि । शब्दस्य व्यञ्जकत्वेऽप्यर्थसामर्थ्यं सहकारि भवति । ततोऽर्थसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तं
प्रतीयमानमिति वक्तुं शक्यत इति भावः ।

अत्र वाच्याद्भेदः ध्वनित्रयस्य साध्यः । तत्र वस्तुध्वनेः वाच्यात् भेदमुदाहरणैरेव दर्शयति— तत्र
स्थतःसिद्धमपीत्यादि । अपोदितं प्रतिषिद्धं, प्रतिप्रसवात्मको निषेधाभावरूपोऽत्र विधिरिति संबन्धः । न तु
नियोगः प्रैषादिरूप इति व्यावर्त्यम् । तत्र हेतुः—अतिसर्गप्राप्तकालयोर्हर्षयं लोटिति ।

अयमर्थः— स्वतःसिद्धं भ्रमणम्, पूर्वः श्वभीतिनिषेध इति यः, इदानीं तु प्रतिषिद्धस्य भ्रमणस्य
प्रतिषेधकोऽभावः कथ्यते सोऽयं प्रतिप्रसवः । प्रतिषेधनिवर्तनं हि सः । प्राप्ते तु प्रतिषेधेऽत्र
प्रतिप्रसवयोगितेत्युक्तेः । अतो भ्रमणस्येदानीं न कश्चित् प्रतिबन्ध इति निषेधाभावरूपोऽत्र विधिः । न तु
नियोगः । न खल्वेषा स्वैरिणी राजवत् भ्रमणविधिं करोति । श्वभयमिव निषेधं वा, किं तर्हि,
भ्रमणप्रतिषेधकाभावकथनं करोति । ततो बलात् भ्रमणं विधीयमानताकांटे निविशते । अतोऽयं
लोडतिसर्गं प्राप्तकारः वा । भवति चैष नियोगप्रायः इति । अथ उदाहरणार्थनिरूपणद्वारा काव्ये
वाक्यार्थपर्यालोचनासंगतं प्रकाशयति— तत्र भावतदभावयोर्द्वयोर्द्विगुण्येन । तत्र प्रथममभिमतमर्थं
प्रस्तौति । द्वयोस्तावन्न युगपद्वाच्यतेति । द्वयोर्विधिनिषेधयोः प्रकृते ह्युदाहरणे भ्रमणविधिश्च भ्रमण-
निषेधश्च हावप्यर्थं प्रतिभासेते । तयोर्गुणपद्वाच्यता न घटते । एकत्वेन विरुद्धाकारद्वयाभावप्रसंगात् । न च
क्रमेणाभिधेयता । अभिधाया विरम्य पुनः संभवाभावात् इति । अत्र अभिधान्वयं वादपूर्वपक्षतया
परिमृशति— ननु तात्पर्येति । तात्पर्यशक्तिर्वाक्यार्थभूतनिषेधप्रतीतिं करोतीति संबन्धः ।

अपर्यवसिता विधौ पर्यवसानमनाप्नुवती । विवक्षया निषेधस्यैव विवक्षितत्वात् समर्थं प्रतिपादयितुं वाक्यं

दृष्टधार्मिकतदादिपदार्थानन्वयरूपमुख्यार्थबाधकबलेन विरोधनिमित्तया विपरीतलक्षणाया च वाक्यार्थभूतनिषेधप्रतीतिमभिहितान्वयदृशा करोतीति शब्दशक्तिमूल एव सोऽर्थः, एवमनेनोक्तमिति हि व्यवहारः; तत्र वाच्यातिरिक्तोऽन्योऽर्थ इति॥

नैतत्; त्रयो ह्यत्र व्यापाराः संवेद्यन्ते—पदार्थेषु सामान्यात्मस्वभिधाय्यापारः, समयापेक्षयार्थावगमनशक्तिर्ह्यभिधा। समयश्च² तावत्येव, न विशेषांशे, आगन्त्याद्व्यभिचाराच्चैकस्य। ततो विशेषरूपे वाक्यार्थे तात्पर्यशक्तिः परस्परान्विते, 'सामान्यान्यन्यथासिद्धेर्विशेषं गमयन्ति हि' इति न्यायात्। तत्र च द्वितीयकक्ष्यायां भ्रमेति विध्यतिरिक्तं न किञ्चित्प्रतीयते, अन्वयमात्रस्यैव प्रतिपन्नत्वात्। न हि 'गङ्गायां घोषः' 'सिंहो वटुः' इत्यत्र यथान्वय एव बुभूषन् प्रतिहन्यते, योग्यताविरहात्; तथा तव भ्रमणनिषेद्धा स श्वा सिंहेन हतः। तदिदानीं भ्रमणनिषेधकारणवैकल्याद्भ्रमणं तत्रोचितमित्यन्वयस्य³ काचित्शक्तिः। अत एव मुख्यार्थबाधा नात्र शङ्क्येति न विपरीतलक्षणाया अवसरः।

उपादीयते। तस्मिन् कथमविवक्षा। न स्यादिति भावः। दृष्टधार्मिकेत्यादि।

मा भ्रमेति वक्तव्ये भ्रमेत्युक्तं विरुद्धलक्षणयेत्यप्रतिपन्नम्। तत्र श्रुतानां पदार्थानां नान्वयः, विरोधात्। ततोऽनन्वयरूपो मुख्यार्थबाधः। तदबलेनोत्थापितविरुद्धलक्षणाया तात्पर्यशक्तिर्निषेधप्रतीतिं करोतीति। अतः शब्दशक्तिमूलत्वात् वाच्य एव निषेधार्थ इति। अभिहितान्वयदृशा अभिहितान्वयवादिमतेन। अभिहितान्वयवादी ह्येवं ब्रूयात्— व्यञ्जनव्यापारविमुखा तात्पर्यशक्तिरेवात्र लक्षणास्पर्शेन निषेधं प्रतिपादयति इति। तदेतत् प्रत्याचष्टे। नैतदित्यादि। त्रय इति॥ अभिधा तात्पर्यं लक्षणा चेति। आगन्त्यादिति।—विशेषसमयश्चेत् विशेषाणामनन्त्यत्वात् समयानन्त्येन न व्युत्पत्तिसंभवः इति व्यभिचाराच्चैकस्येति— एकस्य विशेषस्येत्यर्थः विशेषान्ताभिधाने पूर्वविशेषस्य अभिधानात् व्यभिचारात् स्वार्थविच्छित्तिप्रसंगश्चेत्यर्थः। विशेषरूपो वाक्यार्थ इत्यत्र हेतुमाह— परस्परेत्यादि। अन्यथा विशेषानवगमने असिद्धे स्वकीयान्वयो न सिद्ध्यतीति। द्वितीयकक्ष्यायामिति॥

अभिधात्वविषयसामान्यभूतपदार्थपुञ्जभागः प्रथमकक्ष्या। तात्पर्यव्यापारविषयविशेषभूतैकात्म्यकवाक्यार्थभागो द्वितीयकक्ष्या। विध्यतिरिक्तं न किञ्चिदिति विधिरेव प्रतीयते, न तु तदतिरिक्तस्तद्बाध इत्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुः— अन्वयमात्रस्यैव प्रतिपन्नत्वादिति।

आकांक्षासन्निधियोग्यतावशात् पदार्थानामन्योन्यं संसर्ग एव प्रतीयत इति यदि विरोधस्तर्हि अन्वयो न भवतीति वैधर्म्यादाहरणं दर्शयति— न हि गङ्गायामित्यादि। बुभूषन् भवितुमुद्यतः। तवेति

भवतु वास्यै। तथापि द्वितीयस्थानसंक्रान्ता तावदसौ न भवति। तथा हि--
मुख्यार्थबाधायां लक्षणायाः प्रवृत्तिः। बाधा च विरोधप्रतीतिरेव। न चात्र पदार्थानां
स्वात्मनि विरोधः। परस्परं विरोध इति चेत्— सोऽयं तर्ह्यन्वये विरोधः प्रत्येयः। न
चाप्रतिपक्षेऽन्वये विरोधप्रतीतिः, प्रतिपत्तिश्चान्वयस्य नाभिधाशक्त्या, तस्याः पदार्थ-
प्रतिपत्त्युपक्षीणाया विरम्याव्यापारात् इति तात्पर्यशक्त्यैवान्वयप्रतिपत्तिः।

नन्वेवं 'अङ्गुल्यग्रे करिवरशतम्' इत्यत्राप्यन्वयप्रतीतिः स्यात्। किं न भवत्यन्वयप्रतीतिः
दशदाडिमादिवाक्यवत्? किन्तु प्रमाणान्तरेण सोऽन्वयः प्रत्यक्षादिना बाधितः प्रतिपन्नोऽपि
शुक्तिकायां रजतमिवेति तदवगमकारिणो वाक्यस्याप्राभाण्यम्। 'सिंहो माणवकः' इत्यत्र
तु द्वितीयवक्ष्यानिविष्टतत्पर्यशक्तिरुत्पत्तिरान्वयबाधकसमुल्लासानन्तरमभिधातात्यर्थ-
शक्तिद्वयातिरिक्ता तावत् तृतीयाशक्तिः तद्बाधकविधुरीकरणनिपुणा लक्षणाभिधाना
समुल्लसति। नन्वेवं 'सिंहो वटुः' इत्यत्रापि काव्यरूपता स्यात्, ध्वनिलक्षणस्यात्मनोऽपि
समनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणतया भावात्। ननु घटेऽपि जीवव्यवहारः स्यात्, आत्मनो विभुत्वेन

धार्मिकापेक्षया अभ्युपगम्यापि ब्रूते। भवतु वास्तविति। असौ निपरीतलक्षणा। तथापीत्यादि-
तात्पर्यव्यापारविषये द्वितीयवक्ष्या। यत्र द्वितीयस्थानम् तत्र न लक्षणायाः संक्रमणम्। एतदेव
समर्थयति— तथा हन्त्यादि—

स्वात्मनीतिः। न खलु धार्मिकार्थस्य स्वेन विरोधः। न च दृष्टस्य स्वेनेत्यादि। परस्परमिति
परस्परमन्वय इत्यर्थः। अत एवाह सोऽयं तर्ह्यन्वये विरोधः प्रत्येय इति। न चेत्यादि। अप्रतिपन्ने
अगृहीते। तस्मात् विरोधप्रतीत्युपगमात् अन्वयप्रतिपत्तिरङ्गीकृतैव तावदित्यर्थः।

सा चान्वयप्रतिपत्तिः केन व्यापारेणेति चिन्त्यम्। न तावदभिधयेत्याह—**प्रतिपत्तिश्चेत्यादि।**
तात्पर्यशक्त्यैवेति— लक्षणयेति तु नाऽशङ्कनीयमेव। तस्या निषेधप्रतिपादकत्वाभिगानादित्यर्थः।
अथाऽशङ्कते— **नन्वेवमिति।** एवं विरोधात् प्रागेवान्वयप्रतिपत्तिश्चेत् इति यावत्।

परिहरति॥ किं नेत्यादि॥ अत्रेत्यर्थात् सिद्धं भवत्येवान्वयप्रतीतिः। यथा दश दाडिमादावित्यर्थः।
विशेषमाह— **किन्तित्यादि—** प्रतिपन्नोऽपि सोऽन्वयः बाधित इति संबन्धः। दृष्टान्तमाह— **शुक्तिकायां**
रजतमिवेति। फलितार्थमाह— **तदवगमेति।** एवं प्रकृते वाक्ये द्वितीयवक्ष्यायां न लक्षणा। तृतीयवक्ष्यायामेव
स्यात्, यदि स्यादिति स्थितम्। एवमेव गौणलक्षणायामिति दर्शयति— **सिंह इत्यादि॥**

तद्बाधकविधुरीकरणनिपुणंति। तद्बाधकस्य अन्वयबाधकस्य विधुरीकरणे बाधने शक्ता
इत्यर्थः। लक्षणा हि तात्पर्यसमर्पिता तस्यान्वयस्य यो बाधको विरोधात्प्रकृतं पराणुद्य प्रकारान्तरेणान्व-
यमापादयति। अत्र 'किन्तित्वादि' प्रसङ्गमाशङ्कते। ननु सिंह इत्यादि— **समनन्तरमेव वक्ष्यमाणतयेति।**
समनन्तरमेव त्रितयसन्निधौ लक्षणेत्यादिना पवित्रत्वादिकं पराक्रमातिशयादिकं च लक्षणायाः

तत्रापि भावात् । शरीरस्य खलु विशिष्टाधिष्ठानयुक्तस्य सत्यात्मनि जीवव्यवहारः, नेतरत्र— इति चेत्, तर्हि गुणालङ्कारौचित्यसुन्दरशब्दार्थशरीरस्य सति ध्वननाख्यात्मनि काव्यरूपताव्यवहारः, न चात्मनोऽसारता काचिदिति समानम्॥

न चैवं भक्तिरेव ध्वनिः। भक्तिर्हि लक्षणाव्यापारः तृतीयकक्ष्यानिवेशी, चतुर्थ्या तु कक्ष्यायां ध्वननव्यापारः। तथा हि— 'त्रयसन्निधौ लक्षणा प्रवर्तत इति तावत् भवतां² मतम्। तत्र मुख्यार्थबाधा तावत् प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणान्तरमूला। निमित्तं च यदभिधीयते सामीप्यादि, तदपि प्रमाणान्तरावगम्यमेव। यत्तु इदं घोषस्य अतिपवित्रत्वशीतल-त्वसेव्यत्वादिकं प्रयोजनमशब्दवाच्यं प्रमाणान्तराप्रतिपन्नं वटौ वा पराक्रमातिशयशालित्वं तत्र शब्दस्य न तावन्न व्यापारः। तथा हि— तत्सामीप्यात् तद्धर्मत्वानुमानमनैकान्तिकम्, सिंहशब्दवाच्यत्वं च वटोः असिद्धम्। अथ यत्र यत्र एवंशब्दप्रयोगः तत्र तत्र तद्धर्मयोगः इत्यनुमानम्, तस्यापि व्याप्तिग्रहणकाले मौलिकं प्रमाणान्तरं वाच्यम्; न चास्ति; न च स्मृतिरियम्, अननुभूते⁴ तदयोगात्, नियमाप्रतिपत्तेः वक्तुरेतदेव विवक्षित-

प्रयोजनत्वेनोच्यते। तत्र व्यापारो व्यञ्जनात्मक इति च। ततो हेतोः ध्वननसद्भावादित्यर्थः। एतत् प्रतिबन्धा परिहरति—घटेऽपीत्यादि। पराभिप्रेतं हेतुमाशङ्कते शरीरस्येति।

तर्हि समः समाधिरित्याह— तर्हि गुणालङ्कारेत्यादि॥ असाधारणताविशेष इत्यर्थः। तस्मात् तृतीयकक्ष्यापातिन्येव लक्षणेति स्थितम्। ननु एवमस्तु लक्षणा। तदिह निषेधो लक्ष्योऽस्तु, मा भूदभिधेयः; मा च भूद्व्यङ्ग्यध्वननं च। लक्षणैवास्तु। प्रयोजनप्रयोजनाव्यभिचाराल्लक्षणायाः प्रयोजनं, न ध्वननात्मक-त्वादित्याशङ्काऽवष्टम्भेनाह— न चैवमित्यादि। कक्ष्याभेदाल्लक्षणाध्वननयोर्भेद इत्यर्थः।

उक्तं समर्थयति। तथा हीत्यादि। भवतां, प्रयोजनं पुनः शब्दप्रमाणगम्यमित्यर्थः। अनुमानगम्यत्वाशङ्कायां परिहारमाह— तत्सामीप्यादिति॥

योषोऽतिपवित्रः, गङ्गासमीपत्वात्, तटस्थितमण्डूकशाबवदिति। विपक्षेऽपि वृत्तेरनैकान्तिकत्वम्। वटुः शूरः सिंहशब्दवाच्यत्वादिति अनुमानमपि न भवति। हेतोरसिद्धत्वादिति। अयेत्यादि। एवं शब्दप्रयोगः गङ्गायां घोषः सिंहो वटुरित्येवंप्रकार इत्यर्थः। तत्र प्रतियोगिन्यर्थे घोषमाणवकादौ तद्धर्मः पवित्रत्वादितः, शौर्यातिशयादिश्चास्तीत्यर्थः। तस्यापीत्यादि—

यत्र यत्र धूमस्तत्र तत्राग्निरिति व्याप्तिग्रहणं प्रत्यक्षमूलमुच्यते। न चैवमत्र व्याप्तिग्रहणे किञ्चित् प्रमाणं मूलभूतं वक्तुं लक्ष्यते इत्यर्थः। न चास्ति तदिति शेषः। तर्हि स्मरणगम्यमस्तु। प्रयोजनमत्राह— न चेत्यादि॥ हेतुमाह—अननुभूत इति॥ हेत्वन्तरमप्याह— नियमाप्रतिपत्तेरित्यादि—कस्यचित् स्मरणं चेत्

मित्यवसायाभावप्रसङ्गाच्च इत्यास्ति तावदत्र शब्दस्य व्यापारः । व्यापारश्च नाभिधात्मा^१, समयाभावात्; न तात्पर्यात्मा, तस्याव्ययप्रतीतावेव परिक्षयात्; न लक्षणात्मा, उक्तादेव हेतोः स्खलद्गतित्वाभावात् । तत्रापि हि^२ स्खलद्गतित्वं पुनर्मुख्यार्थबाधा निमित्तं प्रयोजनमित्यनवस्था स्यात् । अत एव यत् केनचित् लक्षितलक्षणेति नाम कृतं तद्व्यसनमात्रम् । तस्मात् अभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणा^३व्यतिरिक्तः चतुर्थोऽसौ व्यापारो ध्वननद्योतनव्यञ्जनप्रत्यायनावगमनादिसोदरव्यपदेशनिरूपितोऽभ्युपगन्तव्यः । यद्वक्ष्यति--

“मुख्यां वृत्तिं परित्यज्य गुणवृत्त्यर्थदर्शनम् ।

यदुद्दिश्य फलं तत्र शब्दो नैव स्खलद्गतिः॥” इति ।

तेन रामयापेक्षा^४ वाच्यार्थावगमनशक्तिः अभिधाशक्तिः; तदन्यथानुपपत्तिसहायार्थावबोधनशक्तिः तात्पर्यशक्तिः; मुख्यार्थबाधादि सहकार्यपेक्षार्थप्रतिभासनशक्तिः लक्षणार्थाः तच्छक्तित्रयोपजनिता र्थावगममूल जाता तत्प्रतिभासपवित्रितप्रतिपत्तुः-

निगमभावेनैतदेव वक्त्रा विवक्षितमिति निर्धारयितुं न पार्यते । सोऽप्यत्र हेतुरित्यर्थः । तस्मात् शब्दत एव प्रयोजनं प्रतिपद्यते, यत्रास्य धेनचिद्व्यापारं भवितव्यमित्याह— अस्ति तावदिति— स च व्यापार अभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणाभ्यो अन्य एवेति समर्थयितुमाह— व्यापारश्चेत्यादि ।

उक्तादेव हेतोरिति । मुख्यार्थबाधे प्रत्यक्षादिमूलत्वमुक्तो हेतुः । स्खलद्गतिरित्याभावादिति मुख्यार्थबाधाभावादित्यर्थः । तटे हि लक्ष्ये गङ्गाशब्दः स्वार्थं सबाधः । नैवं पवित्रत्वे लक्ष्ये विषये बाधमाह— तत्रापि हीति॥ अनवस्थेति— मूलक्षतिकरीति शेषः । अनेनैव न्यायेन मतान्तरं परास्यति । अत एवेत्यादि । लक्षितलक्षणंति । लक्षिते लक्षणा लक्षितलक्षणा । तटे इव गङ्गाशब्दस्य प्रयोजनेऽपि लक्षणाऽस्तीत्यर्थः । ‘नाम कृतं ध्वननव्यपारस्येति शेषः । तद्व्यसनमात्रमिति । अनर्थमात्रं न कश्चिदर्थ-लेशां अपि अनवस्थापातादिति भावः । निगमयति तस्मादिति । तत्र प्रमाणं दर्शयति— यद्वक्ष्यतीति । व्यापारचतुष्टयस्य स्वरूपं विशदयति— तेनेत्यादि । वाच्यार्थावगमनशक्तिरिति पदार्थावगमशक्तिरिति यावत् । तदन्यथानुपपत्तिसहायार्थावबोधनशक्तिरिति । तस्य विशेषरूपस्यान्वितार्थस्य अन्यथा तात्पर्यभावे अभिधाया एव भावे योऽनुपपत्तिः तत्सहायो दोषः । संसृष्टस्तदवबोधनशक्तिरित्यर्थः । तच्छक्तिः त्रयेत्यादि । अभिधयोपजनितोऽर्थः पदार्थः । तात्पर्योपजनितो वाक्यार्थः विशेषरूपः । लक्षणयोपजनितो लक्ष्यः । एतदर्थत्रयावगमरूपं यन्मूलं तस्माज्जातेति यावत् । तथा तत्प्रतिभासेन अर्थत्रयप्रतिभासजेन पवित्रितो

प्रतिभा सहायार्थघोतनशक्तिः ध्वननव्यापारः । स च प्राग्वृत्तं व्यापारत्रयं न्यक्कुर्वन् प्रधानभूतः काव्यात्मा इत्याशयेन निषेधप्रमुखतया च, प्रयोजनविषयोऽपि निषेधविषय इत्युक्तः। अभ्युपगममात्रेण चेदमुक्तम् । न त्वत्र लक्षणा, अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतत्वान्व-संक्रमणयोरभावात् । न ¹चार्थशक्तिमूलेऽस्या व्यापारः। सहकारिभेदाच्च शक्तिभेदः स्पष्ट एव; यथा² तस्यैव शब्दस्य व्याप्तिस्मृत्यादिसहकृतस्य विवक्षावगतायनुमापकत्वव्यापारः, अक्षादिसहकृतस्य वा विकल्पकत्वव्यापारः। एवमभिहितान्वयवादिना तावदियदनपह्नवनीयम्॥

योऽप्यन्विताभिधानवादी “यत्परः शब्दः स शब्दार्थः” इति हृदये गृहीत्वा शरवदभिधाव्यापारमेव दीर्घदीर्घमिच्छति तस्य यदि दीर्घदीर्घो व्यापारः, तदेकोऽसाविति परिशोधितो योऽयं प्रतिपत्ता तस्य या प्रतिभा तया सहिता अर्थस्य प्रयोजनादिरूपस्य घोटन-शक्तिरित्यर्थः।

स चेत्यादि— व्यापारत्रयन्यकारात् प्रधानभूतत्वं ध्वननस्य, प्रधानत्वादेव काव्यात्मत्वं तदभिप्रायेण च। निषेधप्रमुखतया च निषेधाभिमुखतया च। निषेधविषय इत्युक्त इति भूतकालत्वं न विवक्षितम्। उच्यत इति यावत्। स हि वाच्ये विधिरूपे कदाचित् प्रतिषेपरूपो यथेति प्रतीयमानार्थ उक्तः। न खलु व्यञ्जनाव्यापारेणैवावगम्यत इति व्यञ्जनाव्यापारनिषेधविषय इत्युक्त इत्यर्थः॥

यद्यप्येवमुक्तं तथापि अत्र वस्तुतो लक्षणायाः कथैव नास्तीत्याह— अभ्युपगमेत्यादि। लक्षणाभावे हेतुमाह— अत्यन्तेत्यादि। लक्षणाया हि वाच्यस्यात्यन्ततिरस्कृतत्वं वा अर्थान्तरसंक्रमितत्वं वा नियतम्। न चैतत् किञ्चिदत्र। तस्मान्न लक्षणेति यावत्। ननु अर्थशक्तिमूलोऽयं ध्वनिः तत्र किं लक्षणं न स्यादित्याशङ्क्याह— न ह्यर्थशक्तिमूले अस्या व्यापार इति अस्या लक्षणाया अन्यथा लक्षणाभूलध्वनिरिति व्यपदेशः स्यात्, नार्थशक्तिमूल इति भावः। किं च अर्थशक्तिमूलध्वननव्यापारस्य वक्तुर्बोद्धव्यकाव्यादिवैशिष्ट्यं सहकारि लक्षणायास्तु मुख्यार्थबाधादित्यतोऽन्यनयोर्भेदः सिद्ध इत्याह— सहकारिभेदाच्च शक्तिभेदः स्पष्ट एवेति। तदपि विशदयति यथा तस्येत्यादि। शब्दोऽनुमानमिति दर्शने यो यत्र दृश्यते शब्दः स तस्यार्थस्य वाचकः। यस्मिन् न दृश्यते वासौ न तस्यार्थस्य वाचकः, इति व्याप्ति-स्मरणम्। आदिशब्देन पक्षधर्मत्वं शब्दोऽर्थवानित्येवंरूपम्। एतत्सहकृतस्य शब्दस्य यथा विवक्षावगमे अनुमापकत्वशक्तिरित्यर्थः।

अस्य वक्तुरनेन शब्देनायमर्थो वक्तुमिष्ट इत्यवगमे खलु शब्दोऽनुमानं भवतीति दृष्टान्तान्तरं दर्शयति। अक्षादीत्यादि— अक्षमिन्द्रियं श्रोत्रम्, आदिशब्दाददृष्टादि। तत्सहकृतस्य शब्दस्य। विकल्पकत्वं बोधकत्वं, अर्थप्रतिपादकत्वं वाचकत्वमित्यर्थः॥

उपसंहरति— एवमभिहितेत्यादि। इयदिति। अभिधादिव्यापारत्रयोतीर्णध्वननव्यापार-तद्विषयवैभवंमित्यर्थः। अथान्विताभिधानवादिमतेनापि न प्रतिहन्यतेऽयं ध्वनिरित्याह— योऽप्यन्विता-भिधानेत्यादि॥ शरवदिति— यथा शरो हस्तवता मुक्तः शत्रोरुच्छदमुरश्च भित्वा प्राणानपहृत्य निर्गच्छति इति दीर्घस्तद्व्यापारः, तथा शब्दोऽप्यनेकपथं सकृत् प्रयुक्तोऽभिधत्ते इति दीर्घोऽस्याभिधा-व्यापारः। अतो अभिधाव्यतिरेकेण न कश्चन ध्वननव्यापारो युक्तः शब्दस्य अस्त्यपूर्वः। अर्थोऽपि

¹क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च.(नि) (का) न हि. ²क.ख.ग.(नि) तथा.

कुतः? भिन्नविषयत्वात्। अथानेकोऽसौ, तद्विषयसहकारिभेदात् असजातीय एव युक्तः। सजातीये च कार्ये विरम्य व्यापारः शब्दकर्मबुद्ध्यदीनां पदार्थविद्भिः निषिद्धः। असजातीये चास्मन्नय एव। अथ योऽसौ चतुर्थकस्यानिविष्टोऽर्थः स एव इदिति वाक्येनाभिधीयते इत्येवंविधं दीर्घदीर्घत्वं विवक्षितम्, तर्हि तत्र संकेताकरणात् कथं साक्षात् प्रतिपातः? निमित्तेषु संकेतः नैगित्तिकस्त्वसावर्थ इति संकेतानपेक्ष एवेति चेत् पश्य श्रोत्रियस्योक्तिः कौशलम्! यो ह्यसौ पर्यन्तकस्याभाग्यर्थः प्रथमं प्रतीतिपथमवतीर्णः तस्य पश्चात्तनाः पदार्थावगमा निमित्तभावं गच्छन्तीति नूनं मीमांसकस्य प्रसौत्रं प्रति नैमित्तिकत्वमभिमतम्। अधोच्येत—पूर्वं तत्र संकेतग्रहणसंस्कृतस्य तथा प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीति अमुषा वस्तुस्थित्या निमित्तत्वं पदार्थानाम्, तर्हि तदनुसरणोपयोगि न किञ्चिदप्युक्तं

अभिधेय एव, न व्यङ्ग्य इति पूर्वपक्षः। तं विघटयति—तस्य यदीत्यादि। योऽयं दीर्घदीर्घो व्यापारः स किमेको अनेको वा? न एकः विषयभेदेन भेदापातात्। न ह्यभिधेया अर्था अनेके, अभिधात्वेकैवेति भवति। अथानेकश्चेत् विषयभेदात् सहकारिभेदश्च अनेकस्यासजातीयवैवासी व्यापारः स्यात्। विषयो मुख्यलक्ष्यादिः। सहकारी सङ्केतः। मुख्यार्थव्यापारि वक्तुबोद्धव्यादिवैशिष्ट्यं च। किं चानेकस्यास्य व्यापारस्य ये विषयाभिन्नाः ते किं सजातीया विजातीया वा इति विकल्पमभिसन्धाय, सजातीयपक्षां व्युदायनि—सजातीये चेत्यादि। कार्ये विषये इत्यर्थः। व्यापार इति। अभिधात्मेत्यर्थः। द्वितीयं पक्षमनुमन्यते—असजातीये चेति। अस्मन्नय एवेति। अस्मत्पक्ष एव, कात्र विमतिरित्यर्थः। आशङ्कते—अथ योऽसाविति॥ चतुर्थकस्यानिविष्ट इति लक्षणाभिमतपक्षे इति शेषः। अभिधामूलव्यञ्जनाभिमतो अर्थ इति। व्यङ्ग्याभिमत इत्यर्थः। तृतीयकस्याविनिविष्ट इति शेषः। वाक्येनाभिधायकपदसमुदायेन स एवेति—नान्योऽर्थः कश्चिदित्यर्थः। परिहरति—तर्हीत्यादि। वाक्यं चतुर्थकस्याविनिविष्टमर्थं साक्षात् नाभिदध्यात्। तत्र असङ्केतित्वात्। न खलु गङ्गाशब्दः पवित्रतायां संकेतितः। न च 'मम धम्मिज' इत्यादिवाक्यं गोदावरीतीरे मा धमेत्यर्थे संङ्केतितमित्यर्थः। आशङ्कते—निमित्तेष्विति। निमित्तेषु पदार्थेषु चतुर्थकस्यापातिनोऽर्थस्य निमित्तभूताः पदार्थाः, तेष्वेवं सङ्केतः, असाविति चतुर्थकस्याविनिविष्टः संकेतानपेक्ष एवेति निमित्तबलादेव सिद्धत्वादिति भावः। सोपहासं परिहरति—पश्येत्त्यादि। प्राग्भवस्य पश्चाद्भाविनिमित्तशब्देन मीमांसकस्य तव भविष्यत्प्रसौत्रो निमित्तः स्यादित्यर्थः। आशङ्कते, अर्थाच्येत इत्यादि।

तत्र पदार्थेषु सङ्केतग्रहणसंस्कृतस्य पुरुषस्य तथा प्रतिपत्तिः। वस्तुर्थकस्याविनिविष्टार्थ-प्रतिपत्तिर्भवतीत्यनया वस्तुस्थित्या पदार्था निमित्तं भवन्तीत्यर्थः॥ परिहरति—तर्हीति। तदनुसरणोपयोगि चतुर्थकस्याविनिविष्टार्थावगमोपयोगि किञ्चिदपि नोक्तं स्यादिति यावत्। गृहीतसंकेतस्य संकेतिताः पदार्थाः 'एव गम्येन्' नाऽगृहीतसङ्केतश्चतुर्थकस्याविनिविष्टोऽर्थ इति भावः।

स्यात् । न चापि प्राक् पदार्थेषु संबन्धग्रहणं वृत्तम्, अन्वितानामेव सर्वदा प्रयोगात् । आवापोद्वापाभ्यां तथाभाव इति चेत्, संकेतः पदार्थमात्र एवेत्यभ्युपगमे पाश्चात्त्यैव विशेषप्रतीतिः । अथोच्यते— 'दृष्टैव झटिति तात्पर्यप्रतिपत्तिः, किमत्र कुर्म' इति; तदिदं वयमपि न नाङ्गीकुर्मः, यद्वक्ष्यति—

“तद्वत्सचेतसां सोऽर्थो वाच्यार्थविमुखात्मनाम् ।

बुद्धौ तत्त्वार्थदर्शिन्यां झटित्येवावभासते ॥”

इति; किं तु सातिशयानुशीलनाभ्यासात्तत्र संभाव्यमानोऽपि क्रमः सजातीयतद्विकल्प-परम्परानुदयात् अभ्यस्तविषयव्याप्तिसमयस्मृतिक्रमवत् न संवेद्यते इति । निमित्त-नैमित्तिकभावश्चावश्याश्रयणीयः । अन्यथा गौणलाक्षणिकयोः मुख्याद्भेदः, श्रुतिलिङ्गा-

अगृहीतसङ्केते कथमभिधा व्याप्रियतामिति निष्कर्षः॥ एतदेव विशदीकर्तुं 'किं च भवन्मते सङ्केतग्रहणमपि न घटत' इत्याह— न चापीति । तत्र हेतुमाह—

अन्वितानामेवेति । परस्परं व्यतिषक्ता एव पदार्थाः न तु विभक्ताः पृथक् पृथग्भूताः । तत्र कथमयमियान् भागोऽस्य पदस्यार्थ इति सङ्केतो गृह्यत इत्यर्थः । आशङ्कते— आवापेत्यादि—

व्यवहारेषु वृद्धानां वाक्यश्रवणभाविषु ।

आवापोद्वापभेदेन पदानां शक्तिनिश्चयः॥

इति नयात्तथाभावः पृथक् पृथक् सङ्केतग्रहणमित्यर्थः । परिहरति— सङ्केतः इति । आवापोद्वापाभ्यां पदशक्तिनिर्णये पदार्थसामान्य एव संकेत इति स्थितिः स्यात्, न च विशेष इति । तदा पश्चात् प्रतीयमाने विशेषरूपे अर्थे किं संकेतग्रहणमुपकरोतीत्यर्थः॥

आशङ्कते—अथोच्यत इति । तात्पर्यप्रतिपत्तिरिति । तात्पर्यस्य विशेषरूपस्य चतुर्थकस्याविनिविष्टस्यार्थस्य प्रतिपत्तिरिति यावत् ।

परिहरति—तदिदमिति । अङ्गीकारमेव प्रदर्शयति— यद्वक्ष्यतीति । तत्र विशेषमाह— किं त्वेत्यादि । झटिति प्रतीतावपि पदार्थवाक्यार्थयोर्निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावः क्रमात्मा अवश्यमस्तीत्यङ्गीकर्तव्य इति युक्त्या संभाव्यमानोऽपि क्रमो न संवेद्यत इत्येतावदेव । न तु तस्य नास्तित्वमिति । तस्माद्धेतोरित्यर्थः ।

असंवेदने कारणमाह— सजातीयतद्विकल्प-परम्परानुदयादिति । सजातीयानां शब्दाभिधेयत्वेन तुल्यानां तद्विकल्पानां तद्भेदानां अर्थानां परम्परया अनुदयात् प्रतीततयाऽभावादित्यर्थः ।

एतत् किनिमित्तमित्याह— सातिशयानुशीलनाभ्यासादिति । सातिशयपरामर्शपौनःपुन्या-दित्यर्थः । तत्र दृष्टान्तमाह— अभ्यस्तविषयव्याप्तिसमयस्मृतिक्रमवदिति । एवं क्रमाङ्गीकारेऽभिधेयैव नैमित्तिककार्योऽपि प्रतिपाद्य इति न भवतीति स्थितम् । अत एव च गौणादिपरिग्रहोऽयुपपद्यत इत्याह— अन्यथेत्यादि । श्रुतिलिङ्गादिप्रमाणबद्धकस्य पारदौर्बल्यमिति । श्रुतिलिङ्गवाक्यप्रकरणस्थानसमाख्यानां

दिप्रमाणषट्कस्य पारदौर्बल्यम् इत्यादिप्रक्रियाविधातः। निमित्ततावैचित्र्येणैवास्याः समर्थितत्वात्, निमित्ततावैचित्र्यं चाभ्युपगते किमपरमस्मात्स्वसूयया॥

येऽप्यविभक्तं स्फोटं वाक्यं तदर्थमाहुः तैरप्यविद्यापदपतितैः सर्वेयमनुसरणीया प्रक्रिया। तदुतीर्णत्वे तु सर्वं परमेश्वरादयं ब्रह्म इति अस्मच्छास्त्रकारेण न न विदितं तत्त्वालोकगन्धं विरचयता इत्यास्ताम्॥

यत्तु भट्टनायकेनोक्तम्-- इह दृष्टसिंहादिपदप्रयोगे^२ च भयानकरसावेशकृतैव निषेधावगतिः, तदीयभीरुत्व^३धीरत्व^४प्रकृतिनियमावगममन्तरेणैकान्ततो निषेधावगत्यभावादिति, तत्र केवलार्थसामर्थ्यं निषेधगतेर्निमित्तमिति। तत्रोच्यते-- केनोक्तमेतत् वक्तृप्रतिपत्तृविशेषावगमविरहेण शब्दगतध्वननव्यापारविरहेण च निषेधावगतिः इति? प्रतिपत्तृप्रतिभासहकारित्वं ह्यस्माभिः द्योतनस्य प्राणत्वेनोक्तम्^५; भयानकरसावेशश्च न वार्यते, तस्य^६ भयमात्रेणोत्पत्त्यभ्युपगमात्। प्रतिपत्तृश्च रसावेशो रसाभिन्नैक्यैव; रसश्च

समाये पारदौर्बल्यमर्थविप्रकर्षादिति प्रमाणान्यन्यानि षड्वक्तानि। तेषां पारदौर्बल्यं लिङ्गाच्छीघ्रग्राहिणी श्रुतिरित्यादि रोदाहरणं दर्शितम्। तदेतत्सर्वं दीर्घदीर्घाभिधाविलासे निरवकाशं स्यादित्यर्थः। प्रक्रियाविधाने हेतुमाह-- निमित्ततेति। निमित्ततावैचित्र्यं निमित्ततायां नानाविधत्वं दीर्घत्वमित्यर्थः। अस्याः अभिधायाः। इयमभिधैव दीर्घदीर्घलक्षणभावस्वधुरमुद्रोऽहं समर्था, तत इत्यर्थः। अपि च अभिधाया र्निमित्ततात्वमर्थप्रतिपादने तस्या वैचित्र्यं नानाविधत्वमङ्गीक्रियते चेत् अर्थभेदोऽङ्गीकृतः स्यात्। ततो व्यापारभेदोऽभ्युपेत इति॥ किमस्मादुक्ते असमर्थ इत्याह-- निमित्ततेति। एवमन्विताभिधानवादिना न पराकरणीयो ध्वनिरिति प्रसाध्य वैयाकरणदर्शनमपि नैनं विरोद्धमलमिति आह-- येऽप्यविभक्तमित्यादि। ये तावन्निरवयवमेकं वाक्यं निरवयवस्य वाक्यान्त्यस्य वाचकमिति वदन्ति, ते किं विद्यापदपतिताः एवं ब्रुवते, उत अविद्यापदपतिताः? नाद्यः कल्पः। विद्यापदपाते तूष्णींभाव एव स्यादिति। द्वितीयपक्षे इदं पदपदार्थविभागादिकं सर्वमङ्गीकरणीयम्। अन्यथा वचनस्वैवानुत्थानप्रसङ्गादिति। एवं शास्त्रकाराणां प्रतिवाच्य काव्यविदः प्रत्याह--यत्तु भट्टनायकेत्यादि। भयानकरसावेशकृतैवेति। न वाच्यसामर्थ्यकृतैत्यर्थः।

परिहरति-- तत्रोच्यत इत्यादि। प्रतिपत्ता बोधयितव्यः। तस्य भयानकरसस्य भयमात्रेण भयेनैवात्पत्तेरभ्युपगमात् प्रतिपत्तृधर्मीकस्य रसावेशः भयानकरसावेशः रसाभिन्नैक्यैव भवति नान्यथेत्यर्थः।

^१क.ख.ग.ङ.च.नि) तन्त्रालोक०. ^२क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च.नि) 'अपि' अधिकः. ^३क.ख.घ.ङ.च.का) भीरु. ^४घ.ङ.च.०वीरल०. ^५क.ख.ग.च.नि) 'वक्तु' इत्यधिकमादौ. ^६क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च. अस्य.

व्यङ्ग्य एव; तस्य च शब्दवाच्यत्वं तेनापि नोपगतमिति व्यङ्ग्यत्वमेव। प्रतिपत्तुश्च¹ रसावेशो न नियतः; न ह्यसौ नियमेन भीरुधार्मिकसब्रह्मचारी सहृदयः। अथ तद्विशेषोऽपि सहकारी कल्प्यते, तर्हि वक्तृप्रतिपत्तुप्रतिभाप्राणितो ध्वननव्यापारः किं न सह्यते? किं च वस्तुध्वनिं दूषयता रसध्वनिस्तदनुग्राहकः समर्थ्यत इति सुतरां² ध्वनिध्वंसोऽप्यम्। यदाह— “क्रोधोऽपि देवस्य वरेण तुल्यः”³॥

अथ रसस्यैवेयता प्राधान्यमुक्तं तत्को न सहते। अथ वस्तुमात्रध्वनेरेतदुदाहरणं न युक्तमित्युच्यते, तथापि काव्योद्दाहरणत्वात् द्वावप्यत्र ध्वनी स्ताम्⁴, को दोषः? यदि तु रसानुवेधेन विना न तुष्यते, तद्भयानकरसानुवेधोऽपि नात्र सहृदयहृदयदर्पणमध्यास्ते। अपि तूक्तनीत्या संभोगाभिलाषविभावभूतसंकेतस्थानोचितविशिष्टकाव्याद्यनुभावसंवल-
नोदित⁵शृङ्गाररसानुवेधः, रसस्यालौकिकत्वात्, तस्य तावन्मात्रादेव⁶ चानवगमात्। प्रथमं निर्विवादसिद्धिवित्तविधिनिषेधप्रदर्शनाभिप्रायेण चैतद्वस्तुध्वनेरुदाहरणं दत्तम्। यस्तु ध्वनिव्याख्यानोद्यतस्तात्पर्यशक्तिमेव विवक्षासूचकत्वमेव वा ध्वननमवोचत्, स नस्माकं हृदयमावर्जयति। यदाहुः— “भिन्नरुचिर्हि लोकः” इति। तदेतदग्रे यथायथं प्रतिनिष्याम

व्यङ्ग्य एव। न वाच्य इत्यर्थः। सब्रह्मचारी सदृशः। आशङ्कते— अथेति। तद्विशेषोऽपि सहृदयविशेषोऽपि। परिहरति— तर्हीति॥ उपहसति— किं चेति। क्रोधोऽपीति। कश्चित् केनचित्क्रोधवशात् कृतमभीप्सितार्थ-
युक्तत्वात् अनुग्रहं मन्यमान आहैवम्। काव्योदाहरणत्यादिति। काव्योदाहरणेषु लिलक्षयिः, मेव भवेत्, नान्यत् किञ्चिदिति न नियमः, अन्येषामपि बहूनां प्रस्तावान्तरे प्रतिपाद्यानां संभवत्। कुत एतत्? काव्यत्वात्। काव्यं खलु विचित्रार्थं भवति। शास्त्रोदाहरणे लिलक्षयितमेव स्यादिति भावः।

द्वावपीति। वस्तुध्वनिश्च रसध्वनिश्च स्तां भवेताम्। अथ यदि रसे निर्बन्धः, तर्हि शृङ्गार एव रसोऽस्तु न भयानक इत्याह। यदित्यित्यादि। संभोगेति। संभोगाभिलाषस्य विभावभूतमालम्बनभूतं यत् संकेतस्थानं तदुचितैः विशिष्टकाव्यादिभिः निर्णयकाकुनयनविकारादिभिरनुभावैः संवलनात् मिश्रणादुदित-
शृङ्गाररसानुवेध इति यावत्। तर्हि किमेतत् रसध्वनेरुदाहरणत्वेन न कृतमित्यत्राह— तस्येति। तावन्मात्रादेव चानवगमादिति। तावन्मात्रात् स्वरूपव्यावर्तनविरहेण देवलमुदाहरणमात्रात् रसस्थानवगमादित्यर्थः। व्याख्यानान्तरं प्रतिक्षिपति— यस्त्वित्यादि। तदेतत्तात्पर्यविवक्ष, सूचकत्वद्वयतिरिक्तध्वननस्वरूपमिति यावत्।

¹क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च.(का) अपि. ²क.ख.ग.घ.च.(का) सुष्ठुतरां. ³(नि) (का) 'इति' इत्यधिकम्. ⁴क.ख.(नि) कार्ष्ण. ⁵ग.(नि)(का) स्तः. ⁶क.ख.ग.(नि) 'यदि तुअप्यास्ते' नास्ति. ⁷क.ख.(नि)(का) ०शबलनोचित०. ⁸(कौ) तावन्मात्रेण.

इत्यास्तां तावत् ॥ भवेति॥ अतिसृष्टोऽसि, प्राप्तस्ते भ्रमणकालः॥ धार्मिकेति॥
कुसुमाद्युपयोगार्थं^१ युक्तं ते भ्रमणम्॥ विप्रबुध इति॥ शङ्काकारणवैकल्यात् ॥ स इति॥
यस्ते भयप्रकमामङ्गललतिकामकृत ॥ अर्धेति॥ दिष्ट्या वर्धसे इत्यर्थः॥ मारित इति॥
पुनरयानुत्थानम् ॥ तेनेति॥ यः पूर्वमेव कर्णाकर्णिकया^२ त्वयाप्याकर्णितो गोदावरीकच्छगहने
प्रतिवसतीति। पूर्वमेव हि तद्वक्षायै एतत्तयोपश्रावितोऽसौ ; अधुना तु दृप्तत्वात् ततो
गहनान्निस्सरतीति प्रसिद्धगोदावरीपरिसरानुसरणमपि तावत् कथाशेषीभूतम्, का कथा
तल्लतागृह^३प्रवेशशङ्काया इति भावः॥

श्वश्रूश्च शोते (अथवा निमज्जति) अत्राहं दिवसकं प्रलोकय।

मा पथिक राज्यन्ध शय्यायामावयोः शयिष्ठाः^४ ॥

महँ इति निपातोऽनेकार्थवृत्तिरत्र, आययोरित्यर्थे न तु भमेति; एवं हि विशेषवचनमेव
शङ्काकारि भवेदिति प्रच्छन्नाभ्युपगमो न स्यात्। काञ्चित्प्रोषितपतिकां तरुणीमवलोक्य
प्रवृद्धमदनाङ्कुरः^५ पान्थः अनेन निषेधद्वारेण तयाभ्युपगत इति निषेधाभावोऽत्र विधिः; न
तु निमन्त्रणरूपोऽप्रवृत्तप्रवर्तनास्वभावः, सौभाग्याभिमानखण्डनाप्रवेशात्। अत एव
'राज्यन्ध' इति समुचितसमयसंभाव्यमानविकाराकुलितत्वं ध्वनितम्। भावतदभावयोश्च
साक्षाद्विरोधात् वाच्याद्याह्यस्य स्फुटमेवात्यत्वम्॥

यच्चाह भट्टनायकः—“अहमित्यभिनयविशेषेणात्मदशावेदनात् शाब्दमेतदपि”
इति, तत्र अहमिति तावत् शब्दस्य नायं साक्षादर्थः; काक्वादिसहायस्य च तावति
ध्वननमेव व्यापार इति ध्वनेर्भूषणमेतत्॥

प्रकृतोदाहरणे यथाभिप्रायं दर्शयति—भवेति। आकर्णितपूर्वत्वं समर्थयति—पूर्वमेवेति। श्वश्रूरित्यादि
अनेकार्थवृत्तिरिति बहुवचन इत्यर्थः॥ विधेर्निमन्त्रणत्वे बाधमाह—सौभाग्येति। प्रवेशात्। प्रसङ्गादित्यर्थः।
अत एवेति। सौभाग्याभिमानादित्यर्थः। समुचितसमयः संश्लेषोचितरात्रिसमयः। अत्र भट्टनायकमतमनुवदति।
यच्चाहेति एतदपीति। एतन्निषेधद्वारेण अभ्युपगमनम्, अपीत्यनेनोक्तचरं प्रकाशयति। परिहरति—तत्रेति।
साक्षादर्थः। मुद्रार्थः। अभिधाव्यापारार्थ इत्यर्थः। काक्वेति, काक्वादिसहायस्याऽहंशब्दस्यायमर्थश्चेत्
तत्रास्य ध्वननमेव व्यापारो नाभिधेत्यर्थः।

^१क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) उपकरणार्थं. ^२क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च.(नि)(का) कर्णापकर्णिकया. ^३क.ख.ग.(का) गहन. ^४क.ख.(नि)
माङ्गलीः। अत्र शयिष्ठा वा. ^५क.ख.(नि) कश्चित्. ^६क.ख.(नि)(का) 'संमलः' इत्यधिकः.

‘अत्ता’ इति प्रयत्नेनानिभृतसंभोगपरिहारः। अथ ¹च यद्यपि भवान् मदनशरासारदार्यमाणहृदयः उपेक्षितुं न युक्तः, तथापि किं करोमि, पापो दिवसकोऽप्यम्। अनुचितत्वात् कुत्सितोऽयमित्यर्थः। प्राकृते पुनपुंसकयोरनियमः। न च सर्वथा त्वामुपेक्षे; यतोऽत्रैवाहं तत्प्रलोकय नान्यतोऽहं गच्छामि। तदन्योन्यवदनावलोकनविनोदेन दिनं तावदतिवाहयाव इत्यर्थः। प्रतिपन्नमात्रायां च रात्रावन्धीभूतो मदीयां² शय्यां मा श्लिषः, अपि तु निभृतनिभृतमेतदत्ताभिधाननिकटकण्टकनिद्रान्वेषणपूर्वकमितीयदत्र ध्वन्यते॥

व्रज ममैवैकस्या भवन्तु निःश्वासरोदितव्यानि ।

मा तवापि तथा विना दाक्षिण्यहतस्य जनिषत्³॥

अत्र व्रजेति विधिः। न प्रमादादेव नायिकान्तरसङ्गमनं तव, अपि तु गाढानुरागात्, येन अन्यादृङ्मुख⁴वर्णः गोत्रस्खलितादि च। केवलं पूर्वकृतानुपालनात्मना दाक्षिण्येनैक-रूपताभिमानेन त्वमत्र स्थितः, तत्सर्वथा शठोऽसि इति गाढमन्युरूपोऽयं खण्डित-नायिकाभिप्रायः अत्र प्रतीयते। न चासौ ⁵व्रज्याभावरूपो निषेधः; नापि विध्यन्तरमेव अन्यनिषेधाभावः।

दे⁶ इति निपातः प्रार्थनायाम्। आ इति तावच्छब्दार्थे।

प्रार्थये, प्रसीद ⁷तावत्, निर्वर्तस्व मुखशशिज्योत्स्नाविलुप्ततमोनिर्वहे।

अभिसारिकाणां विघ्नं करोष्यन्यासामपि हताशे॥

अत्र व्यवसितात् गमनान्ननिर्वर्तस्व इति प्रतीतेः निषेधो वाच्यः। गृहागता नायिका

प्राकृतेषु पुनपुंसकयोरनियम इत्येतच्चिन्त्यम्। दिवसशब्दो हि पुनपुंसकलिङ्गः। न च कुत्सा कप्रत्ययान्तः पुल्लिङ्ग एवेति नियमः। अन्धीभूतः मदनविजृम्भान्धीभूतः मा श्लिषः मा प्रापः। निभृतनिभृतप्राप्तेर्हेतुमाह— एतदिति।

एतस्य श्वश्रूनामः कण्टकस्यानर्थस्य निद्रान्वेषणपूर्वकमिति। व्रजेत्यादि। अत्र व्रजेति विधिरिति विधिरूपवाच्यार्थानुवादः। प्रतीयमानस्यानुभवरूपत्वं प्रदर्शयितुं तत्स्वरूपं प्रतिपादयति। न प्रमादादेवेत्यादि। अतो विवक्षितमाह न चेति। असौ प्रतीयमानार्थः। अन्यनिषेधाभाव इति। व्रज्याया अन्यस्य निषेधाभावः इति यावत्। दे आ इत्यादि। अत्र वाच्यस्य निषेधात्मकत्वं समर्थयति— अत्र व्यवसितादिति।

¹क.ख.ग.ङ.(नि)(का) ‘व’ नास्ति. ²ग.(नि)(का) मदीयायां शय्यायां. ³क.ख. जनिष्यते. ⁴क.ख.(का) राग; ग.घ. वर्णो इति. ⁵क.ख.(नि) विध्यभावः. ⁶क.ख.ग.(नि) हे. ⁷क.ख.(नि)(का) तावत्प्रसीद.

गोत्रसखलिताद्यपराधिनि नायके सति ततः प्रतिगन्तुं प्रवृत्ता नायकेन चाटूपक्रमपूर्वकं निवर्त्यते— न केवलं स्वात्मनः मम च निवृत्त्या^१ विघ्नं करोषि यावदन्यासामपि। ततस्तव न कदाचन सुखलवलाभोऽपि भविष्यति। अत एव हताशासि इति वल्लभाभिप्रायरूपः चाटुविशेषो व्यङ्ग्यः। यदि वा सख्योपदिष्टमानाणि तदवधीरणया गच्छन्ती सख्या उच्यते— न केवलमात्मनो विघ्नं करोषि लाघवादबहुमानास्पदम् आत्मानं कुर्वती, अत एव हताशा, पावद्भदनचन्द्रिकाप्रकाशितमार्गतया अन्यासाम^२प्यभिसारिकाणां विघ्नं करोषि -- इति सख्यभिप्रायरूपश्चाटुविशेषो व्यङ्ग्यः। अत्र तु व्याख्यानद्वयेऽपि व्यवसितात् प्रतीपगमनात् प्रियतमगृहगमनाच्च निवर्तस्वेति पुनरपि वाच्य एव विश्रान्तेः गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्य^३भेदस्य प्रेयोऽलङ्कारस्य नारम्भेण रसवदलंकारस्य उदाहरणमिदं स्यात्, न ध्वनेः। तेन अयमत्र भावः— काचित् रभसात् प्रियतमगृहभिसरन्ती तद्गृहाभिमुखमागच्छता तेनैव हृदयवल्लभेन एवमुपश्लोक्यते अप्रत्यभिज्ञानच्छलेन। अत एवात्मप्रत्यभिज्ञानान्धमेव नर्मवचनम् 'हताशे' इति। अन्यासां^४ च विघ्नं करोषि; तय चेप्सितलाभो भविष्यतीति का प्रत्याशा। अत एव मदीयं वा गृहमागच्छ, त्वदीयं वा गच्छाव इत्युभयत्राप्य^५ तात्पर्यादनुभयरूपो वल्लभाभिप्रायश्चाटुत्मा व्यङ्ग्य इत्येवाव^६तिष्ठते। अन्ये तु तटस्थानां सहृदयानामभिसारिकां प्रतीयमुक्तिरित्याहुः। तत्र हताशे इत्यामन्त्रणादि^७ युक्तमयुक्तं वेति सहृदया एव प्रमाणम्॥

उदाहरणवाक्यरथात्मलाभनिमित्तं प्रकरणमाह गृहमागतेति। प्रतीयमानं प्रकाशयति— न केवलमित्यादि। प्रकान्तरमाह—यदि वेत्यादि।

अत्र व्यङ्ग्यं दर्शयति न केवलमिति। उभयथायत्र मध्यमत्वाव्यक्तं प्रसज्यत इत्याह— अत्रत्वित्यादि^८ निवर्तस्वेति स्वरूपे वाच्ये अस्य प्रतीयमानस्य विश्रमाद्वाच्यस्यऽङ्गित्वं सति योऽत्र प्रतीयते रतिभावः। शृंगारो वा, तस्याङ्गतादपराङ्गव्यंग्यस्य प्रेयोऽलङ्कारस्य रसवत् इदमुदाहरणं युक्तं, न ध्वनेः। ध्वनौ हि वाच्यस्य न प्राधान्यं अपि तर्हि व्यंग्यस्येत्यर्थः। अत्र पुनर्व्यङ्ग्यस्य चाटुरूपस्य न प्राधान्यं वाच्ये विश्रान्तत्वात्, भावरसगोरपि न प्राधान्यं, चमत्कारकृता वाच्येन न्यक्कृतत्वादिति भावः। उदाहरणवाक्यस्य वक्त्रन्तरत्वमभिमतं केषांचिदित्याह—

अथ ध्वन्युदाहरणानुक्रममर्थं वक्तुं प्रकरणमाह— तेनायमन्त्रेति। अत्र व्यङ्ग्यमाह— इति एवावतिष्ठत इति। अस्य व्यङ्ग्यस्य वाच्ये विश्रान्त्यभावात्। प्रधानत्वेन ध्वन्युदाहरणमिदं युवतमिति भावः। अन्ये त्विति। तदेतदयुक्तमित्यभिप्रायेणाह— तत्रेति।

^१ ग. घ. इ. च. (का) निवृत्तिः. ^२ क. ख. ग. (नि) उपदिश्यते. ^३ क. ख. ग. घ. (नि) 'अपि' नास्ति. ^४ ग. व्यङ्ग्यस्य च. ^५ क. ख. (नि) अन्यासामपि. ^६ क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) ०त्रापि तात्पर्यं ०. ^७ क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) ०वः पवतिष्ठते. ^८ ग. घ. इ. च. आमन्त्रणादित्य.

एवं वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः धार्मिकपथिकः प्रियतमाभिसारिकाविषयैक्येऽपि स्वरूपविरो²धात् भेद इति प्रतिपादितम्। अधुना तु विषयभेदादपि व्यङ्ग्यस्य वाच्याद्भेद इत्याह— **क्वचिद्वाच्यादिति॥ व्यवस्थापित इति॥** विषयभेदोऽपि विचित्ररूपोऽप्यवतिष्ठमानः सहृदयैः व्यवस्थापयितुं शक्यत इत्यर्थः।

कस्य वा न भवति रोषो दृष्ट्वा प्रियायाः सव्रणमधरम्।

सभ्रमरपद्माघाणशीले वारितवामे सहस्वेदानीम् ॥

कस्स³ वेति॥ अनीर्षालोरपि भवति रोषः। दृष्ट्वैव कृत्वापि। कुतश्चिदेवापूर्वताया प्रियायाः सव्रणमधरं विलोक्य। सभ्रमरपद्माघाणशीले। शीलं हि कथंचिदपि वारयितुं न शक्यम्। वारिते वारणायां वामे ⁴तदनङ्गीकारिणि सहस्वेदानीम् उपालम्भपरम्परामित्यर्थः। अत्रायं भावः— काचिदविनीता कुतश्चित् खण्डिताधरा, निश्चिततत्ताविधसन्निधाने तदभर्तारि, तमनवलोकमानयेव कयाचिद्विदग्धसख्या तद्वाच्यतापरिहारायैवमुच्यते। सहस्वेदानीमिति तु वाच्यमविनयवतीविषयम्। भर्तृविषयम् अपराधो नास्तीत्यावेद्यमानं व्यङ्ग्यम्। सहस्वेत्यपि च तद्विषयं व्यङ्ग्यम्। तस्यां च प्रियतमेन गाढमुपालभ्यमानायां तद्व्यलीकशङ्कितप्रातिवेशिकलोकविषयं चाविनयप्रच्छादनेन प्रत्यायनं व्यङ्ग्यम्। तत्सपत्न्यां च तदविनयप्रह्लादितायां⁷ सौभाग्यातिशयख्यापनम् 'प्रियायाः' इति शब्दबलादिति सपत्नीविषयं व्यङ्ग्यम्। सपत्नीमध्ये इयता खलीकृतास्मीति लाघवमात्मनि ग्रहीतुं न युक्तम्, प्रत्युतायं बहुमानः। सहस्व शोभस्वेदानीम् इति सखीविषयं सौभाग्यव्यख्यापनं व्यङ्ग्यम्। अद्येयं तव प्रच्छन्नानुरागिणी हृदयवल्लभा इत्थं रक्षिता, पुनः

एवमिति। प्रथमोदाहरणे वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोर्द्वयोरपि धार्मिक एव विषयः। द्वितीये पान्यः। तृतीये प्रियतमा। चतुर्थेऽभिसारिका। **कस्यवेति। कृत्यापीति।** स्वयं कृत्यापीत्यर्थः। कुतश्चिदेव येन केनापि निमित्तेन लक्षणविगलनादिना अपूर्वतया नवतयोदाहरणस्य प्रकरणं दर्शयति। **क्वचिदित्यादि।** कुतश्चित् केनचित् चौर्यकामुकेनेत्यर्थः। **वाच्यता** अपराधः। विषयभेदं दर्शयति— **सहस्वेत्यादि।** भर्तृविषयमन्यदपि व्यङ्ग्यमस्तीत्याह— **सहस्वेत्यपि चेति।** अस्यास्तपस्विन्या इदमेवंविधं अधरव्रणत्वं सहस्वेत्यर्थः।

एवं भर्तृविषये व्यङ्ग्यद्वयमुक्तम्। अथ प्रातिवेशिकजनादिविषयान्तरविषयव्यङ्ग्यभेदप्रकाशनं करोति **तस्यामित्यादिना।** तद्व्यलीकशङ्कितेत्यादि तदप्रीतिशङ्किनः भर्त्रेर्षाशङ्किनः॥ शङ्का अपि नत्वसंभावना। प्रत्यायनं विश्वासनम्। नास्याः कश्चिदपराध इति निश्चायनम्। तस्यां चेति सौभाग्यातिशयः। अविनयवतीसौभाग्यातिशयः। अविनयवतीविषयमपि व्यङ्ग्यमप्यस्तीत्याह— **सपत्नीमध्ये** इत्यादि।

¹क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) पान्य. ²क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) भेदात्. ³क.ख.ग.घ.च.(नि)(का) कस्य वेति. ⁴क.ख.ग.(नि) तदनङ्गीकारिणि. ⁵क.ख.ग.घ.च.(नि) तत्पत्न्याम्. ⁶क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) 'तदुपालम्भन' इत्यधिकः. ⁷क.ख.(नि) (का) प्रहृष्टायाम्. ⁸क.ख.ग. (का)०प्रच्छा०.

प्रकटाधरदनविधिरत्र न युक्तः इति तच्चौर्यकामुकविषयसम्बोधनं व्यङ्ग्यम् । इत्थं मयैतदपह्नुतमिति स्ववैदग्ध्यख्यापनं तदस्थविदग्धलोकविषयं व्यङ्ग्यमिति । तदेतदुक्तं व्यवस्थापितशब्देन॥ अत्र इति॥ द्वितीयोद्घोते “अरंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्यः क्रमेण^१ द्योतितः परः” इति विवक्षितान्यपरवाव्यस्य द्वितीयप्रभेदवर्णनावसरे । यथा^२ हि विधिनिषेध-तदनु^३भयात्मना रूपेण संकलय्य वस्तुध्वनिः संक्षेपेण सुवचः^४ तथा नातङ्कारध्वनिः, अलङ्काराणां भूयस्त्वात् । तत एवोक्तम्— सप्रपञ्चमिति॥ तृतीयस्त्विति॥ तुशब्दो व्यतिरेके । वस्त्वलंकारावपि शब्दाभिधेयत्वमध्यासात् तावत् ; रसभावतदाभासतत्प्रशभाः पुनर्न कदाचिदभिधीयन्ते ; अथ कास्वाद्यमानताप्राणतया^५ भान्ति । तत्र ध्वननव्यापारादृते नास्ति कल्पनान्तरम्, स्खलद्गतित्वाभावे मुख्यार्थबाधादेर्लक्षणा निबन्धनस्या-नाशङ्कनीयत्वात् । औचित्येन प्रवृत्तौ चित्तवृत्तेरास्वाद्यत्वे स्थायिन्या रसो व्यभिचारिण्या भावः । अनौचित्येन तदाभासः, रावणस्येव सीतायां रतेः । यद्यपि तत्र हास्यरसरूपतैव “शृङ्गारद्वि भवेद्धास्यः” इति वचनात्, तथापि पाशचात्येयं सामाजिकानां स्थितिः । तन्मयीभवनदशायां तु रतेरेवास्वाद्यतेति शृङ्गारतैव भाति पौर्वापर्यविवेकावधीरणेन, “दूराकर्षणमोहमन्त्र इव मे तन्नामि यातं श्रुतिम्” इत्यादौ । तदसौ शृङ्गाराभास एव ; तदङ्गं भावभासः । चित्तवृत्तेः प्रशम एव प्रक्रान्ताया हृदयमाह्लादयति यतो विशेषेण, तत एव तत्संगृहीतोऽपि पृथग्गणितोऽसौ । यथा—

रदनविधिः । दन्तखण्डनविधिः । संबोधनं प्रबोधनं उपदेश इति यावत् । अयं व्यङ्ग्यप्रपञ्चो ग्रन्थकारस्याभिमत इत्याह— तदेतदिति । द्वितीयप्रभेदः संलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्यः सप्रपञ्चग्रहणस्योपर्यतिं दर्शयति । यथाहीति॥ व्यतिरेकं प्रकाशयति— वस्त्वलङ्काराविति । रसादिलक्षणा इत्यत्रादिशब्दावरुद्धानाह— रसभाव-तदाभासतत्प्रशमा इति । अथ चेति । तथापीति यावत् ।

कल्पनान्तराभावस्य हेतुमाह— स्खलद्गतित्वाभाव इति । लक्षणानिबन्धनस्य लक्षणानिमित्तस्य रसादीनां विषयमाह— औचित्येनेत्यादि । यदा चित्तवृत्तिरास्वाद्यत्वे स्थायिनी भवति, तदा रसः । यदा व्यभिचारिणी तदा भावः, तदा भासः रसभावाभासः । अत्र दृष्टान्तमाह— रावणस्येति । आशङ्कते— यद्यपीति । परिहरति— तथापीति । इयं शम्यरमरूपताम् । एवं रसाभासं प्रदर्श्य भावाभासं दर्शयति॥ तदङ्गं भावाभास इति ।

तदङ्गं रसाभासाङ्गम् । तदङ्गाभासः । अथ भावप्रशमं निरूपयति । चित्तवृत्तेरिति तत्संगृहीतोऽपि । भावसंगृहीतोऽप्यसौ भावप्रशमः पृथग्गणितः । तत्र हेतुमाह— तत एवेति॥

कृता एवेत्याह— यतो विशेषणं न विशेषप्रक्रान्तायाश्चित्तवृत्तेः प्रशम एव हृदयमाह्लादयति, तत

^१क.ख.ग.(नि) (कः) ०क्रमेणो०. ^२क.ख.ग. (नि) तथा हि. ^३क.ख.ग. (नि) तदुभय. ^४क.ख.ग.(नि) सुवचन. ^५क.ख.ग.(नि) प्रतिभान्ति.

“एकस्मिन् शयने पराङ्मुखतया वीतोत्तरं ताम्यतो-

¹रन्योन्यं हृदयस्थितेऽप्यनुनये संरक्षतोर्गौरवम्।

दम्पत्योः शनकैरपाङ्गवलनामिश्रीभवच्चक्षुषो-

र्भग्नो मानकलिः सहासरभसव्यावृत्तकण्ठग्रहः२॥”

इत्यत्रेष्वा³क्रोधात्मनो मानस्य प्रशमः। न चायं रसादिरर्थः ‘पुत्रस्ते जातः’ इत्यतो यथा हर्षो जायते तथा; नापि लक्षणया; अपितु सहृदयस्य हृदयसंवादबलाद्धिभावानु-भावप्रतीतौ तन्मयीभवने⁴भास्वाद्यमान एव रस्यमानतैकप्राणः सिद्धस्वभावसुखादिविलक्षणः परिस्फुरति। तदाह- प्रकाशत⁵ इति॥ तेन तत्र शब्दस्य ध्वननमेव व्यापारोऽर्थ-सहकृतस्येति। विभावाद्यर्थोऽपि पुत्रजन्महर्षन्यायेन तां चित्तवृत्तिं जनयतीति जननातिरिक्तोऽर्थस्यापि व्यापारो ध्वननमेवोच्यते॥ स्वशब्देति॥ शृङ्गारादिना शब्देन अभिधाव्यापारवशादेव॥ निवेदितत्वेनेति॥ विभावादीति॥ तात्पर्यशक्त्यर्थः। तत्र स्वशब्दस्यान्वयन्यतिरेकौ रस्यमानतासारं रसं प्रति निराकुर्वन् ध्वननस्यैव ताविति दर्शयति- न च सर्वत्रेति॥ यथा भट्टेन्दुराजस्य-

“यद्विश्रम्य विलोकितेषु बहुशो निःस्थेमनी लोचने

यद्गात्राणि दरिद्रति प्रतिदिनं लूनाब्जिनीनालवत्।

दूर्वाकाण्डविडम्बकश्च निबिडो यत्पाण्डिमा गण्डयोः

कृष्णे यूनि सयौवनासु वनितास्वेषैव वेषस्थितिः॥” इति॥

अत्रानुभावविभावावबोधानन्तरमेव तन्मयीभवनयुक्त्या तद्धिभावानुभावोचितचित्तवृत्ति-वासनानुरञ्जितस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वण⁶गोचरोऽर्थात्मा⁷ स्फुरत्येवाभिलाषचिन्तौत्सुक्यनिद्रा-धृतिग्लान्यालस्यश्चरन्मृतिवितर्कादिशब्दाभावेऽपि। एवं व्यतिरेकाभावं प्रदर्शयन्वयाभावं

एवेति यावत्। न चायमिति। नापि लक्षणयेति जायते इत्यनुषङ्गः। अभिघयेत्याशङ्कैव नेत्यपिशब्दाशयः। तर्हि कीदृशो रसादिरित्यत्राह- अपित्विति। सिद्धस्वभाव इति जनननिषेधः। अत एव भुखादिविलक्षण इति ध्वननमेवेति। नाभिधा न लक्षणेति व्यावर्त्यम्। ननु शब्दो रसादिकमजीजनत् अर्थस्तु विभावादीनजनयत्। यथा पुत्रजन्मार्थो हर्षमित्यत्राह- विभावाद्यर्थोऽपीति।

साक्षाच्छब्दस्य व्यापारविषय इति। अत्र साक्षाच्छब्दव्यापारोऽभिधा। स्वशब्दनिवेदित्वेनेति। एतद्व्याचष्टे- स्वशब्देतीत्यादि- विभावादिप्रतिपादकत्वेनैतद्विवृणोति- विभावादीतीत्यादि। प्रथम-कल्पपरकारणं प्रस्तौति- तत्रेति। एतौ अन्वयव्यतिरेकौ। यद्विश्रम्येति। विश्रम्यान्निर्षय, अलसीभूयेति

¹ ग.घ.(नि) (का) अन्योन्यस्य हृदि स्थिते. ² ग.ङ.(का) ग्रहम्. ³ क.ख.(नि) (का) रोधात्मनो. ⁴ क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च.(नि)(का) भावेन. ⁵ क.ख. प्रकाशयत. ⁶ क.ख. ‘चर्वण’ नास्ति। घ.ङ.(नि) (का) चर्वणा. ⁷ क.ख.ग.(नि) (का) अर्थो रसात्मा.

दर्शयति— यत्रापीति॥ तदिति स्वशब्दावेदितत्वम्^१॥ प्रतिपादनमुखेनेति॥ शब्दप्रयुक्तया विभावादिप्रतिपत्त्येत्यर्थः॥ सा केवलमिति। तथा हि—

याते द्वारवतीं तदा मधुरिपौ तद्वत्तन्ममानतां^२

कालिन्दीतटरूढवज्जुललतामार्गालेङ्ग्य सोत्कण्ठया।

तद्गीतं गुरुवाष्पगद्गदगलत्तारस्वरं राधया

येनान्तर्जलचारिभिर्जलधरैरप्युत्कमुत्कृजितम्॥ इति॥

अत्र विभावानुभावम^३प्लानतया प्रतीयते,^४ उत्कण्ठा चर्वणागोचरं प्रतिपद्यत एव। सोत्कण्ठाशब्दः केवलं सिद्धं साधयति। उत्कमित्यनेन तु उक्तानुभावानुकर्षणं कर्तुं सोत्कण्ठाशब्दः प्रयुक्त इत्यनुवादोऽपि नानर्थकः। पुनरनुभावप्रतिपादने हि पुनरुक्तम्, अतन्मयीभावो वा॥ न तु तत्कृतेति॥ अत्र हेतुमाह— विषयान्तर इति॥ “यद्विश्रम्य” इत्यादौ। न हि यदभावेऽपि यद्भवति तत्कृतं तदिति भावः। अदर्शनमेव प्रथयति— न हीति॥ केवलशब्दार्थं स्फुटयति— विभावादीति ॥ काव्य इति॥ तत्र मते काव्यरूपतया प्रसज्यमान इत्यर्थः॥ मनागपीति॥

“शृङ्गारहास्यकरुणारौदवीरभयानकाः ।

बीभत्साद्भुतसंज्ञां चेत्यष्टौ नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः॥” इत्यत्र।

एवं रवशब्देन सह रसादेर्व्यतिरेकान्वयाभावमुपपत्त्या प्रदर्श्य तथैवोपसंहरति— यतश्चेत्यादिना कथंचिदित्यन्तेन॥ अभिधेयमेव सामर्थ्यं सहकारिशक्तिरूपं विभावादिकं

यावत्। दरिद्रति—शुष्यन्ति कृषीभवन्ति। याते इत्यादि। श्रम्यमानतां—रहःकेलीसाक्षिभावादित्यर्थः। जलचरैः सारसादिभिः। विभावानुभावमिति एकवद्भावेन निर्देशः। विभावः—शोरिविरहो विशिष्टस्थानं च। अनुभावा गीतवाष्पादयः। सिद्धं साधयति—प्रतीतामुत्कण्ठामनुवदतीत्यर्थः। उत्कण्ठेन पुनर्योऽयमुत्कण्ठानुभावः कृतः स न व्यर्थः। उक्तानुभावानुकर्षणार्थत्वादित्याह—उत्कमित्यनेनेति। पुनरिति। पुनराकृष्टानुभावप्रदर्शने पुनरुक्तान्तन्मयीभावः पुनरुक्तोत्कण्ठा तन्मयीभावश्च न व्यर्थ इत्यर्थः।

न तु तत्कृतेति। तेन स्वशब्देन कृता रसादिप्रतीतिरित्यर्थः। स्वशब्दमात्रप्रयोगे रसाप्रतीतेरुदाहरणं दर्शयति—शृङ्गारहास्य इति। अभिधेयसामर्थ्याक्षिप्तत्वपदं व्यापाष्टं—अभिधेयमेवेति। अत्र व प्रथममभिधेय-सामर्थ्यमिति कर्मधारये षष्ठीतत्पुरुषश्च भवतीति कर्मधारयाश्रयेण शब्दध्वननपक्षं प्रदर्शयति। शब्दस्य

^१क.ख. निवेद्यत्वं, ग.(नि) (का) निवेदितत्वम्. ^२क.ख.ग.घ. कम्पनतां, ड. संपन्नताम्, च. संपानताम्. ^३क.ख.ग.(नि) (का) भावौ प्लानतया प्रतीयते. ^४क.ख.ग.घ.ड.च.(नि) (का) प्रतीयते, प्रतीयते, (कौ) प्रतीयतः. ^५घ.ड.च. बीभत्साद्भुतशान्ताश्च नव नाट्ये रसाः स्मृताः.

रसध्वने शब्दस्य कर्तव्ये, अभिधेयस्य च पुत्रजन्महर्षभित्रयोगक्षेमतया जननव्यतिरिक्ते दिवाभोजनाभावविशिष्टपीनत्वानुमितरात्रिभोजनविलक्षणतया; चानुमानव्यतिरिक्ते ध्वने कर्तव्ये सामर्थ्यं शक्तिः विशिष्टसमुचितवाचकसाकल्यम्—इति द्वयोरपि शब्दार्थ-योर्ध्वननव्यापारः। एवं द्वौ पक्षवुपक्रम्याद्यो दूषितः। द्वितीयस्तु कथंचिददूषितः, कथंचिदङ्गीकृतः— जननानुमानव्यापाराभिप्रायेण दूषितः, ध्वननाभिप्रायेणाङ्गीकृतः। यस्त्वत्रापि तात्पर्यशक्तिमेव ध्वननं मन्यते, स न वस्तुतत्त्ववेदी। विभावानुभावप्रतिपादिके हि वाक्ये तात्पर्यशक्तिर्भेदे, संसर्गे वा पर्यवस्येत; न तु रस्यमानतासारे रसे— इत्यलं बहुना। इतिशब्दो हेत्वर्थः²; इत्यतो³ हेतोस्तृतीयोऽपि प्रकारो वाच्याद्भित्र एवेति संबन्धः॥ ⁴सहेवेति॥ इवशब्देन विद्यमानोऽपि क्रमो न संलक्ष्यत इति⁵ दर्शयति ॥ अग्र इति॥ द्वितीयोद्घोते॥

एवं “प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव” इतीयता ध्वनिस्वरूपं व्याख्यातम्। अधुना
1.5 काव्यात्मत्वमितिहासव्याजेः⁶ दर्शयति॥ काव्यस्यात्मेति॥ स एवेति॥ प्रतीयमानमात्रेऽपि प्रक्रान्ते तृतीय एव रसध्वनिरिति मन्तव्यम्, इतिहासबलात् प्रक्रान्तवृत्तिग्रन्थार्थबलाच्च। तेन रस एव वस्तुत आत्मा वस्त्वलंकारध्वनी तु सर्वथा रसे⁸ पर्यवस्येते इति वाच्यादुत्कृष्टौ

रसध्वने रसव्यञ्जने कर्तव्येऽभिधेयमेव सामर्थ्यमित्यन्वयः। अभिधेयसामर्थ्यस्वरूपं प्रदर्शयति— सहकारि-शक्तिरूपमिति। तदेव विस्पष्टयति— विभावादिरूपमिति॥ तथा चोक्तम्—

अथोऽपि व्यञ्जकस्तत्र सहकारितया मतः। इतिः। षष्ठीतत्पुरुषाश्रयेणार्थध्वननपक्षं परामृशति—अभिधेयस्य चेति। भिन्नयोगक्षेमतया भिन्नन्यायतया। पुत्रजन्म खलु हर्षं जनयति, न तथा विभवाद्यर्थो रसं जनयतीति तद्विलक्षणत्वमर्थध्वननस्य। एवं जननपक्षः पराकृतः। अनुमानपक्षमपि पराकरोति—दिवाभोजनेति। विशिष्टं रात्रिभोजनं अविनाभावबललब्धं, न त्वेवं विभावादेः रसस्य चाविनाभाव इति विलक्षण्यम्। विशिष्टेति। वाचकस्य विशिष्टत्वं गुणालङ्कारैरुचितत्वम्, सुकुमारमध्यमवर्णयोगः। आद्यो दूषितः शब्दध्वननपक्षो दूषितः। स्वशब्दनिवेदित्वनिराकरणेनेति शेषः।

द्वितीयस्त्विति॥ द्वितीयः अर्थध्वननपक्षः। कथञ्चित् केनचित् प्रकारेण। कोऽयं प्रकार इत्यत्राह—जननेति। पक्षान्तरमनुभाव्य दूषयति। यस्त्वत्रेति। भेदे संसर्गे चेति। केषाञ्चित् गामानयेत्पादौ भेदो वाक्यार्थः। भेदः कर्मान्तरेभ्यः क्रियान्तरेभ्यश्च व्यावृत्तिः। संसर्गरत्वाथो न शाब्द इति। अन्येषां संसर्गो वाक्यार्थः। कर्मविशेषस्य क्रियाविशेषणसंबन्धः, भेदस्त्वर्थ इति। उभयपक्षेऽपि तात्पर्यशक्तिर्वाच्यकस्यात्र किञ्चिदप्यतिक्रामतीत्यर्थः। वृत्तिग्रन्थार्थबलादिति। वृत्तिग्रन्थो रसादिलक्षण इत्यादि। ननु यदि वस्त्वलंकारध्वन्योः रसे पर्यवसानं तर्हि काव्यात्मा रस इति वक्तव्यम्, न तु सामान्येन ध्वनिरित्यत्राह—

¹क.ख. रस्यमानसरो रसः. ²क. (का) ख.ग. (नि) अर्थ. ³(नि) (का) इत्यपि, क.ख.ग. अतो. ⁴क.ख.ग.(नि) सहेवेति.

⁵ग.ङ.च.(नि) (का) इति तद्वर्शयति. ⁶घ.च.(नि) (का) च. ⁷(के) प्रक्रान्तार्थं वृत्तिः. ⁸(के)क.ख. रसं प्रति पर्यवस्यत.

तावित्यभिप्रायेण ध्वनिः काव्यस्यात्मेति सामान्येनोक्तम्॥ शोक इति॥ क्रौञ्चस्य द्वन्द्ववियोगेन सहचरी हननोद्भूतेन साहचर्यध्वंसेनोत्थितो यः शोकः स्थायिभावो निरपेक्षभावत्वाद्विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारोचितरतिस्थायिभावादस्य एव। स एव तथाभूत-विभावतदुत्थाकृन्ताद्यनुभावचर्चणया हृदयसंवादतन्मयीभवनक्रमादास्वाद्यमानतां प्रतिपन्नः करुणरसरूपतां लौकिकशोकव्यतिरिक्तां स्वचित्तवृत्तिद्रुतिरूमास्वाद्यसारां प्रतिपन्नो रसपरिपूर्णकुम्भोच्चलनवचित्तवृत्तिनिष्यन्दस्वभावां वाग्विलापादिवच्च समयानपेक्षत्वे चित्तवृत्तिव्यञ्जकत्वादिति नयेन अकृतकतयैवावैशवशात् समुचितच्छन्दोवृत्तादि-नियन्त्रितश्लोकरूपतां प्राप्ताः—

“मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः।

यः क्रौञ्चमिधुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥” इति।

न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम्। एवं हि सति तदुःखेन सोऽपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा रसात्यात्मतेति निरवकाशं भवेत्। न च दुःखसंतप्तस्यैषा दशेति। एवं हि चर्चणोचित-शोकस्थायिभावात्मक²करुणरससमुच्चलनस्वभावत्वात् स एव काव्यस्यात्मा सारभूतो³ अपरशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः। एतदेवोक्तं हृदयदर्पणे— “यावत्पूर्णो न दैतेन तावन्नयं वमत्यमुम्” इति। ‘अगमः’ इति छान्दसेनाडागमेन॥ स एवेति॥ एवकारेणेदमाह— नान्य

दाच्यादिति। द्वन्द्वशब्दस्य साहचर्यार्थं प्रदर्शयति— क्रौञ्चस्येति। निरपेक्षभावत्वादिति॥ विप्रलम्भशृङ्गारे रतेः सापेक्षभावतां करुणे तु निरपेक्षभावत्वम्। तथाभूतविभावः सहचरीहननम्। तदुत्थः सहचरोहननोत्थः। समयानपेक्षत्वेऽप्येति। इह तावद्विलापप्रशंसाभर्तनादयः सन्ति नवभग्नकाराः। न च ते शोकबहुमानेभ्योऽधिरेष भवन्तीति नियन्त्रं शक्यते। निमित्तान्तरेणापि भावात्। तथापि विलापः शोकरूपां चित्तवृत्तिं व्यनक्ति। स्तुतिर्बहुमानरूपां, भर्तनमीष्यारूपां प्रश्नः संशयरूपमित्यस्ति न्यायः, तस्मादित्यर्थः।

अत्र मुनिर्दुःखित एवमवोचत् इति न प्रतिपत्तव्यमित्याह— न तु मुनेरिति। अत्र हेतुः। एवं हीति॥ न खलु शोकमात्रं रस इति भावः। न चेति। एषा दशा श्लोकोक्तिरूपा दशा एव। शोकेति। इदं काव्यं करुणरसबलेन समुच्चलनस्वभादम्। अतो अस्य रस एवात्मेति यावत्। अपरशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारक इति। शब्दान्तराभिधेयार्थवैलक्षण्यकारक इति यावत्।

हृदयदर्पणमिति कश्चित् काव्यलक्षणग्रन्थः। यावत् पूर्ण इति। यावत् कविरितेन रसेन पूर्णो न भवति, तावदां रसं श्लोकमुद्धेन न वमतीत्यर्थः।

आत्मेति। तेन यदाह भट्टनायकः—

“शब्दप्राधान्यमाश्रित्य तत्र शास्त्रं पृथग्विदुः।

¹अर्थे तत्त्वेन युक्ते² तु वदन्त्याख्यानमेतयोः॥

द्वयोगुणत्वे व्यापारप्राधान्ये काव्य³गीर्भवेत् ॥”

इति तदपास्तम्। व्यापारो हि यदि ध्वननात्मा रसनास्वभावः तत्रापूर्वमुक्तम्। अर्थाभिधैव व्यापारः तथाप्यस्याः प्राधान्यं नेत्यावेदितं प्राक्॥

श्लोकं व्याचष्टे— विविधेति॥ विविधं तत्तदभिष्यञ्जनीयरसानुगुण्येन विचित्रं कृत्वा वाच्ये वाचके रचनायां च ⁴प्रपञ्चेन यच्चारु शब्दार्थालङ्कारगुणयुक्तमित्यर्थः। तेन सर्वत्रापि ध्वननसद्भावेऽपि न तथा व्यवहारः। आत्मसद्भावेऽपि हि क्वचिदेव जीवव्यवहार इत्युक्तं प्राक्। तेनैतन्निरवकाशम्, यदुक्तं हृदयदर्पणे “सर्वत्र तर्हि काव्यव्यवहारः स्यात्” इति। निहतसहचरीति विभाव उक्तः। आक्रन्दितशब्देनानुभावः॥ जनित इति॥ चर्वणागोचरत्वेनेति शेषः। ननु शोकचर्वणातो यदि श्लोक उद्भूतः तत्प्रतीयमानं वस्तु काव्यस्यात्मेति कुत इत्याशङ्क्याह— शोको हीति॥ करुणस्य तच्चर्वणागोचरात्मनः शोकः स्थायिभावः। शोके हि स्थायिभावे ये विभावानुभावाः तत्समुचिता चित्तवृत्तिः चर्व्यमाणात्मा रस इत्यौचित्यात् स्थायिनो रसतापत्तिरित्युच्यते ; प्राक्स्वसंविदितं परत्रानुमितं च चित्तवृत्तिजातं संस्कारक्रमेण हृदयसंवादमादधानं चर्वणायामुपयुज्यते यतः⁵। ननु प्रतीयमानरूपमात्मा, तच्च त्रिभेदं प्रतिपादितम्; न तु रसैकरूपम्। अनेन चेतिहासेन रसस्यैवात्मभूतत्वमुक्तं भवतीत्याशङ्क्य अभ्युपगमेनैवोत्तरमाह— प्रतीयमानस्य चेति॥ अन्यो भेदो वस्त्वलंकारात्मा। भावग्रहणेन⁶ व्यभिचारिणोऽपि चर्व्यमाणस्य तावन्मात्रविश्रान्तावपि स्थायिचर्वणापर्यवसानोचितरसप्रतिष्ठामनवाप्यापि प्राणत्वं⁷ भवतीत्युक्तम्॥ यथा—

अत्र भट्टनायकोक्तमनुभाषते— तेनेति। अयं व्यापारः किं ध्वननं, उताभिधेति विकल्पं हृदि निधाय परिहरति तदपास्तमिति।

तेनेति। विविधवाच्यवाचकरचनाप्रपञ्चचारुणः शब्दस्य काव्यत्वेन सिंहां देवदत्त इत्यादावपि ध्वननसद्भावेऽपि न काव्यव्यवहारः गुणालङ्कारादिसौन्दर्याभावादित्यर्थः।

एतत् पूर्वमेव समर्थितमिति स्मृतिमादधाति—आत्मेति। ननु तु शोकेति। प्रतीयमानं वस्तु इति। रस इत्यर्थः, इति भावः॥ औचित्यादिति। निमित्तत्वरूपादैर्चित्यात् स्थायी रसः संपद्यत इत्यर्थः। तत्र हेतुमाह— प्राप्तिः। भावग्रहणेनेत्यादि। तावन्मात्रविश्रान्तावपीति। स्वचर्वणामात्रविश्रान्त्यापि भवतीत्युक्तमिति। अथ चास्वाद्यमानताप्राणतया भान्तीत्यादाविति शेषः। अत्रोदाहरणं दर्शयति— यथेति।

¹क.ख.ड.च.(नि) (का) अर्थतत्त्वेन. ²क.ख.(नि) (का) युक्तम्. ³क.ख.(नि) (का) काव्यधी. ⁴क.ख. ‘प्रपञ्चेन’ नास्ति.

⁵क.ख.ग.(नि) ‘यतः’. नास्ति. ⁶क.ख.ग.घ.(नि) ग्रहणम्. ⁷(के). प्राणकत्वं.

“नन्त्रं नखाग्रेण विघट्टयन्ती विवर्तयन्ती वलय विलोलम्।

आमन्त्रमाशिञ्जितनूपुरेण पादेन मन्दं भुवमालिखन्ती ॥”

इत्यत्र लज्जायाः। रसभावशब्देन¹ तदाभासतत्प्रशमावपि संगृहीतावेव, अवान्तरवैचित्र्येऽपि तदेकरूपत्वात्॥ **प्राधान्यादिति॥** रसपर्यवसानादित्यर्थः। तावन्मात्रविश्रान्तावपि चान्यशब्दवैलक्षण्यकारित्वेन वस्त्वलंकारध्वन्योऽपि जीवितत्वमौचित्यादुक्तमिति भावः॥ एवमिनिहासमुखेन प्रतीयमानस्य काव्यात्मतां प्रदर्श्य स्वसंवित्तिरुद्धमप्येतदिति दर्शयति—

I.6 सरस्वतीति॥ वारुणा भगवतीत्यर्थः। वस्तुशब्देनार्थशब्दं तत्त्वशब्देन च वस्तुशब्दं व्याचष्टे— **निःष्यन्दमानेति॥** दिव्यमानन्तरसं स्वयमेव प्रस्तुवानेत्यर्थः।

यदाह भट्टनायकः—

“वाग्धेनुर्दुग्ध एतं² हि रसं यद्वाल³तृष्णया ।

तेन नास्य समः स स्यादुदुह्यते योगिभिर्हि यः॥”

तदावेशेन विनाप्याक्रान्त्या हि यो योगिभिर्दुह्यते। अत एव

“यं सर्वशैलाः परिकल्प्य वत्सं मेरौ स्थिते दौग्धरि दोहदक्षे।

भासन्ति रत्नानि महौषधीश्च पृथूपदिष्टां दुदुर्धुरित्रीम् ॥”

इत्यनेन साराग्रघवस्तुपात्रत्वं हिमवत उक्तम्॥ **अभिव्यनक्ति परिस्फुरन्तमिति॥** प्रतिपत्तुन्

अत्र लज्जाया इति। अत्र श्लोके लज्जाया व्यभिचारिणः शुङ्गाररसप्रविचर्वणीयतया काव्यजीवित-
त्वमित्यर्थः। ननु यदि वस्त्वलंकारध्वन्योः रसे पर्यवसानं तर्हि रस एवात्मैति वक्तव्यमित्यत्राह—
तावन्मात्रेति। रसमात्रविश्रान्तौ चान्यशब्दः शब्दप्रतिपादितोऽर्थः तद्वैलक्षण्यकारित्वेन हेतुनाऽनयो-
जीवितत्वमुक्तमित्यर्थः।

वाग्धेनुरिति। वाग्धेनुर्बालि श्रोतरि वत्से च तृष्णया कृपया स्नेहेन च एतं रसं दुग्धे यत्, तेन अस्य
रसस्य स समो न स्यात्। यो रसो योगिभिर्दुह्यते इति यावत्। असमानत्वं प्रदर्शयितुं चतुर्थपादार्थमाह—
तदावेशेनेति। रसावेशेन विनापि योगिनो बलात्कारेण परमानन्दं दुहते। वाग्धेनुस्तु रसावेशेनैव रसपूर्णत्वात्
स्वयमानन्दं प्रप्नोति। अतो न समत्वमित्यर्थः। अत एवेति। यतो रसपरिपूर्णं वेनुरियं रसं प्रप्नोति, अत एव।
पृथ्वी धेनुर्गर्भीकृतसारवस्तु प्रस्तुतवतीति हिमवतः साराग्रघवस्तुपात्रत्वमुक्तमित्यर्थः।

एवं वाग्धेनोरनुग्रहात् सारभूतरसपात्रत्वं सहृदयानां भवतीति भावः। **अभिव्यनक्तीति।** सहृदयान्

प्रति सा प्रतिभा नानुमीयमाना, अपि तु तदावेशवशेन भासमानेत्यर्थः। यथोक्तमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन— “नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः समानोऽनुभवस्ततः” इति। प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा। तस्या विशेषो रसावेशवैवश्यसुन्दरकाव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम्। यदाह मुनिः— “कवेरन्तर्गतं भावम्” इति॥ येनेति॥ अभिव्यक्तेन स्फुरता प्रतिभाविशेषण निमित्तेन महाकवित्वगणनेति यावत् ॥

इदं चेति ॥ न केवलम् “प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेव” इत्येतत्कारिकासूचितौ स्वरूपविषयभेदावेव, यावद्भिन्नसामग्रीवेद्यत्वमपि वाच्यातिरिक्तत्वे प्रमाणमिति यावत्।

I.7 वेद्यत इति॥ न तु न वेद्यते, येन न स्यादसाविति भावः। काव्यस्य तत्त्वभूतो योऽर्थस्तस्य भावना वाच्यातिरेकेणानवरतं चर्वणा तत्र विमुखानाम्। स्वराः षड्जादयः सप्त। श्रुतिर्नाम शब्दस्य वैलक्षण्यकारि² यद्वृत्तान्तरं तत्परिमाणानां स्वरतदन्तरालोभयभेदकल्पिता द्वाविंशतिविधा।⁴ आदिग्रहणेन जात्यंशकग्रामरागभाषाविभाषान्तरभाषादेशीमार्गा गृह्यन्ते। प्रकृष्टं गीतं येषां ते प्रगीताः; गातुं वा प्रारब्धा इत्यादिकर्मणि क्तः; प्रारम्भेण चात्र

प्रतीति शेषः। प्रतिपत्तुः सहृदयस्य। तदावेशवशेन रसावेशवशेन स्वरूपविषयभेदावेवेति। “प्रतीयमानं पुनरन्यदेवेति”—कारिकाया अन्यदेवेति प्रतीयमानस्य स्वरूपमुक्तम्। भातीत्यनेन विषयभेदशेवोक्तः। सहृदयस्य खलु भातीति सहृदयो विषयः। अथ च प्रत्युतेति यावत्।

श्रुतिर्नामित्यादि। वैलक्षण्यमात्रकारि भेदमात्रकारि रूपान्तरं रूपविशेषः। तत्परिमाणतावन्मात्र-कालस्वरतदन्तरालोभयभेदकल्पितरवरस्य षड्जादेस्तदन्तरालस्य स्वरांतर्भागस्य चोभययोर्भेदस्तेन कल्पिता स्वरांशभूतेत्यर्थः॥ तदुक्तम्—

सूचीमुखेनाष्टसरोजपात्रे

संवेद्यकालस्त्रुटिसंज्ञकः स्यात्।

तत्कालरुद्धः श्रवणोपशत्यं

स्वरांशमाद्यं श्रुतिमाहुरार्याः॥ इति यथा

पवनघट्टनात्तन्व्याः यः समुत्पद्यते ध्वनिः।

श्रवणप्रीतिहेतुः सा श्रुतिरित्यभिधीयते॥ इति। द्वाविंशतिविधेति॥ यथा—

मन्दमध्यमताराख्यस्थानभेदेन सा श्रुतिः।

स्यादेकैकस्वरस्थाने त्रिविधेत्येकविंशतिः॥

कृत्रिमा सहजाऽप्येका द्वाविंशतिरुदीरिता॥ इति।

आदिग्रहणेन जात्यंशकेत्यादि “नादश्रुतिस्वरग्राममूर्च्छनातानसङ्गमात्। अष्टादश समुद्भूता”

¹ (कौ) (नि) ०वैशद्य—(V.L. वैशारद्य)सौन्दर्यकाव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम्। अत्रत्यः शुद्धतरः पाठः जोधपुरपाशुलिप्यां, सोमेश्वरस्य काव्यप्रकाशसंकेते चोपलभ्यते. ² क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च.(नि) (का) वैलक्षण्यमात्रकारि. ³ (का) तत्परिमाणानाम्. ⁴ क.ख.(नि) (का) आदिशब्देन.

फलपर्यन्तता लक्ष्यते॥ एवमिति॥ स्वरूपविषयभेदेन भिन्नसामग्रीज्ञेयत्वेन चेत्यर्थः।

प्रत्यभिज्ञेयावित्यर्थः कृत्यः, सर्वो हि तथा यतते इतीयता प्राधान्येन² लोकसिद्धत्वं

- 1.8 प्रमाणमुक्तम्। नियोगार्थेन च कृत्येन शिक्षाक्रम उक्तः। प्रत्यभिज्ञेयशब्देनैदमाह—“काव्यं तु जानु जायेत कस्यचित् प्रतिभावतः” इति नयेन यद्यपि स्वयमस्यैतत् परिस्फुरति तथापीदमित्यमिति विशेषतो निरूप्यमाणं सहस्रशांखीभवति। यथोक्तमस्मत्परमगुरुभिः श्रीमदुत्पलपादैः—

“तैस्तैरप्युपयाधितैरुपनतस्तन्याः स्थितोऽप्यन्तिके

कान्तो लोकसमान एवमपरिज्ञातो न रन्तुं यथा।

लोकस्यैष तथानवेक्षितगुणस्यात्मापि⁴ विश्वेश्वरो

नैपालं निजवैभवाय तदियं तत्प्रत्यभिज्ञोदिता ॥”

इति। तेन ज्ञातस्यपि विशेषतो निरूपणमनुसंधानात्मकमत्र प्रत्यभिज्ञानम्। न तु तदेवेदमित्येतावन्मात्रम् ॥ महाकवेरिति॥ यो महाकविरहं भूयांसमित्याशास्ते⁵। एवं व्यङ्ग्यस्यार्थस्य व्यञ्जकस्य शब्दस्य च प्राधान्यं वदता व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावस्यापि प्राधान्यमिति ध्वनति ध्वन्यते ध्वननमिति त्रितयमप्युपपन्नमित्युक्तम्॥

ननु प्रथमोपादीयमानत्वाद्वाच्यवाचकतद्भावस्यैव⁷ प्राधान्यामित्याशङ्क्य उपायानामेव प्रथममुपादानं भवतीत्यभिप्रायेण विरुद्धोऽयं प्राधान्ये साध्ये हेतुरिति

- 1.9 दर्शयति—इदानीमित्यादिन॥ आलोकनमालोकः। वनितायदनारविन्दवलोकनमित्यर्थः। तत्र⁸ चोपायो दीपशिखा॥

- 1.10 प्रतिपादिति भावे क्विप्॥ तस्य वस्तुन इति॥ व्यङ्ग्यरूपस्य सारस्येत्यर्थः। अनेन श्लोकेनान्त्यन्तसहृदयो यो न भवति तस्यैव स्फुटसंवेद्य⁹ एष क्रमः यथा अत्यन्तशब्दवृत्तज्ञो यो न भवति तस्य पदार्थवाक्यार्थ¹⁰क्रमः¹¹। काष्ठाप्राप्तसहृदयभावस्य तु वाक्यवृत्तकुशलस्येव सन्नपि क्रमोऽभ्यस्तानुमानाविनाभावस्मृत्यादिवदसंवेद्य इति दर्शितम्¹²॥

इति जातिस्वरूपं कथितम्। एवमंशकारिरूपं द्रष्टव्यम्। श्रीमदुत्पलदेवपादाः श्रीमदीश्वरप्रत्यभिज्ञा-
शास्त्रकाराः। तैस्तैरित्यादि। विरुद्धोऽयमिति। इह वाच्यवाचकत्वभाव प्रधानः प्रथमोपादीयमानत्वादिति

¹क.ख. स्वरूपभेदेन विषयभेदेन. ²क.ख.ध.(नि) (का) प्राधान्ये. ³(के) देव. ⁴क.ख.(का) गुणः स्वात्मापि. ⁵ड.व. आशंसते. ⁶ड.ख.(व.) 'उत्तम' अधिकः. ⁷क.ख. 'किं न' अधिवाः. ⁸(के) अत्र. ⁹क.ख. संवेद्यक्रमः, ग.घ.ङ.च. संवेद्य एव क्रमः, तं. ¹⁰क.ख.ग. वाक्यक्रमः. ¹¹क.ख.ग. 'प्रतिपाद्यापि दर्शयितुमाह—इदानीमित्यादिना॥' अधिकः. ¹²ड.ख.ग.घ.च. 'इति दर्शितम्' नास्ति.

यथा न व्यालुप्यत इति॥ प्राधान्यादव हि तत्पर्यन्तानुसरणरणकत्वरिता मध्ये विश्रान्तिं न कुर्वत इति क्रमस्य सतोऽप्यलक्षणं प्राधान्ये हेतुः॥

- I.11 स्वसामर्थ्यम् आकाङ्क्षायोग्यतासंनिधयः॥ न विभाव्यत इति॥ विशब्देन विभक्ततोक्ता। विभक्ततया न भाव्यत इत्यर्थः। अनेन विद्यमान एव क्रमो न संवेद्यत इत्युक्तम्²। तेन यत् स्फोटोभिप्रायेणासन्नेव क्रम इति व्याचक्षते तत् प्रत्युत विरुद्धमेव।
- I.12 वाच्यार्थविमुखात्मनाम्। वाच्येऽर्थे विमुखो विश्रान्तिनिबन्धनं परितोषमलभमान आत्मा हृदयं येषामित्यनेन सचेतसामित्यस्यैवार्थोऽभिषिक्तः³। सहृदयानामेव तद्वर्त्यं महिमास्तु, ⁴न काव्यस्यासौ कश्चिदतिशय इत्यत्राह⁵—अवभासत इति॥ तेनात्र विभक्तता न भासते। न तु वाच्यस्यैव सर्वथाऽनवभासः। अत एव तृतीयोद्घोते घटप्रदीपदृष्टान्त-बलाद्व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिकालेषु वाच्यप्रतीतिर्न विघटत इति यद्वक्ष्यते तेन सह अस्य ग्रन्थस्य न विरोधः॥

सद्भावमिति॥ सत्तां साधुभावं प्राधान्यं चेत्पर्यः। द्वयं हि प्रतिपिपादयिषितम्⁷ प्रकृत इति। लक्षणे॥उपयोजयन्ति॥ उपयोगं गमयन्। “तमर्थम्” इति चायमुपयोगः। स्वशब्द आत्मवाची। स्वं चार्थश्च स्वार्थः। तौ⁸ गुणीकृतौ याभ्याम् यथासंख्येन तेनार्थो

I.13 गुणीकृतात्मा, शब्दो गुणीकृताभिधेयः॥ तमर्थमिति॥“सरस्वती स्वादु तदर्थवस्तु” इति यदुक्तम्। “व्यङ्क्तः”⁹ इति द्विवचनेनेदमाह—यद्यप्यविवक्षितवाच्ये शब्द एव व्यञ्जकः,

हेतुरप्रयोजक इत्यर्थः॥ तत्प्रतीतेः व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतेः। इतिशब्दो लक्षणवचन इति दर्शयति— प्रकृत इति लक्षणे इति।

अथ कोऽयमुपयोगः यस्येदं गमनमित्याशङ्कायामाह— तमर्थमिति चायमिति गुणीकरणं तेन व्यङ्ग्येन हि वाच्यार्था गुणीकृतात्मा भवति। शब्दोपि गुणीकृताभिधेयो भवतीत्यर्थः।

ननु यत्रार्थ इत्यत्र लक्षणे कथं व्यङ्क्तः इति द्विवचनं घटतां यः शब्दशक्तिमूलोऽर्थशक्तिमूलो उभयशक्तिमूलश्चेति। तत्रोभयशक्तिमूले शब्दार्थयोर्द्वयोरपि संपं व्यञ्जकत्वमिति युक्तं तत्र द्विवचनम्। एकतरस्य व्यञ्जकत्वे ध्वनित्वं न स्यात्। तत्र द्वयोरपि व्यापाराभावदित्याशङ्क्य, आह— व्यङ्क्त इति।

¹क.ख. सतोपलक्षणम्. ²क.ख. इत्यर्थः. ³क.ख. विभक्तः. ⁴क.ख.ग. ‘तु’ अधिकः. ⁵क.ख. इत्याशङ्क्याह—, ⁶घ.ङ.च. वाच्यस्य सर्ववैव. ⁷क.ख. (के) पूर्वं प्रकृते. ⁸क.ख. ‘तौ गुणीकृतौ’ नास्ति. ⁹क.ख. ‘व्यङ्क्तः द्योतयतः’ अधिकः.

तथायर्थस्यापि सहकारिता न त्रुट्यति; अन्यथा अज्ञातार्थोऽपि शब्दरतद्वयञ्जकः स्यात्। विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये च शब्दस्यापि सहकारित्वं भवत्येव। विशिष्टशब्दाभिधेयतया विना तस्यार्थस्याव्यञ्जकत्वात्— इति सर्वत्र शब्दार्थयोरुभयोरपि ध्वननं व्यापारः। तेन यद् भट्टनायकेन द्विवचनं दूषितं तद्गजनिमीलिकयैव। “अर्थः शब्दो वा” इति तु विकल्पाभिधानं प्राधान्याभिप्रायेण। काव्यं च तद्विशेषश्चासौ, काव्यस्य वा विशेषः। काव्यगहणाद्गुणालङ्कारोपस्कृतशब्दार्थपृष्ठपाती ध्वनिलक्षण आत्मेत्युक्तम्। तेनैतन्निरवकाशम्—श्रुतार्थापत्तावपि ध्वनिव्यवहारः स्यादिति। यच्चोक्तम्—‘चारुत्व-प्रतीतिस्तार्ह्यं काव्यस्यात्मा स्यात्’ इति तदङ्गीकुर्म एव। ३। नाम्नि खल्वयं विवाद इति। यच्चोक्तम्—‘चारुणः वस्तुनः प्रतीतिर्यदि काव्यात्मा प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणादपि सा भवन्ती तथा स्यात्’ इति, तत्र शब्दार्थमयकाव्यात्माभिधानप्रस्तावे क एष प्रसङ्ग इति न किंचिदेतत् ॥

स इति॥ अर्थो वा^१, शब्दो वा व्यापारो वा; अर्थोऽपि वाच्यो वा ध्वनतीति; शब्दोऽप्येवम्; व्यङ्ग्यो वा ध्वन्यत इति; व्यापारो वा शब्दार्थयोर्ध्वननमिति। कारिकया तु प्राधान्येन समुदाय एव काव्यरूपो मुख्यतया ध्वनिरिति प्रतिपादितम्^७ ॥ विभक्त इति॥ गुणालङ्काराणां वाच्यवाचकभावप्राणत्वात् अस्य च तदन्यव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभाव-सारत्वान्नास्य तेष्वन्तर्भाव इति। ४। अनन्यत्रभावो विषयार्थः। एवं ‘तद्व्यतिरिक्तः

द्विवचनेनेदमाहेत्यादि। निष्कृष्टस्यार्थस्य फलमाह— तेन यदिति। गजनिमीलिकयैव अपर्यालोचनयेत्यर्थः। तर्हि कथमयं विकल्प इत्यत्राह—अर्थः शब्दो वेति। अत्राह स्य व्यक्तिविवेककारः—“अत्र केचिद्विद्वन्मानिनो द्विवचनसमर्थनमनोराशिपित्तचित्ततया वाच्यवाचकयोर्विस्मृतसुप्रसिद्धप्रतीतिक्रम-मावा...” इत्यादि, तद्वन्तान्मात्रमूलं न तत्त्वमित्यलमवस्तुनिर्बन्धेनेत्यन्तम्। तदसत्, उक्तनयेन द्विवचनोपपत्तेः! श्रुतार्थापत्तावपीति। पीनो देवदत्तो दिवा न भुङ्क्ते इति श्रुते, यदात्रिभोजनं प्रतीयते, न तस्य गुणालङ्कारवस्तुनः शब्दार्थपृष्ठपातित्वम्। तस्मान्न तत्र ध्वनिव्यवहार इत्यर्थः॥

पक्षान्तरमप्यनुभाष्य दूषयति—यच्चोक्तमिति। चारुणः वस्तुनः सा भवन्ती चारुवस्तुप्रतीतिः। भवन्ती तथा स्यात्, काव्यार्थः स्यात्। परिहरति—तत्रेति। एकरणबलादेव निरवकाशतया प्रतिहतोऽयं प्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः। अर्थो वेति। शब्दवाच्यव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जनानि चत्वार्यपि ध्वनिशब्दवाच्यानि। शब्दश्च वाच्यार्थश्च ध्वनतीति ध्वनीभवतः। व्यङ्ग्यो ध्वन्यत इति। व्यञ्जनं ध्वननमित्यर्थः॥

एतत्समुदायोऽपि ध्वनिरित्याह— कारिकया त्विति। एवमिति। एवं यत्रार्थो वाच्यविशेषो

^१क.ख.ग. ज्ञातोऽपि. ^२क.ख. तेन नैता०. ^३क.ख.ग. ‘नाम्नि’ नास्ति. ^४क.ख.ग. यथोक्तम्. ^५(कं) शब्दो वा. ^६क.ख.ग. वाच्यरूपमुखतया. ^७ग.घ. प्रतिपादितः. ^८क.ख.ग.च. अन्यत्र.

कोऽयं ध्वनिः' इति निराकृतम्॥ लक्षणकृतमेवेति॥ लक्षणकारा¹प्रसिद्धता विरुद्धो हेतुः। तत एव हि यत्नेन लक्षणीयता।

लक्ष्ये² त्वप्रसिद्धत्वमसिद्धो हेतुः। यच्च³ नृत्तगीतहास्यादिकल्पं तत् काव्यस्य⁴ न किञ्चित्। चित्रमिति॥ विस्मयकृद्वादि⁵वशात्, न तु सहृदयाभिलषणीयचमत्कारसाररसनिः-
ष्यन्दमयमित्यर्थः। काव्यानुकारि⁶त्वाद्वा चित्रम्, आलेख्यमात्रत्वाद्वा, कलामात्रत्वाद्वा॥
अग्र इति॥

“प्रधानगुणभावाभ्यां व्यङ्ग्यस्यैवं व्यवस्थिते⁷।

द्विधा काव्ये⁸ ततोऽन्यद्यत्तच्चित्रमभिधीयते ॥”

इति तृतीयोद्घोते वक्ष्यते। परिकरार्थं कारिकार्थस्याधिकावापं कर्तुं श्लोकः परिकरश्लोकः॥
यत्रेति॥ अलङ्कारे ॥ वैशद्येनेति॥ चारुतया स्फुटतया चेत्यर्थः॥ अभिहितमिति॥

वेत्यादिना कथितेन प्रकारेण प्रथमाभाववादे यत् तद्व्यतिरिक्तं कोऽयं ध्वनिर्नमित्युक्तं तन्निराकृतमिति यावत्।

अथ विवरणकारो द्वितीयाभाववादभागमनुभाषते दूषयितुं, यदयमुक्तमिति। यत्र यद्ध्वने-
रप्रसिद्धत्वमुक्तं तत्किं लक्षणकारविषयं वा लक्ष्यविषयं वेति विकल्पं हृदि निधायार्थं कल्पं दूषयति—
लक्षणकाराप्रसिद्धता विरुद्धो हेतुरिति। 'अयं ध्वनिर्न लक्षणीयः' लक्षणकाराप्रसिद्धत्वादिति हेतुर्विरुद्धः।
विपक्षेऽपि वर्तमानत्वादित्यर्थः।

तदेवाह— तत एवेति। लक्षणकाराणामप्रसिद्धत्वादेवास्माभिर्ध्वनिर्लक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः। द्वितीयं पक्षं
दूषयति— लक्ष्ये त्विति।

ध्वनिर्न लक्षणीयः। लक्ष्याप्रसिद्धत्वादिति हेतुः। घटो नित्यः अकृतकत्वादितिवत् असिद्ध इति
यावत्। ननु 'स्निग्धश्यामलकान्तिलिप्तवियंतः' इत्यादिलक्ष्ये श्रूयमाणे न तत्र किञ्चिन्नुतं गीतं वा
उपलभ्यते, तस्य तु रङ्गप्रयोगे तद्विरुद्धयते। एवं ध्वन्यर्थोऽपि लक्ष्ये नास्त्येव। त्वया तु सङ्घर्षे लक्ष्यते
इत्याशङ्क्याह— यच्चेति। गीतादिलक्ष्येऽप्रसिद्धः नायं ध्वनिरित्यर्थः।

स एवेति। स ध्वन्यर्थ एवानन्दकारि काव्यतत्त्वमिति यावत्। अनेन लक्ष्ये प्रसिद्धोऽयं ध्वनिरिति
दर्शितम्। ततोऽन्यदिति। ध्वनेरन्यदित्यर्थः। चित्रशब्दप्रवृत्तिनिमित्तमाह— विस्मयकृदित्यादिना। अधिका-
वापं कर्तुं परिपोषं कर्तुमित्यर्थः। ननु चित्रकाव्यान् पृथक् ध्वनिकाव्यं स्यात्। चित्रस्वरूपैरलङ्कारैरेव
ध्वनेराक्षिप्तत्वात्। यत्र क्वचिदस्य दुर्लक्ष्यतास्तु कामं तत्र, मा भूदेष दोषः। यत्र पुनः सुलक्षः
तत्रालङ्कारेऽसावन्तर्भूतः स्यात्, इत्याशङ्कापरिहाराय कारिकायां उपसर्जनीकृतस्यायमिति
पदमित्याह वृत्तिकारः॥

¹क.ख.ग. ०कारप्रसि०. ²क.ख.ग. लक्ष्यत्व. ³क.ख.ग.ङ.च. 'न च'. ⁴क.ख.ग. 'वा क्वापि' अधिकः. ⁵क.ख. वृत्त्यादि.
⁶ग.ङ.च. ०कारकारि०. ⁷क.ख.ग.घ.ङ.च. व्यवस्थितम्. ⁸क.ख.घ.ङ.च. काव्यं ततो.

भूतत्रययोगः आदौ “व्यङ्क्तः” इत्यस्य व्याख्यातत्वात्॥ गुणीकृतात्मेति॥ आत्मेत्यनेन स्वशब्दस्यार्थो व्याख्यातः ॥ न चैतदिति॥ व्यङ्ग्यस्य¹ प्राधान्यम्। प्राधान्यं च ज्ञप्ती यद्यपि न चंकास्ति “बुद्धौ तत्त्वावभासिन्याम्” इति तु² नयेन अखण्डचर्वणा³ विश्रान्तेः, तथापि विवेचकैर्जीवितान्वेषणे क्रियमाणे यदा व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थः पुनरपि वाच्यमेव अनुप्राणयन्नास्ते तदा तदुपकरणत्वादेव तस्यालङ्कारता, यतो वाच्यादेव तदुपस्कृताच्चमत्कारलाभ इति। यद्यपि पर्यन्ते रसध्वनिरस्ति तथापि मध्यमकक्ष्यानिविष्टोऽस्ती व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थो न रसोन्मुखीभवति स्वातन्त्र्येण, अपि तु वाच्यमेवार्थं संस्कर्तुं धावतीति गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यतोक्ता⁴॥

“यत्रोक्ते⁵ गम्यतेऽन्योऽर्थस्तत्समानैर्विशेषणैः।

सा समासोक्तिरुदिता संक्षिप्तार्थतया यथा ॥”

इति। अत्र समासोक्तेर्लक्षणं स्वरूपं⁶ हेतुर्नाम तन्निर्वचनमिति पादचतुष्टयेन क्रमादुक्तम्। उपोढो⁷ रागः सान्ध्योऽरुणिमा प्रेम च येन। विलोलास्तारका ज्योतींषि नेत्रत्रिभागाश्च यत्र॥ तथेति॥ झटित्येव प्रेमरभसेन च गृहीतमाभासितं परिचुम्बितुमाक्रान्तं च। निशायां मुखं प्रारम्भो वदनकोकनदं च⁸। यथेति॥ झटिति ग्रहणेन प्रेमरभसेन च। तिमिरं चांशुकाश्च सूक्ष्मा अंशवः तिमिरांशुकं रश्मिशबलीकृतं तमःपटलम्, तिमिरांशुकं नीलजालिका नवोढाप्रौढवधूचिता। रागात् रक्तत्वात् सस्याकृतादनन्तरम्, प्रेमरूपाच्च हेतोः। पुरोऽपि पूर्वस्यां दिशि अग्रे च। गलितं प्रशान्तं पतितं च। तथा रात्र्या करणभूतया; समस्तं मिश्रितं उपलक्षणत्वेन वा। न लक्षितं रात्रिप्रारम्भोऽसाविति न ज्ञातम्। तिमिरशबलितांशुदर्शने हि रात्रिमुखमिति लोकेन लक्ष्यते, न तु स्फुटे आलोके।

ननु यत्रेति। व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्यमिति। ननु व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्यं प्रतीतावस्फुरत् कथं गृह्यत इत्याशङ्कते—प्राधान्यं चेति। तत्र हेतुमाह—बुद्धाविति। परिहरति—तथापीति विवेचकैः सहृदयैः। तदुपस्कृतात्। व्यङ्ग्योपस्कृतात्। मध्यमकक्ष्येति। समासोक्त्यादौ प्रथमं वाच्यकक्ष्या। ततो वस्तुव्यङ्ग्यकक्ष्या। पुनस्तृतीया रसध्वनिकक्ष्येत्यस्ति कक्ष्यात्रयविभागः। यत्रोक्त इति भामहलक्षणम्। तस्य पादचतुष्टयविधेयभेदं प्रदर्शयति—उपोढ इत्यादि।

तिमिरांशुकमित्यत्र रूपकर्णरेग्रहे विशेषणातुल्यत्वात् समासोक्तिभंगप्रसंग इत्याशयेनाह—तिमिरश्चांशुकश्चेति। नीलजालिका नीलवसनम्। नवेति॥ नवोढा च सा प्रौढा चेति कर्मधारयः।

[“ववाचकैः सहृदयैः जनूपस्मृतव्यङ्ग्यो वस्तुतात् मध्यमकक्ष्या। समासोक्त्यादौ प्रथमं वाच्यकक्ष्या ततो वस्तुव्यङ्ग्यकक्ष्या पुनस्तृतीया सा ध्वनिकक्ष्येत्यस्तु कक्ष्यात्रयविभागः”] *

रात्रिप्रारम्भाज्ञानं समर्थयति तिमिरैरेति। व्ययच्छेदमाह—न तु स्फुटे आलोके इति। पञ्चादगतेन

¹ङ. व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्यम्. ²क.ख. ‘तु’ नास्ति. ³क.ख.ग. चर्वण ⁴क.ख.ग. ‘समासोक्ताविति’ अधिकः. ⁵क.ख. यत्रोक्ते. ⁶क.ख.ग. स्वरूप, घ.ङ.च. वरूपे. ⁷(के) ‘वृत्ते’ अधिकः. ⁸क.ख.ग.(का) वेति.

नायिकापक्षे तु—तयेति कर्तृपदम्। रात्रिपक्षे तु अपिशब्दः लक्षितमित्यस्यानन्तरः। अत्र च नायकेन पश्चाद्गतेन चुम्बनोपक्रमे पुरो नीलाशुकस्य गलनं पतनम्। यदि वा पुरोऽग्रे नायकेन तथा गृहीतं मुखमिति संबन्धः। तेनात्र व्यङ्ग्ये प्रतीतेऽपि न प्राधान्यम्। तथा¹हि—नायिकानायकव्यवहारो निशाशशिनावेव शृङ्गारविभावरूपेण संस्कुर्वाणोऽलङ्कारतां भजते, ततस्तु वाच्याद्विभावीभूताद्रसनिःष्यन्दः²॥ यस्तु व्याचष्टे—“तया निशयेति कर्तृपदम्। न चाचेतनायाः कर्तृत्वमुपपन्नमिति शब्दे³नैव नायकव्यवहार उन्नीतोऽभिधेय एव, न व्यङ्ग्य इति; अत एव समासेनोक्तिः⁴” इति सः प्रकृतमेव⁵ ग्रन्थार्थमत्यजत् “व्यङ्ग्येनानुगतम्” इति। एकदेशविवर्ति चेत्थं रूपकं स्यात्, “राजहंसैरवीज्यन्त शरदैव सरोनृपाः” इतिवत्; न तु समासोक्तिः, तुल्यविशेषणाभावात् ‘गम्यते’ इति चानेनाभिधाय्यापारनिरासात्—इत्यलमवान्तरेण बहुना। नायिकाया नायके यो व्यवहारः स निशायां समारोपितः, नायिकायां नायकस्य यो व्यवहारः स च शशिनि समारोपित इति व्याख्याने नैक⁷शेषप्रसङ्गः॥ आक्षेप इति॥

“प्रतिषेध इवेष्टस्य यो विशेषाभिधित्सया ।

वक्ष्यमाणोक्तविषयः स आक्षेपो द्विधा मतः॥”

पश्चाद्भागतेन। तेनेति। यत एवं नायकव्यवहारस्य कथञ्चिद्द्योजना, तेनेत्यर्थः॥

शृङ्गारविभावरूपेण शृङ्गारस्योद्दीपनविभावेन। रसनिष्यन्दः रसास्वादः। व्याख्यानान्तर-मनुभाषते—यस्त्विति। शब्देनैव। निशयेति शब्देनैव शशिशब्देनैव च नायकव्यवहारः नायकयोर्व्यवहारः उन्नीतः ऊहितः। अभिधेय एवेति। अन्यथा रागो रागस्तारकास्तारकाः मुखं मुखं तिमिरमंशुकमित्यादि न घटते। अतो न व्यङ्ग्यो नायकव्यवहार इति यावत्।

अत एवेयं समाख्यापि संगच्छत इत्याह। अत इति। समासेन संक्षेपेण। परिहरति सः प्रकृतमिति। प्रकृतार्थमुद्घाटयति—व्यङ्ग्येनानुगतमिति व्याख्येयप्रमुखपतितमिति शेषः।

किञ्चैवमभिधेयतायां इयं समासोक्तिरेव न स्यादित्याह—एकदेशेति। तत्र उदाहरणं दर्शयति—राजहंसैरिति। लक्षणविरोधमपि प्रकटयति—गम्यत इति चेति। अथ नायिकानायकेत्यत्र कथमेकशेषाभावः इत्याशंकायामाह—नायिकाया इति।

एवं समासोक्तौ वाच्यस्य प्राधान्यात् व्यङ्ग्यस्य तदनुगामितया ध्वनित्वाभावं प्रसाध्य क्रमप्राप्ते आक्षेपेऽप्ययमेव प्रकार इत्युपक्रमे त्रुटिकारः। आक्षेपेऽपीति। व्यङ्ग्यतिशेषाक्षेपिणः व्यंग्य-विशेषाकार्षिणः प्राधान्येन वाक्यार्थत्वादित्यर्थः।

अथ कथमयं वाच्य एवात्र वाक्यार्थ इति जायते? अत्राह—वाक्यार्थ इति। सामर्थ्यजेत्यव्युत्पन्नमप्युत्पन्नमुपादयति। तथा हीति। प्रतिषेधरूप इति। नाकर्षणरूप इति यावत्।

¹ (के) ततो. ² क.ख.ग.(नि) निःष्यन्दः. ³ क.ख.ग.ङ.(का) ०नैवात्र, (कौ) ०नात्र. ⁴ क.ख.ग.(नि) (का) समासोक्तिः.

⁵ क.ख.ग.(नि) प्रकृतार्थमेव. ⁶ घ. (के) विशेषणत्वा०. ⁷ क.ख.(नि) न कोऽपि दोष०.

तत्राद्यो यथा—

“अहं त्वां यदि नेक्षेय क्षणमप्युत्सुका ततः।

इयदेवास्त्वतोऽन्येन किमुक्तेनाप्रियेण ते ॥”

इति वक्ष्यमाणमरणविषयो निषेधात्माक्षेपः। तत्र ‘इयदस्तु’ इत्येतदेव अत्र ‘प्रिये’ इत्याक्षिपत्¹ चारुत्वनिबन्धनमित्याक्षेपेणाक्षेपकमलंकृतं सत् प्रधानम्। उक्तविषयस्तु यथा ममैव—

“भो भोः किं किमकाण्ड एव पतितस्त्वं पान्थ कान्या गति—

स्तत्तादृक्प्रतिषितस्य मे खलमतिः सोऽयं जलं गूहते ।

अस्थानोपनतामकालसुलभां तृष्णां प्रति क्रुध्य भो—

स्त्रेलोक्यप्रथितप्रभावमहिमा मार्गः पुनर्मार्गः ॥”

अत्र कश्चित् सेवकः प्राप्तः प्राप्तव्यमस्मात् किमिति न लभे इति प्रत्याशाविशयमानहृदयः केनचिदमुनाक्षेपेण² प्रतिबोध्यते। तत्राक्षेपेण निषेधरूपेण वाच्यस्यैवासत्पुरुषसेवातद्वैफल्यतत्कृतोद्वेगात्मनः शान्तरसस्यापिभूतनिर्वदविभावा-
नुभावरूपतया चमत्कृतिर्दायित्वम्। वामनस्य तु “उपमानाक्षेपः” इत्याक्षेपलक्षणम्। उपमानस्य चन्द्रादेराक्षेपः। ‘अस्मिन् सति किं त्वया कृत्यम्’³ इति। यथा—

“तस्यास्तन्मुखमस्ति सौम्यसुभगं किं पार्वणेनेन्दुना

सौन्दर्यस्य पदं दृशौ यदि च ते किं नाम नीलोत्पलैः।

किं वा कोमलकान्तिभिः किसलयैः सत्येव तत्राधरे

ही धातुः पुनरुक्तवस्तुरचनारम्भेष्वपूर्वो ग्रहः॥”

अत्र व्यङ्ग्योऽप्युपमार्थो वाच्यस्यैवोपस्कुरुते। किं तेन कृत्यमिति त्वपहस्तनारूप

आक्षिपत् आकर्षत्। अथ व्याख्याकारः आक्षेपलक्षणमाह— प्रतिषेध इवेति। एतदपि भामहलक्षणम्। प्रिये इत्याक्षिपदिति। प्रिये इत्येवं रूपमर्थ आकर्षदिति यावत्।

आक्षेपेण प्रिये इत्यर्थेन व्यङ्ग्येनेत्यर्थः। आक्षेपकं वाच्यम्। इयदेवास्त्वित्येवंरूपम्। भो भो इति—पतितः व्यापारेण परिश्रान्तः। गूहते निस्तुते। क्रुध्य—क्रोधं कुरु। प्राप्तव्यं प्राप्तुं योग्यम्। अस्मान् सेवमानात् वाच्यस्यैव प्रतिपाद्यायैव। न त्वभिधेयमानस्य गान्धर्वातृष्णामरुमार्गरूपस्येत्यर्थः।

अन्यथा ऽस्याप्रस्तुतप्रशंसात्वप्रसंगः, असंगतिश्च स्यात्। वामनेनाक्षेपस्यान्यथा लक्षणं कृतमित्याह— वामनस्तेति। आक्षेपः प्रतिषेधो वाच्यस्यैवोपस्कुरुते वाच्यमेवालङ्कुरुत इति यावत्।

¹ घ.ङ.च. इत्यालोपकं. ² क.ख.ग.(नि) विडम्बनाक्षेपेण. ³ क.ख.ग.(नि) ‘दायि’ नास्ति.

⁴ क.ख.ग.(नि) कृतम्. ⁵ (कं) वाच्यमेव.

आक्षेपो वाच्य एव चमत्कारकारणम्। यदि वोपमानस्याक्षेपः सामर्थ्यादाकर्षणम्। यथा--

“ऐन्द्रं धनुः पाण्डुपयोधरेण शरद्वधानाद्रनखक्षताभम् ।

प्रसादयन्ती सकलङ्कमिन्दुं तापं रवेरभ्यधिकं^१ करोति॥”

^२ईर्ष्याकलुषितनायकान्तरमुपमानमत्राक्षिप्तमपि वाच्यार्थमेव अलङ्करोतीति। एषा तु समासोक्तिरेव। तदाह— चारुत्वोत्कर्षेति॥ अत्रैव प्रसिद्धं दृष्टान्तमाह— अनुरागवतीति॥ तेनाक्षेपप्रमेयसमर्थनमेवापरिसमाप्तमिति मन्तव्यम्। तत्र तूदाहरणत्वेन समासोक्तिश्लोकः पठितः “अहो दैवगतिः^३ कीदृक्” इति। गुरुपारतन्त्र्यादिनिमित्तं^४ कोऽसमागम इत्यर्थः॥ तस्यैवेति॥ वाच्यस्यैवेति यावत्। वामनाभिप्रायेणायमाक्षेपः, भामहाभिप्रायेण समासोक्तिरित्यमुमाशयं हृदये गृहीत्वा समासोक्त्याक्षेपयोर्युक्त्येदमेकमेवोदाहरणं व्यतरदग्रन्थकृत्।^५ एवं हि समासोक्तिर्वास्तु आक्षेपो वा ; किमनेनास्माकम्^६? समासोक्त्यादिषु^७ सर्वथालङ्कारेषु^८ व्यङ्ग्यं वाच्ये गुणीभवतीति नः साध्यम्— इत्याशयोऽत्र ग्रन्थे गुरुभिर्निरूपितः॥

एवं प्राधान्यविवक्षायां दृष्टान्तमुक्त्वा व्यपदेशोऽपि प्राधान्यकृत एव भवतीत्यत्र दृष्टान्तं स्वपरप्रसिद्धमाह— यथा चेति॥ उपमायां इति॥ उपमानोपमेयभावस्येत्यर्थः॥ तथेति॥ उपमया। दीपके हि “आदिमध्यान्तविषयं त्रिधा दीपकमिष्यते” इति लक्षणम्।

“मणिः शाणोल्लीढः समरविजयी हेतिदलितः^९।

कलाशेषश्चन्द्रः सुरतमृदिता बालललना।

मदक्षीणो नागः शरदि सरिदाशयानपुलिना

तनिम्ना शोभन्ते गलितविभवाश्चार्येषु जनाः^{१०}”

इत्यत्र दीपनकृतमेव चारुत्वम्।

अपहस्तना निरसनम्, प्रकृतस्य लक्षणस्यार्थान्तरं दर्शयति— यदि वेति। एषा त्विति। यदीदमुदाहरणं वामनमते आक्षेपत्वेनोक्तं, तदेतत् भामहमते समासोक्तिर्भवति। नायकार्थस्य गम्यमानत्वादिति। तदाहेति— तदेतद् व्यङ्ग्याक्षेपिणो वाच्यचमत्कृतिदायित्वात् प्राधान्यं तदिति यावत्। तेनेति दृष्टान्तप्रदर्शनेन दार्ष्टान्तिकसमर्थकेनेति यावत्। दार्ष्टान्तिकं चात्राक्षेपप्रमेयमित्यर्थः।

उदाहरणत्वेन दृष्टान्तत्वेन। वामनाभिप्रायेणेति। उपमानप्रत्यायनपक्षरूपेण, भामहाभिप्रायेण। नायकप्रतीयमानताश्रयेण। गुरुभिर्निरूपित इति। प्रामाण्यमुक्तम्। दीपके तावदुपमाव्यपदेशस्योपपत्तिमुपपादयति— तथा हीति।

आदिमध्यान्तेत्येतदपि भामहलक्षणम्। दीपनकृतमेवेति नोपमानोपमेयभावकृतम्। अतो दीपकमिति

^१ क.ख.ग.ङ. (नि)(का) चकार. ^२ क.ख.ग. (नि)(का) ‘इत्यत्र’ अधिकः. ^३ घ.ङ.च.(का)(के) ‘कीदृक्’ नास्ति. ^४ क.ख.ग. (नि)(का) निमित्तो. ^५ क.ख.(का) एषापि. ^६ (के) किमस्माकमनेन. ^७ क.ख.(का) ‘समासोक्त्यादिषु’ नास्ति. ^८ क.ख.(नि) अलंकारादिषु, ग. सिद्धान्तकारेषु. ^९ (के) निहितः. निहतः (जोषणुर). ^{१०} ग.घ.ङ.ब. नराः.

“अपह्नुतिरभीष्टस्य किंचिदन्तर्गतोपमा” इति।

तत्रापह्नयेनैव शोभा—

“नेयं विरौति भृङ्गाली मदेन मुखरा मुहुः।

अयमाकृष्णस्य कन्दर्पधनुषो ध्वनिः ॥”

इति। एवमाक्षेपं विचार्याद्देशक्रमेणैव प्रमेयान्तरमाह— अनुक्तनिमित्तायाम²पि¹ति॥

“एकदेशस्य विगमे या गुणान्तरसंस्तुतिः।

विशेषप्रथनायासौ विशेषोक्तिरिति स्मृता ॥”

यथा—

“स एकस्त्रीणि जयति जगन्ति कुसुमायुधः।

हरतापि तनुं यस्य शम्भुना न हृतं बलम् ॥”

इयं चावित्यनिमित्तेति नास्यां व्यङ्ग्यस्य सद्भावः। उक्तनिमित्तायामपि वस्तु-
सद्भावमात्रत्वे पर्यवसानमिति तत्रापि न व्यङ्ग्यसद्भावशङ्का³। यथा—

“कर्पूर इव दग्धोऽपि शक्तिमान् यो जने जने।

नमोऽस्त्ववार्थवीर्याय तस्मै कुसुमधन्वने ॥”

तेन प्रकारद्वयमवधीर्य⁴ तृतीय प्रकारमाशङ्कते— “अनुक्तनिमित्तायामपि” इति॥
व्यङ्ग्यस्येति॥ “शीतकृता खल्वार्तिरत्र निमित्तम्” इति भट्टोद्भटः; तदभिप्रायेणाह— न
त्वत्र काचिच्चारुत्वनिष्पत्तिरिति॥ यत्तु रसिकैरपि निमित्तं परिकल्पितम्—
“फान्तासमागमे गमनादपि लघुतरमुपायः⁵ स्वप्नं मन्यमानो निद्रागमनबुद्ध्या संकोच

व्यपदेशो नोपमेत्यर्थः॥ अपह्नुतिरित्यपि। भामहीयम्। ज्ञेयमिति। अत्रापह्नवस्यैव चारुत्वं नोपमानोपमेयस्येति
भावः॥

एकदेशस्येत्यपि भामहीयम्। विशेषोक्तिरत्र— उचित्यनिमित्ता, उक्तनिमित्ता, अनुक्तनिमित्ता
वेति। तत्राद्यभेदयोः व्यंग्ये नास्त्येव। तृतीये त्वस्ति। तदेतत् प्रकाशयति— यथेति। शीतकृतेति। अत्र
“आहूतोऽपि इत्युदाहरणोक्तसङ्कोचाशयित्वेनेत्यर्थः। अपि त्विति। अभिव्यज्यमानं स्वप्नोपायमननं न

¹व.ख.(नि) अर्हतोपमा. ²क.ख.(का) ‘अपि’ नास्ति. ³क.ख.ग.(का) ०भावशंका. ⁴क.ख.ग.(नि) अवधार्य.

⁵व.ख.ग.(नि)(का) ‘परि’ नास्ति. ⁶(के) स्वप्नोपनत. ⁷(के) तत्समागमे.

नात्यजत्' इति तदपि निमित्तं चारुत्वहेतुतया नालंकारविद्भिः^१ कल्पितम्; अपि तु विशेषोक्तिभाग एव न शिथिलयतीत्येवंभूतोऽभिव्यज्यमाननिमित्तोपस्कृतश्चारुत्वहेतुः। अन्यथा तु विशेषोक्तिरेवेयं न भवेत्। एवमभिप्रायद्वयमपि साधारणोक्त्या ग्रन्थकृतं न्यपपद्यत्, न त्वौद्भटेनैवाभिप्रायेण ग्रन्थो व्यवस्थित इति मन्तव्यम्॥ **पर्यायोक्तेऽपीति॥**

“पर्यायोक्तं यदन्येन प्रकारेणाभिधीयते ।

वाच्यवाचकवृत्तिभ्यां शून्येनावगमात्मना ॥”

इति लक्षणम्।

“शनुच्छेददृढेच्छस्य मुनेरुत्पथगामिनः।

रामस्यानेन धनुषा देशिता धर्मदेशना॥”

इत्यत्र भीष्मस्य भार्गवप्रभावाभिभावी प्रभाव इति यद्यपि प्रतीयते, तथापि तत्सहायेन “देशिता धर्मदेशना” इत्यभिधीयमानेनैव काव्यार्थोऽलंकृतः। अत एव पर्यायेण प्रकारान्तरेणावगमात्मना व्यङ्ग्येनोपलक्षितं सद्यदभिधीयते तदभिधीयमानम् उक्तमेव सत् पर्यायोक्तमिति— अभिधीयत इति लक्षणपदम्, पर्यायोक्तमिति लक्ष्यपदम्, अर्थालङ्कारत्वं सामान्यलक्षणमिति— सर्वं युज्यते। यदि तु ‘अभिधीयते’ इत्यस्य बलाद्व्याख्यानम्— अभिधीयते प्रतीयते प्रधानतयेति, उदाहरणं च “भम धम्मिअ” इत्यादि, तदालङ्कारत्वमेव दूरे संपन्नम्, आत्मतायां पर्यवसानात्। तदा चालङ्कारमध्ये गणना न कार्या, भेदान्तराणि चास्य वक्तव्यानि। तदाह— यदि प्राधान्येनेति॥ **ध्वनाविति॥** आत्मन्यन्तर्भावादात्मैवासौ नालङ्कारः स्यादित्यर्थः॥ तत्रेति॥ यादृशोऽलङ्कारत्वेन विवक्षितस्तादृशे ध्वनिर्नान्तर्भवति। न तादृगस्माभिर्ध्वनिरुक्तः। ध्वनिर्हि^३ सर्वत्रभावाद्वापकः समस्तप्रतिष्ठास्थानत्वाच्चाङ्गी; न चालङ्कारो व्यापकोऽन्यालंकारवत्; न चाङ्गी अलंकार्यतन्त्रत्वात्। अथ व्यापकत्वाङ्गित्वे तस्योपगम्येते, त्यज्यते चालङ्कारता, तर्ह्यस्मन्नय

शिथिलयतीति रूपो विशेषोक्तिभाग एवालङ्कारविद्भिश्चारुत्वे हेतुः कल्पित इति यावत्।

निमित्तस्य चारुता चेत् कथं विशेषोक्तिः स्यादित्याह— अन्यथेति। **पर्यायोक्तमिति।** भट्टोद्भटस्य लक्षणमिदम्। पर्यायेण प्रकारान्तरेणोक्तं पर्यायोक्तम्। शनुच्छेदेति। अनेन कर्त्रा भीष्मेण धनुषा करणेन धर्मदेशना धर्मोपदेशः। अत्रापि वाच्यमेव प्रधानमिति दर्शयति— अत्रेति। उक्तादेव हेतोः लक्षणत्रयमप्युपपन्नमित्याह— अत एवेति॥ पक्षान्तरमाशङ्कते—यदिति। प्रकृतस्य लक्षणवाक्यस्य व्याख्यानविशेषेणार्थान्तरं परिक्रम्य उदाहरणान्तरमप्येवं कल्प्यते चेदित्यर्थः। तर्हि अमत्तं न सिद्ध्येदिति तावदाह—

तदिति। अनिष्टान्तरमपि दर्शयति— तदा चेति। अथेति। पर्यायोक्तमित्ययमलङ्कारः। व्यापकश्चाङ्गी

एवायमवलम्ब्यते। केवलं मात्सर्यग्रहात् पर्यायोक्तवाचीति^१ भावः। न चेयदपि प्राक्तनैर्दृष्टम्, अपि त्वस्माभिरवोन्मीलितगिति दर्शयति— न पुनरिति॥ भामहस्य यादृक्तदीपं रूपमभिमतं तादृग्गुदाहरणेन दर्शितम्; तत्रापि नैव व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्यं चारुत्वाहेतुत्वात्; तेन तदनुसारितया तत्सदृशं यदुदाहरणान्तरमपि कल्प्यते तत्र नैव व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्यमिति सिद्धयतिः। यदि तु तदुक्तमुदाहरणमनादृत्य “भम धम्मिअ” इत्याद्युदाह्रियते, तदस्मच्छिष्यतैव। केवलं तु अन्यमवलम्बापश्रवणेनात्मसंस्कार इत्यनार्यवेष्टितम्। यदाहुरैतिहासिकाः— “अवज्ञयाप्यच्छाद्य शृण्वन्नरकमृच्छति^४” इति। भामहेन ह्युदाहृतम्—

“गृहेष्वध्वसु वा नात्रं भुञ्जहे यदधीतिनः^५।

विप्रा न भुञ्जते..... ॥” इति।

एतद्धि भगवद्वासुदेवकथनं पर्यायेण रसदानं निषेधति। यत्स एवाह—

.....“तच्च रसदाननिवृत्तये” इति। न चास्य रसदाननिषेधस्य व्यङ्ग्यस्य किञ्चिच्चारुत्वमस्ति येन प्राधान्यं शङ्क्येत। अपि तु तद्व्यङ्ग्योपोद्बलितं विप्रभोजनेन विना यत्र भोजनं तदेव उक्तप्रकारेण पर्यायोक्तं सत् प्राकरणिकं भोजनार्थमलंकुरुते; न ह्यस्य निर्विषं भोजनं भवत्विति विवक्षितमिति पर्यायोक्तमलंकार एव^६ चिरन्तनानामभिमत इति तात्पर्यम्॥ अपह्नुतिदीपकयोरिति॥ एतत्पूर्वमेव निर्णीतम्, अत एवाह— प्रसिद्धमिति॥ प्रतीतं प्रसाधितं प्रामाणिकं^७ चेत्पर्यः। पूर्वं चैतत् ‘धुपमादिव्यपदेशं भ्राजनमेव तद्यथा न भवति’ इत्यमुया

चेत्यभ्युपगम्यत इति चेदित्यर्थः। इयदेव तावत् पर्यायोक्ते व्यंग्यप्राधान्यं गम्यत इत्यर्थः। ततस्तत्सदृशस्योदाहरणान्तरस्य प्रकल्पने तथा न व्यङ्ग्यस्य प्राधान्यमिति यावत्—पश्चान्तरमाशङ्क्य परिरुति—यदि त्विति॥ किं तद्भामहोदाहृतमित्याह— भामहेन हीति। रसदानं निषेधतीति। विषदानं निषेधतीति यावत्, अ एव भामह एव रसदाननिषेधस्य रसं न दद्यादिति रूपस्य, उपोद्धस्तमुपस्कृतं। तदेवेति। वाच्यरूपमिति यावत्। न ह्यस्येति एवं भूतं वाच्यमेवात्र प्राधान्येन विवक्षितं, न तु व्यंग्यं विषं न देयमिति। यदि तु निर्विषं भोजनं भवत्विति विवक्षितं स्यात्, तर्हि व्यंग्यं प्रधानं स्यात्। न वैम्। तस्माद्वाच्यमेवात्र प्रधानम् इत्यर्थः।

प्रकृतमुपसहरति— पर्यायोक्तमिति। अतः पर्यायोक्तमलंकार एव नालङ्कार्यमिति भामहादीनां चिरन्तनानां सिद्धान्त इत्यर्थः। अपह्नुतीति अपह्नुतिदीपकयोर्व्याख्यानगतस्य वाच्यस्य प्राधान्यं पूर्वमेव यथा दीपकापह्नुत्यादाविति ग्रन्थव्याख्याने एव, निर्णीतमिति यावत्। ननु अत्रापह्नुति-दीपकयोरित्यादिकमेतत् किमर्थमुक्तम्? उक्तः ‘अत्र पूर्वमयमवार्थो यथा दीपकापह्नुत्यादिनेत्याशङ्कायां आह—पूर्वं चैतदिति।

^१क.ख.ग.(नि) ०भागिति. ^२क.ख.(के) तत्रच. ^३(के) ‘नयमन’ इत्येव पाठः. ^४(के) भार्ठ. ^५क.ख.ग. c.तिनो.

^६क.ख.ग.(का) एवेति. ^७क.ख.(के) ‘प्रामाणिक’ नास्ति. ^८घ.(के) उपमन०. ^९क.ख.ग.(के) ‘एव’ नास्ति। ‘भ्राजनमेतद्यथा’ इत्येव पाठः.

छायया दृष्टान्ततयोक्तमपि, उद्देशः^१क्रमपूरणाय ग्रन्थशय्यां योजयितुं पुनरप्युक्तम्
'व्यङ्ग्य'^२प्राधान्याभावात् ध्वनिः^३ इति छायान्तरेण। वस्तु पुनरेकमेव। उपमाया एव व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन
ध्वनित्वाशङ्कनात्। यत्तु विवरणकृत् "दीपकस्य सर्वत्रोपमान्वयो आस्ति" इति
बहुनोदाहरण^४प्रपञ्चेन विचारितवान्, तदनुपयोगि निस्सारं सप्रतिक्षेपं च॥

"मदो जनयति प्रीतिं सान्द्रं मानभङ्गुरम्^५ ।

स प्रियासङ्गमोत्कण्ठां सासह्यां मनसः शुचम् ॥"

इति। अत्राप्युत्तरोत्तरजन्यत्वेऽप्युपमानोपमेयभावस्य सुकल्पत्वात्। नहि क्रमिकाणां नोपमानो-
पमेयभावः। तथा हि—

"राम इव दशरथोऽभूद्दशरथ इव रघुराजोऽपि रघुसदृशः।

अज इव दिलीपवंशशिवत्रं रामस्य कीर्तिरियम् ॥"

इति न^६ न भवति; तस्मात् क्रमिकत्वम्, समं वा प्राकरणिकत्वमुपमां^७ 'रुणद्धीति कोऽयं त्रास
इत्यलं गर्दभीदोहानुवर्तनेन॥

सङ्करालङ्कारोऽपीति॥

"विरुद्धालंक्रियोल्लेखे समं तद्वृत्त्यसम्भवे ।

एकस्य च ग्रहे न्यायदोषाभावात्^८ स संकरः॥"

इति लक्षणादेकः प्रकारः। यथा ममैव—

छाया प्रकारः। वस्तु पुनरिति। छायाप्रयोजनयोरेव भेदः। अर्थस्य व्यंग्यत्वेऽप्युपमाया अप्राधान्यान्
ध्वनित्वमित्येवमात्मा एक एवेत्यर्थः। विवरणकृदिति—ध्वनिग्रन्थस्य विवरणं कृतवान्, कश्चित् विचारितवानिति।
स्वविवरणग्रन्थे इति शेषः। तत्रिराकरोति तदिति। उपमान्वयमुदाहरणेन समर्थयति मदो जनयतीति। क्रमिकाणां
क्रमवतां समं वेति। अक्रमिकत्वमित्यर्थः। यथा— 'मणिः शाणोल्लीढः' इत्यादौ॥ प्राकरणिकत्वं प्रावरणिकमिति
यावत्। दोहानुवर्तनेन दोहानुवर्तनेन, निस्सारपरीक्षणेनेत्यर्थः॥

अथ, संकरालङ्कारनिस्पणम्—संकरेति। अत्र संकरालङ्कारश्चतुर्था— सन्देहेन, एकवाक्यवर्तनेन,
एकवाक्यांशप्रवेशेन, अनुग्राह्यानुग्राहकभावेन चेति। प्रकारश्चायं भट्टोद्भटमतेनावृत्तिश्चेति। तत्रैषां क्रमेण
लक्षणोदाहरणानि दर्शयति विरुद्धेति। यत्र विरुद्धयोरलङ्कारयोः संभवः युगपत्तयोर्वृत्त्यनंभवश्च एकपरिग्रहे

^१ग. (के) उद्देशानुक्रमं०. ^२क. ख. ग. व्यंग्यम्. ^३क. ख. ग. (के) 'न' नास्ति. ^४च. (के) उदाहरणादिप्र०. ^५घ. ड. च. (का)
० भङ्गुरम्. ^६क. ख. ग. नतु. ^७क. ख. ग. (का) निरुणद्धिः. ^८ग. घ. ड. च. ० दोषाभावे च.

“शशिवदनसितसरसिजनयना सितकुन्ददशनपङ्क्तिरियम् ।

गगनजलस्थलसम्भवहृद्याकारा कृता विधिना ॥” इति ।

अत्र च^१ शशी वदामस्याः, तद्वद्वा वदनमस्या इति । रूपकोपमोलोखात् युगपद्व्यासम्भवा-
देकतरपक्षत्यागग्रहं प्रमाणाभावात् संकर इति व्यङ्ग्यवाच्यताया एव अनिश्चयात् का
धनिसम्भावना? योऽपि द्वितीयः प्रकारः— ‘शब्दार्थालंकाराणामेकत्र भावः’ इति तत्रापि
प्रतीयमानस्य का शङ्का? यथा— ‘स्मर स्मरमिव प्रियं स्म रमसे^२ यदालिङ्गनात्’ इति ।
^३तत्रैव यमकमुपमा च । तृतीयः प्रकारः— यत्रैकत्र वाक्यांशेऽनेकोऽर्थालंकारः तत्रापि द्वयोः
साभ्यात् कस्य व्यङ्ग्यता । यथा—

“तुल्योदयावसानत्वाद्गतेस्तं प्रति भास्वति ।

वासाय वासरः क्लान्तो विशतीव तमोगुहाम् ॥”

इति । अत्र हि स्वामिविपत्तिसमुचितवतग्रहणहेवाकिंकुलपुत्रकरूपणमेकदेशविवर्तिरूपकं दर्शयति ।
उत्प्रेक्षा चेवशब्देनोक्ता । तदिदं प्रकारद्वयमुक्तम् ।

“शब्दार्थवर्त्यलंकारा वाक्य एकत्र वर्तिनः^४

संकरो वैकवाक्यांशप्रवेशाद्वाभिधीयते ॥”

साधकस्य बधकस्य वाभावः स एकः सन्देहः त्वकः संकर इति यावत् । शशीति । तथा वक्त्रचन्द्र इत्यत्र ‘वक्त्रं चन्द्र
इवेति किमुपमा, उत ‘वक्त्रमेव चन्द्र’ इति रूपकमिति संशयः । उभयथापि समासस्य संभवात् । ‘उपमितं
व्याघ्रादिभिः सामान्याप्रयोगे’ इति उपमासमासः व्याघ्रादीनामाकृतिगणत्वात् । मयूरव्यंसकादित्वात्, रूपकसमासः
मयूरव्यंसकादीनामाकृतिगणत्वात् ।

एवं ‘शशिवदनेत्यत्र ‘शशीव वदनमस्या’ इति वि.मुपमा, उत ‘शश्येव वदनमस्या’ इति रूपकमिति संशय
इत्यर्थः । व्यङ्ग्यवाच्यताया एवानिश्चयादिति । उपमाया वाच्यत्वे रूपकं व्यङ्ग्यं स्यात् । अन्यथा चेदन्यथा स्यात् । तत्र
द्वयोरप्यस्य वाच्यत्वानिर्धारणात् कुत एव ध्वनिस्वरभावनेत्यर्थः ।

अथ द्वितीयं सङ्करभेदं लक्षयति—वापीति । तत्रैव चेति । यमकमुपमा च द्वयमपि वाच्यमेव, न किञ्चित्
व्यङ्ग्यमिति कृत एव ध्वनिप्रसङ्ग इत्यर्थः । अथ तृतीयं प्रकारं विवेचयति— तृतीय इति ।

अत्रोक्ते । एकदेशविवर्तिरूपकं दर्शयति—कविरिति शेषः । रूपकोत्प्रेक्षयोर्द्वयोरपि वाच्यतया साम्यान्
कस्यचिदपि व्यङ्ग्यत्वमिति भावः । उक्तस्यास्य भेदद्वयस्य लक्षणमाह— शब्दार्थैति ॥

^१कः,ङ.ग.(का) ‘च’ नास्ति. ^२क.ख.(नि)(का) ०ग्रहणे. ^३ग.(नि)(का) रमसे. ^४क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) अत्रैव. ^५ग.प.च.(नि)
०वृत्तत्वं. ^६क.ख.(नि)(के) शविनः.

इति॥ चतुर्थस्तु प्रकारः यत्रानुग्राह्यानुग्राहकभावोऽलंकाराणम्। यथा—

“प्रवातनीलोत्पलनिर्विशेषमधीरविप्रेक्षितमायताक्ष्याः ।

तया गृहीतं नु मृगाङ्गनाभ्यस्ततो गृहीतं नु मृगाङ्गनाभिः॥”

अत्र मृगाङ्गनावलोकनेन तदवलोकनस्योपमा यद्यपि व्यङ्ग्या, तथापि वाच्यस्य
‘संसदेहालंकारस्याभ्युत्थानकारिणीत्वेन अनुग्राहकत्वाद्गुणीभूता। अनुग्राह्यत्वेन हि ‘संसदेहे
पर्यवसानम्। यथोक्तम्—

“परस्पररोपकारेण यत्रालंकृतयः स्थिताः ।

स्वातन्त्र्येणात्मलाभं नो लभन्ते सोऽपि संकरः॥” ४इति।

तदाह— यदालंकार इत्यादि॥ एवं चतुर्थेऽपि प्रकारे ध्वनिता निराकृता। मध्यमयोस्तु
व्यङ्ग्यसंभावनैव नास्तीत्युक्तम्। आद्ये तु प्रकारे ‘शशिवदना’ इत्याद्युदाहृते कथंचिदस्ति
संभावेनेत्याशङ्क्य निराकरोति— अलंकारद्वयेति॥ सममिति॥ द्वयोरप्यान्दोत्यमानत्वादिति
भावः। ननु यत्र व्यङ्ग्यमेव प्राधान्येन भाति तत्र किं कर्तव्यम्? यथा

“होइ ण गुणानुराओ खलान्णं णवरं पसिद्धिसरणाणम्।

किर पट्णवइ ससिमणि चन्दे ण पिआमुहे दिट्ठे ॥”

अत्रार्थान्तरन्यासस्तावद्वाच्यत्वेन ५भाति व्यतिरेकापह्नुती तु व्यङ्ग्यत्वेन प्रधानतयेत्यभि-
प्रायेणाशङ्कते— अथेति॥ सत्रोत्तरम्— तदा सोऽपीति॥ सङ्करालङ्कार एवायं न भवति,
अपि त्वलङ्कारध्वनिर्नामायं ध्वनेद्वितीयो भेदः। यच्च पर्यायोक्ते निरूपितं तत्सर्वमत्राप्यनु-

तुरीयं भेदं दर्शयति— चतुर्थस्त्विति। अनुग्राह्यत्वेनेति। उपमायाः ससन्देहे पर्यवसानमिति यावत्।
अनुग्राह्यत्वेनेति। ससन्देहस्येति शेषः। व्यङ्ग्याऽप्युपमा अनुग्राहकत्वात् ससन्देहस्यानुग्राह्यास्यानुगतरी । अतो
वाच्यस्य ससन्देहस्यैव प्राधान्यमतो नात्र ध्वनित्वमित्यर्थः। अस्य भेदस्य लक्षणं प्रदर्शयति— यथोक्तमिति।
तदाहेति। यदिदं चतुर्थभेदे ध्वन्यभावः प्रादर्शितदित्यर्थः। चतुर्थे प्रकारे इति। अनुग्राह्यानुग्राहकभावसंकरे अयं
भेदः प्रथमं वृत्तिकारेण प्रतिक्षिप्तः अथ द्वितीयतृतीययोर्भेदयोः व्यङ्ग्यासंभवात् सन्देहसंकरभेदे प्रथमे पर्यालोचनां
करोतीत्याह— मध्यमयोरेति।

होइ इति। भवति न गुणानुरागः न परं प्रसिद्धिसरणाणाम्। किं प्रस्नौति शशिमणिरचन्द्रे न प्रियामुखे
दृष्टे॥ व्यतिरेकापह्नुतीति। ‘चन्द्रे दृष्टे शशिमणिः प्रस्नौति, न तु प्रियामुख’ इत्यनेनैतावानेव भेदोऽनयोः
प्रियामुखचन्द्रयोर्नान्यः कश्चिदिति व्यतिरेको ध्वन्यते।

‘चन्दो न चन्द्रः प्रियामुखमेव चन्द्रः’ इति अपह्नुतिश्च इति यावत्। अलङ्कारध्वनिरिति।
वस्त्वलङ्काररसास्त्रयो ध्वनयस्तत्र वस्तुध्वनेः प्रथमभूतस्य यो द्वितीयः अलङ्कारध्वनिः स एवायं न

१क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) ‘व’ अधिकः. २क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) सा. ३क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) संदेहे. ४क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) ‘इति’ नास्ति.

५क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) आभाति. ६घ.ङ.(के) अत्र.

सरणीयम्। अथ सर्वेषु संकरप्रभेदेषु व्यङ्ग्यसंभावनानिरासप्रकारं साधारणमाह — अपि चेति॥
'क्वचिदपि संकरालंकारे च' इति संबन्धः। सर्वभेदभिन्न इत्यर्थः। संकीर्णता ¹तु मिश्रत्वं
लोलीभावः; तत्र कथमेकस्य प्राधान्यं क्षीरजलवत्?

“अधिकारादयेतस्य वस्तुनोऽन्यस्य या स्तुतिः।

अप्रस्तुताप्रशंसा सा त्रिविधा परिकीर्तिता ॥”

अप्रस्तुतस्य ²वर्णनं प्रस्तुताक्षेपिण इत्यर्थः। स चाक्षेपस्त्रिभिः ³प्रकारैर्भवति— सामान्य-
विशेषभावात्, निमित्तनिमित्तिभावात्, सारूपाच्च। तत्र प्रथमे प्रकारद्वये प्रस्तुताप्रस्तुतयोस्तुल्यमेव
प्राधान्यमिति प्रतिज्ञां करोति— “अप्रस्तुत” इत्यादिना “प्राधान्यम्” इत्यन्तेन। तत्र
सामान्यविशेषभावेऽपि द्वयी गतिः— सामान्यमप्राकरणिकं शब्देनोच्यते, गम्यते तु प्राकरणिको
विशेषः, स एकः प्रकारः। यथा—

“अहो संसारनैर्घृण्यमहो दौरात्म्यमापदाम् ।

अहो निसर्गज्जिम्सस्य दुरन्ता गतयो विधेः ॥”

अत्र हि दैवप्राधान्यं ⁴सर्वत्र सामान्यरूपमप्रस्तुतं वर्णितं सत् प्रकृते क्वापि वस्तुनि विनष्टे
विशेषात्मनि पर्यवस्यति। तत्रापि च विशेषांशस्य सामान्येन व्याप्यत्वाद् व्यङ्ग्यविशेष-
वद्वाच्यसामान्यस्यापि प्राधान्यम्। न हि सामान्यविशेषयोर्युगापत् प्राधान्यं विरुध्यते। यदा तु
विशेषः, प्राकरणिकः प्राकरणिकं सामान्यमाक्षिपति तदा द्वितीयः प्रकारः। यथा—

“एतत्तस्य मुखात् कियत्कमलिनीपत्रे कणं पायसोऽ

यन्मुक्तामणिरित्यमंस्त स जडः शृण्वन्यदस्मादपि ⁶॥

संकरालङ्कारः इत्यर्थः। अत्र समर्थकमाह— यच्चेति। अपि चेत्कयोरन्वयं दर्शयति। अथ स्मारकोक्त्या-
क्षेपेयत्रादि शब्दावरुद्धां अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसां विचारयितुं तत्तत्संज्ञाभेदे— अधिकारदिति। प्रथमे प्रकारद्वये इति।
सामान्यविशेषभावे निमित्तनिमित्तिभावे चेति यावत्। विशेषांशस्येति। विनष्टस्य कस्यचिदस्तुन इति यावत्।
सामान्येन। दैवप्राधान्येनेति यावत्। व्यङ्ग्यविशेषवत्— व्यङ्ग्यभूतविशेषवत्, वाच्यसामान्यस्य— वाच्यभूत-
सामान्यस्येति यावत्।

ननु कथं सागान्यविशेषयोः युगपत् प्राधान्यं स्यात्? यदि सामान्यं प्रधानं तर्हि विशेषोऽप्रधानमेव। यदि
पुनर्विशेषः प्रधानं, तर्हि सामान्यमप्रधानं स्यात्। उभयोरपि भिन्नत्वात् प्राधान्यं न संभवतीत्याशङ्कयामाह— न
हीति। रक्तं पटं वयेत्यादौ विशिष्टपटलरक्तत्वादीनां प्राधान्यं युगपदेव दृश्यते, अतो न विरोध इति भावः।
एतदिति। तस्यैतन्मुखात्। प्रथमं कियदित्यस्यैवोपरितनापेक्षयेत्यर्थः। कमलिनीत्यादि। यदेषः कमलिनीपत्रस्यितं

¹घ.(का)(कं) हि. ²क.ख.ग. 'च' अधिकः. ³क.ख.(नि)(का) त्रिविधो भवति. ⁴वा.(नि)(कौ) स्वातन्त्र्यं. ⁵(कं) वारिणो.
⁶(नि)(का) शृण्वन्यदस्मादपि, (कौ) शृण्वन् यदस्मादपि.

अङ्गुल्यग्रलघुक्रियाप्रविलयिन्यादीयमाने शनै-

स्तत्रोड्डीय गतो 'ममेत्यनुदिनं निद्राति नान्तः शुचा॥' इति।

अत्र अस्थाने महत्त्वसम्भावना^३ सामान्यं प्रस्तुतम्; अप्रस्तुतं तु जलबिन्दौ शणित्वसंभावनां विशेषरूपं वाच्यम्। तत्रापि सामान्यविशेषयोर्युगपत्प्राधान्ये न विरोध इत्युक्तम्। एवमेकप्रकारो द्विभेदोऽपि विचारितः “यदा तावत्” इत्यादिना “विशेषस्यापि प्राधान्यम्” इत्यन्तेन।^४ एनमेव न्यायं निमित्तनैमित्तिकभावेऽतिदिशस्तस्यापि द्विप्रकारतां दर्शयति। कदाचिन्निमित्तमप्रस्तुतं सदभिधीयमानं नैमित्तिकं प्रस्तुतमाक्षिपति। यथा—

“ये यान्त्यभ्युदये प्रीतिं नोज्झन्ति व्यसनेषु च।

ते बान्धवास्ते सुहृदो लोकः स्वार्थपरोऽपरः ॥”

अत्राप्रस्तुतं सुहृद्बान्धवरूपत्वं निमित्तं सज्जनासक्त्या वर्णयति नैमित्तिकीं श्रद्धेयवचनतां प्रस्तुतामात्मनोऽभिव्यङ्क्तुम्। तत्र नैमित्तिकप्रतीतावपि निमित्ताप्रतीतिरेव प्रधानीभवत्यनुप्राणकत्वेनेति व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकयोः प्राधान्यम्। कदाचित्तु नैमित्तिकमप्रस्तुतं दर्शयमानं सत् प्रस्तुतं निमित्तं व्यनक्ति यथा सेतौ—

“सगं अपारिजातं कोत्थुहलच्छिरहिअं महुमहस्स उरम् ।

सुमरामि महणपुरओ अमुद्धअन्दं च हरजडापम्भारम् ॥”

अत्र जाम्बवान् कौस्तुभलक्ष्मीविरहितहरिवक्षःस्मरणादिकमप्रस्तुतं नैमित्तिकं वर्णयति प्रस्तुतं वृद्धसेवाचिरजीवित्वव्यवहारकौशलादिनिमित्तभूतं मन्त्रितायामुपादेय^५मभिव्यङ्क्तुम्। तत्र निमित्तप्रतीतावपि नैमित्तिकं वाच्यभूतम्। प्रत्युत तन्निमित्तानुप्राणितत्वेनोद्धुरकन्धरी-
करोत्यात्मानमिति समप्रधानतैव वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः। एवं द्वौ प्रकारौ प्रत्येकं द्विविधौ विचार्य तृतीयः प्रकारः परीक्ष्यते सारूप्यलक्षणः। तत्रापि द्वौ प्रकारौ—अप्रस्तुतात् कदाचिद्वाच्या-
च्चमत्कारः, व्यङ्ग्यं तु तन्मुखप्रेक्षम्। यथास्मदुपाध्यायभट्टेन्दुराजस्य—

जलकणं मुक्ताफलं मन्यते तद्भवेदेव सादृश्यबलात् तदत्यल्पमित्यर्थः— शृण्वन्त्यदित्यादि। अस्मात् प्रसिद्धात्तदानीं तत्र स्थिताज्जनादिति यावत्।

मम हस्तान्धारलमुड्डीय गतमित्येवमन्तः शुचा अनुदिनं निद्रादिकं न लभत इत्येतदति- महदित्यर्थः। अत्रेति। जडानामिति शेषः। एकप्रकार इति। सामान्यविशेषभावनिबन्धन इत्यर्थः। द्विभेद इति। सामान्यविशेषयोर्वाच्यत्वभेदभिन्न इत्यर्थः। ये यन्तीति। कस्यचित् सुहृदं प्रति किञ्चिद्विवक्षोर्वचनमिदम्। सज्जनासक्त्या सज्जनाभिप्रायेण अनुप्राणकत्वेनेति प्रतीयमानोऽजीवकत्वेनेत्यर्थः।

उद्धुरकन्धरीकरोत्यात्मानं प्रधानीभवतीत्यर्थः। तन्मुखप्रेक्षमिति वाच्यमुखप्रेक्षं अप्रधानमित्यर्थः। प्राणा

^१ क.ख.(नि)(का) हरे. ^२ क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) 'इति' नास्ति. ^३ क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) ० भावनं. ^४ क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) एतमेव.

^५ क.ख.(नि)(का) वाच्यव्यङ्ग्ययोः. ^६ ग.(नि)(का) प्रस्तुतनैमित्तिकं. ^७ क.ख.(कं) उपादेयभूतायां.

‘प्राणा येन समर्पितास्तव बलाद्येन त्वमुत्थापितः

स्कन्धे यस्य चिरं स्थितोऽसि विदधे यस्ते सपर्यामपि।

तस्यास्य स्मितमात्रकेण जनयञ्जीवापहारक्रियां

भ्रातः प्रत्युपकारिणां धुरि परं वेताल लीलायसे ॥”

अत्र यद्यपि सात्त्विकवशेन कृतघ्नः कश्चिदन्यः प्रस्तुता आक्षिप्यते, तथाप्यप्रस्तुतस्यैव वेतालदुत्तान्तस्य चमत्कारकारित्वम्। न ह्यचेतनोपालम्भवदसंभाव्यमानोऽयमर्थो न च न हृद्य इति वाच्यस्यात्र प्रभावना। यदि पुनरचेतनादिनात्यन्तासंभाव्यमानतदर्थविशेषणेन अप्रस्तुतेन वर्णितेन प्रस्तुतमाक्षिप्यमाणं चमत्कारकारि तदा वस्तुध्वनिरसौ। यथा ममैव—

“भवन्नात हठाज्जनस्य हृदयान्याक्रम्य यन्तर्तयन्

भङ्गीभिर्विविधाभिरात्महृदयं प्रच्छाद्य २संघ्रीडसे।

स त्वामाह जड ततः सहृदयंगन्यत्वदुःशिक्षितो

मन्येऽमुष्य जडात्मता स्तुतिपदं त्वत्साम्यसंभावनात्॥”

कश्चिन्महापुरुषः “वीतरागोऽपि सरागवत्” इति न्यायेन गाढविवेकालोकोक्तिरस्कृत-
तिमिरप्रज्ञानोऽपि लोकमध्ये स्वात्मानं प्रच्छादयन् लोकं च बाबालयन् आत्मन्युपतिभा-
समेवाङ्गीकुर्वन् तेनैव लोकेन भ्रूखोऽयमिति यदावज्ञायते, तदा तदीयं लोकोत्तरं चरितं प्रस्तुतं
व्यङ्ग्यतया प्राक्षन्येन प्रकाश्यते। जडोऽयमिति उद्यानेन्दूदयादिर्भावो लोकेनावज्ञायतं। स च
प्रस्तुतः कस्यचिद्विरहिणः औत्सुक्यचिन्ताद्वयमानमानसतामन्यस्य प्रहर्षपरवशतां करोतीति हठादेव
लोकं प्रथेष्टं विकारकारणाभिर्नर्तयति। न च तस्य हृदयं केनापि अवज्ञायते कीदृगयमिति।
प्रत्युत महागम्भीरोऽतिविदग्धः सुष्ठु गर्वहीनोऽतिशयेन क्रीडाचतुरः स यदि लोकेन जड इति
तत एव कारणात् प्रत्युत वैदग्ध्यसंभावनानिमित्तात् संभावितः; आत्मा च यत एव कारणात्

इति। धुरि अग्रेः आक्षिप्यमाणं व्यज्यमानं। भावेति हे भावन्नात पदार्थन्नात, उद्यानादि पदार्थन्नातेति यावत्। यदिहि।
वाक्यार्थपरामर्शः। सज्जनः सहृदयंगन्यत्वदुःशिक्षितः—सहृदयं—मन्यत्यदुर्विनीतः, सहृदयोऽहमित्यभिमानेन हतः
दुर्लभित इति यादत्। अमुष्य जनस्य जडात्मता, जडोऽसीत्युच्यमानत्वेत्यर्थः। त्वत्साम्यसंभावनात् स त्वया
समत्वापातदित्यर्थः। अत्र प्रस्तुतमर्थं दर्शयति— कश्चिदित्यादिना प्रकाश्यत इत्यन्तेन। अप्रस्तुतं वाच्यं
विवेचयति। जडोऽयमित्यादिना। प्रत्युत स्तुतिरित्यन्तेन। स इन्दूदयादिपदार्थन्नात विकारकारणाभिः
विकाराविषाणभिः। स गदगीति। स भावन्नात वैदग्ध्यसंभावनानिमित्तादेर्विधकीडनात् यदि जडोऽयमिति

प्रत्युत जाड्येन संभाव्यस्तत एव सहृदयः संभावितः; तदस्य लोकस्य जडोऽसीति यद्युच्यते तदा जाड्यमेवंविधस्य भावव्रातस्यातिविदग्धस्य प्रसिद्धमिति सा प्रत्युत स्तुतिरिति जडादपि पापीयानयं लोक इति ध्वन्यते। तदाह— यदा त्वित्यादिना^१॥ इतरथा त्पिति॥ इतरथैव पुनरलंकारान्तरत्वमलंकारविशेषत्वम्, न व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्येन कथंचिदपीति भावः। उद्देशे यदादिग्रहणं कृतम्। “समासोक्तिः” इत्यत्र द्वन्द्वे तेन व्याजस्तुतिप्रभृतिरलंकारवर्गोऽपि संभाव्यमान^२ व्यङ्ग्यानुप्रवेशः संभावितः। तत्र सर्वत्र साधारणमुत्तरं दातुमुपक्रमते— तदयमत्रेति। कियद्वा प्रतिपदं लिख्यतामिति भावः।

तत्र व्याजस्तुतिर्यथा—

“किं वृत्तान्तैः परगृहगतैः किं तु नाहं समर्थ-

स्तूष्णीं स्थातुं प्रकृतिमुखरो दाक्षिणात्यस्वभावः।

गेहे गेहे विपणिषु तथा चत्वरे पानगोष्ठ्या-

मुन्मत्तेव भ्रमति भवतो वल्लभा हन्त कीर्तिः॥”

अत्र व्यङ्ग्यं^३ यत् स्तुत्यात्मकं तेन^४ वाच्यमेवोपस्क्रियते। यत्तूदाहृतं केनचित्—

“आसीन्नाथ पितामही तव मही माता^५ ततोऽनन्तरं

जाता^६ संप्रति साम्बुराशिरशना जाया कुलोद्भूतये।

पूर्णे वर्षशते भविष्यति पुनः सैवानवद्या स्नुषा

युक्तं नाम समग्रनीतिविदुषां किं भूपतीनां कुले ॥”

इति।^७ एतदस्माकं ग्राम्यं प्रतिभाति, अत्यन्तासभ्यस्मृतिहेतुत्वात्। का^८ चानेन स्तुतिः कृता? ‘त्वं वंशक्रमेण राजा’ इति हि कियदिदमिति एवंप्राया व्याजस्तुतिः सहृदयगोष्ठीषु निन्दितेत्युपेक्ष्यैव॥

संभावितो भवति जनेन। यदि च जनेन आत्मा स्वयं जड इति संभाव्यः, प्रत्युत सहृदय इति संभावितस्तर्हि अमुं लोकं प्रति जडोऽसीति वचनमस्य स्तुतिरेव संपद्यते भावव्रातसाम्यापातात्। एवंविधस्य भावव्रातस्यातिविदग्धस्य जाड्यं प्रसिद्धमिति। तदाहेति। यदेतत् साक्ष्ये प्रतीयमानस्य प्रधानतायां ध्वनित्वमुक्तं तदाहेत्यर्थः। अलङ्कारविशेषत्वमिति । अप्रस्तुतप्रशंसात्मकमिति भावः । न व्यङ्ग्येति । न व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्येन ध्वनित्वं कथञ्चिदपीति भाव इत्यर्थः। व्याजस्तुतिप्रभृतिरलङ्कारवर्गोऽपीति। न केवलमप्रस्तुतप्रशंसैवेति यावत्। संभावितः

^१ क. ख. ग. इति. ^२ क. ख. ग. (नि)(का) व्यंग्यस्य कथंचिदपि प्राधान्यमिति. ^३ क. ख. (नि)(का) व्यंग्यानुवेशः. ^४ क. ख. ग. (नि)(का) ‘यत्’ नास्ति. ^५ क. ख. ग. (नि)(का) यत्नेन. ^६ क. ख. ग. (नि) आसीनाथ. ^७ क. ख. (का) जाता. ^८ क. ख. (का) माता. ^९ क. ख. ग. (नि)(का) तदस्माकं. ^{१०} क. ख. (नि) काचानेन.

“यस्य िकारः प्रभवन्न¹प्रतिबद्धेन हेतुनः येन ।

गमयति तदभिप्रायं तत्प्रतिबन्धं च भावोऽसौ ॥”

इत्यत्रापि वाच्यप्राधान्ये भावालंकारता। यस्य चित्तवृत्तिविशेषस्य संबन्धी वाग्व्यापारा-
दिर्विकारोऽ²प्रतिबद्धोऽनियतः प्रथवंस्तं चित्तवृत्तिविशेषरूपमभिप्रायं येन हेतुना गमयति स
हेतुर्यथेष्टोपभोग्यत्व-दिलक्षणोऽर्थो भावालंकारः यथा—

“एकाकिनी यदबला तरुणी तथाहमस्मिन् गृहे गृहपतिश्च गतो विदेशम्।

कं यावत्सं तदिह वासमियं वराकी श्वश्रूर्ममान्धबधिरा ननु मूढ पान्थ ॥”

अत्र व्यङ्ग्यभेदैकत्र पदार्थ उपस्कारकारीति वाच्यं प्रधानम्। व्यङ्ग्यप्राधान्ये तु न
कश्चिदलंकारेति निरूपितं इत्यलं बहुना॥

यत्रेति॥ काव्ये॥ अलंकृत्य इति॥ अलंकृतित्वादेव च वाच्या³र्थोपस्कारकत्वम्॥

प्रतिभामात्र इति॥ यत्रोपमादौ स्मिष्टार्थप्रतीतिः॥ वाच्यार्थानुगम इति॥

वाच्येनार्थानुगमः समं प्राधान्यम् अपस्तुतप्रशंसायापियेत्यर्थः॥⁴ स्फुटतया प्राधान्यं न
चकास्ति, अपितु बलात् कल्प्यते, तथापि शृङ्गदये नानुप्रविशति। यथा— “दे आ
पसिअ णिवत्सु” इत्यान्यकृतासु व्याख्यासु। तेन चतुर्षु प्रकारेषु न ध्वनिव्यवहारः सद्भावोऽपि
¹⁰व्यङ्ग्यस्य— अप्राधान्ये, स्मिष्टप्रतीती, वाच्येन समप्राधान्ये, अस्फुटे प्राधान्ये च¹¹। वव
तर्ह्यसावित्याह— तत्प्रभावेवेति॥ संकरेणालंकारानुपपन्नसंभावनया उक्तिरिति इत्यर्थः।
संकरालंकारेति त्वसत्। अन्यालंकारोपलक्षणत्वे हि स्मिष्टं स्यात्॥

स्वीकृतः, यत्रास्तुतिप्रभृतिरित्यर्थः। तत्र अमुतिशब्देनावरुद्धेषु अलङ्कारेषु भावालङ्कारं दर्शयति।
यस्येति। लक्षणार्थं व्याचष्टे—यस्येति।

अथ संकेतार्थस्तोकेषु प्रथमं व्याचष्टे—यत्रेतीति। द्वितीयं व्याचष्टे—प्रतिभामात्र इतीति। स्मिष्टा
अविस्पष्टा। व्यङ्ग्यस्यास्फुटप्राधान्ये ध्वनिर्नास्तीति यदुक्तं, तत्रोदाहरणं दर्शयति—यथेति। दे आ पसिअ णिवत्सु
इत्यत्र ये अन्यकृता व्याख्यानप्रकाराः गुणीभूतव्यङ्ग्यभेदसहृदयोविस्फुटस्थायः ते प्रत्येकमप्राधान्येन व्यङ्ग्यवन्त
इत्यर्थः। संकरशब्दं ‘वेप्रतिमितिपरावरणार्थं व्याचष्टे—संकरेणेति। संकरशब्दस्य संकरालङ्कारो नार्थ इत्यर्थः।
अन्यथा अलङ्कारान्तगन्गुजानात् ध्वनेरलंकार- व्यतिरिक्तो न विषय इति स्मिष्टत्वं स्यादित्यर्थः।

¹ग. (का) अप्रतिबन्धस्तु. ²(नि)(के) बरतं. ³(का) अप्रतिबन्ध. ⁴क.ख. (नि) प्राधान्ये हि भावालंकारता ⁵क.ख. (नि)(का)
शब्दोप०. ⁶क.ख. (नि) स्मिष्टा प्रतीतिः. ⁷(नि)(का)(के) ‘न प्रतीयते इति’ इति प्रतीकमधिकम्. ⁸क.ख. ‘व’ अधिकम्.
⁹क.ख. ग. (का) देवा पसिअणिआतासु. ¹⁰क.ख. ग. (नि) ‘प्राधान्यम्’ अधिकः. ¹¹व. (के) ‘व’ नास्ति.

इतश्चेति॥ न केवलमन्योन्यविरुद्धवाच्यवाचकभावव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावसमा-
श्रयत्वात् न तादात्म्यमलंकाराणां ध्वनेश्च, यावत् स्वामिभृत्यवदङ्गिरूपाङ्गरूपयो-
र्विरोधादित्यर्थः॥ अवयव इति॥ एकैक इत्यर्थः। तदाह— पृथग्भूत इति। पृथग्भूतस्तथा मा
भूत्, समुदायमध्यपतितस्तर्ह्यस्तु तथेत्याशङ्क्याह— अपृथग्भावे त्विति॥ तदापि न स एक
एव समुदायः, अन्येषामपि समुदायिनां तत्र भावात्; तत्समुदायमध्ये च प्रतीयमानमप्यस्ति; न
च तदलंकारस्वरूपम्, प्रधानत्वादेव; यत्त्वलंकाररूपं तदप्रधानत्वाच्च ध्वनिः; तदाह— न तु
तत्त्वमेवेति॥ नन्वलंकार एव कश्चित्त्वया प्रधानताभिषेकं दत्त्वा ध्वनिरित्यात्मेति चोक्त
इत्याशङ्क्याह— यत्रापि वेति॥ न हि समासोक्त्यादीनामन्यतम एवासौ तथास्माभिः कृतः,
तद्विविक्तत्वेऽपि तस्य भावात्। समासोक्त्याद्यलंकारस्वरूपस्य समस्तस्याभावेऽपि तस्य
दर्शितत्वात् “अत्ता एत्य” इति “कस्स वा ण” ६ इति। तदाह— न तन्निष्ठत्वमेवेति॥ विद्वद्भ्य
उपज्ञा प्रथमत उपक्रमो यस्या उक्तेरिति बहुव्रीहिः। तेन “उपज्ञोपक्रमम्” इति तत्पुरुषाश्रयं
नपुंसकत्वं निरवकाशम्॥ श्रूयमाणेष्विति॥ श्रोत्रशष्कुलीं संतानेनागता ७ अन्त्याः शब्दाः श्रूयन्त
इति प्रक्रियायां शब्दजाः ८ शब्दाः श्रूयमाणा इत्युक्तम्। तेषां घण्टानुराणनरूपत्वं तावदस्ति, ते च
ध्वनिशब्देनोक्ताः। यथाह तत्रभवान् भर्तृहरिः—

“यः संयोगवियोगाभ्यां करणैरुपजन्यते ।

स स्फोटः ९ शब्दजाः शब्दा ध्वनयोऽन्यैरुदाहृताः॥”

अथात्र हेतुन्तरं दर्शयितुमाह— इतश्च नान्तर्भाव इति। न चेति। अवयव एवावयवीति न भवतीत्यर्थः।
अपृथगिति तस्यावयवस्य, अवयवाङ्गत्वमिति यावत्। न तु तत्त्वमेवेति। अवयवित्वमेवेत्यर्थः। यत्रापि वा
तत्त्वमिति। यत्र पर्यायोक्त्यादौ ‘भम धमिअ’ इत्यत्र पर्यायोक्तादिकल्पेन ध्वनित्वमुक्तम्। ‘हो इ ण गुणानुराओ’
इति संकरालङ्कारेऽपि ध्वनिस्तीत्युक्तम्। ‘भावव्राते’त्यप्रस्तुतप्रशंसायामपि तथा तदभाव उक्त इति। तत्त्वं।
अवयवित्वं व्यङ्ग्यप्रधान्यमित्यर्थः। तन्निष्ठत्वं तदवयवनिष्ठत्वं तदलङ्कारनिष्ठत्वमिति यावत्। श्रोत्रशष्कुलीमिति।
संयोगविभागात् शब्दाच्च शब्दनिर्णयतिरिति शब्दजाः शब्दाः अन्त्याः श्रूयन्ते इति वैशेषिकप्रक्रिया। तेषामिति
श्रूयमाणानामन्त्यानां शब्दानां शब्दानामिति यावत्। घण्टेति। पूर्वशब्दजन्यत्वादिति शेषः। तेषां ध्वनिशब्दवाच्यत्वे
प्रमाणमाह— यथेति। संयोगविभागाभ्यां तात्त्वादित्थानसंयोगविभागाभ्याम्। करणैः जिह्वामूलभागादिभिः। स
स्फोट इति। प्रथममेव जायते स्फोटः, अभिव्यज्यते स्फोटः, पुनः शब्दजाः शब्दा ये श्रूयन्ते ते ध्वनयः इत्यर्थः।

१ क. ख. घ. ङ. च. (नि.) (का) ‘अथ’ अधिकः. २ ग. घ. (नि.) (का) (के) मध्यनिपतितः. ३ क. ख. ग. (का) रूपम्. ४ क. ख. ग. (नि.)
(का) इत्यादि. ५ क. ख. (नि) ‘तस्मिन्निष्ठा यस्येति तत्र भवति। महाविषयत्वात् व्यापकत्वादित्यर्थः। घटो घट एव न भवति किं
तु तत्कर्तृपरोक्षे, तत्रापि न भवति किं तु घटेऽपीत्यनेन व्यापकोऽयमित्युक्तं भवति महाविषयत्वात् विद्वदुपज्ञेति’ अधिकः.
६ ङ. च. (के) शब्दाः श्रूयन्ते अन्त्याः. ७ ग. (नि) ‘शब्दजाः’ नास्ति. ८ क. ख. (नि) शब्दजः शब्दो ध्वनिरित्युच्यते बुधैः.

एवं घण्टा¹निर्हादस्थानीयोऽनुरणनात्मोपलक्षितो व्यङ्ग्योऽप्यर्थो ध्वनिरिति व्यवहृतः। तथा
2 श्रूयमाणे ये वर्णा नादशब्दवाच्या अन्त्यबुद्धिनिर्वाह्याः स्फोटाभिव्यञ्जकाः ते
ध्वनिशब्देनोक्ताः। यथाह स⁴ एव तत्रभवान्—

“प्रत्ययैरनुगच्छेयैर्ग्रहणानुग्रहैस्तथा ।

ध्वनिप्रवाशितं शब्दे स्वरूपमवधार्यते ॥”

इति। तेन व्यञ्जकौ शब्दार्थाविपीह ध्वनिशब्देनोक्तौ। किंच वर्णेषु तावन्मात्रपरिमाणेष्वपि सत्सु,
यथाोक्तम्—

“अल्पोऽपि यत्नेन शब्दमुच्चारितं मतिः ।

यदि वा नैव गृह्णाति वर्णं वा सकलं स्फुटम् ॥”

इति। तेषु तावत्स्वेव श्रूयमाणेषु वक्तुर्योऽन्यो द्रुतविलम्बितादिवृत्तिभेदात्मा प्रसिद्धा—
दुच्चारणव्यापारादभ्यधिकः स⁵ व्यापारो ध्वनिरुक्तः। स एव⁶ यदाह—

“शब्दस्योर्ध्वमभिव्यक्तेर्दृष्टिभेदं तु⁷ वैकृताः।

ध्वनयः रागगुणोहन्ते स्फोटात्मा तैर्न भिद्यते ॥”

इति। अस्माभिरपि प्रसिद्धेभ्यः शब्दव्यापारेभ्योऽभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणारूपेभ्योऽतिरिक्तो व्यापारो
ध्वनिरुक्तः। एवं चतुष्कमपि ध्वनिः। तद्योगाच्च सप्रस्तमपि काव्यं ध्वनिः। तेन

एवमिति। एवंप्रकरणान्त्यो व्यङ्ग्यरूपो यः शब्दः पूर्वशब्दव्यञ्जितः स ध्वनिरिति वैयाकरणैर्विदोक्तः
इत्यर्थः।

एवं व्यङ्ग्यात्मकप्रार्थस्य ध्वनिशब्दवाच्यत्वं प्रसाध्य वाच्यवाचकयोरपि तत्प्रसाधयितुमाह—
अन्त्यबुद्धीति। अन्त्या या बुद्धिः उन्त्यध्वनिसहितबुद्धिः, तथा ग्राह्यो यः स्फोटः, तस्याभिव्यञ्जका इति यावत्।
तदुक्तम्—

नादैराहितबीजायामन्त्येन ध्वनिना सह। आवृतपरिपाकायां बुद्धौ शब्दो विभाव्यते॥ इति ।

प्रत्ययैरिति। अथ व्यापारस्यापि व्यञ्जनात्मकरं ध्वनिशब्दाभिधेयत्वं समर्थयति—किं चेति। वर्णेषु
तावन्मात्रपरिमाणेष्वपि सन्तिव्यत्यय वक्तुर्योऽन्यो द्रुतत्यादिना सम्बन्धः तत्र तदेकदेशमप्युक्तं संवादेन
द्रवयितुमाह—अल्पोऽपि यत्नेन। अस्मीयसा यत्नेनोच्चारितो वर्णः। किञ्चिदपि न गृह्यते वा, स्फुटं सवस्तो गृह्यते
वा, न तु किञ्चिदगृह्यते वर्णस्य निरवयवत्वादित्यर्थः।

वृत्तिभेदात्मा व्यापारविशेषात्मा शब्दस्येति। शब्दस्याभिव्यक्तेरुर्ध्वं ये वैकृता द्रुतादयो वृत्तिभेदास्ते ध्वनयः

¹ क.ख. (नि) घटादि. ² क.ख. (नि) 'इत्येष प्रकारोऽव्यक्तशब्दानामेव वर्तते। व्यक्तशब्दानाम्' अधिकः. ³ ड. च. ग्राह्यस्फोट.

⁴ क.ख. (नि) भगवान् स एव ⁵ क.ख.ग. (नि) 'व्यापारः' नास्ति. ⁶ क.ख.ग.घ. (नि) (के) यदाह स एव (यथाह) इति. ⁷ घ.ङ. व्यतिभेदास्तु. ग. वृत्तिभेदास्तु.

व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकव्यपदेशोऽपि न न युक्तः ॥ वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्र इति ॥ वाच्यवाचकसहितः संमिश्र इति मध्यमपदलोपी संमासः। “गामश्वं पुरुषं ¹पशुम्” इतिवत् समुच्चयोऽत्र चकारेण विनापि। तेन वाच्योऽपि ध्वनिः; वाचकोऽपि शब्दोः ध्वनिः; द्वयोरपि व्यञ्जकत्वम्, ²ध्वनतीति कृत्वा। ³संमिश्रयते विभावानुभावसंवलनयेति व्यङ्ग्योऽपि ध्वनिः, ध्वन्यत इति कृत्वा। शब्दनं शब्दः शब्दव्यापारः। न चासावभिधादिरूपः, अपि त्वात्मभूतः; सोऽपि ⁴ध्वननं ध्वनिः। काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्यश्च योऽर्थः सोऽपि ध्वनिः, उक्तप्रकारध्वनिवतुष्टयत्वात्। अत एव साधारणं हेतुमाह— व्यञ्जकत्वसाम्यादिति ॥ ⁵व्यञ्जकत्वं व्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जकभावः सर्वेषु पक्षेषु सामान्यरूपः साधारण इत्यर्थः। यत् पुनरेतदुक्तम् “वाग्विकल्पानामानन्त्यात्” इत्यादि, तत् परिहरति— न चैवंविधस्येति ॥ वक्ष्यमाणः प्रभेदो यथा— मुख्ये द्वे रूपे; तद्भेदा यथा— अर्थान्तरसंक्रमितवाच्यः अत्यन्ततिरस्कृतवाच्य इत्यविवक्षितवाच्यस्य, असंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्यः संलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्य इति विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यस्य⁶ति; तत्राप्यवान्तरभेदाः ॥ महाविषयस्येति ॥ अशेषलक्ष्यव्यापिन इत्यर्थः। विशेषग्रहणेनाव्यापकत्वमाह; मात्रशब्देनाविगित्वाभावम्। तत्र ⁷ध्वनिस्वरूपे भावितं प्रणिहितं चेतो येषाम्; तेन⁸ वा चमत्कारस्वरूपेण भावितमधिवासितम्, अत एव मुकुलितलोचनत्वादिविकारकारणं चेतो येषाम्¹⁰। अभाववादिन इति ॥ अवान्तरप्रकारत्रयभिन्ना अपीत्यर्थः। तेषां प्रत्युक्तौ फलमाह—अस्तीति ॥

उदाहरणपृष्ठे भाक्तत्वं सुशङ्कं सुपरिहरं च भवतीत्यभिप्रायेणोदाहरणदानावकाशार्थं ¹¹भाक्तत्वाल्लक्षणीयत्वे प्रथमं परिहरणयोग्ये अप्यप्रतिसमाधाय भविष्यदुद्धोत¹²गतानुवादानुसारेण वृत्तिकृदेव प्रभेदनिरूपणं करोति— स चेति ॥ पञ्चधापि ध्वनिशब्दार्थं येन यत्र यतो यस्मै

इत्यर्थः। व्यतिरेकाव्यतिरेकव्यपदेशः भेदाभेदव्यपदेशः ‘काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनि’रिति व्यतिरेकव्यपदेशः। वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्रः शब्दात्मा काव्यमिति व्यपदेश्य इति। अत्र त्रयोऽर्थार्थाः समुच्चेतव्याः। वाच्यवाचकसंमिश्र इति द्वन्द्वः, मध्यमपदलोपी वा। संमिश्र इति व्यङ्ग्योऽर्थ उच्यते रसादिरूपः। तेनेत्यादिना पञ्चानामपि ध्वनित्वं सोपपत्तिकं प्रदर्शयति। तत्र हेतुमाह— अत एवेति। साधारणं सर्वत्र तुल्यम्। एवं स्थिते तृतीयाभावप्रकारोक्तखण्डपराकरणस्य क्रियमाणस्योत्थापनं निबज्जाति—स्त्युत्तरिति। अङ्गित्वाभावमिति। अत्राहेत्यनुषज्यते— अस्तीति।

ननु अभाववादं प्रतिक्षिप्य ध्वनिसद्भावे समर्थिते, क्रमप्राप्तं भाक्तपक्षं प्रविष्टयितुं युक्तम्, अनिवर्चनीयपक्षं च। तत्र कथमन्तरा ध्वनिभेदस्तदुदाहरणं च समुद्भाव्यत इत्याशङ्कयामाह— उदाहरणेति। उदाहरणपृष्ठे उदाहरणानन्तरम्। वृत्तिकृदेवेति। नात्र सूत्रकारवचनं किञ्चिदिति यावत्। पञ्चधापीति। ध्वनिः शब्द इति पक्षे अविवक्षितो वाच्यो येनेति बहुव्रीहिः। यत्रेति वा यत इति वा यस्मै इति यस्येति वा सर्वत्रान्यपदार्थः

१ ड. च. (के) ‘पशुम्’ नास्ति. २ (के) ध्वनिकृत्वात्. ३ क. ख. ग. मिश्रिते. ४ ग. ध्वननात्. ५ ग. व्यंग्यस्य, ड. व्यञ्जकत्वमिति. ६ क. ख. (नि) व्यञ्जनभावः, ग. व्यञ्जकभावः. ७ क. ख. (नि) ‘न चैवं भवतीत्यन्वयः’ अधिकः. ८ क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) न, ग. (नि) अने ‘वा’ नास्ति. ९ क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) (के) रूपेण. १० क. ख. ग. (नि) (के) ‘इति’ अधिकः. ११ क. ख. ग. (नि) भाक्तत्वाल्लक्षणीयत्वे. १२ क. ख. (नि) ० उद्धोतानु०, ग. उद्धोते गतानु.

यस्य चेति बहुव्रीह्यर्थाधयेण यथोचितं सामानाधिकरण्यं सुयोजम्। वाच्येऽर्थे तु ध्वनी वाच्यशब्देन सदात्मा^१ तेनाविवक्षितोऽप्रधानीकृतः स्वात्मा येनेत्यविवक्षितवाच्यो व्यञ्जकोऽर्थः। एवं विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्येऽपि। यदिवा कर्मधारयेणार्थपक्षे अविवक्षितश्चासौ वाच्यश्चेति। विवक्षितान्यपरश्चासौ वाच्यश्चेति। तत्रार्थः कदाचिदनुपपद्यमानत्वादिना निमित्तेनाविवक्षितो भवति। कदाचिदुपपद्यमान इति कृत्वा विवक्षित एव, व्यङ्ग्यपर्यन्तां तु प्रतीतिं स्वसौभाग्यमहिम्ना करोति। अत एवार्थोऽत्र प्राधान्येन व्यञ्जकः, पूर्वत्र शब्दः। ननु च विवक्षा चान्यपरत्वं चेति विरुद्धम्, अन्यपरत्वेनैव विवक्षणात्को विरोधः? सामान्येनेति॥ वस्तुतलंकाररसात्मना हि त्रिभेदोऽपि ध्वनिरुभाभ्यामेवाभ्यां संगृहीत इति भावः। ननु तन्नामपृष्ठे एतन्नामनिवेशनस्य किं फलम्। उच्यते— अनेन हि नामद्वयेन ध्वननात्मनि व्यापारे पूर्वप्रसिद्धाभिधातात्पर्यलक्षणात्मक- व्यापारत्रितयावगतार्थप्रतीतेः प्रतिपत्तृतायाः प्रयोक्तृभिप्रायरूपायाश्च विवक्षायाः सह- कारित्वमुक्तमिति ध्वनिस्वरूपमेव नामभ्यामेव प्रोज्जीवितम्। सुवर्णपुष्पामिति॥ सुवर्णानि

शब्दः। ध्वनिर्व्यङ्ग्य इति पक्षे 'अविवक्षितो वाच्यो येनेति' बहुव्रीहिः। यत्रेति वा यत इति वा यस्यै इति वा यस्येति वा सर्वत्र व्यङ्ग्य एवात्यन्तदार्थः। ध्वनिर्व्यापार इति पक्षे अविवक्षितो वाच्यो येनेति अन्यार्थः। यत्रेत्यादिक्रमापि पूर्ववत्। ध्वनिः काव्यमिते पक्षे अविवक्षितो वाच्यो येनेत्यर्थः। अन्यत् पूर्ववत्। ध्वनिर्वाच्यार्थ इति पक्षे नैष न्यायः। कथमित्याह— वाच्येऽर्थे स्थितिः। अत्र उच्यत इत्यध्याहार्यम्। वाच्यशब्देन स्वात्मा उच्यते इत्यर्थः। यदि वेति। अथवा ङर्थपक्षे कर्मधारयाभिप्रायेण योजनीयमिति यावत्। तदेव दर्शयति—अविवक्षित इति। ततोऽविवक्षितवाच्यो ध्वनिरिति सामानाधिकरण्यम्। विवक्षितान्यपरेति। अत्रोपपत्तिं दर्शयति—तत्रार्थ इति। आदिशब्देनानुपयोगित्वं गृह्यते। अविवक्षितवाच्यो ध्वनी वाच्यस्यानुपपद्यमानत्वं अनुपयोगित्वं वा। विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये उपपद्यमानत्वम्। अथाशङ्कते— ननु चेति। परिहरति— अन्येति।

एतावन्मात्रेणात्र व्यक्तिविवेककारेणोक्तम् प्रतिवृत्तं वेदितव्यम्। आशङ्कते—नन्वेति। तन्नामपृष्ठे ध्वनेनामपृष्ठे एतन्नामनिवेशनस्य अविवक्षितवाच्यं विवक्षितान्यं परवाच्येति नामद्वयनिर्देशनस्य। परिहरति— उच्यते इति॥ अनेन नामद्वयेन व्यापारे ध्वनिरिति पक्षं प्रति अभिप्रायदिव्यापारत्रयावगतार्थप्रतीतेर्वक्तृ- विवक्षायाश्च सहकारित्वमुक्तम्। तेन नामभ्यां ध्वनिस्वरूपमेव प्रोज्जीवितमित्यर्थः।

^१ (नि) 'ध्वन्यतो' अधिकः. २ क. ख. (नि) भूतः, ग. कृतः णार्थपक्षे अविवक्षितश्चासावर्थश्चेति। विवक्षितान्यपरश्चासौ वाच्यश्चेति। तत्रार्थः.

पुण्यतीति सुवर्णपुष्पा। एतच्च वाक्यमेवासंभवत्त्वार्थमिति कृत्वा¹ अविवक्षितवाच्यम्। तत एव पदार्थमभिधायान्वयं च तात्पर्यशक्त्यावगमय्यैव बाधकवशेन तमपहस्य² सादृश्यात् सुलभसमृद्धिसंभारभाजनतां लक्षयति। तल्लक्षणाप्रयोजनं³ शूरकृतविधसेवकानां प्राशस्त्यम-
शब्दवाच्यत्वेन गोप्यमानं सन्नायिकाकुचकलशयुगलमिव महार्घतामुपयद्ध्वन्यत इति शब्दोऽत्र प्रधानतया व्यञ्जकः, अर्थस्तु तत्सहकारितयेति चत्वारो⁴ व्यापाराः॥ **शिखरिणीति**॥ न हि निर्विघ्नोत्तमसिद्धयोऽपि श्रीपर्वत⁵प्रभृतय इमां सिद्धिं विदधुः। दिव्यकल्पसहस्रादिश्चात्र परिमितः कालः⁶ न चैवंविधोत्तम⁷फलत्वेन पञ्चाग्निप्रभृत्यपि तपः श्रुतम्। तवेति भिन्नं पदम्— समासेन विगलिततया सा न प्रतीयते⁸— तव दशतीत्यभिप्रायेण। तेन यदाहुः— 'वृत्तानुरोधात्त्वदधरपाटलमिति न कृतम्' इति, तदसदेव॥ **दशतीति**॥ आस्वादयति अविच्छिन्न⁹प्रबन्धतया, न त्वौदरिकवत्परं¹⁰ भुङ्क्ते; अपि तु रसजोऽत्रेति तत्तात्पित्वदेव रसज्ञताप्यस्य तपःप्रभावादेवेति॥ **शुकशाबक इति**॥ तारुण्याद्युचितकाललाभोऽपि तपसैवेति¹¹। अनुरागिणश्च प्रच्छन्नस्वाभिप्रायख्यापनवैदग्ध्य¹²चाटुविरचनात्मकविभावो-
न्मीलनं¹³ व्यङ्ग्यम्। अत्र च त्रय एव व्यापाराः— अभिधा तात्पर्यं ध्वननं वेति; मुख्या¹⁴र्थाबाध।¹⁵ दिविरहे मध्यमकक्षयाया लक्षणायास्तृतीयस्या अभावात्। यदि वाकस्मिकविशिष्टप्रश्नार्थानुप-
पत्तेर्मुख्यार्थाबाधायां¹⁶ सादृश्याल्लक्षणा भवतु मध्ये; तस्यास्तु तत् प्रयोजनं ध्वन्यमानमेव;
¹⁶तत्तुर्यकक्षयानिवेशि। केवलं पूर्वत्र लक्षणैव प्रधानं ध्वननव्यापारे सहकारि; इह

अर्थप्रतीतिः प्रतिपत्तुगता विवक्षा प्रयोक्तृगतोति च विभागः। चिन्वन्ति लभन्ते इत्यर्थः। अपहस्य परित्यज्य। सादृश्यात्— पुष्पोच्चयनरूपात्। चत्वारोऽत्र व्यापारा इति। अभिधा तात्पर्यं लक्षणा व्यञ्जनमिति चत्वारः। **शिखरिणीति**। अत्र पदेषु ध्वनिं प्रकाशयति— न हीत्यादिना— तवेति।

त्वदधरपाटलमिति समासे सति युष्मदर्थो विगलिततया अप्रधानतया प्रतीयेत। न च तथा प्रतीयताम्, अपि तर्हि प्राधान्येन प्रतीयतामित्यभिप्रायेण तवेति पदं भिन्नं कृतम्, न तु समस्तमित्यर्थः। अत एवाह— तेन यदाहुरिति। स्वाभिप्रायः। अधरास्वादानाभिलाषरूपः। **वैदग्ध्येति**। वैदग्ध्येनाग्राभ्यन्ततया यच्चाटुविरचनं तदात्मको यो विभावः प्रेमकारणं तरुणीरागकारणं तस्योद्दीपनं पोषणमित्यर्थः॥ यदि वेति' अथवा आकस्मिकः असंभावितः। विशिष्टः शुकवृत्तान्तरूपो योऽर्थः, तस्यानुपपत्तेः आकस्मिकत्वादेवानुपपत्तेः। निमित्तान्मुख्यार्थाबाधायां सत्यां, सादृश्याद्विशिष्टशुकबिम्बफलास्वादानमिव तरुणविशेषस्य त्वदधरपल्लवामृतास्वादनं इत्येवरूपाल्लक्षणा भवतीत्यर्थः। ध्वन्यमानमेवेति। प्रथम-
पक्षोक्तमेवेति यावत्। तत्र विशेषमह— तत्तुर्येति। लक्षणायां खलु प्रयोजनं व्यङ्ग्यरूपं

1(के) अविवक्षित। 2क.ख. वशेनोपहस्य, ग.घ.च.(नि)(का) तमपहस्य। 3क.ख.(नि) प्रयोजकः। 4क.ख.ग.(नि) 'अत्र' नास्ति। 5क.ख.(नि) पर्वतादयः। 6क.ख.ग.(नि) 'किमभिधानमिति' अधिकः। 7ग.(नि) फलजनकत्वेन। 8(कौ) प्रतीयताम्। 9क.ख.ग.(नि) अनविच्छिन्न। 10(के) परिभुङ्क्ते। 11क.ख.घ.च.(नि)(के) तपस एवेति। 12क.ख.ग.(नि) 'वैदग्ध्य' नास्ति। 13(कौ) उद्दीपनं। 14ग.(नि)(के) मुख्यादबाध्याविरहे। 15ग.च. मुख्याबाधायाम्, (के) मुख्याबाधया। 16क.ख.ग. 'तत्' नास्ति।

त्वभिधातात्पर्यशक्ती, वाक्यार्थसौन्दर्यादेव व्याख्यप्रतिपत्तेः; केवलं लेशेन लक्षणाव्यापारोपयोगोऽप्यस्तीत्युक्तम्, असंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यङ्ग्ये तु लक्षणासमुन्मेषमात्रमपि नास्ति. असंलक्ष्यत्वादेव कमस्येति वक्ष्यामः। तेन द्वितीयेऽपि भेदे चत्वार एव व्यापाराः। अत एवोभयोदाहरणपृष्ठ एव, “भाक्तमाहुः” इत्यनुभाष्य¹ दूषयति। अयं भावः— भक्तिर्ध्वनिश्चेति किं पर्यायवत्ताद्रूपम्। अथ पृथिवीत्वंमिव पृथिव्या अन्यतो व्यावर्तक-धर्मरूपतया लक्षणम्? उत काक इव देवदत्तगृहस्य संभवमात्रादुपलक्षणम्? तत्र प्रथमं पक्षं I.14 निराकरोति— भक्त्या बिभर्तीते॥ उक्तप्रकार इति पञ्चसर्वथेषु योज्यम्— शब्दे, अर्थे, व्यापारे, व्यङ्ग्ये, समुदाये, च। रूपभेदं दर्शयितुं ध्वनेस्तावद्रूपमाह— वाच्येति॥ तात्पर्येण विश्रान्तिधामतया। प्रयोजनत्वेनेति यावत्। प्रकाशनं द्योतगमित्यर्थः॥ उपचरमात्रमिति॥ उपचारो गुणवृत्तिलक्षणा उपचरणमतिशयितो व्यवहार इत्यर्थः। मात्रशब्देनेदमाह— यत्र लक्षणाव्यापारादृतीयादन्यश्चतुर्थः प्रयोजनद्योतनात्मा व्यापारो वस्तुस्थित्या संभव-त्रय्यनुपयुज्यमानत्वेनानाद्रियमाणत्वादसत्कल्पः “यमर्थमधिकृत्य” इति हिं प्रयोजन-

चतुर्थकस्यानिवृत्तीति इह त्विति। शिखरिणीत्युदाहरणे लक्षणाश्रये तत्र ये अभिधातात्पर्यशक्ती ते एव ध्वननव्यापारं सहकारिण्यौ भवत इति यावत्।

तत्र हेतुमाह— वाक्यार्थेति। असंलक्ष्येति। अविवक्षितवाच्ये ध्वनी लक्षणाऽस्त्येव। विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये लक्षणा नास्ति। असंलक्ष्यक्रमव्यंग्ये तु विकल्पः। शिखरिणीत्युदाहरणे लक्षणा-श्रयणपक्षेण चत्वार एव व्यापार इत्यर्थः।

अथ भाक्तवादं व्याकुलयितुमुपक्रमते— अत एवेति। भक्तिर्ध्वनिरित्युक्ते पक्षत्रयं भवतीत्याह— अयं भाव इति। परं यवदिति। इन्द्रः शक्रः इत्यनयोः पर्याययोः यथा एकरूपत्वं तथा किं भक्तिर्ध्वनयोः पर्यायत्वेनैव रूपमित्येकं विकल्पः। पृथिवीत्वमिति। पृथिवीत्वं पृथिव्या लक्षणमिति वैशेषिकाः। तत्र पृथिवीत्वं यथा पृथिव्या जलादिभ्यो व्यावर्तकतया लक्षणं, तथा भक्तित्वं ध्वनेः किं लक्षणमिति द्वितीयः। काकवदिति। काकवन्तः चैत्यगृहा इत्यत्र यथा काकश्चैत्रगृहस्योपलक्षणं कादाचित्कतया भेदेहेतुः, तथा किं भक्तिर्ध्वनेरुपलक्षणमिति तृतीयः। भक्त्येति। ध्वनिर्भक्त्या एकतां ऐक्यं न बिभर्तीत्यन्वयः। अतिशयित इति। “गौर्देवदत्त” इत्यादावमुख्ये मुख्यार्थारोपणमतिशयव्यवहारो भवतीति। वस्तुस्थित्येति। प्रयोजनाभावे मुख्यवृत्तिपारेत्यागो न युक्त इत्येवंरूपयेति यावत्। अनुपयुज्यमानत्वेनानाद्रियमाणत्वात् असत्कल्प इति। यथा— ‘कृशाङ्ग्याः सन्तापं वदति बिसिनीपत्रणयनम्’ इत्यादौ। अत्र हि वदति ना पिशुनत्वं लक्ष्यते। तत्र यत्प्रयोजनं स्पष्टतया झटिति सन्तापग्रहणं, तन्नात्यादरास्पदं भवति। यमर्थमिति।

लक्षणम्— तत्रापि लक्षणास्तीति कथं ध्वननं लक्षणं¹ चेत्येकं तत्त्वं स्यात्? द्वितीयं पक्षं दूषयति— अतिव्याप्तेरिति²। असाविति ध्वनिः। तयेति भक्त्या। ननु ध्वननमवश्यंभावीति कथं तद्व्यतिरिक्तोऽस्ति विषय इत्याह— महत् सौष्टवमिति॥ अत एव प्रयोजनस्या-
नादरणीयत्वाद्व्यञ्जकत्वे न³ किञ्चित् कृत्यमिति भावः। महद्ग्रहणेन गुणमात्रं तद्भवति, यथोक्तम्— “समाधिरन्यधर्मस्य क्वाप्यारोपो विवक्षितः” इति दर्शयति। ननु प्रयोजनाभावे कथं तथा व्यवहार इत्याह— प्रसिद्धचनुरोधेति॥ परम्परया तथैव प्रयोगात्। वयं तु ब्रूमः— प्रसिद्धिर्या⁴ प्रयोजनस्या⁵ निगूढतेत्यर्थः। उत्तानेनापि रूपेण तत्प्रयोजनं चकासन्निगूढतां निधानवदपेक्षत इति भावः। वदतीत्युपचारेण⁶ हि स्फुटीकरणप्रतिपत्तिः प्रयोजनं⁷ यद्यगूढं स्वशब्देनोच्यते किमचारुत्वं स्यात्? गूढतया वर्णने⁸ वा किं चारुत्वमधिकं⁹ ज्ञातम्? अनेनैवाशयेन वक्ष्यति— “यतः— उक्त्यन्तरेणाशक्यं यत्¹⁰” इति।¹¹ अवलम्बिज्जइ आलिङ्ग्यते। पुनरुक्तमित्यनुपादेयता लक्ष्यते, उक्तार्थस्यासंभवात्। “कुपिताः प्रसन्ना अवरुदितवदना विहसन्त्यः। यथा गृहीतास्तथा हृदयं हरन्ति स्वैरिण्यो महिलाः॥” अत्र

यमर्थमधिकृत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनमिति न्यायसूत्रम्। ध्वननं— व्यञ्जनम्, लक्षणं लक्षणाव्यापारः। एकं तत्त्वं— एकमेव वस्तु। एवं तादृग्यपक्षं विघटय्य, लक्षणपक्षं निराकर्तुमाह— द्वितीयमिति। नन्विति। लक्षणायां यदा ध्वननमवश्यंभावि लक्षणायाः प्रयोजनाविनाभावित्वात् तदा कथं ध्वनिव्यतिरिक्तो लक्षणाया विषयः स्यादित्याशंका। गुणमात्रमिति। बन्धगुण एव भवति, न ध्वनिरित्यर्थः।

तथा व्यवहारः। उपचारव्यवहारः। अथ प्रसिद्धिशब्दस्य परम्परया तथैव प्रयोग इति योऽर्थ उक्तः, तत्रारुच्या स्वाभिमतमर्थं प्रदर्शयन्नाह— वयं त्विति। प्रसिद्धिः। प्रकर्षेण सिद्धिः प्राकट्यं प्रयोजनस्येत्यर्थः। उत्तानेन प्रकटनेन। निगूढतां नितरां गूढतां। ध्वनौ प्रयोजनं निगूढतामपेक्षत इत्यर्थः। ननु प्रयोजनस्याचारुत्वात्तत्र ध्वनित्वं न स्यात् निगूढत्वादिति शङ्कायामाह— वदतीति। तस्मात् प्रयोजनस्यानिगूढत्वमेव ध्वन्यभावकारणं नाचारुत्वमित्यर्थः।

उक्तेऽर्थे ग्रन्थकारानुमतिं दर्शयति। अनेनैवेति॥ प्रयोजनस्य चारुतायाः उक्त्यन्तराशक्यत्वं निगूढताविनाभूतम्। परिस्लानमिति। सङ्गात्— मर्दनात्। उभयतः द्वयोर्मार्गयोः। तनोः कृशस्य। अन्तः मध्ये। परिमिलनं विमर्दनं। हरितं हरितवर्णमेव। अस्लानमित्यर्थः॥ व्यस्तन्यासं व्याकुलीकृत्य संनिवेशम्। बिसिनी नलिनी। अत्र शयनस्थाचेतनत्वाद्वदनस्य मुख्यार्थस्यानुपपत्त्या बाधे ज्ञापकत्वं लक्ष्यते। प्रयोजनं च स्फुटीकरणप्रतिपत्तिः। तस्याः पुनरनिगूढतया नादरास्पदत्वान्न ध्वननं दिशिष्टम्। चुम्बिज्जइ इति।

अत्र पुनरुक्तशब्दस्य मुख्यार्थो न घटते। उक्तार्थस्यासंभवात्। अतोऽनुपादेयता लक्ष्यते। प्रयोजनाधिक्यरूपं नादरास्पदम्। कुबिआ इति। अत्र गृहीतशब्दस्य मुख्यार्थ उपातरूपो नोपपद्यते। अतो

¹क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) लक्षणा, ड. लक्षणम्. ²क.ख.(नि) तत्रैतदिति. ³क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) न कृत्यं किञ्चिदिति. ⁴(कौ) प्रनोजन०. ⁵क.ख.(नि) निगूढतेत्यर्थः. ⁶क.(का)(के) उपचारे हि. ⁷ग. यद्यगूढम्. ⁸क.ख.ग. वर्णनेन. ⁹ड. ज्ञातम्. ¹⁰क.ख.ग. 'किम्' अधिकम्. ¹¹घ.ड.च.(के) 'परिस्लानम्' इति श्लोकः, 'चुम्बिज्जइ' इति गाथा च समग्रा पठ्यते.

ग्रहणेनोपदेयता लक्ष्यते। हरणेन तत्परतन्त्रतापत्तिः॥ तथा ¹अज्जेति॥ कनिष्ठभार्यायाः स्तनपृष्ठे नवलतया कान्तेनोचितक्रोडायोगेन मृदुकोऽपि प्रहारो दत्तः सपत्नीनां सौभाग्य-सूचकत्वत्क्रीडासंविभागमप्राप्तानां हृदये दुःसहो जातः मृदुकत्वादेव। अन्यस्य दत्तो मृदुः प्रहारोऽन्यस्य च संपद्यते दुःसहश्च मृदुरपीति चित्रम्। दानेनात्र तत्फलवत्त्वं लक्ष्यते॥
³परार्थ इति॥ यद्यपि प्रस्तुतमहापुरुषापेक्षया अनुभवतिशब्दो मुख्य एव, तथाप्यप्रस्तुते इक्षौ प्रशस्यमाने पीडाया अनुभवनेनासंभवता पीडावत्त्वं लक्ष्यते। तच्च श्रीड्यमानत्वे

I.15 पर्यवस्यति। नन्वस्त्यत्र प्रयोजनम्। तत्किमिति न ध्वन्यत इत्याशङ्क्याह— न चैवंविध इति॥ ‘उक्त्यन्तरेणेति॥ ध्वन्यतिरिक्तेन⁷ स्फुटेन शब्दार्थध्व्यापारविशेषेणेत्यर्थः। शब्द इति पञ्चस्वर्थेषु योज्यम्। ‘अनुक्तोर्विषयीभवेदिति॥ ध्वनिशब्देनोच्यत इत्यर्थः॥ उदाहृत इति॥ वदतीत्यादौ। एवं यत्र प्रयोजनं सद्यपि नादरासदं तत्र को ध्वननव्यापार इत्युक्त्वा यत्र भूला एव प्रयोजनं नास्ति, भवति चोपचारस्तत्रापि को ध्वननव्यापार इत्याह— किं

I.16 चेति॥ लावण्यद्या ये शब्दाः स्वविषयात् लवणरसयुक्त्वादेः स्वार्थादन्यत्र हृद्यत्वादौ रुढाः, रुढत्वादेव च त्रितयसंनिध्यपेक्षणव्यवधानशून्याः, यदाह— “निरुद्धा लक्षणाः काश्चित् सामर्थ्यादभिधानवत्” इति, ते तस्मिन् स्वविषयादन्यत्र प्रयुक्ता अपि न ध्वनेः पदं भवन्ति। न तत्र ध्वनिव्यवहारः। उपचरिता शब्दस्य वृत्तिगौणी लाक्षणिकी⁹ चेत्यर्थः। आदिग्रहणनानुलोम्यं प्रातिश्रूल्यं सब्रह्मचारीत्येवमादयः शब्दा लाक्षणिका गृह्यन्ते। लोम्नामनुगतमुलोमं मर्दनम्; कूलस्य प्रतिपक्षतया स्थितं स्रोतः प्रतिकूलम्; तुल्यगुरुः सब्रह्मचारी— इति मुख्या विषयः। अन्यः पुनरुपचरित एव। न चात्र प्रयोजनं किंविदुद्दिश्य

लक्ष्यते। आदेयत्वं प्रयोजनम् पुनः स्वाधीनत्वं न बहुमानपदम्। हरणशब्दस्यापि मुख्यार्थः तेन स्वीकारात्मा न घटते। तेन तत्परतन्त्रतापत्तिर्लक्ष्यते। प्रयोजनं तु स्वाधीनत्वं न श्लाघ्यम्। अज्जाए इति। मृदुकत्वं प्रेमातिरेकसूचकमिति सपत्नीनां प्रहारसंपत्तिः। अत्र ‘दिण्णो’ शब्दस्य मुख्यार्थः पूजानुग्रहकामनाविशिष्टस्वचपरित्यागरूपो न संभवति। ततो लक्ष्यते। तत्फलवत्त्वं कनिष्ठ-भार्यायाश्चरितार्थात्। प्रयोजनं पुनः प्रहारस्य सुखोपभोग्यत्वं नात्यादरस्थानम्। परार्थ इति। अत्राप्रस्तुतेऽर्थे अनुभवतिशब्दस्य लाक्षणिकत्वं न प्रस्तुतमिति प्रतिपादयति— यद्यपीति।

अनुभवं ज्ञानम्। तदचेतनस्येक्षोर्न संभवतीति मुख्यार्थबाधे पीडावत्त्वं लक्ष्यते। पीड्य-मानत्वपर्यवसानं प्रयोजनं कष्टावस्थत्वान्नादरणीयम्। एवंविध इति। एतादृशमनादरपदं प्रयोजनमित्यर्थः। पञ्चस्वर्थेषु वाच्यवाचकव्यङ्ग्यव्यञ्जककायेषु। शब्दशब्देन हि पञ्चापि कथ्यन्ते। शब्दते प्रतिपाद्यते शब्दो अनेनेति च कृत्वा उपचरितशब्दवृत्तिः। शब्दं विवृणोति—उपचरितेति। अन्यः पुनरिति।

¹घ.ङ.च. ‘अज्जाए’ इति गाथा समजा पठ्यते. ²क.ख.घ. सूचकः. ³क.ख.ग.(का) ‘तथा’ अधिकम्, घ.ङ.च. परार्थ इत्यादि मरुभुव इत्यन्तं श्रूयते. ⁴क.ख.ग. पीड्यमाने. ⁵(के) प्रयोजकम्. ⁶क.ख.ग.(का) ‘यतः’ अधिकम्. ⁷क.ख.ग. ‘उक्त्यन्तरेण’ अधिकम्. ⁸क.ख.ग. शब्दार्थोभयव्यापार. ⁹(के) लाक्षणिकरूपे.

लक्षणा प्रवृत्तेति न तद्विषयो ¹ध्वननव्यापारः। ननु “दीवडि तेल्लु णाहि पल्लु द्रम्भि गमिद्धा लावण्णज्जलंगु घरि ढोल्लु पइद्धा” * इत्यादौ लावण्यादिशब्दसंनिधानेऽस्ति प्रतीयमानाभिव्यक्तिः। सत्यम्; सा तु न लावण्यशब्दात्, अपि तु समग्रवाक्यार्थ-प्रतीयनन्तरं ध्वननव्यापारादेव। अत्र हि ²प्रियतममुखस्यैव समस्ताशाप्रकाशकत्वं ध्वन्यत इत्यलं बहुना। तदाह— प्रकारान्तरेणेति॥ व्यञ्जकत्वेनैव, न तूपचरित-लावण्यादि³शब्दप्रयोगादित्यर्थः। एवं यत्र यत्र भक्तिस्तत्र तत्र ध्वनिरिति तावन्नास्ति। तेन ध्वनेः यदि भक्तिर्लक्षणं तदा भक्तिसंनिधौ सर्वत्र ध्वनिव्यवहारः स्यादित्यतिव्याप्तिः। अभ्युगम्यापि ब्रूमः— भवतु यत्र यत्र भक्तिरतत्र तत्र ध्वनिः; तथापि यद्विषयो लक्षणाव्यापारो न तद्विषयो ध्वननव्यापारः। न च भिन्नविषययोः धर्मधर्मिभावः। धर्म एव च⁴ तक्षणमित्युच्यते। तत्र लक्षणा तावदमुख्यार्थविषयो व्यापारः। ध्वननं च प्रयोजन-विषयम्। न च तद्विषयोऽपि द्वितीयो लक्षणाव्यापारो युक्तः, लक्षणासामग्र्यभावात्।

I.17 इत्यभिप्रायेणाह— अपि चेत्यादि॥ मुख्यां वृत्तिमभिधाव्यापारम्; परित्यज्य परिसमाप्य; गुणवृत्त्या लक्षणारूपया अर्थस्यामुख्यस्य ⁵तावत् दर्शनं प्रत्यायना; सा यत्फलं कर्मभूतं प्रयोजनं भुविश्य क्रियते तत्र प्रयोजने तावद्वितीयो व्यापारः। न चासौ लक्षणैव; यतः स्वलन्ती बाधकव्यापारेण विधुरीक्रियमाणा गतिरदबोधनशक्तिर्यस्य शब्दस्य तदीयो

अविरुद्धादिधर्म एव लक्षणमिति। लक्ष्यवाच्यसाधारणो धर्मो लक्षणमिति लाक्षणिकाः। ननु यदि लक्षणाया अमुख्यार्थ एव विषयः न प्रयोजनम्, तद्वितीया काचित्लक्षणा भवतु। तस्या विषयोऽस्तु प्रयोजनमित्याशंकायामाह—न चेति। लक्षणासामग्र्यभावादिति। मुख्यार्थसंभवः; तद्बाधः, मुख्येन लक्ष्यस्य संबन्धः, प्रयोजनं, शब्दस्य स्वलद्गतित्वेति पञ्चतयी सामग्री। तत्रेति। प्रयोजने तावत् द्वितीयो लक्षणाया अनन्तरं कश्चिद्व्यापारोऽस्त्येवेति यावत्। न चेति। चत्वर्ये। स्वलन्तीति। शब्दः खलु स्वार्थे व्याहन्यमानाभिधाशक्तिः सन्नर्थान्तरं लक्षयति, नान्यथा। गङ्गाशब्दो हि स्रोतसि बाधितवृत्तिस्तटे लक्षणायादत्ते। सिंहशब्दश्चतुष्पात्तादौ स्वलितगतिः सदृशं प्रतिपदयति। न चैवं तद्वृत्ततावनत्वादौ लक्षणीयोऽयं शब्दो बाधितावगमनशक्तिर्भवति। अस्य स्वार्थसमवेतत्वात्। स्वार्थसंप्रवेतो हि धर्मः प्रयोजनत्वेनोच्यते। ननु यदि शब्दः स्वार्थमिव स्वार्थगतं धर्ममप्यभिदध्यात्, तर्हि गोशब्दः शौकल्पमभिधत्त

¹क.ख.घ.च. ध्वननव्यवहारः. ²क.ख.(के) प्रियतमस्यैव. ³(के) लावण्ययोगा०. ⁴ग.घ.च. अतिव्याप्तम्, (का) अतिव्याप्तिः. ⁵क.ख.ग. 'व' नास्ति. ⁶ङ. सामग्र्यभावात्. ⁷क.ख.ग. 'तावत्' नास्ति. ⁸क.ख.ग.(का) प्रयोजनस्य०'.

* दीपके तैलं नास्ति पलं द्रव्यं गवेषितम् ।

लावण्योज्ज्वलाङ्गो गृहे प्रियतमः प्रविष्टः॥ इति छाया।

व्यापारो लक्षणा। न च प्रयोजनमन्वयगतः शब्दस्य बाधकयोगः। तथाभावे तत्रापि निमित्तान्तरस्य प्रयोजनान्तरस्य चान्वेषणेनावस्थानात्^२। तेनायं ^३लक्षितलक्षणाया न विषय इति भावः। दर्शनमिति प्यन्तो निर्देशः॥ **कर्तव्य इति**^४॥ अवगमयितव्य इत्यर्थः॥ **अमुख्यतेति**॥ बाधकेन विधुरीकृततेत्यर्थः॥ **तस्येति**॥ शब्दस्य॥ **दुष्टतैवेति**॥ प्रयोजनावगमस्य सुखसम्पत्तये हि स^५ शब्दः प्रयुज्यते तस्मिन्मुख्येऽर्थे॥ यदि च 'सिंहो वटुः' इति शौर्यातिशयेऽप्यवगमयितव्यं स्वलद्वगतित्वं शब्दस्य, तत्तर्हि प्रतीतिं नैव कुर्यादिति किमर्थं तस्य प्रयोगः? उपचारेण करिष्यतीति चेत्, तत्रापि प्रयोजनान्तरमन्वेष्ट्यम्^७;

इति। भागानयेत्येव वक्तव्यं क्वचिन्न गां शुक्लामिति। पैवम्। नात्र धर्मोऽभिधीयते। किं तर्हि, प्रत्याव्यतं। तच्चाव्यभिचारेण एव न व्यभिचारिणः। व्यभिचारिणि गां शौक्यम्। पावनत्वं पुनः न गङ्गां व्यभिचारि, यथाऽग्निमौषधम्। अतोऽग्निरुष्ण इत्यत्र विशेषणायोऽगं गन्त्यन्ते। न चानयोः स्तार्थधर्मयोः पृथक्प्रतिपादनं यथा जातिव्यक्तयोः। अत्र तु व्यक्तौ लक्षणा न युक्ता आक्षेपेणैव सिद्धेः।

ननु तदुक्तं पावनत्वं अन्यदन्यच्च गङ्गागतं, तदा कथं गङ्गाशब्दस्तदुक्तं पावनत्वं प्रत्याययेत्। सामान्येन प्रत्याययेदित्यास्येयम्। किं च वाक्यार्थघटनायैव लक्षणाः परिगृह्यते, स तु पावनत्वेन लक्षिते न स्यात्, गंगातटपावनत्वे घोष इति केयं वाच्ययुक्तिः? अथ समुच्चयेनाह— न चेति।

प्रयोजनं पावनत्वादिकं, बाधकयोगः बाधितत्वं, तदुक्तपावनत्वादिकं लक्षयतश्शब्दस्य न तदे बाधितत्वं^६। तथाभावे बाधकयोगो निमित्तान्तरस्य बाधिततटलक्षणीयपावनत्वादिसम्बन्धरूपस्य प्रयोजनान्तरस्यान्यप्रयोजनस्य चान्वेषणेऽनवस्था। तेनेति। लक्षितलक्षणायां हि नानवस्था।

आ हन्त किमिदं तन्वि नेत्रयोः श्रावणस्तव।

शरत्कर्मले ग्रीष्मोऽङ्गे शिशिरो मुखपङ्कजे॥

अत्र श्रावणेन पूर्वविगवेन वर्धतुर्लक्ष्यते इति लक्षितलक्षणा भवति। तत्र च प्रयोजनमुत्कण्ठातिशयप्रतीतिः। न च ततः परं किञ्चिदमिलक्ष्यते इति कुतोऽनवस्था? अतः सिंहो वटुरित्यादिकं ततो अश्रुपातोदयो लक्षितलक्षणाया न विषय इत्यर्थः। अथवा नायं लक्षितलक्षणाया विषयः, लक्षितलक्षणाया एवाभावादित्यर्थः। तथाहि—लक्षणायामवश्यं प्रयोजनेन भवितव्यम्। अत्र प्रथमलक्षणायां किं प्रयोजनं द्वितीयलक्षणार्थ एवेति चेत्? तत्प्रयोजनमपि लक्ष्यमन्यस्या लक्षणाया इत्यनवस्थैव स्यात्। तस्मात् श्रावणादिशब्देन जलवर्षणादिलक्ष्यते। प्रयोजनमुत्कण्ठातिशय एवेति। यदि चेति। सिंहशब्दो यथा वटोः स्वलद्वगतिर्भवति तथा शौर्येऽपि चेत् तत्प्रतीतिर्न भवेदिति तत्प्रयोगस्य वैयर्थ्यापात इत्यर्थः।

ननु सिंहशब्दः शौर्यं स्वलद्वगतिर्भवति, शौर्यं च प्रतिपादयति लक्षणयेत्याशङ्कते—**उपचारेणेति**। परिहरति—**तत्रेति**। शौर्यं लक्ष्ये प्रयोजनमन्यदन्विष्य ग्राह्यं लक्षणायां प्रयोजनस्यावश्यं-भावात्, पुनस्तस्या च लक्ष्यता स्यात्, प्रयोजनस्य लक्षणीयत्वाङ्गीकरणात्। तदा तस्यापि प्रयोजनं, तस्यापि तथेति मूलसन्निकृदनवस्थैवापत्तेदित्यर्थः।

^१ग. अपगमयतः. ^२क.ख.ग.(नि) अन्वेषणेनावस्थानात्. ^३क.ख.ग.(नि) लक्षणलक्षणाया. ^४क.ख.ग.(नि) कर्तव्य इत्येव.

^५क.ख.घ.ङ.च.'स' नास्ति. ^६ग.(नि) तस्मात् मुख्यार्थे. ^७ग.घ.ङ.च.(नि) अविद्यते.

तत्राप्युपचारेऽनवस्था। अथ न¹ तत्र स्खलद्गतित्वम्, तर्हि प्रयोजनेऽवगमयितव्ये न² लक्षणाख्यो व्यापारः तत्सामग्र्यभावात्। न च नास्ति व्यापारः। न चासावभिधा, समयस्य तत्राभावात्। यद्व्यापारान्तरमभिधालक्षणातिरिक्तं स ध्वननव्यापारः॥ न चैवमिति॥ न च प्रयोगे दुष्टता काचित्। प्रयोजनस्याविघ्नेनैव प्रतीतेः। तेनेयमभिधैव मुख्येऽर्थे बाधकेन विधुरीकृता प्रविवृत्युः निरुध्यमाना सती अचरितार्थत्वादन्यत्र प्रसरति³। अत एवामुख्योऽस्यायमर्थ इति व्यवहारः। तथैव चामुख्यतया संकेतग्रहणमपि तत्रास्तीत्यभिधापुच्छभूतैव लक्षणा ॥ तस्मादिति उपसंहरति। यतोऽभिधापुच्छभूतैव⁴ लक्षणा, ततो हेतोः वाचकत्वम् अभिधाव्यापारम् आश्रिता तद्बाधनेनोत्थानात्तत्पुच्छभूतत्वाच्च गुणवृत्तिः, गौणलाक्षणिकप्रकार इत्यर्थः, सा कथं ध्वनेर्व्यञ्जनात्मनो लक्षणं स्यात्, भिन्नविषयत्वादिति। एतदुपसंहरति— तस्मादिति॥ यतोऽतिव्याप्तिरुक्ता, तत्प्रसङ्गेन च भिन्नविषयत्वम् तस्माद्धेतोरित्यर्थः। एवम् “अतिव्याप्तेः तथाव्याप्तेर्न चासौ लक्ष्यते तथा” इति कारिकागतमतित्व्याप्तिं व्याख्यायाव्याप्तिं व्याचष्टे— अव्याप्तिरव्यथ्येति॥ अस्य गुणवृत्तिरूपस्येत्यर्थः। यत्र यत्र ध्वनिस्तत्र तत्र यदि भक्तिर्भवेत्⁵ स्यादव्याप्तिः; न चैवम्। अविवक्षितवाच्ये ह्यस्ति भक्तिः “सुवर्णपुष्पाम्” इत्यादौ⁶। “शिखरिणि” इत्यादौ तु सा कथम्? ननु लक्षणा तावद्गौणमपि व्याप्नोति। केवलं शब्दस्तमर्थं लक्षयित्वा तेनैव सह सामानाधिकरण्यं भजते ‘सिंहो वटुः’ इति॥ अर्थो वार्थान्तरं लक्षयित्वा स्ववाचकेन तद्वाचकं समानाधिकरणं करोति। शब्दार्थौ वा युगपत् लक्षयित्वा⁷ ॥ ११ ॥ अन्याभ्यामेव

आशङ्कते— अथ चेति। शौर्यं प्रतिपादयत्येव सिंहशब्दः तत्कथमस्यात्राशङ्कत्वमित्यर्थः। परिहरति—सर्हसि। तर्हि शौर्यं न लक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः। एवं प्रयोजनस्याविघ्नेन प्रतीतिर्यतः, तत इयं लक्षणाप्येवं स्थितिं लभत इत्याह—तेनेति। गङ्गाशब्दस्याभिधा प्रथमं स्रोतसि प्रवर्तितुमिच्छति। यदा बाधकेन घोषाधिकरणत्वरूपेण विधुरीक्रियमाणा अचरितार्थत्वात् तटे प्रसरति, तदा लक्षणेत्पुच्यते। तत्र संमयोऽप्यस्ति॥ मुख्यार्थबाधादित्रयरूप इत्यर्थः। अभिधापुच्छभूतैवेति। तदुक्तम्— गुणवृत्तिरुमुख्यत्वेन स्थितं वाचकत्वमेवेति। “शिखरिणी” इत्यादावेति। विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्य इति शेषः।

अथ विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्येऽपि लक्षणाऽस्त्येवेति समर्थयितुं चोदयति— नञ्चिति। तर्हि कोऽनयोर्भेदव्यवहारहेतुरित्यत्राह— केवलमिति। गुणवृत्तौ त्रयः प्रकाराः। शब्दः प्राधान्येन लक्षकः, अर्थस्तु गुणतयेत्येकः प्रकारः। एतद्वैपरीत्येन द्वितीयः। उभयप्राधान्येन तृतीयः। तदनुसरणेनोपन्यस्यति— शब्द इत्यादि। सिंहो वटुरित्यत्र सिंहशब्दो वटुं लक्षयित्वा तेनैव तद्वाचकभूतवटुशब्देन समानाधिकरणो भवतीति यावत्। अर्थः सिंहार्थः, अर्थान्तरं वटुं, स्ववाचकेन सिंहशब्देन तद्वाचकं वटुवाचकं, शब्दार्थौ

¹ घ. च. ‘न’ नास्ति. ² क. ख. घ. ‘न’ नास्ति. ³ क. ख. ड. च. (नि) (का) तेनाभिधैव, घ. तेनैवमभिधैव. ⁴ क. ख. च. (नि) ‘विधुरीकृता’ नास्ति. ⁵ क. ख. ग. (नि) ‘इति’ अधिकम्. ⁶ क. ख. ग. च. (नि) एव मुख्यो. ⁷ ड. च. (के) अभिधाशेषभूतैव. ⁸ क. ख. ग. (नि) ‘अपि’ नास्ति. ⁹ क. ख. ग. (नि) ‘च’ अधिकम्. ¹⁰ घ. ड. च. ‘आदौ’ नास्ति. ¹¹ क. ख. ग. ड. (नि) ताभ्यामेव.

शब्दार्थाभ्यां मिश्रीभवतः इत्येवं लाक्षणिकादृगौणस्य भेदः, यदाह— ‘गौणे शब्दप्रयोगः, न लाक्षणायाम्’ इति। तत्रापि तु¹ लक्षणास्त्वेति सैव सर्वत्र व्यापिका। सा च पञ्चविधा, तद्यथा—अभिधेयेन संयोगात्। ‘द्विरेफ’शब्दस्य हि योऽभिधेयो भ्रमरशब्दः, द्वौ रेफौ यस्येति कृत्वा, तेन भ्रमरशब्देन यस्य संयोगः संबन्धः षट्पदलक्षणार्थस्य सोऽर्थो द्विरेफशब्देन लक्ष्यते अभिधेयसंयोगं व्याख्यातरूपं निमितीकृत्य। सामीप्यात्। “गङ्गायां घोषः”। समवायतः² इति। ‘संबन्धादित्यर्थः’। ‘यष्टीः प्रवेशय’ इति यथा। वैपरीत्यात्। यथा—शत्रुमुद्दिश्य कश्चिद्ब्रवीति—‘किमिवोपकृतं न तेन मे⁴ इति। क्रियायोगादिति।⁵ कार्यकारणयोगादित्यर्थः। यथा—अत्रापहारिणि व्यवहारः ‘प्राणानयं हरति’ इति। एवमनया लक्षणया पञ्चविधया विश्वमेव व्याप्तम्। तथा हि—“शिखरिणि” इत्यत्रा—कस्मिन्प्रशङ्गिशेषादिबाधकानुप्रवेशे सादृश्याल्लक्षणास्त्येव। नन्वत्राङ्गीकृतैव मध्ये लक्षणा, कथं तदर्थ्युक्तं विवक्षितान्यपरिति।⁶ तद्भेदोऽत्र मुख्योऽसंलक्ष्यक्रमात्मा विवक्षितः। तद्भेदशब्देन च रसाभावतदाभासतत्प्रशमभेदास्तदवान्तरभेदाश्च। न च तेषु लक्षणाया उपपत्तिः। तथा हि— विभावानुभावप्रतिपादके काव्ये मुख्येऽर्थे तावद्वाधानु-

रिह इत्यात्मकौ तं वदत्यर्थम्। गौणे इति। शब्दप्रयोगः—लक्ष्यशब्दप्रयोगः। ‘सिंहो वटु’ इत्यत्र हि लक्ष्यवाचको वटुशब्दः प्रयुज्यते। ‘गङ्गायां घोष’ इत्यत्र लक्ष्यवाचकस्तदशब्दो न प्रयुज्यत इत्येतावदेव वैलक्षण्यमनयोः। मुख्यार्थबाधादिकमुभयत्रापि सममित्यर्थः। अत एवाह— तत्रापीति। लक्षणा—पञ्चविधत्वमभिधेयेन संयोगादित्यादि श्लोकानुवृत्त्या प्रदर्शयति— तद्यथेति। विश्वमेवेति। उक्तहेतु-पञ्चकेऽन्यतमस्य कुत्रचिदप्यपरिहार्यत्वादिति भावः। तदेव प्रस्तुते योजयति—तथाहीति। सादृश्यादिति। ननु लक्षणायाः सादृश्यं न निमित्तत्वंनोक्तम्, तत्कथं सादृश्याल्लक्षणास्तु? मैवम्, समवायग्रहणात्—संबन्धसामान्यवचनान्, संबन्धविशेषः सादृश्यात्मकः सेत्स्यति। विवक्षितान्यपरिति। लक्षणायां मुख्यार्थो न विवक्षितो भवतीति भावः।

अत्र सप्ताध्यामाह— तद्भेद इति। विवक्षितान्यपरशब्देनासंलक्ष्यक्रमात्मा भेदो विवक्षितः, न संलक्ष्यक्रम इति यावत्। तदवान्तरभेदाः हास्यवीरादयः। अत्रापि किं लक्षणा न स्यादित्यत आह—

¹ क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) ‘तु’ गस्ति. ² क. ख. ग. घ. च. (नि) (का) (के) समायादिति. ³ क. ख. (नि) स्वसंबन्धात्. ⁴ क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) ‘म’. ⁵ क. ख. ग. घ. ङ. (नि) (के) काणभावादित्यर्थः. ⁶ क. ख. (के) न तद्भेदो हि मुख्यो. ⁷ क. ख. ग. (नि) (के) काव्ये तत्रार्थं मुख्ये तावत् बाधकान्.

प्रवेशोऽप्यसंभाव्य इति को लक्षणावकाशः। ननु किं बाधया? इयदेव लक्षणायाः स्वरूपम्—
 ‘अभिधेयाविनाभूतप्रतीतिर्लक्षणेष्यते’^१ इति। इह चाभिधेयानां विभावानुभावादीनाम-
 विनाभूता रसादय इति लक्ष्यन्ते, विभावानुभावयोः कारणकार्यरूपत्वात्^२, व्यभिचारीणां च
 तत्सहकारित्वादिति चेत्, नैवम्। धूमशब्दाद्धूमे प्रतिपन्ने ह्यग्निस्मृतिरपि लक्षणाकृतैव
 स्यात्। ततोऽग्नेः शीतापनोदस्मृतिः इत्याद्यपर्यवसितः शब्दार्थः स्यात्। धूमशब्दस्य
 स्वार्थविश्रान्तत्वात् तावति व्यापार इति चेत्, आयातं तर्हि मुख्यार्थबाधो लक्षणाया
 जीवितमिति। सति हि^३ तस्मिन् स्वार्थविश्रान्त्यभावात्। न च विभावादिप्रतिपादने बाधकं
 किंचिदस्ति। नन्वेवं धूमाव^४गमानन्तराग्निस्मरणवद्विभावादिप्रतिपत्त्यनन्तरं रत्यादिचित्तवृत्ति-
 प्रतिपत्तिरिति शब्दव्यापार एवात्र नास्ति। इदं तावदयं प्रतीतिस्वरूपज्ञो मीमांसकः
 प्रष्टव्यः— किमत्र परचित्तवृत्तिमात्रे प्रतिपत्तिरेव रसप्रतिपत्तिरभिमतता भवतः? न^५ चैवं
 भ्रमितव्यम्। एवं हि लोकगतचित्तवृत्त्यनुमानमात्रमिति का रसता। यस्त्वलौकिक-
 चमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः काव्यगतविभावादिवर्चणाप्राणः, नासौ स्मरणानुमानादिसाम्येन
 खिलीकारपात्रीकर्तव्यः। किं तु लौकिकेन कार्यकारणानुमानादिना संस्कृतहृदयो
 विभावादिकं प्रतिपद्यमान एव न ताटस्थ्येन प्रतिपद्यते; अपि तु हृदयसंवादापर-
 पर्यायसहृदयत्वपरवशीकृततया पूर्णाभिविष्यद्रसास्वादाङ्कुरीभवेनानुमानस्मरणादि-
 सरणिम्नारुह्यैव तन्मयीभवनोचितचर्चणाप्राणतया। न चासौ चर्चणा प्रमाणान्तरतो
 जाता पूर्वम् येनेदानीं स्मृतिः स्यात्। न चाधुना कुतश्चित्प्रमाणान्तरादुत्पन्ना, अलौकिके
 प्रत्यक्षाद्यव्यापारात्। अत एवालौकिक एव विभावादिव्यवहारः। “यदाह^६ विभावो
 विज्ञानार्थः”। लोके तु कारणमेवाभिधीयते न विभावः। अनुभावोऽप्यलौकिक एव।
 यदाह— “यदयमनुभावयति वागङ्गसत्त्वकृतोऽभिनयस्तस्मादनुभावः” इति। तच्चित्तवृत्ति-

बाधानुप्रवेशोऽपीति। कुत एव संबन्धप्रयोजने इति भावः। सति तस्मिन्निति। मुख्यार्थबाधे कथं धूमशब्दः
 स्वार्थे विश्राम्येदिति यावत्।

समुच्चयेनाह— न वेति। न ताटस्थ्येनेति। न साधारण्येन अस्वगतत्वेनेत्यर्थः। अलौकिकेति। कथं
 रसस्यालौकिकत्वमित्यत आह— अत एवेति॥ लोके कारणं कार्यं सहकारि इति व्यवह-रस्तदेवालौकिकत्वं
 संवादपुरस्सरं प्रसाधयति—यदाहेति। ‘विभावो विज्ञानार्थ’ इति। विभाव्यन्ते विशिष्टतया ज्ञायन्ते
 स्थायिव्यभिचारिणः सवागङ्गसत्त्वा अनेनेति भावः। अभिनयानां ह्यनेकहेतुजत्वम्, तद्यथा—
 ‘हर्षातिभयहासधर्मधूमरोगादिभ्यो बाष्पः’। तद्बाष्पात् किं प्रतीयताम्? विभावात् इदित्येव निश्चयः।
 यदयमिति। अनुभावयति बोधयति वागङ्गसत्त्वकृताभिनयरूपस्थायिसञ्चारिणः इत्यनुभावः।

^१ क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) लक्षणोच्यते. ^२ घ.ङ.च. कार्यभूतत्वात्. ^३ घ.ङ.च. ‘हि’ नास्ति. ^४ क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) गमनानन्तर.
^५ क.ख.ग.(नि) नैवम्. ^६ क.ख.ग.(नि) ‘यदाहअलौकिक एव’ नास्ति.

तन्मयीभवनमेव ह्यनुभवनम्। लोके तु कार्यमेवोच्यते नानुभावः। अत एव परकीया न चित्तवृत्तिर्गम्यत इतिभिर्प्रायेण “विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिसंयोगादसनिष्पत्तिः” इति सूत्रे^१ स्थायिग्रहणं न कृतम्। कृतं^२ तत्प्रत्युत शल्यभूतं स्यात्। स्थायिनस्तु रसीभाव औचित्यादुच्यते। तद्विभावानुभावोचितं चित्तवृत्तिसंस्कारसुन्दरचर्वणोदयात्। हृदयसंवादोपयोगिलोकचित्तवृत्तिपरिज्ञानावस्थायामुद्यानपुलकादिभिः स्थायिभूतरत्याद्यवगमाच्च। व्यभिचारी तु चित्तवृत्त्यात्मत्वेऽपि मुख्यचित्तपरवश एव चर्यते इति विभावानुभावमध्ये गणितः। अत एव रस्यगानताया एषैव निष्पत्तिः यत् प्रबन्धप्रवृत्तबन्धुसमागमादिकारणोदितहर्षादिलौकिकचित्तवृत्तिभ्यश्चाभावेन चर्वणारूढत्वम्। अतः चर्वणात्राभिव्यञ्जनमेव, न तु ज्ञापनम्, प्रमाणव्यापारवत्। नाप्युत्पादनम् हेतु

ननु यद्येवमनुभावो भावस्य गमक एव स्यादित्यत्राह—‘चित्तवृत्तितन्मयीभवनमेव ह्यनुभवन’-मिति। न परगतं चेत्तद्वृत्तिबोधकमात्रमिति व्यावर्त्यम्। एतदेव प्रमाणेन दृढयति— अत एवेति। विभावसूत्रे हि “विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिस्थायिसंयोगादसनिष्पत्तिरिति स्थायिग्रहणं कर्तव्यम्। विभावादिभिः स्थायिनः संयोगादसनिष्पत्तिरित्यर्थसिद्धये। अन्यथा, कस्य विभावादिसंयोग इत्यप्रतीतिः स्यात्। तत्तु न कृतम्, अनुभावग्रहणेनैव स्थायिरिच्छेः। अनुभावादिना भूतभननुभवनम्, तच्च चित्तवृत्तितन्मयी भवनम्। चित्तवृत्तिश्च स्थायीति॥ सा पुनः स्वगतैव न परगता। स्वात्मविमुखरसनिष्पत्तिकथनानुपपत्तेः। अतो युक्तगुक्तं ‘परकीया न चित्तवृत्तिर्गम्यत’ इति। अतो यदि त्वत्र स्थायिग्रहणं क्रियते, तर्हि तद्व्यर्थं विरुद्धं च स्यादित्याह— कृतं तदिति।

ननु अन्योन्यसंयुक्तेषु विभावादिषु कुतो विशिष्य स्थायी रस इत्युच्यते। किं विभावो रसो न स्यात्, अनुभावो वा व्यभिचारी वा? अत्राह— स्थायिनस्त्विति। अचित्तमेव स्पष्टयति— तद्विभावोति। तस्या विभावानुभावोचितायाश्चित्तवृत्तेर्यः संस्कारो वारुणात्मकताया स्थितिः तेन। सुन्दर्याश्चर्वणाया उदयात्। हेत्वन्तरमप्याह— हृदयसंवादेति। लोकवृत्तपरिज्ञाने खलु हृदयसंवादो भवति। लोके चोद्यानादिविभावैः पुलकादिभिरनुभादैश्च स्थायिभूतरत्याद्यवगमः इत्यर्थः॥ नैतावता स्थायिनोऽनुमितिर्नुमता लोकन्यायप्रदर्शनात्। जाट्ये तु चर्यते एव। स्थायिनाद्यायमानश्च काव्यम्।

ननु चित्तवृत्तिर्त्वाविशेषात् स्थायीव व्यभिचार्यपि न ग्रहणमर्हते इत्यत्राह— व्यभिचारी त्विति। मुख्यचित्तवृत्तिः स्थायी व्यभिचारिणो मुख्यचित्तवृत्तिपारवश्यं दृढयति— अत एवेति।

रस्यगानता लौकिकहर्षादिचित्तवृत्तिन्यग्भावनेन चर्वणारूढत्वमिति यावत्। प्राङ्गाच्चर्वणास्वरूपमाह— अतश्चेति। व्यावर्त्यं दर्शयति— न तु ज्ञापनमिति। समुच्चयेन रसस्यालौकिकत्वं स्फुटयति—

^१घ.ङ.च. इत्यत्र. ^२क.ख.ग.ङ.च.(नि)(का)(के) ‘कृतं’ नास्ति. ^३क.ख.(के) ‘चित्त’ नास्ति. ^४क.ख.ग.ङ.च.(नि)(का) न्याग्भावेन चर्वणारूपत्वम्.

व्यापारवत्। ननु यदि नेयं ज्ञप्तिः, न वा निष्पत्तिः, तर्हि किमेतत्। नन्वयमसावलौकिको रसः। ननु विभावादयोऽत्र किं ज्ञापको हेतुः उत कारकः? न ज्ञापको न कारकः, अपितु चर्वणोपयोगी। ननु क्वैतत् दृष्टमन्यत्र? यत एव न दृष्टम्, तत एवालौकिकमित्युक्तम्।
 1 ननु एवं रसोऽप्रमाणं स्यात्? अस्तु, किं ततः? तच्चर्वणात एव प्रीतिव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः किमन्यदर्थनीयम्? नन्वप्रमाणकमेतत्? न, स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात्, ज्ञानविशेषस्यैव चर्वणात्मत्वात् इत्यलं बहुना। अतश्च रसोऽयमलौकिकः, येन ललितपरुषाद्यनुप्रासस्यार्थाभिधानानुपयोगिनोऽपि रसं प्रति व्यञ्जकत्वम्। का³ तत्र लक्षणायाः शङ्कापि? काव्यात्मकशब्दनिष्पीडनेनैव च⁴ तच्चर्वणा दृश्यते। दृश्यते हि तदेव काव्यं पुनः पुनः पठंश्चर्व्यमाणश्च सहृदयलोकः। न तु काव्यस्य तत्र “उपादायापि ये हेयाः” इति न्यायेन कृतप्रतीतिकस्यानुपयोग एवेति शब्दस्यापि⁶ ध्वननव्यापारः। अत एवालक्ष्यक्रमता। यनु वाक्यभेदः स्यादिति केनचिदुक्तम् तदनभिज्ञतया। शास्त्रं हि⁷ सकृदुच्चारितं समयबलेनार्थं

अतश्चेति। न खलु लोके किञ्चिदनुप्रासव्यङ्ग्यं वस्तु दृष्टम्। अतोऽनुप्रासव्यङ्ग्यस्यालौकिकत्वं सिद्धमिति भावः। एवं लक्षणारूपलक्षणस्य व्याप्तिप्रदर्शनार्थं प्रवृत्तौ प्रसंगागतानुमानपराकरणाय रसस्यालौकिकत्वं प्रसाध्याऽनुप्रासेन व्यज्यमाने रसध्वनौ लक्षणायाः शङ्कैव नास्तीत्याह— का तत्रेति। लक्षणादिक्वैमुख्येनानुप्रासो रसव्यञ्जक इत्यत्र युक्तिं दर्शयति— काव्यात्मकेति। निष्पीडनमाग्नेडनं, तच्चर्वणा रसचर्वणा। दृश्यते हीति। ननु काव्येन रसचर्वणा साध्या। सा सकृत्पठितेनैव सिद्धा। ततः पुनः— पुनस्तस्य पठनं किमर्थम्? न खलु कृतप्रतीतिकस्य पौनःपुन्येनोपादानम्। दीपो दृश्यदर्शने नोपादीयते इत्याशङ्क्याह— न त्विति। कृतप्रतीतिकस्य काव्यस्यानुपयोग एवेति। नेत्यन्यः। “उपादायापि ते हेयाः।” इति न्यायस्त्वत्र काव्यमार्गे न क्रमते। पुनः पुनः पाठेनैव रसचर्वणादर्शनादित्यर्थः। अत एव शब्दस्यापीह ध्वननव्यापारपरिग्रह इत्याह— शब्दस्यापीति। शब्दस्य व्यापारे सति क्रमाप्रतिभासोऽपि युक्त इत्याह— अत एवेति।

ननु इह वाक्यव्यङ्ग्यभेदेनार्थद्वयं प्रतिभासते। तत्प्रतिपादनं कर्तुं कथं सकृत्प्रयुक्तमेकं वाक्यं शक्नुयात्? तस्माद्वाक्यभेदः कर्तव्यः। तत्रैकं वाक्यं वाक्यं प्रतिपादयेत्। अन्यत् व्यङ्ग्यमिति कस्यचिन्मतमावृत्य दूषयति— यत्त्विति। यदत्रार्थद्वयं प्रतिपाद्यते तत् परस्परविरुद्धं वा अविरुद्धं वा इति विकल्पावष्टम्भेन प्रथमकल्पं निराकरोति— शास्त्रं हीति। शास्त्रं वाक्यमिति यावत्— द्वितीयपक्षे

1 (के) 'पानकरसोऽपि क्वाच्यत्र दृष्टो गुडमरीचादावदर्शनादिति सर्वत्र सुवचम्' अधिकम्. 2 क. ख. ग. (नि) 'आदि' नास्ति.

3 (के) 'का' स्थाने 'न' इति पाठः. 4 क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) 'च' नास्ति. 5 (के) प्रीतिकस्य. 6 (जे) इह. 7 क. ख. ग. (नि) (का) 'सकृदुच्चारितम्'.

प्रतिपादयद्गुणपद्धिर्दानेकसमयस्मृत्ययोगात्कथमर्थद्वयं प्रत्याययेत्। अविरुद्धत्वे वा तावानेको वाक्यार्थः स्यात्। क्रमेणापि विरम्यव्यापारायांशः। पुनरुच्चरितेऽपि वाक्ये स एव प्रसमयादिप्रकरणादेस्तादवस्थ्यात्। प्रकरणसमयप्राप्त्यर्थितरस्कारेणार्थान्तर-प्रत्यायकत्वे^२ नियमभाव इति। तेन 'अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयात्स्वर्गकामः' इति श्रुती खादेत्^३ श्वमांसमित्येष गार्थ इत्यत्र का प्रमेति प्रसज्यते। तत्रापि न 'काचित्रियततेत्यनाशवास इत्येवं वाक्यभेदो दूषणम्। इह तु विभावाद्येव प्रतिपाद्यमानं चर्वणाविषयतोन्मुखमिति सम्भयाद्युपयोगाभावः। न च 'नियुक्तोऽहमत्र करवाणि कृतार्थोऽहम्' इति शास्त्रीयप्रतीति-सदृशभेदः। तत्रोत्तरकर्तव्यौन्मुख्येन लौकिकत्वात्। इह तु विभावादिकर्वणाद्भुतपुष्प-वत्तत्कालसारूप्योदिता न तु^४ पूर्वापरकालानुबन्धिनीति लौकिकादास्वादोयोगिविषयाद्वान्य^५ एवायं रसास्वादः। अत एव 'शिखरिणि' इत्यादावपि मुख्याय बाधादिकमनपेक्षैव सहृदया वक्त्रभिप्रायं चाटु^६ प्रीत्यात्मकं संवेदयन्ते^७।^{१०} अत एव ग्रन्थकारः साभान्येन

आह—अविरुद्धत्व इति। वाक्यार्थस्यैकत्वे वाक्यमध्यैकमेवेति कुतो वाक्यभेदप्रसङ्गः इति भावः। किं च अर्थद्वयप्रतिपादनं युगपदा क्रमेण वेति विकल्पाभिसन्धिना युगपत्पक्षो वाक्यार्थस्यैकत्वापादकः इति क्रमपक्षं दूषयति—क्रमेणापीति। अपि चास्तु वाक्यभेदः। प्रसङ्ग इति भावः। तत्र पुनः पठिते वाक्ये समयप्रकरणादिः स एव वा अन्यो वेति विकल्पाभिप्रायेण। प्रथमकल्पे वाक्यभेदो निरर्थक इत्याह—पुनरुच्चरितेऽर्थेति। द्वितीयकल्पं दूषयति प्रकरणसमयेत्यादिना प्रसज्यत इत्यन्तेन। नाम्नां धातूनां धानेकार्थत्वात् प्रकरणादीनामप्यनियमात् अग्निहोत्रं जुहुयादित्यस्य श्वमांसं खादेदित्यर्थः किं न स्यादेति कश्चिन्नास्तिकः। एवमर्थान्तरप्रत्यायनेऽपि न काचिद्व्यवस्थेति दर्शयति—तत्रापीति।

ननु वाच्यस्तावत् समयप्रकरणादिना प्रतीयतां व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतौ किं तत्समयादिकमित्यत्राह—भू-
त्विति। समयान्नपेक्षणाप्रसङ्गात् काव्यप्रतीतिः शास्त्रप्रतीतिविराक्षणेत्याह—न चेति। विधेयाक्यश्रवणं नियुक्तोऽहमिति बुद्धिः तदर्थमुद्धाने कृतार्थोऽहमिति। शास्त्रप्रतीतेर्लौकिकत्वानुवादेन साधयति—
तत्रेति। तत्र शास्त्रप्रतीतौ। उत्तरकाले यत् कर्तव्यं तत्रौन्मुख्यमेव शास्त्रश्रवणेन तु तावन्मात्रे-
णान्वयनिरपेक्षतया आनन्दैकघनता। अतो लौकिकत्वमेव शास्त्रप्रतीतेरित्यर्थः।

काव्यप्रतीतिस्वरूपमाह—इह त्वित्यादिना रसास्वाद इत्यन्तेन। अद्भुतपुष्पं इन्द्रजालादिदर्शितपुष्पम्। अत्र तत्कालसारत्वमात्रेण पुष्पमुपमानिकृतं न तु ध्रान्तत्वेनापि, रसास्वादस्य निरपेक्षत्वेनाध्रान्तत्वात्। लौकिकास्वादादन्व इत्युक्ते योगिज्ञानेऽतिप्रमङ्गः। तद्व्यावृत्त्यर्थं योगिविषयाद्वेति।

अत इति। यतो रसास्वादस्य पूर्वापरकालानुबन्धवन्ध्यत्वमलौकिकत्वं य तत इत्यर्थः॥
शिखरिणीत्यादावपीति॥ अपिशब्देन लक्षणाप्रकारसङ्करं संवेदयन्ते संगिदन्ते विदन्तीत्यर्थः॥ व्याचक्षत
इति वा। अत्रोपपत्तिं प्रदर्शयति—अत एवेति। सामान्येन साधारण्येन भक्षारभाय लक्षणाया अभावम्। स

^१ घ.ङ.च. समयादिः प्रक०. ^२ क.ख.ग.(नि) 'हि' अधिकम्. ^३ (कौ) खादेच्च न (दित् श्व) मांसमित्येष. ^४ क.ख.ग.(नि)(क.) काचित्रियतेत्यना. ^५ क.ख.ग.(नि)(क.) शास्त्रप्र०. ^६ सर्वमातृकासु तुशब्दरहित एष पाठः. ^७ क.ख.ग.(नि)(क.) विषयाच्चान्ध. ^८ क.ख.ग.(नि) प्रतीत्या०. ^९ (के) संवेदयति. ^{१०} क.ख.ङ.च.छ. तत.

विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्ये ध्वनौ भक्तेरभावमभ्यधात्। अस्माभिस्तु दुर्दुरुत्¹ प्रत्याययितुमुक्तम्:- भवत्वत्र लक्षणा, अलक्ष्यक्रमे तु कुपितोऽपि किं करिष्यसीति। यदि तु न कुप्यते 'सुवर्णपुष्पाम्' इत्यादावविवक्षितवाच्येऽपि मुख्यार्थबाधादि²लक्षणासामग्रीमनपेक्षैव

I.18 व्यङ्ग्यार्थविश्रान्तिरित्यलं बहुना। उपसंहरति— तस्माद्भक्तिरिति॥

ननु मा भूद्भक्तिरिति³ ध्वनिरिति चैकं रूपम्। मा च भूद्भक्तिर्ध्वनेर्लक्षणम्। उपलक्षणं तु भविष्यति। यत्र ध्वनिर्भवति तत्र भक्तिरप्यस्तीति भक्त्युपलक्षितो ध्वनिः। न तावदेतत्सर्वत्रास्ति। इयत्ता च किं परस्य सिद्धम्, किं वा नः⁴ त्रुटितम्⁵। तदाह—

I.19 कस्यचिदिति⁶॥ ननु अत्र⁷ भक्तिस्तावच्चिरन्तनैरुक्ता। तदुपलक्षणामुखेन च ध्वनिमपि समग्रभेदं लक्षयिष्यन्ति ज्ञास्यन्ति⁸ च। किं तल्लक्षणेनेत्याशङ्क्याह—यदि चेति॥ अभिधानाभिधेयभावो ह्यलंकाराणां व्यापकः। ततश्चाभिधावृत्ते वैयाकरणमीमांसकैर्निरूपिते कुत्रेदानीमलंकारकाराणां⁹ व्यापारः।¹⁰ तथा हेतुबलात्कार्यं जायत इति तार्किकैरुक्ते किमिदानीमीश्वरप्रभृतीनां कर्तृणां ज्ञातृणां वा कृत्यमपूर्वं स्यादिति सर्वो निरालम्बः¹¹ स्यात्॥ तदाह—लक्षणकरण¹²वैयर्थ्यप्रसङ्ग इति॥ मा भूद्वाऽपूर्वोन्मीलनम्; पूर्वोन्मीलितमेवास्माभिः सम्यङ्निरूपितम्, तथापि को दोष इत्यभिप्रायेणाह— किं च¹³

चाविवक्षितवाच्यो विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यश्चेति द्विविधः सामान्येनेत्यत्र विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यशब्देन लक्षणा-भाव उक्तः। लक्षणासद्भावे वाच्यस्याविवक्षितत्वप्रसङ्गात्।

ननु यद्येवं किमिति भवता शिखरिणीत्यत्र यदि वा आकस्मिकांवेशिष्टप्रश्नानुपपत्तेः मुख्यबाधायां सादृश्याल्लक्षणा भवतु मध्ये, इत्यादि वर्णितमित्याशङ्क्याह— अस्माभिस्त्विति। दुर्दुरुत् दुर्गाहकग्रन्थग्रस्तमङ्गीकृत्य ब्रूते— भवत्विति। अत्र लक्ष्यक्रमे। अलक्ष्येति। रसादिध्वनौ लक्षणाप्रसङ्ग एव नास्ति। तत्र कथं तव लक्षणाग्रह इत्यर्थः।

अपि चाभिमतविषयेऽपि लक्षणाया न प्रभविष्युतेत्याह—यदि त्विति। एवं भक्तिः लक्षणस्याव्याप्तिं प्रसाध्य, तद्विषयं वाग्विस्तराद्यमं निवर्तयति— अलं बहुनेति। प्रकृतमनुसन्धत्ते— उपसंहरतीति।

अथोपलक्षणपक्षं निरूपयितुमुपक्रमते— ननु मा भूदिति। भक्त्युपलक्षितो ध्वनिरित्येतावती उपलक्षणपक्षाशङ्का। न तावदित्यादि परिहारः। एतत्—उपलक्षणं सिद्धं—लब्धम्॥

त्रुटितं—छिन्नं। चिरन्तनैः—पुरातनैः। अभिधावृत्तौ—अभिधाव्यापारे। न त्वनाख्येयत्वपक्षो यः पञ्चमः स

¹ क.ख.ग.(नि)(के) दुर्दुरुत्। ² घ.ङ.च.छ. लक्षणां। ³ क.ख.(के) भक्तिर्ध्वनिरिति, घ. 'ध्वनिरिति' नास्ति। ⁴ क.ख.ग.(नि) नु। ⁵ क.ख.ग.(नि) 'इति' अधिकम्। ⁶ क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) कस्यचिदित्यादि। ⁷ क.ख.ग.घ.(नि)(का) 'अत्र' नास्ति।

⁸ क.ख.(नि) 'ज्ञास्यन्ति' नास्ति। ⁹ (के) 'काराणां' नास्ति, तत्स्थाने 'कारकाराणां' इत्येव साधु। ¹⁰ क.ख.ग.(नि) यथा।

¹¹ (का)(के) निरालम्बः। ¹² क.ख.घ.ङ.च.(नि) करणे। ¹³ क.ख.ग.(का) किञ्चेति।

लक्षणोऽन्यैरिति॥ प्रागेवेति॥ अस्मत्प्रयत्नादिति शेषः। एवं त्रिप्रकारमभाववादम्, 'भाक्ताः तर्भूतत्वं च निराकुर्वताऽलक्षणीयत्वमेतन्मध्ये निराकृतमेव। अत एव मूलकारिका व्याक्षात्तनिराकरणार्था न श्रूयते। वृत्तिकृत्तु निराकृतमपि प्रमेय^१शय्यापरिपूरणाय स्व^२कण्ठेन तत्पक्षमनूद्य निराकरोति— येऽपीत्यादिना॥ उक्तया नीत्या 'यत्रार्थः शब्दो वा—' इति सामान्यलक्षणं प्रतिपादितम्। वक्ष्यमाणया तु नीत्या विशेषलक्षणं भविष्यति 'अर्थान्तरे संक्रमितम्' इत्यादिना। तत्र प्रथमोद्घोते ध्वनेः सामान्यलक्षणमेव कारिकाकारेण कृतम्। द्वितीयोद्घोते तु कारिकाकारोऽनन्तरविभागं विशेषलक्षणं च विदधदनुवादमुखेन मूलविभागं द्विविधं सूचितवान्। तदाशयानुसारेण तु वृत्तिकृदत्रैवोद्घोते मूलविभागमवोचत् 'स च द्विविधः' इति ॥ सर्वेषामेवेति॥ लौकिकाणां शास्त्रीयाणां चेत्यर्थः॥ अतिशयोक्त्येति॥ यथा 'तान्यक्षराणि हृदये किमपि न्नन्ति'* इति। अतिशयोक्त्या अनाख्येयतोक्त्या,

किमिति न निराकृत इत्याह— एवं त्रिप्रकारमिति अभाववादिपक्षपराकरणे प्रतिपदमेवंभूतादिदमेवंभूतमिदमिति ध्वनेर्लक्षणीयत्वप्रकाशनात्। अलक्षणीयत्वपराकरणमाप्रवणसेकपितृतर्पणवत् अप्रुथग्यत्न-सिद्धमित्यर्थः। तत्रोपपत्तिं दर्शयति—एतदिति। वृत्तिकृत्त्विति। प्रमेयशय्या— प्रमेयोद्देशः। प्रथमं त्रिप्रकारोऽभाववादः, पुनर्मोक्तिवादः, पश्चादनाख्येयत्वपक्ष इति पञ्चप्रमेयवस्तूनि पूर्वपक्षत्वात् पराकरणीयत्वेन निश्चितानि। तत्र चत्वारि प्रतिक्रिय पञ्चभाप्रतिभेदे खण्डनीयप्रमेयापरिपूरणं स्यादिति कृत्वा वृत्तिकृदनाख्येयत्वपक्षं निराकरोतीत्यर्थः। कुत्र कथं ध्वनेः सामान्यलक्षणमुक्तं कुत्र वा विशेषलक्षणमिति आशङ्क्याह— यत्रार्थ इति। अत्रान्तरविभागमिति। अर्थान्तरसंक्रमितवाच्यभत्यन्त-तिरस्कृतवाच्यं चेत्यनन्तरविभागः। अविवक्षितवाच्यो विवक्षितान्यपरवाच्यश्चेति मूलविभागः। अत्रैवोद्घोते— प्रथमोद्घोते। नन्दिमनाख्येयत्वं नासत्त्वात्, नाप्यसायुक्त्वात्, किं तु आतिशयोक्तादिति चेद्युक्तमित्याह वृत्तिकारः। यदि पुनरिति। काव्यान्तरं गुणीभूताद्यङ्गं विभक्तं च। अत्रातिशयोक्त्येति पदं व्याचष्टे— अतिशयोक्त्येति। अनाख्येयत्वोक्त्या इति। अतिशयस्य व्याख्यानं अनाख्येयताया उक्तिः

^१क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) शक्यताभूततां. ^२घ. 'साक्षात्' नास्ति. ^३क.ख.(नि) संख्यापूरणाय. ^४क.ख.(नि)(का) 'स्व' नास्ति.

^५घ.ङ.च.(के) द्वितीये तुष्टोते. ^६क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) 'एव' नास्ति.

* निरार्थमीलितदृशो मदमन्यराणि नाप्यर्थवन्ति न च नाम निरर्थकानि।

अद्यापि ६ मृगदृशो मधुराणि तस्या-स्तान्यक्षराणि हृदये किमपि न्नन्ति ॥

(इति पूर्णसंस्कृतः बिल्वणस्येति शार्ङ्गपरपद्धती सम्पते। श्लोकसंख्या—१४६८; पञ्चतुलशकस्येति सुभाषितावधिः—श्लोकसंख्या—१२८०).

साररूपतां प्रतिपादयितुं¹ दर्शितम्। इति शिवम्॥

किं लोचनं विनालोको भाति चन्द्रिकयैव² हि।

तेनाभिनवगुप्तोऽत्र लोचनोन्मीलनं व्यधात्॥

यदुन्मीलनं³ शक्त्यैव विश्वमुन्मीलितं⁴ क्षणात्।

स्वात्मायतनविश्रान्तां तां वन्दे प्रतिभां शिवाम्॥

॥ इति श्रीमहामाहेश्वराभिनवगुप्तोन्मीलिते सहृदयालोकलोचने

ध्वनिसङ्केते प्रथमोद्घोतः॥

अनाख्येयतोक्तिः साररूपतां प्रतिपादयितुमिति प्रवृत्तयेति शेषः।

अतिशयोक्त्या अनाख्येयतोक्त्या साररूपतां प्रतिपादयितुं प्रवृत्तयानया काव्यान्तरातिशयितं रूपं यत् व्याख्यायत इत्यर्थः।

युक्ताभिधायिन इति। ध्वनेः साररूपत्वाभिधानं अस्माकमभिमतं, यतो वयं काव्यस्यात्मा ध्वनिरिति ब्रूम इति भावः।

किं लोचनमिति। लोचनं नेत्रम् अयं व्याख्यानग्रन्थश्च। लोको भवनमालोकश्चायं ध्वनिग्रन्थः। चन्द्रिका—ज्योत्स्ना ध्वनिव्याख्यानग्रन्थश्चान्यः। लोचनोन्मीलनं— उन्मीलितं लोचनमिति यावत्। आलोकस्य शोभाग्रहणं वा। उन्मीलितेन लोचनेन नान्येनेत्यर्थः। यदुन्मीलनेति। उन्मीलनशक्त्या स्पन्दशक्त्या। उन्मीलति—स्फुरति। स्वात्मायतनविश्रान्तां स्वस्वरूपावस्थिताम्।

॥ इति प्रथमोद्घोतः॥

¹क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) दर्शितमिति. ²क.ख.ग.(नि)(का) चन्द्रिकयापि हि. ³क. युक्त्यैव. ⁴(का) लति.

ENGLISH
TRANSLATION

Triumphant is the uniqueness of the Goddess of Speech, designated by the twin names, Poet and Critic. Even without a shred of causality, it brings forth subjects never known before; by the exuberance of its own *rasa* (experience of ecstasy), it vivifies the entire universe, hard as flint; it illumines everything in a double process of intuition and verbal objectification.

Serving attendance on the lotus-feet of the Great Teacher Bhaṭṭa Indurāja, I have acquired the philosophy of beauty; I am known by the title Abhinavagupta (lit. 'ever more protected'). I shall herein expound the work *Kāvyaśloka* as far as possible, following the text closely, so that the people are proffered my own vision (also my own commentary) designated *Locana* or Insight.

Svecchā....

Although the author of the gloss, in himself, is blessed by the grace acquired through unimpeded salutations to the Godhead, he once again invokes His grace through an apt benedictory verse in order that the commentators and readers (lit. listeners) might obtain the full fruit of their labours, viz., commenting and reading, as desired by them.

May the nails of Nara-siṁha, the destroyer of the demon Madhu, protect you, i.e., the commentators and readers; for they alone deserve to be addressed to. The second personal pronoun expresses essentially a vocative. Protection is no other than offering assistance in the attainment of the desired goal. That becomes possible only by removing the obstacles pitted against it. Such is the protection intended here. The Godhead is indeed ever-active as well as endowed with a steadfastness of purpose without even a trace of illusion. As this heroism is understood, the heroic sentiment is suggested here. The nails do duty as weapons; through weapons, protection is effected. As the nails serve as exclusive or extraordinary instruments, they are put in the active voice to emphasize their superior powers. It is also suggested that the Godhead stands in no need of other instruments. The allusion to Him as the destroyer of Madhu indicates that He is always busy removing the fears of the world. One might ask what His qualifications are. The answer is that He is a lion by choice, and not born so as a result of past action, nor become so by another's form suited to His purpose most, viz., killing the particular demon. Now what about the nails? They are capable of

cutting down the woes of devotees. It is quite reasonable that nails should have a cutting capacity. Though woe itself (being abstract) cannot be actually cut by nails, His nails can be reasonably imagined to have that capacity, since they have been created by His choice to accomplish His object. Such is the main import. Another alternate explanation is this: Hiraṇyakaśipu, a thorn to all the three worlds, is the cause of misery in the entire universe. Therefore he is himself the exclusive embodiment of woe—as he torments people who are singularly devoted to the Lord. Hence were he to be destroyed, all woe would be automatically destroyed. Thus the Lord shows His infinite mercy even in such a contingency. The nails are further qualified by epithets. They possess purity or stainlessness. Words like 'pure', 'soft', etc., primarily refer to abstract states only. Besides that, by their brightness too, that is to say, by their form characterised by both archness and attractiveness, they outshine the moon and cause him worry. That the crescent moon is intended here is suggested by the *dhvani* based on the power of sense. The Expression 'causing him worry' suggests that in the presence of the nails, the moon becomes pale (by comparison) and unattractive. That the nails can cause worry or injury is well known. More so would be the said capacity in the case of the nails of 'Nara-siṃha' because they are extraordinary. Furthermore, seeing their purity and archness, the crescent moon suffers worry within himself.

'Although the qualities of purity and archness are common to both of us, only these (nails) are able to remove the woes of the devoted, but not I'. This idea constitutes a suggested figure of speech, viz., *Vyatireka* or contrast. 'Furthermore, so long I alone happened to be the object of regard and appreciation by the people, on account of my exclusive possession of purity and delightful shape; now they will start looking up to these extraordinary ten nails only, appearing like so many crescent moons with the added ability of destroying the sorrows of the devoted, and will not look up to me any longer'. So thinking, the crescent moon suffers, as it were, incessant worry. This is the suggested mixed figure, viz. *Utprekṣā-apahnuṭi* (poetic fancy and poetic denial). Such is the three-fold *dhvani* of idea (*vastu*), figure of speech (*alanākāra*) and sentiment (*rasa*), as explained by my worthy preceptor.

I.1 Kavyasyatma...

In order to state primarily the nature of the subject on hand, and secondarily, conveying, by implication, the virtual benefit of its direct benefit, along with the relation between the subject and the benefit, and

the overall benefit of such exposition, the author comes out with this first statement. When the author of the gloss explains the word learned by the phrase 'those who know the truth about poetry', his idea is that the word 'learned' here has in view the knowledge of the soul of poetry, since it is connected with the expression 'the soul of poetry' occurring earlier.

The word 'soul' (*ātman*) is explained by the word 'truth' (*tattva*); this indicates not only that it is essential but also distinct from other verbal usages. The word *iti* refers to the sound-form *dhvani* only, because its meaning, being a matter of controversy, cannot be properly taken as anything certain.

Now this is explained further:

Samjñitah

As a matter of fact, it is not just a designation, but it has also justification for being regarded as the meaning of the term *dhvani*, in so far as it is the very quintessence of everything. Otherwise, the learned would not have propagated such a concept. To bring out this idea it is said:

tasya sahrdaya....

An even better interpretation would be:— the word *iti* coming in a dislocated order has a reference to the entire sentence as such, viz., "the meaning called *dhvani*, has been advocated as the soul of poetry". If it were to refer only to the designation, where would be its coherence with the statement: 'the meaning called *dhvani*? Virtually, "the word *dhvani* is the soul of poetry" would be its sense, as in the sentence: "this man says "cow!" Nor is it possible that the very matter of controversy is non-existent. A controversy about qualities can arise only when a qualificand is existent. We need not elaborate on this irrelevant point and tire the patience of men of taste. Possibly, a single learned man might say a wrong thing inadvertently; but such a mistake cannot arise in the case of many learned men. That is the reason why the plural has been used, viz., *budhaiḥ*. This is further explained:

Paramparayā...

The purport is that the learned have said this in an unbroken tradition of teacher and pupil, even though it has not been recorded in particular books. Many learned men would not have taught so respectfully a disresponsible theory. Hence the author says:

Samyagāmnātapūrvah....

The author goes on to indicate by the expression '—*pūrvā*' that it is not enunciated for the first time here, that is why he further interprets it as: *Samyak=āsamantāt, mnātah = prakāṣitah*.

rasya.....

How can there be any possibility of the non-existence of the very subject for whose acquisition one should attempt? But what can we do? Such is the colossal ignorance of the critics who deny *dhvani*. Of course, we have not personally heard the various arguments of the critics who deny *dhvani*. They are only imagined and refuted by us; hence the use of the perfect tense which relates to what is not directly perceived. A future subject cannot be refuted, for the simple reason that it is not born. One might say: "We will imagine that also in our mind and refute it"; such a mental construction itself will contradict its futurity. Thus, only the past tense is left; it is both mediate and without any specific relevance to the present. Therefore, the verb is put in the perfect tense, viz.,

jagaduh

With this idea in view, the author interprets the original text as laying bare only hypothetical objections. Even framing an impossible hypothesis is improper, since it is proper to suppose what is only possible. Otherwise the assumed hypotheses as well as objections would become endless. Therefore, in order to justify the hypothetical objections to be presently set out, he states as a preamble the verb—*Sambhavanti*.

Were he to say: 'hypothetical positions will be assumed' (i.e. with the verb *ācakṣīran* in the future tense), it would only be a repetition. There is no future assuming involved in what is actually present in the mind at the time of writing. The present tense of the verb is indicative of this. One might argue: 'a hypothesis which is itself based on another hypothesis involving an impossible entity cannot possibly admit of any refutation'. So it is said:—

vikalpāḥ

There is positively no such (impossible) entity at the back of this hypothesis. What we have are only imaginary ideas. Being void of the proper understanding of it (=poetry), such ideas are indeed likely to arise; that is why the verbs here like *ācakṣīran* are put in the optative mood, referring to imagined hypotheses, thereby suggesting that they relate to actual ideas in the past, as in the following example:

If what within the body stays,
Were to be turned outside;
Men would carry sticks always
To drive the dogs and crows aside.

Here, 'supposing the body were to be seen like this (i.e. inside out), it would be also noticed in the said manner (i.e. men carrying sticks)'; the

supposition relates to a possibility in times past only. The negative alternative to it, viz., if it were to be otherwise (i.e. not so seen), what would be the result? It would remain equally despicable and would equally relate to the past itself. In either case, the (body's) existence itself is not an assumed hypothesis. There is no need to labour this point any more.

There are only three forms of the anti-*dhvani* viewpoint:— 1) since words become meaningful only by virtue of conventional usage, there can be no suggested meaning over and above the stated; 2) even if it were to be there, it can be suggested only by the denotative function of the word, and it deserves to be regarded as an implied meaning understood in the context of the stated meaning; and 3) any meaning not so implied would be indescribable, even like the sexual pleasure on the part of maidens who are ignorant of it.

Again, there are three sub-divisions of the no-*dhvani* standpoint:— 1) "only literary qualities (*guṇas*) can contribute beauty to sound and sense; that is why poetry consists of beautified sound and sense, not to be found either in the empirical or scientific use of language; and there is no other source of beauty not noted by us;" 2) "what is left unnoted cannot be beautiful at all;" 3) "should it be beautiful, it will surely come under either *guṇa* or *alankāra* already defined by us;" what special erudition is there in merely coining a new name?

Even supposing (for argument's sake) that it cannot be subsumed either among *guṇas* or among *alankāras* which have been set forth (by the theorists), the endeavour of the opponent would be tantamount to no more than giving a new name to it by reason of some slight speciality; for the sub-divisions of its beauty even under simile are numberless. Yet the fact remains that it is nothing distinct from *guṇa* or *alankāra*. Even so, what use does it serve? Other forms of beauty, equally striking, can always be discovered. Ancients like Sage Bharata enunciated only two figures of speech, viz., chime (*yamaka*) and simile (*upamā*) as respective figures of sound and sense. Other literary theorists have shown the way how these can be further sub-divided and explained. For example, understanding the application of the grammatical rule, viz., the suffix *an* is added in the sense of a maker of something (*karmāṇyaṇ*), as in the word *kumbha-kāra*, one can coin other words like *nagara-kāra* on his own. Is that enough reason for any one to feel proud about himself? This is true of the present claim also.

Such are the three major anti-*dhvani* alternatives of what is really one standpoint. Taken along with the other two standpoints (already mentioned), the total alternatives come to be five in all. Such is the

purport of the entire passage. These are now taken up in this very order:—

Śabdārtha-śarīrah tāvat...

"The expression *tāvat* ('surely') indicates that there is no agreement on this point on the part of anyone. First of all, sound and sense cannot, surely be *dhvani*; for there is no point in merely giving a new name (to an old thing). If one were to say that only the beauty of sound and sense constitutes *dhvani*, there also one should clearly distinguish between two kinds of beauty:—(1) beauty inherent in its very nature; (2) beauty based on arrangement (*saṅghaṭanā*). Now, the beauty inherent in the very nature of sounds is brought about by figures of sound (*śabda-alankāra*); the beauty based on arrangement springs from qualities of sound. In the same way, beauty inherent in the very nature of sense results from figures of speech like the simile (*upamā*). Beauty based on arrangement comes from qualities of sense. Thus there can be nothing like *dhvani* over and above qualities and figures.

Saṅghaṭanā-dharmāh...

The words to be understood here to complete the sense are:—'belonging to sound and sense'. "Whatever is different from *guṇa* and *alankāra*, that cannot be a source of beauty; e.g. permanent and temporary flaws, viz., solecism (*asādhū*) and cacaphony (*duḥśrava*) respectively, to give two examples. But *dhvani* is held to be a source of beauty. Hence it cannot be different from the former." This is a negative probans in support of the argument. Another objector might urge:— 'But there are others, e.g. *vr̥tti* (mode) and *riti* (style) which are not only different from *guṇa* and *alankāra* but also sources of beauty; like them even *dhvani* can remain at once distinct from them and a source of beauty. The negative probans will thus be quashed.' This idea is elaborated in the following text:

tadānatirikta-vṛttayah.....

The very postulate that *vr̥tti* and *riti* are different from them (*guṇa* and *alankāra*) is unsubstantiated. This may be illustrated here. The *vr̥ttis* defined by theorists are just three types of alliteration (*anuprāsa*). The purpose of this three-fold classification is to set forth the nature of the qualities, viz., harshness (*paraśatva*), tenderness (*lalitatva*) and their absence (*madhyamatva*); since they serve to bring out how alliteration can be effected to suit subjects which may be powerful, or soft or medium. So it is said: "poets always deem as separate varieties of alliteration each of these three modes of using similar consonants". The word 'separate' implies that the harsh alliteration is called *nāgarikā* (city-damsel), the soft alliteration is called *upanāgarikā*, (lit. one resem-

pling the *nāgarikā*) or *lalitā* (charming damsel). The word *upanāgarikā* means here a damsel comparable to the fashionable city-damsel. An alliteration which is midway, neither harsh nor sweet, is called *madhyama* (lit. medium). That is the reason why this mode is also called by the name 'rustic' (*grāmyā*); as it bears resemblance to a country maiden who is unsophisticated in her manners and yet delicate by nature without harshness. The third among the modes is also called by the name *komalānuprāsa* (lit. soft alliterative diction). Thus all the three are only alliterative types. Here the word 'mode' (*vr̥tti*) does not carry the Vaiśeṣika sense of the 'inherently related', in which case the alliteration which is particular would have to be contained inherently in the universal of *vr̥tti*. What is meant here is only that some assistance is extended by the universal of *vr̥tti*. An illustration of this is had in the following citation:—

*In majesty without parallel
Kings always do dwell!*

Hence modes are not at all different from alliterative effects etc.; they have no additional function. Hence the word *vr̥tti* which denotes 'function' (*vyāpāra*) cannot be considered as anything inferred either, since no extra function is involved. It is because of this non-difference between them, they have not been given a designation like *vr̥tti* by ancient theorists like Bhāmaha. Though this designation is given by theorists like Udbhaṭa, no extra sense has come within the range of our understanding. Such is the purport of the author when he says—

gatāḥ śravaṇagocaram and rītaśca

Though *Rītis* or styles are really non-different from *Vr̥ttis*, they too have come within our hearing. Qualities (*guṇas*) like 'sweetness' (*mādhurya*) are to be understood by the pronoun 'that' (*tat*). When they are couched in an appropriate verbal mode or diction (*vr̥tti*), they tend to mingle with one another just as the juices of sugarcandy, pepper and so forth blend together to form a single sweet drink; the blended three-fold *rītis* are called by regional names like *Gauḍīya*, *Vaidarbha* and *Pāñcāla*, as they are largely come across in those regions (though in fact they relate only to hard, soft and medium styles employed). The universal is not different from its particulars; the whole is not different from its parts. In the same way, modes and styles cannot be different from qualities and figures of speech. Hence the strength of the negative evidence remains unaffected (in proving that there can be no new element of charm like *dhvani* different from *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*). Hence the author states:

Ko'yam dhvanirnāma?

It cannot be an element of charm as it is not of the nature of a 'sound' or 'sense'. Nor can it be a source of charm as it is something different from *guṇa* and *alanākāra*. Poetry is that which is enjoyed only when it is conceived as a whole by the mind; yet, for purposes of analysis, if it be divided into parts artificially, even then, we do not find anything new meriting the designation of '*dhvani*'. The particle *nāma* signifies this idea.

An objection might be raised as follows, at this juncture: "Let it not be of the nature of 'sound' or 'sense'; let it not be a source of their charm too. But it can well remain something quite distinct from *guṇa* and *alanākāra* all right." Anticipating such an objection, the author now sets out the second form of the anti-*dhvani* contention:

anye...

"Let it be so (= let us grant for argument's sake that something exists over and above *guṇas* and *alanākāras*). Even then, *dhvani* cannot be such as is intended by you in your attempt at definition. Surely, you have to define it as something existing in poetry. But actually, it has no place therein. It is extraneous to it even like vocal music, dance and orchestra. Poetry is something composed; the genus of poetry presupposes the operation of the creative art on the poet's part. Certainly, no one regards dance, music and so forth as 'poetically composed'.

prasiddha-prasthāna...

The well established poetic categories are 'sound', 'sense' and their *guṇas* and *alanākāras*. The word '*prasthāna*' etymologically denotes a way by which people move about happily, following their forerunners. *kāvya-prakāśya*

"Indeed, that pathway is regarded by you too as a kind of poetry, as you have said that "it is the *ātman* or life-essence of poetry!" The reason why it cannot be poetry is now adduced:

sāhṛdaya.... mārgasya

i.e. A pathway comparable to dance, music and eye-gesture.

tat

i.e. the definition of poetry cited here in the words '*sāhṛdaya*-' etc.

Possibly, it might be argued that connoisseurs are only those who understand such a unique thing as poetry. A definition of poetry which wins their appreciation should perforce be quite different from the ones in the trodden pathway. Hence the author says:

na ca ...

We might give an illustration here:— Suppose a person starts offering a definition of a good sword and says:

"A good sword is that which has length and breadth, which is used as dress to cover the entire body, very smooth to feel, made up of threads, folding up or spreading out as the occasion demands, and without torn patches, though it admits of easy tearing."

Others who listen to him might challenge him thus: "Only a cloth will be like this, and not at all a sword!" But the speaker might continue to assert dogmatically as follows:

"Only that described by me is a sword according to me."

The assertion about *dhvani* is on par with the above (absurd) assertion.

The thing defined has got to be real and not imaginary. That is why the author adds:—

sakala-vidvanmanogrāhitām

The epithet 'entire' (*sakala*) removes the possible objection that even scholars might be described only as those well versed in the special tradition of *dhvani*. Even if the connotation of the word 'scholar' be taken in such a restricted form, nothing would be gained by the objectors; only their madness would stand revealed. Such is the purport of the passage.

A commentator has given a different explanation of the purport of this passage as follows:

The *dhvani* which you want to explain is indeed some 'life-essence'.

That 'life-essence' has to be something over and above the traditional categories, since it has not been defined by (earlier) writers on poetics. But that is not recognised as poetry by anyone in the world.

All this is riddled with self-contradiction. For, if the objector should accept that there is some 'life-essence' left unexplained by ancient theorists of poetry, then it would provide a valid reason for an adequate definition of it now, since it has escaped notice so long. Hence our earlier explanation alone is right.

Now the author introduces the third anticipated form which the anti-*dhvani* contention might assume:—

"For argument's sake let us say that *dhvani* is a source of charm. Let us also admit that it is subsumed under the old categories of *guṇa* and *alaukāra*. (Even if we give up our earlier stance under these two counts) the fact remains that no theorist has, in so many words, declared that *dhvani* is the 'life-essence' of poetry:—

punarapare

The word '*kāmanīyakam*' etymologically signifies that which is affected as an object by the operation of the agent, viz., the beautiful.

And in this context, it is to be understood in the sense of the conceptual idea of beauty occasioned by the beautiful object. One possible contention here is:

Since shades of beauty are countless, indeed we have come across such a kind of poetic beauty which is at once different from the beauty we find in figures of speech like alliteration and also from the beauty we find in qualities like 'sweetness' as defined by the theorists.

This anticipated contention is admitted for argument's sake and then rejected:—

vāgvikalpānām

vāk etymologically means 'word' when the root *vac* is taken in an active sense (viz., *vakti*)—'that which states', when it is taken in a passive sense (viz., *ucyate*)—'that which is stated', it signifies 'sense' or 'meaning': when it is taken in the sense of the linguistic function (*vyāpāra*) by which something is stated (viz., *ucyate anayā*), it stands for the denotative function of words. Endless are the varieties of beauty in relation to words and senses; equally countless are the possibilities in respect of the denotative function itself.

prakāraśaḥ.....

The source of beauty in question should be either of quality (*guṇa*) or figure of speech (*alankāra*). Now both of these are already included under the general definition itself of poetry. As it is said— "The productive agents of poetic beauty are qualities, while figures of speech are only sources that add to the beauty already produced". Also a deviant turn of content as well as expression is designated as beauty (*alankāra*) in our discussion". The iteration of the word *dhvani* is indicative of the critic's inordinate enthusiasm. It deserves nothing but contempt.

Nṛtyata...

The reference is to those who theorise about it; to those who compose poems containing it and those critics who respond to it with great enthusiasm on listening to it. In other words, where is the point in all this undue enthusiasm regarding the mere term (*dhvani*)?

Eṣā daśā...

This is indicative of pride on the part of the speaker and undue admiration on the part of the listeners.

Vāgvikalpā...

The possibilities of speech may also be taken as the varieties of creative imagination at the back of poetic expression. "Thus *Dhvani* is no more than a mere talk"—such is the common conclusion of anti-*dhvani* theorists, one and all. For if it be a source of beauty, it cannot be

different from either a quality (*guṇa*) or a figure of speech. On the other hand, if it should be different; it would cease *ipso facto* to be a source of beauty. Further, even if it be a remote source of beauty, it would not be worth any respect. Nor is this supposition of ours, viz., the non-existence of *dhvani*, baseless:

Tathā ca

The opponent alluded to is a poet by name Manoratha who was a contemporary of this author. "Because it is devoid of figures of speech, therefore, it is not pleasing to the heart". This phrase suggests the absence of figures of sense. "Not even composed of embellished words" suggests the absence of figures of sound. "Oblique expression" (*vakrokti*) is a very stylized arrangement. "Bereft of it" means absence of qualities of sound and sense. Thus the phrase "bereft of oblique expression" suggests the absence of figures of speech, in so far as their general definition itself is inapplicable. Those critics, of course, have not been able to avoid the flaw of repetition. So we may close this discussion now.

Prityā...

The implication is that it is nothing but a craze for following the beaten track.

Sumatinā...

On the other hand, if a dunce were to ask the said question, the *dhvani*-theorist might jolly well describe its nature by way of a reply through (wordless) gestures like twitching eyebrows and befuddled looks.

These anti-*dhvani* suppositions have all been proffered in a chain; they are not exactly exclusive of one another. To illustrate: The initial word *punaḥ* ('again') while setting out the third anti-*dhvani* stance carries this very significance. Similarly, the common summing up at the end is also in conformity with it. The anti-*dhvani* view is given the past tense since its very essence lies in being an imagined hypothesis. On the other hand, the *bhākta-vāda* or the view that *dhvani* is identical with metaphorical usage has come down in an unbroken tradition, being embodied in books on the subject. The verb *ābhuḥ* carries the sense of an ever-continuous present. The word *bhakti* means a property as it is derived from *bhaja*—'to be related to', i.e., fancied as identical with another well-known relatum; examples are nearness etc., to what is directly stated; derived from *bhakti* is the sense called *bhākta* (secondary sense) or metaphorical meaning. So it is said:— Metaphorical meaning is five-fold: 1) closely connected with the direct (primary) meaning, 2) similar to it, 3) intimately associated with it, 4) opposed to

it and 5) partaking in the same action (as it).

A word is usually used metaphorically to connote the group of several properties possessed by it. Such implied common properties like irresistible daring constituting the connotation of a word in an instance like 'the boy is a lion' is termed *bhakti*. The secondary meaning derived from it comes to be designated '*bhākta*'. *Bhakti* can also be interpreted as high regard in the properties like closeness and sharpness in the place (e.g. *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*) or person (e.g. *agnirmāṇavakaḥ*) described. Such high regard comes to be deemed as the end-purpose for justifying the secondary usage of words, which is thus two-fold:— 1) *gauṇa*, i.e. based on (similarity of) properties and 2) *lākṣaṇika*, based on secondary usage of words (in respect of relations other than common property). Also *bhakti* may be taken to involve the condition of incompatibility of the direct sense. Thus three conditions govern all metaphorical usage: 1) incompatibility of the direct sense, 2) a reason in justification, and 3) an end-purpose.

Kāvyaṭmānaṁ guṇavṛttim...

The use of the same case-ending for both these words carries the following significance:— Although in the *Dhvani*-variety called *avivakṣita-vācya* ('poetry wherein the stated meaning is not exclusively intended'), e.g. "like the mirror blinded by breath", there is metaphorical superimposition, yet *Dhvani* is not exactly identical with it. For, it can exist even in instances other than it, as in the *Dhvani*-variety viz., *vivakṣita-anyapara-vācya* ('poetry wherein the stated meaning is intended, but the significance goes beyond it'). Even in the former variety, metaphorical superimposition itself is not *dhvani* as we shall hereafter demonstrate. The original author also is going to state further on: "*bhaktya bibharti...*" (1.17) and "*kasyacit...*" (1.22).

Secondary relations or properties are proximity and the like; while similar characteristics are sharpness and the like. *Guṇa-vṛtti* etymologically means that which conveys a new significance implied by these (properties and characteristics) serving as instrumental media. This derivation makes it refer to the word secondarily used. Another derivation is the new significance or sense so conveyed mediately. This second etymology refers to the word conveying such sense or sense itself so conveyed. The word can be derived in a third way also as the state (*vartana*) of secondary signification through the mediate characteristics. So understood, it will mean the process of secondary or indirect signification (as distinguished from *abhidhā* i.e. primary or direct signification). The purport is: All the three alternate derivations of the term *dhvani* possible, become exactly identical with the three alternate

etymological interpretations of the term *bhakti* as word, sense, and function or process. Thus *Dhvani* can not be anything different from *bhakti*. Meaning or sense can only be two-fold—direct and indirect. The primary verbal function covers the former, while by a process of simple elimination *dhvani* can come under the latter only, since there is no third category at all in the picture.

The objector might retort:—“Whoever said that *dhvani* is *guṇavṛtti* (i.e. *bhakti*)”? Anticipating such an objection, the author remarks: “*yadyapi....*” and “*anyo vā....*” in the text.

The reference here is to an aspect of poetic beauty like quality (*guṇa*) and figure of speech (*alaṅkāra*).

Darśayātā...

Theorists like Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa and Vāmana etc. are meant. Bhāmaha had stated—“*śabdaḥ chando 'bbhidhānārthaḥ....*” (*Kāvya-alaṅkāra* I.9). While commenting on the term *śabda* in this passage, Bhaṭṭa Udbhaṭa distinguishes between *abbhidhāna* and *śabda* as follows (in his *Bhāmaha-vivaraṇa*):—*Abhidhāna* is the significatory usage of words which is called the function of primary connotation (*abbhidhā*) when the sense is primary, and which is called the function of secondary implication (*guṇa-vṛtti*) when it is secondary. Vāmana also has observed:—*sādṛśyā-lakṣaṇā vakroktiḥ* (*Kāvya-alaṅkāra-sūtra* IV.3.8), which means that the secondary usage of words based on similarity comes to be termed ‘deviant expression’ (*vakrokti*).

Manāk spr̥ṣṭa...

Only the direction of *Dhvani* has been hinted by them. Yet, mediocre readers confined to the literal meaning of the words, and unable to catch its inner nature have failed to explain its nature. Not only that; they even indulge in decrying it; their procedure is comparable to tasting an unbroken coconut in so far as they parrot out the texts most literally. Hence the author says—

Parikalpya evaṁ uktam...

If this construction is not followed, then it would go against the statement of the *prima facie* view, viz., “The way of *Dhvani* has been touched (slightly)”.

Śālina-buddhayaḥ...

It means those that are dull-witted. Of these three anti-*Dhvani* theorists, each following one is more advanced in thought than the preceding one. The first are completely mistaken. The second allow their general awareness of it to be obscured by doubt. The last do not obscure it; yet they are unable to define it precisely. In this way, these three classes of *Dhvani*-opponents are beset respectively by misconcep-

tion, doubt and ignorance.

Tena...

Each one of these anti-*Dhvani* views provide a reason for the setting out of the real nature of *Dhvani* by the author; that is why the singular is used.

Evain-vidhāsu vimatiṣu

The locative here is in the sense of selecting individually each one out of a group. Among the different alternatives mentioned (of the anti-*Dhvani* school), each one of them provides sufficient reason for the self-chosen task of explaining the real nature of *Dhvani*. This is stated in so many words:—

Tat svarūpam brūmah:—

Here the subject is the nature of *Dhvani*. The relation between *Dhvani* and its text-book is that of the communicator—communicated; the relation between the author and the reader is that of educator—educated. The end is the knowledge of its (*Dhvani*'s) nature through the removal of all contrary views. Finally, the relation between the text-book and the end is one of cause and effect.

Hereafter the author proceeds to comment upon the expression "For the delight of men of taste", which is expressive of incidental benefits deriving from this basic end, so far as the readers are concerned:—

Tasya hi...

That is to say 'or that which has become a subject of controversy'. The different words in the sentence have to be construed in the following way to bring out their full implication:— May *ānanda* or infinite repose, also known as *camatkāra* or striking effect fill the hearts of those who discern the true nature of *dhvani* in such a firm manner that it cannot be shaken in the least by the onslaughts of rivals flinging difficulties in their way. This end-result is to be achieved; hence the nature of *dhvani* is being expounded at the outset. The end-result indeed is a direct outcome of the efficiency in the means productive of it. With this idea in mind the author has stated: "We shall expound its nature for the sake of delight in readers". In this explanation the consistency of thought is best brought out. Next the author takes up for explanation the term—'its nature'; and in doing so he suggests how all the five anti-*Dhvani* views mentioned earlier get a proper answer.

Sakala...

The two words *sakala* (entire) and *satkavi* (good poet) refute the charge that *Dhvani* is something confined to a very negligible part of poetry. The word *ati-ramaṇīya* (exceedingly beautiful) brings out how it is quite different from what is *bhākta* or metaphorically indicated.

Surely, there is no beauty of any kind in metaphorical statements like "The boy is a lion" and "There is a hamlet in the Ganges". The adjective *Upaniṣad-bhūta* (quintessential) refutes the charge that it is no more than a novel nomenclature, a mere coinage of a new term for what is already known before.

The expression *anīyasibhiḥ* (even a jot), etc. indicate that it (*Dhvani*) is not subsumed under either *guṇa* or *alaṅkāra*. The words *atha ca* etc. serve to take away the ground under the feet of the criticism that *Dhvani* is a doctrine held by a coterie as suggested in the phrase *tatsamayāntaḥpātinaḥ*. The words *Rāmāyaṇa-Mahābhārata-* reveal that, beginning from the first poet Vālmīki, it has been held in high regard by the learned poets, one and all. By the expression *lakṣayatām* ("who discern precisely") he confutes the charge that it is something beyond the pale of words. The etymology of the verb *lakṣyate* takes us to the root *lakṣ* which in its turn brings us to the derivative *lakṣa* which means *lakṣaṇa*. Those may be supposed to be discerning who are able to explain it by means of a definition. Thus the reference here is to critics who are having such a proficiency to note and explain *Dhvani* by way of definition.

Sahṛdayānām...

Sahṛdayas (men of taste) are those who are able to achieve a heartfelt response to poetry, possessing as they do the capacity to attain identification with what is described in poetry; this, in its turn, pointing to a complete spotless-ness of their mind-mirror as a result of continuous study and cogitation of poetry. So it is said:—"When a poetic theme is conducive to an experience of heart-felt identity or communion, its presence is productive of *Rasa*; it pervades the whole body even as fire which catches up dry wood." (Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VII.7).

Ānandaḥ...

The author's purport is to indicate the supreme importance of *Rasa* whose essence lies in the abiding appreciation by men of taste; as preparatory to it, the author is here setting forth that *Rasa-dhvani* is exclusively predominant in all instances of poetry. Therefore the following objection (of Bhaṭṭanāyaka) is disproved:—

Even if it be accepted for argument's sake that the so-called function of *Dhvani* or suggestion exists over and above the function of plain statement, at the most, it can only be a minor aspect of poetry and not its whole nature.

To explain:— 'You also do not contest the fact that in poetry consisting of three aspects, namely, primary statement, evocation (*bhāvanā*) and enjoyment (*carvanā*) of *Rasa*, the last alone is most

vital. For, as you yourself have said:—

In poetry, every one is an enjoyer; neither a knower nor a person enjoined

So to say that *vastu-dhvani* and *alaṅkāra-dhvani* are mere minor aspects of poetry is only stating the obvious (*siddha-sādhana*). On the other hand, if it should signify *Rasa-dhvani*, it goes against an already admitted fact (that *Rasa* is exclusively predominant).'

From the standpoint of the poet, the end viz., fame also becomes a means to the attainment of popularity (*prīti*). So it is said:—

Fame is said to yield the fruit, namely, heaven etc. (Vāmana, end of I.).

As far as the readers are concerned, though both instruction (*vyutpatti*) and delight (*prīti*) are afforded (by poetry) as stated in the following:—

Appreciation of a good poem brings about proficiency in the four values of life (*Dharma, Artha, Kāma* and *Mokṣa*) as well as the manifold arts; it also helps one attain fame and delight. (Bhāmaha, I.2)

Yet delight alone is the greater end between the two. Otherwise, what would be the speciality in poetry which is said to afford instruction after the manner of a beloved wife distinct from the instruction obtained through scriptures etc., after the manner of a master and from historical chronicles etc., after the manner of a friend? It is for this reason that delight alone is mentioned as the supreme end. Even for instruction in the four-fold values of life, the ultimate and supreme end is nothing but delight.

Ānanda also happens to be the name of the author. So the passage also suggests this:— May the teacher Ānandavardhana find a firm place in the hearts of men of taste, even like a deity enshrined in a temple by virtue of this work. As it is said:—

Though writers of good poetic works might depart to heaven, their imperishable body in the form of their poetry will remain for ever. (Bhāmaha, I.6)

Also the words,

Manasi pratiṣṭhām.....

carry the present sense hinting that such a firm place is indeed already secured by him in the minds of readers. In other words, the purport is that the present author is a sovereign among *sahṛdayas* or men of taste. This interpretation is supported by usages like the following:—

"The greatness of Arjuna is highest in battle."

The author's own name imbedded here is calculated to win the

interest of readers by producing in them a sense of confidence in the competence of the author, as we shall show in detail at the end of the work. Thus the chief purpose served by the work for the author, the poet and the reader is indicated.

Tatra....

'In view of the content as well as the end stated' is the sense of *tatra*. An objector might say:— After starting with the declaration— "We shall set forth the nature of *Dhvani*", where is the congruity in proceeding to state in the *kārikā* that the 'stated' and the 'suggested' are two varieties of content or meaning? To remove such an objection, the author gives his introduction (to the *kārikā*):—

Dhvanereva...

The word *bhūmikā* carries the sense of the 'first principle' though it really means groundwork. Just as the groundwork is first completed when a new structure is sought to be built, so also when the nature of *Dhvani* or suggested meaning is to be set forth, the ground work consists in mentioning the stated meaning first of all, since it is uncontested. The suggested meaning is to be established only over and above this. It is also counted alongside of the stated meaning on a par, in order to bring home the fact that the suggested also is equally undeniable. The word '*smṛtau*' strengthens what is already declared as 'the meaning traditionally handed down'. When the objector says that 'poetry is that whose body is constituted by word and meaning', he should see that this very idea of body involves the admission of something as its soul which endows life to it. Now word can constitute only the body part, as it is possessing properties like fatness and leanness, noticeable by one and all. On the other hand, meaning is not so noticeable by one and all. Yet the presence of meaning by itself can not lead to the designation of poetry; since poetry is absent in statements, empirical as well as scriptural. Therefore the author qualifies it with the epithet—

I. 2 **Sahṛdaya-ślāghyaḥ**

Though that totality of meaning is really indivisible, it is deliberately divided as two-fold to help analysis. To explain:— When the meaning aspect is identical in both the cases, why is it that men of taste admire only a particular one between the two? There must be then some speciality about it. In fact, that speciality itself constitutes the suggested meaning-aspect. And discerning critics decide that it should be the very soul of poetry, in so far as it is the only differentiating speciality of poetry. But those whose minds are confused by its intimate association with the stated meaning-aspect, start doubting its separate existence,

even as materialists who doubt the separate existence of an entity like the soul apart from the body. That is the reason why, in the *kārikā*, the sentence begins with meaning as an undivided entity, subsequently the epithet *sahajdaya-sāghya* ('admired by men of taste') is added as expressive of its differentiating mark; and then only towards the end, its two aspects are mentioned. It has never been stated that these constitute two souls of poetry.

The author proceeds to explain the word *kāvya* in the *kārikā*:— The word *lalita* ('charming') expresses the beauty contributed by the elements of *guṇa* and *alankāra*. The word *ucita* ('appropriate') points to the appropriateness of the constituents in relation to *Rasa* and *Rasa* alone; this in its turn suggests that *Rasadhvani* or suggested *Rasa* alone constitutes the soul of poetry. The idea is that, in its absence, there would be nothing like a norm in relation to which appropriateness is proclaimed time and again. The relative pronoun governing *artha* or meaning hints at the fact that even the opponent has to concede it at the outset. The correlative phrase, *tasya* etc., states that even such a concessional acceptance becomes possible only on the hypothesis that meaning does have the two aspects mentioned. Thus the objection earlier advanced, viz., 'Being a source of beauty, *Dhvani* can in no way be different from *Guṇa* and *Alaṅkāra*' is tainted by the syllogistic fallacy of 'unproved probans' (*asiddha-betu*), because *Dhvani* indeed is its soul (and not a characteristic of the body like *Guṇa* and *Alaṅkāra*). This is implicit in the wording of the text. Surely, it cannot be said that the soul is a source of charm for the body. Even if it could be said, then the reason adduced would be flawed by the fallacy of discrepancy. For the adorned itself is never an adornment; nor is the qualified ever the qualification. For this reason also the stated meaning-aspect is affirmed here. That is also the reason why it is again alluded to in the very beginning of the next *kārikā*.

I.3 Tatra...

This word signifies: 'Though both these aspects of meaning (the stated and the suggested) do exist in poetry'.

Prasiddhaḥ...

Poetic themes such as a beloved's face, pleasure-garden, moon-rise etc. which are commonly found in nature are designated here as 'well-known'. That well-known stated meaning-aspect has been explained at length (by the ancients) in several kinds of figures of speech such as the simile. So interpreted, the continuity of thought will be evident.

The word *anyathā* ('by others') in the latter part of the *kārikā* is explained in the gloss (*vṛtti*). The last quarter of the *kārikā* is indicative

of general consent excepting minor details which are unacceptable. This is hinted in the gloss thereon (3).

I.4 Punah...

The word *punaḥ* in the *kārikā* is indicative of the suggested meaning-aspect being quite distinct from that of the stated.

Anyad eva vastu...

i.e. A theme quite distinct from it and at the same time most essential. The plural in the word *mahā-kavīnām* suggests the infinite scope of (its) applicability. The title 'great poet' comes to be justified only in the case of such writers who possess a genius for creating such poetry as is animated by the suggested meaning-aspect to be fully explained hereafter. It is because such a meaning exists, that it is apprehended. Apprehension of what is totally non-existent is logically impossible. Even silver etc. (in the shell-silver illusion) is apprehended only because it is not totally non-existent. Thus apprehension is conditioned by existence. Therefore from apprehension we can logically infer existence. Hence what is apprehended must exist. Such is the purport. Now this may be applied to the point at issue in a syllogistic form. The well-known meaning-aspect is the one qualified; it is possessing the quality of the suggested meaning-aspect which is quite different from it. The reason is that it is so apprehended. A well-known example cited in support of the reason is the body of a maiden radiant with overall youthful charm. The word *pra-siddha* has two meanings:— 1) universally known; and 2) embellished.

The phrasing beginning with the correlative pronouns *yat, tat* has a special significance. Firstly, it shows that both in the example and in the point on hand exemplified, there is an indescribable overall beauty whose essence is of strikingness; secondly, the confusion of the one with the other is a result of their merging into each other in a very intimate way. This is brought out in the explanation of the indefinite pronoun *kimapi*.

Overall charm is a feature definitely distinct from the different parts that constitute the body; it is something only suggested by means of the shapely limbs. Mere flawless-ness or embellishments of the body can not be regarded as the overall charm of a whole person. That is why one can say of a maiden— 'she is lacking in overall charm', though her body might be free from every conceivable flaw like blindness in an eye in respect of her limbs when separately considered, and even if she be richly adorned with ornaments. Conversely, even if she be neither flaw-less nor adorned, yet a maiden can be described by discerning men as 'a veritable moonlight brimming with the nectar of beauty'.

An objection might be raised like this:— 'Overall charm is something which everyone notices distinctly; but this suggested meaning-aspect is what we cannot understand at all; so much so that the question of its separate existence is too remote to arise. Thus the reason put forward by the author, viz. its being so experienced, becomes unproven.'

The text beginning with '*sa hi arthaḥ*' answers the said objection. The term *sarveṣu* (in all instances) establishes the experience of its separateness (from the stated meaning-aspect). The suggested meaning aspect is indeed of two types:— 1) empirical, and 2) noticeable only in the language of poetry. Between these two, the empirical may at times even partake of communicability by words in a direct way. It may be of several kinds like affirmation and negation; and it gets the technical name *vastu* in this system. That again is of two types:— The first is that which has partaken of the status of a figure of speech such as the simile, sometime in the past, in one usage of poetry or another; but now it is no longer having that status and therefore is as good as unadorned. We say this because it is now rendered subsidiary to something else (which is primary). Yet because of our impression of its past associations, it is termed (rather loosely) as *ālmkāra-dhvani* on the analogy of a brāhmin mendicant. Whatever is not so cognised as *ālmkāra-dhvani* will come to be termed as merely a *vastu* or idea. The adjunct merely rules out the applicability of any other form to it. But *Rasa* is something which can not be denoted by any of its proper names even in a dream. It can not be comprised in any kind of empirical discourse. It is exclusively something tasted, by virtue of a unique function of delectation of the bliss of consciousness within oneself; it is very delicate being coloured by multiple impressions rooted in the very personality of the connoisseur. These impressions get in tune with the stimulants (*vibhāva*) and ensuants (*anubhāva*) depicted in literature and which appear beautiful owing to a heart-felt response (akin to the poet's) as soon as the words are heard. And since such *Rasa* is perceived only by virtue of a singular poetic function, it gets the designation of *Rasa-dhvani*. And it is *Dhvani* and *Dhvani* alone. Therefore it is regarded as the soul of literature because of its exclusive importance.

Now Bhaṭṭanāyaka's contention that '*Dhvani* can be at the most a minor aspect of poetry, but never its whole nature' may be taken up for discussion. If this censure is limited to *Vastu-dhvani* and *Ālmkāra-dhvani*, then there is nothing much to be answered. He too concedes that *Rasa-dhvani* is the soul, since his third poetic function, namely, delectation of *Rasa* is concluded by him also to be over and above the first two aspects, viz. referential and evocative. The first two types of

Dhvani namely, of *Vastu* and *Alamkāra* also really culminate ultimately in *Rasa-dhvani* as we shall show at length in the sequel. This need not detain us any longer.

The word *vācya-sāmarthya-ākṣipta* is indicative of these three types of *Dhvani* and is a general definition equally applicable to all of them. Though, as a matter of fact, suggestion is mainly a function of the word alone, yet it invariably presupposes the co-presence of the power inherent in its meaningfulness. Therefore the power of suggestion may be loosely applied to meaning also. Even in the sub-variety of *Dhvani* called *śabda-śakti-mūla-anuraṇana-rūpa-vyaṅgya* (the suggested idea or figurative idea which flashes in the mind of the critic like resonance, say of a musical note, as a result of the equivocal power of the word itself), the suggested meaning is understood only on account of the inherent power in meaning; the power of the word is not more than an in-between accessory as will be shown later.

Dūram vibhedavān...

No one doubts that affirmation and negation are mutually opposed. That is why these alone are illustrated at the outset.

Bhama dhammā.....

This statement comes from a lady who wishes to protect her place of assignation valued by her as her fondest object of love in her life from the evil of the pious man's intrusion as well as from the peril of destruction of beauty, due to the manhandling of the tender shoots and flowers in the lovely garden. This movement as he pleases is self-assured. Yet here its substantiation by mention of the removal of his fear for dog should be understood not as a positive injunction or direction as in a (Vedic) sacrifice.

It is only a negation of a negation, one leading to the other. The imperative mood here has the force of a free permission as well as something to be accomplished as it is timely. Now, existence, and non-existence of a thing are diametrically opposed; both of these cannot by any chance be denoted simultaneously. Nor can they be denoted sequentially since the universally admitted postulate is that there is nothing like a function acting discontinuously. The *Mīmāṃsaka* dictum is clear on this point—"When the function of denotation has exhausted itself by denoting the attribute, the same function can by no means extend to the denotation of the qualified object."

The objector might argue thus: "There is also a function called *tātparya* (purport) which does not get itself exhausted, since it continues as long as the speaker's intention is prevalent. Further there is inapplicability of the primary sense, in so far as the self-respecting

pious man can not be construed promptly with the other ideas like rambling in the midst of fear etc." This becomes the basis for understanding its opposite as the implied secondary sense. This implication in its turn yields the final meaning of negation, when viewed from the perspective of *Abhihiānvaya-vāda* (held by the Mīmāṃsakas). Thus the ultimate source for the final negative purport would be the referential function of the word itself. Common parlance takes the form—"it is said this way by him" when alluding to the purport of the speaker instead of his actual words. Therefore it is established that there is no meaning over and above the stated.

This objection is wrong. In all, there are only three functions known:— The first is the referential function or denotation in respect of things in general. The very definition of *abhidhā* (denotation) is that it is a function which conveys meaning depending on convention prevalent in a language. This convention can have reference only to generality; and not to any specific aspect. For, if the latter were to be true, it would lead to the fallacies of both infinite regress and discrepancy. Therefore, in order to explain adequately the final meaning of a sentence which is specific, after the individual words are all taken in relation with each other, we have to assume a sentence-function like purport (*tātparya*). The dictum of the experts is that 'the generalities do indicate specific particulars because of their invariable concomitance'. In the (Prakrit) example under discussion, at the second level of understanding (after the function of *abhidhā* is exhausted), one does not understand anything more than the positive injunction 'you may move about', since only the relation of the constituents of the sentence is understood at this stage. But in this example the different units of meaning do not get stultified even as they arise—as in the examples, namely, 'the hamlet on the Ganges' and 'the boy is a lion' — which lack compatibility. In this example, there is no kind of obstacle to the mutual construing of the units of primary meaning, viz., "The dog which stood in the way of your free movement has been killed by the lion. Now that the reason standing in the way of your free movement has been removed, you may move about as you please." Such an *anvaya* or construing of the units in relation to one another is not hindered in any way. Since there is no conceivable hindrance to the primary stated meaning there is no scope here at all for 'implication of the contrary' (*viparīta-lakṣaṇā*).

Even if we were to admit it for argument's sake, still it would be at this second level of sentence-import. To explain:— The scope for *Lakṣaṇā* is provided only when there is contravention of the primary

meaning. Contravention again is nothing but a cognition of the opposite. In the example under discussion, there is no question of opposition between the various items of meaning conveyed by the individual words in a sentence. If it is alleged that there is opposition mutually between the words, then this opposition would have to be cognised during the act of construing. There will not be any cognition of opposition unless and until the words are cognised in mutual relation. The cognition of mutual relation of the words is surely not by the function of *abhidhā* or primary denotation. As already said, the function would have got itself spent up by the time it conveyed the meanings of the separate words. And no function can operate discontinuously. Therefore it should be accepted that the knowledge of mutual relation of word-meanings is a result only of the function of purport.

The objector might argue:— "If that be true, it should be possible for one to say that he cognises syntactic relation even in such a nonsensical statement as— "There are a hundred big elephants at the tip of my finger."

Why should not a cognition of syntactic relation emerge from such a statement, since examples like 'ten pomegranates' etc. have been given by authorities? However, what actually happens is that the said cognition of relation is contravened by other *Pramāṇas* or criteria of valid knowledge like perception. Hence even though cognised, its status is no better than the cognition of silver in a shell. This is why the sentence conveying it becomes invalid. In the sentence 'the boy is a lion', the second stage of understanding the meaning is represented by the rise of relation through the function of purport as also its contravention. Then in the next stage a third function over and above both denotation and purport called by the term *Lakṣaṇā* or implication starts operating. It is indeed competent to nullify the said difficulty due to contravention.

Again the objector might urge:— "In that case even a sentence like 'the boy is a lion' could well be called an example of poetry; for even here there is the presence of the soul termed *Dhvani* in the way it is explained hereafter."

The rejoinder is: "In the same way one might well posit the existence of a soul even in a pot, because a soul, being all-pervasive, does exist in the pot also."

The objector's argument might proceed thus:— "It is only a specifically endowed body with special characteristics that justifies the positing of a soul, when it embodies the soul; not any and every kind of body."

The reply to the objection is this:—The body of word and meaning is termed poetry only when it is embellished by apt excellences and figures of speech, provided it also possesses the soul called *Dhvanana* or suggestion. The soul will never be lowered in estimation wherever it be; this is a point common to both the contestants. This does not mean that *bhakti* or secondary verbal usage is itself *Dhvani* or suggestion. For, secondary usage is none other than *Lakṣaṇā* which comes at the third level of understanding: sentence-meaning, as already pointed out. The function of suggestion arises only at the subsequent fourth level. To explain further: You yourself are declaring that secondary usage starts only when its three conditions are present. Of these three conditions, the first, namely, inappropriateness of the primary sense is based on a criterion of validity other than perception. The second, namely, the reason which is adduced (in support of the secondary sense) such as proximity (between the stream and the hamlet in the example *gaṅgāyātri ghoṣaḥ*)—is also cognisable only by means of a criterion of validity other than perception.

But in respect of the end signified such as the extreme sanctity and delightful cool effect, and inviting nature etc., it is neither denoted by any other word, nor got at by any other *pramāṇa* or instrument of knowledge. The same is true also of the extra-ordinary valour (suggested in the example 'the boy is fire'). In regard to these there is no function at all other than that of *śabda* or word. To explain:— Any inference like possessing these qualities based on the probans of proximity would be indeterminate. So also the body being denoted by the word 'lion' involves the fallacy of 'the unestablished' (*asiddha*). Further if the inference were to take the form— 'whenever such and such a word is used, such and such a quality comes to be associated with it' the onus of establishing the invariable concomitance between the two at the first instance by offering a more basic *pramāṇa* devolves on the part of the objector. But such a basic *pramāṇa* (other than *anumāna*) does not exist. Nor is it an instance of remembrance (*smṛti*), since nothing which is not already known can become an object of remembrance; and further, since there is no decisive norm as such, we cannot escape the undesirable contingency (*prasaṅga*) that we would never be able to decide that such and such a meaning is intended by the speaker. Thus one has to conclude that the function involved here can only be that of *śabda* or word. And that function is not surely denotation, as there is no convention to support it. Nor can it be purport (*tātparya*), since the function of purport spends itself out by the time it presents the *anvaya* or mutual relation (of the several words in a sentence). It can

not be indication either, for the reason already mentioned, namely, absence of coherence in the primary sense. If absence of coherence in the secondary meaning too is admitted, it would lead to an infinite regress involving admission of further absence of primary meaning, reason or utility for understanding another secondary sense, and so on. Therefore, the designation coined by a writer, namely '*lakṣita-lakṣaṇā*' or indicated secondary sense is no more than a prejudice (against *dhvani*). Thus it is established that one has to accept a fourth function like suggestion which is quite different from the well-known three functions of denotation, purport and indication. Its synonyms are *dhvanana* (suggestion), *dyotana* (illuminating), *vyañjana* (revealing), *pratyañyana* (indirectly communicating) *avagamana* (implying) and so forth. This is borne out by the author's statement later in the twentieth *kārikā*.

The position of the different functions may be summed up as follows:— the function of denotation is that which signifies the direct meaning of words on the basis of established usage or convention. The function of purport is that power of signification which connotes sentence-meaning, necessitated by the impossibility of meaning without resorting to it. The function of indication is the power of signifying a meaning governed by conditions such as incoherence of primary sense etc. And the function of suggestion (*dhvanana*) is that power of signifying meaning which presupposes first of all the knowledge of all the meanings conveyed by the above three functions at the first instance, and which leads to an inner flash due to the awareness of all these meanings; and which further expands, freely sustained by the insight or imaginative power on the part of the person. That function indeed transcends all the three functions mentioned earlier and shines out as the most prominent one in poetry and gets the designation of 'poetic soul' (*kāvyaātman*). All this hidden significance is contained in the author's statement that the prohibition is the suggested meaning (in the literary example) though, as a matter of fact, the prohibition is only a means for the ultimate end such as undisturbed dalliance contemplated by the speaker.

Even this summing up of the position is only by way of a concession, admitting for argument's sake the indirect role of *Lakṣaṇā* at an earlier stage of understanding the poem. As a matter of fact, there is no indication (*lakṣaṇā*) at all here; since its two conditions, namely, incoherence of primary sense and transference of another sense, are both absent. In instances of suggestion based on the power of sense (but not on that of word), there is no scope indeed for any kind of indication. It is

clear that whenever there is variation in the associate causal factors, there is also variation in the function of signification. To give an example:—one and the same word comes to acquire a new function like the inferential when the speaker's intention is understood after remembering the invariable concomitance etc. between the two (i.e. word and intent). If the same word derives assistance from sense-perception, the resulting function will be attributive of name and generality and called *vikalpakatva* or conceptualism. Thus the Mīmāṃsā philosophers, who hold the theory of *abhihitānvaya* (first denotation—next construing) for explaining sentence-import cannot deny any part of this argument.

The other school of Mīmāṃsā philosophers propound *anvitābhidhānavāda* (first construing—next denotation). A follower of that school believes in the principle "whatever the word is intended to convey is all contained in the purview of its meaning". And so he holds that the very function of denotation is unimpeded and continuous even like the movement of an arrow (when shot by an able archer). He can be confuted thus:— If the function should be continuous over a long time, where is the proof to regard it as a single function? It cannot be single, since the meanings conveyed are many. If the philosopher would regard the functions themselves to be many, then they have to be of different types only, since their objects and associates are all so different. When the effect is of the same type, it is a well-known dictum of the logicians that there can be nothing like an intermittent function in respect of word, action and cognition. On the other hand, if the effect be of a different type, then our own reasoning gets confirmed.

The opponent might explain his stand in another way:— 'The so-called fourth-stage-meaning is itself denoted instantaneously by the sentence as a whole. It is this kind of prolongation in function which is meant by us.'

Then our counter-question would be:—since that ultimate meaning is not sanctioned by any conventional usage, how can it even be directly understood? To this he might retort:— 'Convention is only in respect of the means (viz., the word-meanings) but not in respect of the end (whole sentence-meaning)'.

'O, what a skill in debate the ritualist is exhibiting!' The position—that the ultimate-stage meaning which is first understood, towards which the understanding of individual word-meanings at a later stage act as cause—is so ridiculous as stating that the ritualist Mīmāṃsaka is the effect of his grandson.

Again the objector might argue as follows:— 'We say that word-

meanings act as causes only to underscore the fact that the final meaning is understood only by a person whose mind is equipped with the semantic convention of the words.' But this is no answer to the question at issue because the final meaning is not caused in any way by the knowledge of semantic convention of words. Nor can one hold that any convention is possible in respect of words at a stage earlier than their coming together in a sentence. For, words are never used in isolation, but only in combination (as we see in a sentence). Even if it be urged that convention in respect of individual words is by the reasoning process of agreement and difference, the position remains that such a convention becomes applicable only to word-meanings, and without affecting the fact that the understanding of the sentence-meaning is posterior to that of word-meanings.

The objector may insist:— 'It is perceived by one and all that the understanding of sentence-meaning or purport is instantaneous. If facts are such, what can we do?'

Well, if that be so, we too are not averse to accepting it. That is why it is said further on (in *kārikā* I. 12) that its revelation is in a flash.'

'But there is a difference also. Though a sort of sequence is plausible between word-meaning and sentence-meaning in poetry, the sequence is not felt like the sequence between the cognition of a familiar object, and recollection of the relation of invariable concomitance between the object as probans and the probandum. Nor is it like the sequence between the object perceived and the convention remembered. It is not felt because of repeated understanding which is extraordinary to poetry. The relation of cause and effect (*nimitta* and *naimittika*) has to be accepted perforce. Otherwise there would be contradictions in the theory of the Mīmāṃsā school, such as the following:—

1) The sequential difference between the primary meaning on the one hand and the metaphorical or secondary meanings of the same word on the other would get reversed.

2) The dictum that there is sequentially a greater degree of weakness in respect of the six semantic factors like directly stated expression (*śruti*), and indirectly indicative expression (*liṅga*) etc., gets disrupted. For, the said dictum is supported only by the hypothesis that there is a variety among causal factors. Once the variety of casual factors is accepted, where is the point in frowning against us?

There are other philosophers (grammarians) who subscribe to the theory that the sentence and its meaning are both undivided wholes (*spṛṣṭa*). Even they cannot but follow the reasoning detailed above, when they have come down to the level of nescience or worldly usage. If

on the other hand they should stick to the transcendental state, we need only add here that it is not unknown to our author who has written a regular text-book on metaphysics called *Tattvāloka* and who has proved therein that 'All is Brahmin' or a non-duality of the Godhead. We might close the topic with this.

Now Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka's adverse criticism regarding this illustrative passage may be reviewed:— "Some words used in the verse such as 'impetuous lion' and 'pious man' are not in themselves responsible for the meaning of prohibition of movement, but only the afflatus of the emotion of fear is responsible for it. For, unless and until one knows the timid nature of the pious man and the impetuous nature of the lion, the prohibition in question cannot be wholly explained. Hence the function of suggestion based on implicatory power of sense cannot be taken as the whole and sole reason for conveying the sense of prohibition addressed to the pious man."

This deserves examination at length. We should ask back the objecting Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka: "Who ever told you that the sense of prohibition is conveyed without any understanding of the special nature of the speaker as well as the listener on the one hand, and in the total absence of suggestive function in respect of word (as distinguished from that of sense)?" In fact, we have been repeatedly pointing out that the very life-essence of suggestion consists in the association of imaginative insight on the part of the listener. We are not denying at all that there is scope in the example for the influx of the sentiment of fear. In fact we do admit that the critic is subject only to fear as a felt emotion. On the other hand, the real influx of even this *Bhayānaka-rasa* is only to be located in the literary critic and that can be explained only by way of the function of suggestion. Thus *Rasa* is that which is invariably suggested. Even Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka does not subscribe to the view that *Rasa* can be denoted by words. Hence in his aesthetics also *Rasa* is bound to be tantamount to suggestion itself. Nor can one say that this critic invariably experiences the influx of *Rasa* of fear from such an example. Surely, there is no rule that a critic should always be akin in temperament to the timid, pious man.

If, to avoid this, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka should go to the length of qualifying the critic in such a way as to apply only to specific persons akin to the listening pious man, then we would ask the question:— What harm is there in accepting the literary function of suggestion which is vitally inspired, as shown already, by the imaginative insight of both the speaker and the listener or critic? What is more ridiculous, this critic is supporting *Rasa-dhvani* unwittingly even while denouncing *vastu-*

dhvani. In fact *Rasa-dhvani* only substantiates *vastu-dhvani*. Such a demolition of *Dhvani* is absurdly self-contradictory. It illustrates the adage:— Even the angry curse of the Master is tantamount to a boon. If, on the other hand, all the endeavour is only to vindicate the prominence of *Rasa*, then who would differ from him? If it should be urged that this example does not deserve to be given to illustrate *vastu-dhvani* exclusively, then we would say— 'After all, it is an example of poetry (and not of an empirical statement); let there be both kinds of *Dhvani* (both of *Vastu* and of *Rasa*). Where is the harm?'

May be he will not be satisfied unless and until the touch of *Rasa* is fully spelt out. In that case, we must say that no touch of *Bhayānaka-Rasa* is factually reflected in the mirror-like minds of true connoisseurs. But as a matter of fact, the *Rasa* felt is that of *Śṛṅgāra* (the erotic). The erotic arises because there is the description of its *vibhāva* (supporting basis), namely, the place of assignation, which is a natural stimulant for the passionate romance. It is also duly furthered by the tinge of erotic responses through tell-tale modulations of voice (*kāku*) appropriate to the occasion. Yet this is not cited here as a straight example of *Śṛṅgāra-Rasa* because *Rasa* by nature is non-empirical, and cannot be understood easily at the outset by one and all. The author has given this only as an example of *Vastu-dhvani* or suggested idea, since his main intent is to highlight the actual affirmation *vis-a-vis* negation which is established, allowing no scope for controversy.

Another interpreter of this text has taken *Dhvanana* or suggestion as equivalent to the sentence-function of purport (*tātparya*) or an indication of intent itself. Since this commentator has given up the very thesis of *Dhvani* which he is supposed to put on firm ground, he does not appeal to our mind as being worth any attention. This has been well expressed in the adage— "No two tastes need agree!" This will be more and more illuminated as we proceed. We might put a stop to this discussion here.

Bhrama...

You have my 'free permission'; time is goodly for your unhindered movement.

Dhārmika...

Your movement is quite proper for the purpose of collecting materials of worship like flowers.

Visraddha...

This epithet is added to show that the cause for his fear is removed.

Saḥ...

That very dog which brought shivers of agitation in your frail body.

Adya...

The import is— "Indeed, it is your extreme good luck today."

Māritah...

'Has been killed' shows that the dog can never rise again (to obstruct him).

Tena...

The demonstrative pronoun 'that' is meant to remind the pious man that he too would surely have heard about the rumour that a lion is residing in the thick shrubs on the banks of the river Godāvāri. He must have been told already by her to be on his guard from falling into its clutches. But suddenly it has become now violent and started moving out of the limits of its own thicker. Thus even the question of moving about the outskirts of the bank of the Godāvāri is ruled out, once and for all; then what is one to say of his venturing into the creeper-bower in the very heart of that region? Such is the poet's import.

Attā...

(See text above for Sanskrit rendering of the Prakrit verse).

Maha...

The indeclinable *maha* in Prakrit is a multivocal word. It carries here the sense, 'of us two'. It does not mean 'my'. If it were to mean 'my', it would be tantamount to a specific invitation to him to get into her bed, and it might have roused the suspicion (in the mother-in-law); and would not have been a surreptitious indication of readiness (for dalliance with him). We might construe the context thus:— A traveller happens to see a young woman whose husband is away on tour, and falls in love with her at first sight. By this seeming form of negation, the young woman is conveying her compliance to him. The very absence of negation which is suggested here is affirmation. It should not be taken as a positive invitation since it smacks of dragging him by force to the act even while he is disinclined. That would be contrary to the feminine nature. Women are indeed proud of their own superior charms (and would never demean themselves). That is why the vocative *rātryandhā* suggests that the man is blinded by rising passion, most plausible in the circumstances. Since presence and absence (of any action) are palpably opposed, the distinction between the stated and the suggested meaning becomes most obvious.

Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, however, observes:— "All this too is communicated by word-power itself; for her passionate condition is conveyed by way of particular gestures while uttering the word 'I.'" But then the word 'I' certainly does not give this meaning directly. If it should convey it with the assistance of modulated voice (*kāku*) etc., then it is exactly what we

are calling the function of suggestion. Thus it would only set off to advantage our thesis of *Dhvani* itself. The express mention of the mother-in-law by the term *attā* shows the need for avoiding that hindrance with all effort, towards realising the desired goal of secret dalliance. 'Though of course your heart is rent by the volley of Cupid's arrows, and you do not deserve to be ignored, I am helpless. What shall I do? It is wretched day-time (not suited for dalliance)!' Though the Prakrit word for *divasakam* seems to be a masculine accusative, it is taken as a neuter nominative because there is no distinction between masculine and neuter in Prakrit.

'I am not quite ignoring you, since I am all the time here (near you). Please have a good look at me. I am not moving out elsewhere. Let us, then, pass this day-time in the delight of seeing each other's face. And with the advent of the night, do not blindly tumble into my bed, but watchfully, you should approach after ensuring that the obstacle in our way, namely the mother-in-law, is deep asleep. Such is the suggested sense here.

(For Sanskrit version of *Vacca...* see text).

Here 'get going' is a permissive affirmation. Your union with the other lady is not unwitting but is due to deep love on your part. This is evident by your flushing face and taking her name in place of mine etc. You are present here, only on account of your abiding sense of apparent decency of which you are quite proud. But actually you are a cheat. Such is the meaning suggested here expressive of deep resentment on the part of the lady speaking, technically classed as a *khaṇḍitā* (lit. 'crossed').

This can not be regarded as a negation of the form 'Do not go'. Nor is the intent of the form of any other positive proposal negating aught else.

(For Sanskrit version of *de ā ...* see text).

The indeclinable *de* conveys the sense of a request. The indeclinable *ā* has the meaning of 'however'. The straight meaning conveyed is — 'stop your proposed journey'. Hence the stated meaning is a negation. The woman in love has reached the place of assignation to meet her lover. But she finds him committing a slip of tongue in taking another beloved's name instead of hers. So she flies into a fury and starts moving away from him. At this point, the lover tries to dissuade her from returning by gently flattering her:— "You are causing obstacles not only to yourself and me by this act of your return, but also to many other ladies (hurrying to the arms of their lovers) on the road. By such a hasty act you cannot get even an iota of joy. Hence indeed you are

pitiable" — Such is the intent of the lover which has taken the form of this sweet compliment (*cāṭu*). And it is only suggested.

The context may be construed in another way also. It might be imagined that, though prevented by her confidante from the venture of moving out on her own, to preserve self-respect, she might have ignored it and started moving. At that moment, the confidante might have made this statement:— "You are causing trouble not only to yourself by lowering yourself — this loss of self-respect leading to disregard from others (that is why she is addressed as a pitiable one) — but also you cause obstacles in the way of other women in love hurrying to their lovers; because the highway itself has been illuminated by the light of your moon-like face." In this interpretation the subtle compliment to her beauty paid by the confidante would be what is suggested.

Following any two of these interpretations, the final resting place for the import would be:— "please desist from your proposed return in a huff out of the bower or from going towards the place of assignation of the lover." That would make it only an example *not* of *Dhvani* (primarily suggested idea) but of only a variety of *guṇībhūta-vyaṅgya* or the stated meaning with subordinated suggestion. For in the view of the classical theorists, a subordinated emotion (*Bhāva*) or a subordinated sentiment (*Rasa*) only adds to the beauty of the primarily stated idea, and is therefore designated as the *alamkāra* (figure of speech) of *preyas* or *Rasavat* ambience.

Therefore the real purport is to be interpreted in a different way altogether. A woman in love is hurrying along the road to meet her lover, while her lover is coming from the opposite direction to meet her in her residence. But they cross each other mid-way. That lover pays this compliment to her, feigning that he does recognise her identity. The vocative "O pitiable one!" is just an endearment serving the purpose of making himself known to her. It has no other purpose. "You will put obstacles in the path of others; and where is the certainty that you will attain your object either?" Since the lover's words do not take the express form of either "come down to my residence or let us go to yours", the sweet compliment paid by him should be taken only as suggested.

Some other interpreters have said that this is a statement made to the woman in love by sympathetic onlookers, who are unaffected by love. In this interpretation, whether the use of the vocative viz., "O pitiable one" will be justified or not, is something which men of taste have to decide for themselves.

So far it has been shown that the stated and suggested ideas have

vitaly different natures, despite the fact that they relate to a common referent viz. the pious man, the traveller, the lover and the woman in love out to meet her lover, respectively. Now a still another illustration is provided to show how the two are different even when there is difference in the referents:—

Kvacid vācyāt...; vyavasthāpitah

Connoisseurs can decide that even difference in referents may have various forms—such is the gist.

(For Sanskrit version see text).

Kassa veti...,

Even an unprejudiced one is bound to get angry. 'By seeing' suggests 'as he has not caused the hurt'. In other words, we should understand:— 'by seeing the beloved's lip wounded due to some other reason'.

Sa-bhramara-padmaṅghrāṇa-śīle...

One's innate nature can not be changed in any way.

Vārita-vāme...

You, who remained perverse in spite of being warned; i.e. 'you who did not accept the warning.'

Sahasvedānīm...

"Now suffer the series of accusations following from your own obstinacy!"

The context is to be understood thus:— An unrestrained lady has got her lip hurt by a paramour. Her confidante gets a definite clue to the presence of the lady's husband in the vicinity. Being a clever woman, she speaks thus to prevent her friend from censure at his hands, pretending as if she has never seen him. The stated idea, viz., 'suffer now' has the unrestrained lady as the referent. But to the referent, namely the husband, what is conveyed is the suggested idea that the lady is guiltless. The word *sahasva* can also have the husband as referent with its suggested idea that he should bear with her. Alternatively, the suggested idea might be taken as addressed to the referent, viz., the neighbours suspicious of her chastity on seeing her so much abused by her husband. The neighbours are made to believe that she is guiltless, by this clever concealment of her lapse. Perhaps it can be imagined also that the referent is a co-wife and she is suggestively derided on her excessive delight at this discovery (of her rival's adultery). It is asserted by the suggestive use of the word *priyāyāh* (sweet-heart's) that she remains secure in her influence over the husband.

A still another possibility is that the errant lady herself is referent. It is suggested to her— "There is no reason to think that you have been lowered in the eyes of your rivals by all this indignity. On the other

hand, it is virtually a compliment. Hence you may take it as a credit." Thus the suggested idea only adds to her preponderant hold over her husband by virtue of her beauty.

If we take the referent to be the paramour, then the suggested idea concerning him would be:— "This secret beloved of yours, so dear to you, has been somehow saved out of a tight corner with great difficulty. Beware! Do not commit the mistake again of leaving your print on her lip openly."

Finally, the unconcerned onlookers also may be taken as a referent; and then the suggested meaning would be an exhibition of her own cleverness on the part of the confidante, viz. "See, how well I have camouflaged it all!"

All this is the hidden import of the expression *vyavasthāpitah* in the text.

Agre...

i.e. in the second chapter *Kārikā* II.4, wherein the two divisions of *Dhvani*, namely, 'that with unnoticeable sequence' and 'that with noticeable sequence', are described by the author.

Comparatively, it is easy to enumerate succinctly the various types of *Vastu-dhvani* in so far as it admits only of three possibilities viz., positive affirmation, negation and neither of them. But *Ālambkāra-dhvani* does not admit of such an easy division, since the number of figures of speech is very large. That is why the author says—*sa-pra-pañcam*.

Trityastu...

The indeclinable *tu* is used here in the sense of contrast. Both *vastu* and *ālambkāra* do partake of denotability of words. However, *Rasa*, *Bhāva*, their *ābhāsa* (semblance) and *Prasama* (cooling off) are never amenable to denotation by words. What is more, they are felt as the very life-breath of poetic delectability. In order to explain them adequately, there is no other course left (to the theorists) except suggestive power. In the absence of incompatibility, not even the primary conditions of *Lakṣaṇā* or metaphorical usage, like incongruity of the primary sense in the context, can be imagined.

When an abiding state of mind proceeds in a decent way, it is called *Rasa*. If a transitory state of mind should so proceed, it is called *Bhāva*. If these proceed along an indecent course, they get the name of *Ābhāsa* or semblance (of *Rasa* and *Bhāva*). Rāvaṇa's one-sided passion for Sītā is a good example of *Rasābhāsa*. Of course, one might admit that it is as good as a form of *Hārya-rasa* or the comic sentiment, especially so because of Bharata's authority, who lays down that 'the comic is born of

the erotic'. Yet the fact is that this is only a later impression in the minds of the connoisseurs. Actually, when they are in the state of empathy, the erotic mental state itself is the object of delectation. Hence the erotic sentiment alone is manifest which upsets their sense of sequence in the incidents described as in the following example:—

As soon as her name reaches my ear, even like a seducing charm, my mind cannot retain its composure without her, even for a fraction of a moment. But I do not know clearly how the joy of her union can be brought about by these love-sick limbs of mine, since I am so much agonised, and my love is unfulfilled because of these.

(For full text of the verse see *Abhinava-bhārati*, G.C.S. edn., vol. I, 1956, p. 259).

Thus this is an instance of a semblance of the erotic sentiment only. What serves to promote it as an auxiliary will be regarded as the semblance of a transitory mood. The cooling off of a state of mind even when it has started to suggest a *Rasa* on hand, delights the heart of connoisseurs. That is why it is enumerated as a separate head, though, really speaking, it is connoted by the word *Bhāva* itself. The following is an example for *Bhāvābhāsa*:—

The new-weds, though sleeping in the same bed, have turned their faces away from each other and are suffering great vexation. Although the spirit of supplication is latent in the hearts of both, they are out to guard their self-respect. By and by, as their eyes chance to meet during their pranks of side-long glances, their feigned anger ceases and leads to a close embrace of their necks, now turned face to face and accompanied by laughter.

In this example we see the cooling off of self-regard raised by envy and anger.

This *Rasa* is not something comparable to one's joy on hearing a good news like 'you have become the father of a son', nor is it comparable to the secondary verbal function. On the other hand it is a unique experience arising in the connoisseur. It is quite distinct from empirical joy etc. whose nature is pre-established. It is enjoyed by the connoisseur by the process of empathy, as soon as his heart responds readily to the poetic descriptions in the form of *vibhāvas* (antecedents) and *anubhāvas* (consequents). Its whole and sole nature is one of instantaneous manifestation vitally characterised by delectability.

So it is that the author says— *prakāśate...* (shines). By this it comes out that the function of the word accompanied by its meaning is only suggestion (so far as *Rasa* is concerned). Even the subject described,

such as *vibhāvas* or stimulants of *Rasa*, will not produce that state of mind (namely delight) on the analogy of that produced by the birth of a son. Therefore even the function of subject or content is over and above that of empirical causation, and a meta-empirical function namely suggestion.

Svaśabda...

Svaśabda refers to proper names of the *Rasas* such as *śṛṅgāra*. If the proper names like *Śṛṅgāra* could evoke the emotion so named, then the function of word could be deemed as primary statement (*abhidhā*).

Vibhāvādi...

'The treatment by way of *vibhāva* etc.' implies that the function involved might be so-called purport (*tātparyā*). Regarding these two alternatives, the author adduces positive and negative instances to disprove the nameability of *Rasas* by their proper names, as their essence lies in delectability exclusively. At the same time, he also shows that both by the methods of agreement and difference, *Rasas* can admit only of the function of suggestion:—

Na ca sarvatra...

That *Rasas* are not everywhere stated by their proper name may be illustrated with the following example which is a verse composed by my own teacher — (Bhaṭṭa Indurāja):

Since by looking at him intermittently even quite long, their eyes lose their steadiness; since, day after day, their limbs furnish even like the withering lotus-stalk severed from its root; since the extreme pallor of their cheeks surpasses that of grass-stalks; one must say that this natural state of all the youthful damsels is itself an embellishment (to them) when Kṛṣṇa, the youth, is in their midst.

In this example, a full understanding of the *anubhāvas* (consequent signs) and *vibhāvas* (stimulants) of *Rasa* is a necessary prelude to the final manifestation of *Rasa* or vital content perceived as delectable self-delight itself of the connoisseur, coloured by his own mental impressions harmonious to the said *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, by way of empathy, as stated earlier. This manifestation does arise even in the absence of words expressly denoting earnest longing, worry, eager expectation, sleep, steadiness, anguish, langour, fatigue, recollection, doubt and so forth.

Having thus shown the absence of negative instances, the author proceeds to show the absence of positive instances in the sentence beginning with *Yatrāpi...*

Tat...

The pronoun refers to a direct statement by giving the proper name of a *Rasa* in question.

Pratipādana-mukhena...

In other words, by way of understanding the significance of *vibhāvas* etc., conveyed by verbal expression.

Sā kevalam...

The experience of *Rasa* can only be indirectly reported by such proper names. For example:—

When Kṛṣṇa (the destroyer of the demon Madhu) had proceeded to Dvārakā, the love-lorn Rādhā began embracing the very shrub of water-rushes on the banks of the river Yamunā, as it was pressed down by her darling Kṛṣṇa during one of his jumping bouts. She sang a song in such a piteous pitch in a choked voice, tears gushing down her eyes, that even the aquatic creatures moving in the stream started screaming longingly in sympathy.

Here both *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are understood in all their freshness. The emotion of love-sickness is also rendered delectable. The word 'love-lorn' used in the verse only restates what is already communicated (more forcefully). The word 'longingly' used as an epithet of the sympathetic water-fowls recapitulates all the *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* associated earlier with Rādhā's love-sickness, though none of them are directly stated. Hence the naming of Rādhā's emotion is not without significance, since it is of help in this process of suggestive recapitulation. Had the *anubhāva* been openly recapitulated, it would have resulted only in tautology, or become an obstacle to the process of empathy. These defects have been avoided by the poet's resort to suggestion. A further reason is given in the clause—

Viṣayāntare...

The examples alluded to are '*yad viśramya*' etc. The idea is:— What exists even in the absence of something cannot indeed be its effect. The author explains hereafter the significance of the word *kevala*.

Vibhāvādi...kāvyē

The purport to be understood is:— 'In what is to be taken as poetry in pursuance of your opinion'.

Manāgapi...

This is illustrated in Bharata's verse enumerating *Rasas*—

In dramaturgy eight are known as *Rasas*:—

1) the erotic, 2) the comic, 3) the pathetic, 4) the terrific, 5) the heroic, 6) the frightful, 7) the repulsive and 8) the wonderful.

Having thus established logically that there is no relation between

proper names of *Rasas* etc. and actual mental states, both positively and negatively, because of the non-availability of both positive and negative examples, the author now concludes his argument with the words beginning with *yataḥ* and ending with *kutbañcit*.

The function of both word as well as content can be only suggested, for, when *Rasa* is to be suggested by means of word, the denoted content (*abhidheya*), namely, *vibhāvas* etc. is accompanied by its suggestive power as a contributory cause. On the other hand, when *Rasa* etc. is to be suggested by means of content in a manner distinct from production, as in the case of delight at a son's birth, and also different from that of inference, since this is different from a case like Devadatta's being fat in spite of fasting by day, which leads to the inference that he should be eating at night, we find that the entire verbal usage acts as a contributory cause. This is because it has an inherent capacity to denote what is unique to *Rasa* (namely, the beauty in the entire technique of literary qualities and figures of speech) and also what is harmonious with *Rasa* (striking one as most appropriate for suggesting the *Rasa* on hand).

The author thus has set out two alternatives (advanced to explain *Rasa*) and concluded now his refutation of the first. The second, however, is partly refuted and partly accepted. It has been refuted to the extent that the view held by the objector is one of production or inference. But it has been accepted in so far as it might involve the function of suggestion.

But the commentator who has interpreted the function of suggestion here as identical with the function of purport is unaware of the truth of the matter. When there is a sentence connoting *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, the function of purport therein would lead to either difference or conjointness of the sentence-meaning. But it would never lead to *Rasa* whose essence lies in delectability. Further prolixity is needless.

The word *iti* in the original carries the sense of 'by reason of'. By reason of the aforesaid argument, even the third type of suggested sense is quite distinct from the directly denoted sense. This much has to be understood to give a connected idea in the argument.

Sahava...

The word *iva* ('as if') here is used by the author to demonstrate that even if any sequence should exist between the two (namely the directly stated and the suggested senses), it would escape notice.

Agre...

i.e. in Uddyota second.

So far, by means of the *Kārikā*, viz. *pratīyamānam...* the nature of

dhvani has been explained. Now (in the *Kārikā*, viz. *kāvyaśyātmā*.... the author indicates anagogically what the soul or essence of poetry is, by alluding to an incident in poetic tradition.

1.5 Sa eva...

Although the entire body of *dhvani* is contextually relevant here, what is described is only its third type namely *rasa-dhvani*. This is to be understood because both the incident enshrined in tradition and the import of the contextual prose commentary go to support it. Hence, virtually, *rasa* alone is the soul; the other two types of *dhvani*, namely *vastu* and *alanīkāra* are invariably such as end up in *rasa*. So much so that they too are of a higher order than the stated meaning. With this implication in mind, the author has stated in general terms that '*dhvani*' is the soul of poetry.

Śokaḥ...

The sorrow is that of the male (*krauñca*) bird bereaved from its mate caused by the slaughter of the mate, or, in other words, generated by the destruction of their intimate union. This sorrow is indeed an abiding emotion, an emotion quite different from that of *rati* or erotic attachment appropriate to the sentiment of love-in-separation, since the very idea of reciprocation is ruled out. That very sorrow becomes the basis for the rumination on the part of the onlooker of the excitant aspect of the situation and the attendant aspects of it, such as excruciating lamentation proceeding from the bird. Now that rumination transcends itself into delectation at the third stage, the preceding two stages being heart-felt response and empathy. That stage of delectation is termed *rasa* of *karuṇa* or pathos, which is quite different from wordly sorrow. It is a state whose entire essence lies in the delectable upsurge of one's own mental state. It is a state of afflatus like the overflow from a pot filled with wine. It is also like a spontaneous speech at the rise of thought. It does not stand in need of any convention of discourse, when the object is only an expression of an inner state of mind. It is thus least artificial and entirely of the nature of a flooding ecstasy, and its natural outlet is a verse strictly in accordance with the rules of prosody and metre etc. The verse in question is the following:-

mā niṣāda pratiṣṭhām tvamagumah sāsvatīḥ samāḥ /
yat krauñca-mithunādekamavadbīḥ kāmamohitam //
—*Rāmāyaṇa*, I.i.

It should be understood that the sorrow is not of the sage himself. Were it so, he too would be afflicted by the actual sorrow of the bird; and the very dictum that *rasa* is the soul of poetry would become baseless. Surely, no one afflicted with sorrow will have such a creative afflatus.

Thus it is clear that the *rasa* of pathos partaking in the nature of the abiding emotion of only such sorrow as is congenial to delectation, can possibly overflow; that alone constitutes, therefore, the soul of poetry or the essence which differentiates the poetic from all other forms of discourse. This is accepted in the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* also:—

So long as one is not overfull with it, one cannot pour it out.

The verb-form *agamaḥ* in the verse retains the affix 'a' as per Vedic usage.

Sa eva...

The emphatic expression *eva* is added by the author to indicate that naught else is the soul. That is why the following assertion of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is controverted:—

When the form of expression is predominant, linguistic discourse is regarded by the learned as *śāstra* or technical discipline. When the content predominates, they regard it as narrative (*ākhyāna*). But when both are subsidiary, and the very creative process itself is dominant, we get what is termed poetry (*kāvya*).

If the word 'creative process' should relate to the suggestive function itself, entwined with delectability, that would be no new doctrine. On the other hand, if it were to denote only the referential process of denotation, the denotative process can never have primacy in poetry, as we have shown all along.

Vividha...

The commentary on the said verse is contained in this passage. The word *vividha* or 'diverse' carries the sense of beauty contributed by the luxuriance (*śravanā*) of the three elements in question viz. the sense, the expression and the artistic arrangement in their multiple manifestations in tune with the *rasa* intended to be suggested; in short, it means 'endowed with the figures of speech and poetic qualities associated with sound or expression and sense'. Therefore, though the process of suggestion may be present in many poetic instances, all of them are not regarded as *dhvani* par excellence. As pointed out by us earlier, only a few instances come to be regarded as *jīva* (sentient self) and not one and all that possess a soul (*ātman*). Therefore the following objection raised in the *Hṛdaya-darpaṇa* does not hold water:—

'In that event, one would have to speak of poetry everywhere'.

The word *nibata-sahacari* expresses the *vibhāva* (excitant) of the said *rasa*. The word *ākrandita* indicates *anubhāva* (attendant gesture) of the same.

Janitaḥ...

The words "in a form delectable" should be supplied before the word

janita ('produced') to complete the sense. One might ask here:— "If by the delection of sorrow a verse could emerge, how does it go to prove that suggested content is the soul of poetry?" The author answers the question in the next sentence.

Śoko hi...

Karuṇa is that *rasa* or state of delection whose object happens to be the primary emotion of sorrow (in the form of latent instinct in the mind of the spectator). When sorrow happens to be the primary emotion involved, the stimulants and the consequents of it will indeed demand a concordant responsive mind oriented towards delection, to be entitled to the status of *rasa*. It is by this logic of the situation that a primary emotion can be said to get transformed into *rasa*. In this process of delection the whole gamut of one's experience — either immediately had from life or mediately inferred by the sight of others — plays a part. It subsists in the form of a latent impression in the mind. By degrees it purifies the heart (removing the obstacles in the way of delection of the emotion in question), rendering it responsive and culminates in the delection of the *rasa* by way of empathy.

The objector might raise a question at this point. "The soul of poetry has been declared to be its suggested content. Its three varieties have also been set out, and thus it is not certainly *rasa* exclusive (even according to you). This traditional account of the *Krauñca* bird, only goes to support *rasa* exclusively as the soul of poetry. How is it correct?"

The author accepts for argument's sake the truth of this allegation in his following reply:—

Pratīyamānasya ca...

Other varieties of the suggested content referred to are:— *vastu* (unadorned content) and *alamkāra* (adorned content). The word *bhāva* (emotion) in the text carries the implication that even a transitory emotion can become delectable on its own; that is to say, though they may not attain the ultimate state of poise, possible only in the case of the delection of primary emotions culminating in *rasa*, none-the-less the two can be regarded as equally vital to poetry. The following is an example:—

Striking the nail with the tip of another,
And revolving her joggling bracelet,
With her foot, the anklet jingling,
She was scrawling softly on the ground.

In this example, the transitory emotion of bashfulness comes to be relished.

The terms *rasa* and *bhāva* also include their semblance as well as

their cessation. Though the shades of beauty or relish are different, they all come under one general category.

Prādhānyāt...

The primacy here is due to the relish of *rasa* being the ultimate effect of one and all constituents in question. Sometimes even when the other two types of *dhvani* (*vastu* and *alamkāra*) do not so culminate in *rasa*, they may be loosely regarded as the soul of poetry, in so far as they add a unique distinction to linguistic usage, not otherwise discernible in it.

Having thus shown that the suggested part constitutes the soul of poetry by way of the traditional account of the origin of poetry, now the author proceeds to point out that it is also proved by his own personal experience:

I.6 Sarasvatī...

The goddess of Speech is described here. The word *artha* in the *kārikā* is explained as *vastu* in the *vṛtti* and the word *vastu* in the *Kārikā* by the word *tattva* in the *vṛtti*. (The reference is to the suggested *rasa* aspect obviously).

niṣyandamānā...

The idea is:— 'Oozing out the heavenly rapture of *rasa* of her own accord. As Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka rightly observes:—

That *rasa* which the (Celestial) Cow of Speech yields lovingly to her young calves (viz., poets) is not comparable at all to that which is forcefully squeezed out of her (udders) by *yogins*.

That is to say— Even without the spontaneous relish of *rasa*'s ecstasy, the *yogins* just come to acquire it by dint of their hard spiritual exercise only. (What is so acquired by them in the hard way is surely inferior to what is spontaneously attained by the poets effortlessly). Hence, in the following verse, only Himavān is said to have won the best of all valuables from the Earth, when compared with others:—

With Meru as the expert milk-man, all the mountains made Himavān the calf and, as directed by King Prthu, milked the Cow, namely the Earth, and gained precious gems and herbs.

abhiyanakti parisphurantam...

However, so far as the percipients are concerned, the creative inspiration of the poet is not something remote to be inferred by them but something felt within themselves most affectively. That is why my mentor, Bhaṭṭa Tauta observes:—

Alike is the experience of the hero in a literary work,

The poet as well as the critic.

Creativity (*pratibhā*) is the intelligence capable of bringing into existence for the first time things unknown before. Its *vīṣeṣa* or

uniqueness lies in the capacity to create poetry which is beautiful by the poet's ecstatic upsurge of *rasa*. This is in line with the thought of Sage Bharata who says:—

Bhāva or feeling in drama is so termed only because it renders explicit and affective the inner feeling of the poet.

Yena...

In other words, it is only because of this unique creativity which is affectively and dynamically felt by the critic that one comes to be ranked as a really great poet.

idaṁ ca...

Besides the two differences between the expressed and suggested meanings already noted in the *Kārikā* I.4, namely, i) difference in nature and ii) difference in referents, it is now being shown that there is also a third pointer substantiating the distinction of the suggested sense from the expressed. It is the difference of capability involved in the apprehension of the two senses.

I.7 vedyate....

Not that it is not apprehended; only in such a contingency, it could be taken as non-existent.

(*Kāvya-tattvārtha-bhāvanā-vimukhānām*): Those who are averse to a lasting appreciation of the suggested sense over and above the expressed; since the suggested alone constitutes the poetic sense *per se*.

The musical notes are seven, *śadja* etc. and musical mode (*śruti*) is nothing but a variant form of note which brings distinction to the sounds sung in music. It is of 22 kinds based on the different time-scales between the singing of the different notes and their variations (in a given performance). The word *ādi* or etcetera is suggestive of the technical varieties of Indian music termed *jāti*, *aṁśaka*, *grāma-rāga*, *bhāṣā*, *vibhāṣā*, *antara-bhāṣā*, *deśi* and *mārga*.

(*Apragītānām*): Those who are expert in music or those who have started learning music are both called *pragīta-s*. The suffix is passive in sense according to Pāṇini's rule (III. iv. 71). The starting of musical studies here conveys indirectly their completion of study also.

evam...

This refers to the difference in nature and difference in apprehension depending on different capabilities already stated.

I.8 Pratyabhijñeyau

The word has taken the (potential participle) suffix according to the rule II. iii. 71 of Pāṇini in the sense 'worthy of'. By the fact that every one endeavours to apprehend it (suggested sense), its primacy is shown to rest on the authority of accepted critical practice. The suffix can also

have the sense of 'must', when it would refer to the process of educating one to become a poet.

The purport of the expression *pratyabhijñeya* may be summed up as follows: Although it is true that this will spontaneously occur to a creative mind by virtue of his poetic vision (*pratibhā*) as stated in the well-known maxim— "Poetry is born but rarely from one gifted with (innate) poetic vision", yet when one starts analysing the special nature of every particular, it becomes indeed thousand-fold. Thus it has been well observed by our grand preceptor (Śrīmad) Utpala:—

A lover might have been brought to the vicinity of the beloved through the usual overtures of confidantes etc.; yet he would be as neutral towards her as any other individual, and he would be unable to enjoy her company, when he remains unrecognised by her. Even so the supreme Lord, though constituting one's own soul, will not be manifest in all His glory when His greatness goes unrecognised (by individuals). On this analogy is established the usage of the term *pratyabhijñā* in philosophy to signify specific realisation.

Pratyabhijñā here is not just ordinary recognition of the form— 'this is that'; but 't is a realisation or contemplation involving a deeper apprehension of even that which is known in a general sort of way.

mahākaveḥ...

The reference is to one who is fired by the ambition to become a great poet. By thus stating expressly the primacy of the suggested sense and the suggestive word, the author has implicitly included the primacy of the function of suggestivity also existing in them. These three senses are supported respectively by the three etymologies, namely, i) that which suggests, ii) that which is suggested, and iii) the process of suggestion.

At this point an objector might say:— "Primacy should really belong to the directly denoted meaning, denotative word and the process of denotation, since these are first resorted to." The author's implied answer is as follows:— "The means are always resorted to at the first instance. When primacy is the intention to be inferred, the alleged probans is indeed unhelpful, as it proves the opposite." This is made clear in the passage below.

I.9 *idānīm...*

The word *aloka* here means 'seeing' of objects like the lotus-like face of a beloved. The means thereto is the flame of a lamp.

I.10 *pratīpat...*

The word *pratīpat* is used with the suffix *kṛip* carrying the sense of an abstract noun, i.e. apprehension.

tasya vastunaḥ...

i.e. of the essence in the form of the suggested content. This *kārikā* has the following purport:— 'The sequence between the two is indeed quite evident to one who is not absolutely sensitive; just as the sequence of the word-meaning and the sentence-meaning is quite noticeable to one who is not absolutely learned in the science of grammar. But on the other hand, to one who possesses supreme sensitivity, the sequence in question becomes almost unnoticeable, just as to one who is learned in semantics, the steps of an oft-reasoned inference with remembrance of invariable concomitance (between the probans and the probandum etc.) remain unnoticed.

na vyāluptyate...

It is because of its primacy that percipients impelled by their hurry to reach up to it as quickly as possible do not notice any mediate sequence. That sequence escapes attention, even though present, is the cause for its primacy.

I.11 svasāmarthyā...

This term denotes practicability and proximity.

vibhāvyate...

The prefix *vi* signifies distinctiveness. The idea is that it is not felt distinctively. It is said here that the sequence, though existing, is not felt as such. Hence the commentator, who explains this passage, as 'sequence non-existing from the perspective of (indivisible) *sphoṭa*' is surely opposed to the context.

I.12 vācyārtha-vimukhātmanām...

This adjective expands the idea already contained in the word *sacetasām*; it describes them as those whose heart is not experiencing ultimate joy by the apprehension of the surface meaning alone. Some one might argue:— "Let this be taken as the result of the speciality in the percipients themselves. It need not be described as a speciality of poetry." This position is countered in the following, viz.,

avabhāśate

The sense is that the referential meaning does not appear distinctively; not that there is no apprehension at all of it. That is why this passage does not contradict the statement made in the third chapter on the analogy of the pot and the lamp, that the apprehension of the referential meaning does not cease even at the time of apprehending the suggested sense.

sadbhāvam

It means existence as well as goodness or primacy in this context. Both are meanings equally intended by the author.

Prakṛte

In the subject on hand namely definition (of *Dhvani*).

upayojayan...

i.e. turning it into use. The use served is clear in the expression *tañ artham* which relates only to *Dhvani* (suggested sense). The first member *sva-* in the compound *svārthau* refers to expression itself. The expression and its referential member together constitute the compound word *svārthau*. These are rendered subordinate by the referential meaning (*artha*) and the expression (*tabaa*) respectively. In other words, the referential meaning subordinates itself, while the expression subordinates its referential meaning.

I.13 tañ artham...

The *artha* here is what is already described in *Kārikā* no. 6.

vyāñktaḥ...

i.e. when the two reveal. The dual number in this expression carries the following significance:—

Although in the variety of *Dhvani* called '*avivakṣita-vācya*', the primary suggester is only expression, it does not in any way minimise the associate help rendered by its referential meaning also. Otherwise, an expression whose referential meaning is unknown, also would have to be deemed as a suggester (even like a meaningful expression). In the other variety of *Dhvani* also, namely, *vivakṣita-ānyapara-vācya*, the associate help on the part of the expression is bound to be there, since a referential meaning cannot, by itself, be a suggester of any thing unless and until it is first denoted by a specific expression. Thus, in all instances, both expression and referential meaning will partake of the operation of suggestion. Therefore the critique of the dual number here by Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka is pointless even like an elephant's march with closed eyes.

The indeclinable *vā* expressing an alternation between meaning and expression is to be construed in the sense that both of them subordinate themselves to set off the primacy of the suggested sense.

The compound *kāvya-viśeṣa* can be analysed in two ways:—(1) poetry as well as its particular specimen (*dvandva*) and (2) a particular specimen of poetry (*ṣaṣṭhi-tatpuruṣa*). The very mention of the word *kāvya* here is expressive of the purport that its essence (*ātman*) is nothing but *Dhvani*, following in the wake of expressions and meanings embellished by poetic qualities or excellences and figures of speech. This fact rules out the objection, viz., 'one might designate even *śrutarthāpatti* or a hypothetical presumption to explain facts otherwise incompatible'.

As regards the objection— 'Then the idea of beauty itself might serve as the essence of poetry', we accept it all right. The controversy is only over names.

As regards the further objection, viz., 'In case the idea of beauty itself be the soul of poetry, then the same idea of beauty from natural things perceived etc. also would serve as the essence of poetry;' indeed this is an impossible contingency when the subject under discussion is only the soul of poetry which is constituted only of expressions and meanings, (and not anything else).

Saḥ...

This may refer equally to meanings, word or significatory function (i.e. all the three come to be termed *dhvani*). Meaning, again, may be the referential one which is designated *dhvani* by the active etymological sense of the root *dhvan*. *Dhvani* may also be the significatory function itself ingrained in words as well as meanings. In the *Kārikā*, however, the cumulative whole or assemblage of all these elements, namely, *kāvya* or poetry is itself designated primarily as *dhvani*.

Vibhaktah

While the vital principle underlying *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras* is the referential significatory function, the principle underlying this (i.e. *dhvani*) is the suggestive function; and hence this cannot be subsumed under them on any account. The word '*viśaya*' here carries the sense of 'exclusive scope'. Thus the objection, viz., "What is this *dhvani* other than them (i.e. *guṇas* and *alaṅkāras*)?" stands refuted.

lakṣaṇa-kṛtāmeva

The reason adduced against the theory of *dhvani* is that it is unknown among literary theorists of the past. But it is a reason which proves the opposite of what it intends to prove. The fact that it is unknown among other theorists necessitates all the more its definition now with all effort. If it be held that it is unknown in actual poetical works (which illustrate literary theory), then the reason deserves to be dismissed as non-existent. And surely whatever is non-poetry—like dance, song and music —, it cannot have any bearing on a theory which is only about poetry.

citram...

i.e. causing amazement only by virtue of alliterative effect, etc., and not imbued with the flow of *rasā* whose essence is aesthetic joy and which is so much sought by men of taste. Or it may be called *citra* in so far as it is only an imitation of poetry; or in so far as it is pictorial in effect or in so far as it involves a skill.

agre...

i.e. in III. 41 infra.

parikarāślokaḥ

A verse calculated to add to the meaning of the main import of a *kārikā* (and written by a glossator) is *parikāra-sloka*.

yatra

here relates to instances of *alāṅkāra*.

vaiśadvena

that is, with striking beauty and clarity.

at hihitam

the past tense is used here, since the expression "*vyāṅktaḥ*" has already been explained at length.

guṇikṛtātātā

the second member of the compound word here, viz., *atmā* has a reflexive sense. It just explains by a synonym what is stated in the *kārikā* by the word '*sva-*' (in '*upasarjanikṛta-svārthau*').

na caitat

i.e. pre-eminence of the suggested sense. Though it is true that this fact of its pre-eminence is not felt at the level of intellectual understanding—since all aesthetic enjoyment is a composite whole as per the dictum stated in I.12b—still, when literary critics start analysing the sense (so grasped as one indivisible whole), the suggested sense might be seen at times turning back as it were and adding beauty secondarily to the referential sense itself. In such cases only, when the suggested sense has just the functional capacity of a means (instead of being the end itself), it comes to be classed as an *alāṅkāra*. The beauty then is a result primarily of the referential meaning, embellished for the time being by the suggested. Although there will be *rasa-dhvani* in the long run in all instances (including the one under reference), the suggested sense occurring at this mid-level cannot, by itself, result in the delineation of any *rasa*, since it has no independent functioning. It proceeds only to embellish the beauty of the referential meaning. Hence, such a suggestion (whose role is but secondary) is said to be subordinated (to the referential meaning).

"When, in a statement, a second meaning too comes to be suggested through the applicability of common adjectives, it is regarded as a figure of speech called *saṃśokti*, since it is truly a 'condensed expression' " (Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lāṅkāra*, II.79).

The four quarters of the original verse offer in a sequence i) the definition of *saṃśokti*, ii) its nature, iii) its justification and iv) its etymological significance.

upodha-rāgaḥ

It is a possessive compound meaning— he by whom the evening twilight or redness as well as love have been welcomed. *Vilola-tāarakam* means one whose stars are twinkling as well as one whose black pupils of eye are tremulous.

tathā

means 'suddenly' or 'vigorously due to the force of love'. '*Grhītam*' means both 'illuminated' and 'started kissing'. *Nisāmukha* is at once 'the beginning of darkness' and the dark lily, namely, the face (of the beloved).

yathā

=by a sudden grasp as well as by a violent passion. '*Timirāṁśuka*' signifies darkness coupled with faint lights, that is to say, it means 'a shroud of darkness illumined faintly by star-light'. '*Timirāṁśuka*' is also a dark 'sari' worn by new-wed girls when they are young. '*Rāgāt*' = by the red hue caused by evening 'twilight' as well as 'by reason of passionate love'. '*Puro'pi*' = 'in the eastern quarter' as well as 'in front'. '*Galitam*' = 'dispersed' as well as 'slipped off'. '*Tayā*' = by Night, the agent. '*Samastam*' = blended (with starlight) either directly or indicatively. '*Na lakṣitam*' = That it was the onset of night was not known; the advent of night is noticed clearly by the world only when they see darkness mingled with twilight; *not* when the light is conspicuous. These very epithets mean otherwise when they are taken as qualifying the heroine:— *tayā* (= 'by her') will be the agent word or subject of the action. When construing the words in relation to 'night', the particle '*api*' (= 'even') should be understood along with 'noticed' (*lakṣitam*). That is to say, '*na lakṣitamapi*' (= 'the slipping of the garment was not even noticed'). Here the idea is that the lover approaches the beloved from behind and starts kissing her, with the result that her dark garment slips off in her front. Or else, one might construe the words in such a way that the lover is embracing the beloved's face from the front (since the context is that of kissing). Thus, though a suggested sense is grasped here, it has no pre-eminence. To explain: the described behaviour of the beloved and the lover here adds beauty only to the main themes in the context, viz., the night and the moon, serving as determinants (*vibhāvas*) of the *rasa* of *śṛṅgāra* (or the Erotic); and thus gets the status only of an *alanākara* (or figure of speech), it is only from that stated description of the said determinants, that the flow of *rasa* originates.

A previous commentator gives the following explanation:— "The agent-word or subject of the action is, the night described. No such

agency is possible in the case of an insentient one. Hence the behaviour of a sentient couple in love is understood by us; and this understood meaning is only referential and not at all suggested". That is the reason why this becomes an instance of the figure of *samāsokti* ('condensed expression'). That commentator has given away the main point itself in the passage, viz. '*vyāṅgyena anugatam*' (= supported by the suggested meaning'). Such an explanation might make the verse an illustration of 'restricted metaphor' as in:-

The lake-kings were fanned by Autumn herself through the pretty swans.

but would not make it a *samāsokti* or 'condensed expression'; for one thing, the requirement of common epitaphs is absent; and secondly, the expressly stated word '*gamayate*' (= 'is suggested') rules out the interplay of the referential function (*abhidhā-vyāpāra*). This incidental digression need not be prolonged any further.

The grammatical difficulty in respect of the absence of the *ekadeśa* compound form (i.e. *nāyakavyoḥ* stating one of the two members involved, to mean. *nāyakaśva + nāyikāyāsca vyavahārah*) in the expression '*nāyikā-nāyaka-vyavahāra*' can be got over by understanding the compound word as follows:- The behaviour of the beloved in respect of her lover as superimposed on Night and the behaviour of the lover in respect of his beloved as superimposed upon the Moon.

Ākṣepe...

"When what is intended to be conveyed is negated as it were, with a view to communicate some other specific idea, it is *ākṣepa* or *paraleipsis*. It is two-fold: i) that which concerns what is yet to be said and ii) that which concerns what has been already spoken out" (Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*, II.68).

The first of these is illustrated in the following example:-

"If I don't see you even for a moment, I will be a victim of such pangs!" It is enough indeed! What is the use of telling you what is unpleasant?"

(Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*, II.69).

Here what is negated is the mention of death, which is about to be said. In the example, the statement "It is enough indeed!" itself suggests indirectly the idea, viz., "I shall die!" and adds to the beauty of the passage. What is beautified is the suggester, or suggestive sentence; which is the reason for its prominence also; what beautifies it is the suggested idea of death (which is comparatively less in beauty).

The second type is illustrated in the following example authored by me:-

'Oh, my dear traveller, Why is it you have fallen
down in a most unexpected place?

'There was no way left for me to avoid it.

So thirsty I am; but this villain hides all water from me!

'No, No, my dear, you should rather blame your own thirst.

Which has seized you at a wrong place and time.

For the desert-road's might is widely known

In all the triple worlds!

In this verse we have a description of the heart-rending plight of a servant whose hopes of getting help from the patron he approached have been shattered; he is being counselled by a person in this indirect way. The negation here relates to the stated idea of this man's service rendered to a bad man, its futility and his consequential distress—an idea which is so appropriate in depicting the determinants and consequents of the abiding emotion of dispassion (*nirveda*) which is at the root of *śāntarasa* or sentiment or tranquillity.

Vāmana's definition of *Ākṣepa*, however, is a censure of the *upamāna* or object compared to; or in other words, a censure of the moon and so on (when the object described or *upameya* happens to be the heroine's face). It takes the form such as:— 'When this is present, there is no use for you!' The example cited (by him) is:—

When her face is there, pleasant and gay,

The full moon, surely, has no use.

When those two eyes are beaming in beauty,

The dark lilies can't have any use.

When that lip is had, there is no need

for tender shoots with delicate sheen.

Oh, how perverse is the Creator's fad

In fashioning objects so duplicate?

Although the idea of similarity is suggested in this verse, it is made to embellish the referential meaning itself. The idea of censure or condemnation taking the form "What use is there in having it?" is the plain primary meaning; and this is the direct cause of poetic beauty. Alternatively, (according to Vāmana himself), *ākṣepa* may have the sense of 'suggestion of an *upamāna*' or its implication by way of contextual necessity. For example:—

With the rainbow borne on the white cloud

like a raw nail-print on her white bosom:

The autumn-damsel woos the sullied Moon

Only to intensify the heat (also, heart-burn) of the Sun!

The *upamāna* suggested here is a rival lover agitated by jealousy.

Though suggested, it embellishes only the stated meaning. In fact, this (type of) *ākṣepa* is virtually *samāsokti* itself. That is what the author himself observes in the next sentence beginning with *cārutvotkasā...* A well known illustration for it is offered in the verse, viz.,

anurāgavatī...

It should be understood from this that discussion on *ākṣepa* is not yet over. But the illustration cited is a *samāsokti* verse.

In the third quarter of the verse, viz., *aho daivagatiḥ kīdrk*, the purport is that their eternal parting is due to a cause (beyond their control) like their submission to elders

tasyaiva

The reference here is to the referential meaning only. This is an *ākṣepa* according to Vāmana, but a *samāsokti* according to Bhāmaha. With this idea in mind, the author has skilfully provided this single example to illustrate both the figures, viz. *ākṣepa* and *samāsokti* (for the sake of brevity). My mentor's opinion on this text is: "The figure of speech in the verse may well be *samāsokti* or *ākṣepa*. Why should we bother? All that we want to establish is that in all instances of *alankāras* etc., the suggested sense becomes invariably subordinate to the plainly stated.

Having thus illustrated the primacy intended by poets between the two meanings (in question), now the author gives a further example wherein both the disputants (i.e. the *dhvani*-theorist and the *alankāra*-theorist) hold a common opinion in regarding that figures of speech are named or designated only in view of the primacy of the stated meaning.—*yathā ca... upamāyāḥ*.

Here *upamā* (simile) means only the relation between *upamāna* and *upameya*.

tayā

that is to say, by *upamā* (simile).

The figure *dīpaka* (lit. 'illuminer') is defined as follows:— "*Dīpaka* is recognised as three-fold in so far as it relates to iteration at the beginning, the middle and the end of a sentence" (Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*, II.25).

"A gem polished on a grindstone,
A winning soldier with his body injured,
The moon with a single digit left,
A maiden tight-pressed in love-play,
An elephant with its rut all sapped,
A river in autumn with sands shining,
And men with their wealth spent on the needy,
—the thinner they are, more splendour they gain."

In the above verse, the beauty is exclusively due to the figure *dīpaka*.

Apahnuti ('poetic denial') is defined as follows:— "denial of what is intended to be conveyed by way of a hidden simile" (Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*, III.21). The beauty therein (also) is due to the poetic denial itself as in the following example:—

No, this is not a row of bees
singing in their drunkenness!
Indeed, this is the twanging sound
of Cupid's bow-string stretched to shoot!

Having thus dealt with *ākṣepa*, the author now takes up for discussion the other figures, in the order of their first enumeration:—
anukta-nimittāyāmapī...

Its definition is:— "Even when a part is impaired, effectiveness of a person or thing by virtue of the other merits comes to be admired, thereby suggesting that the person or thing is extraordinarily unique. Such a description is termed *viśeṣokti* or 'praise of unique feature'. (Bhāmaha, *Kāvya-lankāra*, III.23). The following is its example:—

Though single, Cupid conquers indeed
the three worlds, one and all!
Though his body was destroyed by Śiva,
His might could not be destroyed!

(*ibid.*, III.24).

Since the cause of this unique phenomenon is inconceivable, there is no scope for any suggested sense in this particular example. When the cause is expressly stated too, it virtually becomes a statement of a natural fact; and it leaves no scope for the presence of any suggested sense. For example,

Though burnt up like camphor completely,
He is still powerful over men, one and all!
To that flower-arrowed Cupid of inseparable might,
Our salutations are addressed!

Hence, the author of our text ignores these two types of *viśeṣokti* and takes up for discussion only its third type, viz. that wherein the cause of the unique phenomenon described is left unmentioned.

Vyaṅgyasya

The (unmentioned) cause in this example is the anguish occasioned by cold, according to Udbhata. It is by adopting his standpoint that the author states:—

na tvātra kāciccārutvanīṣpattiḥ

'There is no trace of poetic beauty in this instance.' Other men of taste have proposed an altogether different cause: 'the lover who feels

that a dream is a speedier means of union with his beloved than even a direct approach, becomes tardy in leaving his couch, since he is eagerly wishing for sleep.' But *alaṅkāra* theorists do not think that such a cause could have any beauty about it, in itself. In their considered opinion, what is really beautiful is the suppressed cause itself expressed in the form— "does not slacken his lethargy," and allowed only to be suggested. This would not have been an example of *viśeṣokti* at all, were the suggested meaning not embellishing the referentially stated one. Thus the author has taken duly into account both these possible interpretations; it need not be concluded hastily that he is tied down only to Udbhaṭa's.

Paryāyokte'pi...

It is defined as follows:—

"*Paryāyokta* or euphemism consists in expressing something in an indirect way, avoiding the usual way of plain communication and using the mode of suggested implication." (Udbhaṭa, *Kāvyaṭāṅkāra-saṅgraha*, IV. 6). An example of it is had in the following verse:—

This bow of mine has taught the lesson of good conduct even to the Sage Paraśurāma who had strayed from the path of virtue in his eagerness to uproot the enemies, one and all.

Although it is suggested here that Bhīṣma's prowess surpasses that of Bhārgava Paraśurāma, it is not primary; on the other hand it embellishes the openly stated idea that 'the lesson of good conduct has been taught by my bow!' The poetic beauty lies in the stated sense itself. That is why '*paryāyokta*' has been defined as that which primarily states something, though it is also stressed and beautified by way of an indirect suggestive implication of the same idea. In the definition cited above, the differentia is 'the sense which is openly stated'; the figure of speech defined is '*paryāyokta*' (lit. 'communicated in an alternative way too'); the general characteristic (*sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*) of this and all the rest of them (i.e. *arthāṭāṅkāras*) is that they are figures of speech which beautify the aspect of sense. So understood, the whole passage will become cogent. On the other hand, if we should resort to a forced interpretation of '*abhidhīyate*', take it to mean 'what is suggested primarily', and cite as example verses like '*bhama dhammā..*' then the figurative character itself of *paryāyokta* would have been thrown to the winds; for such an interpretation would only establish its status as *dhvani*, with the suggested meaning assuming for itself the predominant position of the soul or essence! If that were to be the case, for one thing, it could no longer be counted under *alaṅkāras* or figures of speech; and secondly, its sub-divisions would have to be recounted.

Hence the author observes— "*yadi prādhānyena..*" etc.

dhvanau...

Once it comes under the category of 'soul' (*ātman*), it follows as a corollary that it cannot share the character of an *alaṅkāra* or figure of speech (since *ātman* or *alaṅkārya* and *alaṅkāra* are mutually opposed concepts).

tatra

i.e. in such instances as are admittedly figures of speech, *dhvani* can in no way be included under them. For the *dhvani* we have defined is such that it is exclusive of all shades of express figures of speech. *Dhvani* is a more comprehensive concept since it can exist in a vast variety of instances (lacking in *alaṅkāra*); and it is also a most vital concept (fixing the relative roles of all other aesthetic concepts like *guṇas* and so forth); thereby it is clear that it is pre-eminent (*aṅgin*) in itself. But an *alaṅkāra* is not all-comprehensive in scope, for the very reason that it is an *alaṅkāra*. Nor can it be pre-eminent, since it is always subordinate to what is *alaṅkārya* or embellished. In case, however, this truth is reversed and an *alaṅkāra* itself is declared to be both comprehensive and pre-eminent, it would be tantamount to giving up its very claim to be an *alaṅkāra* and ultimately adopting our philosophy of *dhvani* itself surreptitiously, by using the term *paryāyokta* instead of *dhvani*, since malice does not allow them to acknowledge openly their indebtedness to our thought!

But the truth is that the ancient theorists were not aware of even this suggestive primacy of content in respect of *paryāyokta*; in fact we are the first to envisage such an explanation thereof. This is made clear in the sentence:—

na punaḥ...

The kind of idea which Bhāmaha had in his mind is very much brought to light in the illustration cited by him. Therein, the suggested sense is not at all pre-eminent, because it is not productive of any poetic beauty. Thus, if one were to imagine other illustrations of it, similar to the one actually cited by Bhāmaha, therein too, there would be no prospect of the suggested meaning's pre-eminence. This is how the phrases in the original text are to be construed. If on the other hand, one throws overboard the illustration actually cited by Bhāmaha, and starts giving such examples as "*bhama dhammā*", it means only that one is accepting a studentship in our theory of *dhvani*. Instead of coming straight to us as students, they are overhearing our lessons, entering from the back-door; and it is not the conduct of gentlemen! That is why writers on history say:—

"If one should learn surreptitiously from overhearing a teacher, not approaching him openly because of disregard, it means he would go to hell!"

The illustration of *pariyāyokta* actually recorded by Bhāmaha is this:—

"Whether in homes or in way-side inns, 'We do not eat food, nor partaken earlier by holy brahmins, learned in the Vedic lore!'" ..

This speech by Lord Vāsudeva indeed negates the administration of poison in an indirect way. For, he himself adds—

"And that is to ensure the prevention of poisoning."

The suggested idea here is only the prevention of poisoning; and surely, it has no poetic beauty whatsoever. If there were to be any such extraordinary poetic beauty, then only, one would be justified in imagining that meaning to be pre-eminent. On the other hand, the stated meaning that he would not eat what is not already partaken of by learned brahmins, is more beautified by the suggested shade mentioned above, and comes to be called *pariyāyokta* or circumlocutious statement. The contextual stated theme of dining is in fact embellished by the suggested idea. Certainly, one cannot hold that Lord Kṛṣṇa mainly intended to convey the idea, viz. "Let my food be free from poison!" Hence the purport is clear that the ancient theorists held the circumlocutory proposition itself to constitute an *alaṅkāra* (and *not* the suggested element therein).

apahnuti-dīpakayoh

It (= the relative role of the stated and suggested meanings) has already been discussed and decided upon. That is why the author states—'prasaḍḍham' or well known and well established. Formerly, it was argued that *dīpaka* etc. would cease to deserve their very titles and would become so many instances of *upamā* only (if their suggested idea were to be given primacy over the stated). In order to prevent such a contingency, the case of *dīpaka* was cited as a corroborative instance (and it was established by the positive argument that *dīpaka* was entitled to be an independent *alaṅkāra* only because the suggested *upamā* therein was subsidiary to the stated sense). Now it is again mentioned here in order to fulfil the textual expectancy raised by the order of the first enumeration of *alaṅkāras*, with a new (negative) shade of argument. The new shade adopted here is: "It cannot be *dhvani* because there is no pre-eminence attaching to the suggested sense." The idea however, remains the same. For, *upamā* itself happens to be the idea suggested in *dīpaka*; and it might lead one to urge that it might as well be *dhvani*.

The writer of an earlier commentary on this text has dwelt at length

on the hypothesis that "a *dīpaka* need not always be associated with an *upamā*". His entire discussion is useless, pointless and easily refutable. To take just one example—

Tipsiness generates attachment,
And attachment love that ends pride!
Love, too a yearning for the beloved's union,
And yearning, anguish unbearable in mind!

Though in this verse each successive result is generated by the immediately preceding agent, it is quite easy to imagine that the two are bound by the relation of similitude. There is no rule that successive things should not be comparable to one another. Thus, an example as—

Like Rāma was Daśaratha,
Like Daśaratha was Raghu,
Again like Raghu was Aja,
And like Aja, the dynasty of Dilīpa!
How amazing is the glory of Rāma!

is not at all impossible. Therefore, why all this furore that succession in occurrence of commonness of contextual reference comes in the way of a simile proper? We would fain close this discussion which is as futile as milking a jenny-ass repeatedly.

Saṅkarālaṅkāre'pi

The first variety of 'commixture of figures' (*Saṅkara*) is defined (by Udbhaṭa) as follows:—

When two figures of speech, mutually opposite, are noticed in a single instance, though such co-existence of opposites is really impossible, and when one finds no clear ground either for the retention of any one of them or rejection of the other, it should be deemed a 'commixture'.

It is illustrated in the following (*Kāvyaḷaṅkārasaṅgraha*, V. 20) verse of my own authorship:—

This moon-faced one, blue-lotus-eyed,
and white-jasmine-teethed,
has been by Destiny made
lovely like a lotus in the heavenly lake!

In this example, one might take the first compound to mean either a metaphor, namely, 'moon who has become her face', or a simile, namely 'her face is like the moon'; but it is impossible to construe both the figures at one and the same time (as they are mutually exclusive). Nor do we have any logical ground to adopt any one of them or to discard any one of them. As a result, we get the 'commixture' of the two figures; and in this instance there is only uncertainty even in regard to what the

suggested element is and what the stated element is. In such a predicament, how can there be any scope for even conjecturing *dhvani*?

The definition of the second variety of 'commixture' of figures reads—"co-presence of both 'figures of sound' and 'figures of sense'. Here too, where is any room for conjecturing any *dhvani* or predominantly suggested meaning? Let us take an example:—

smara smaraniva priyam...

(Tr. Take your lover to be Cupid himself!...) The first two syllables are twinned to constitute simultaneously both a chime (*yamaka*) and a simile (*rūpaka*).

The third variety (of 'commixture') is that wherein many figures of sense are found in a single part of the whole sentence as in:—

When the sun is seen about to set,
the day, sharing his rise as well as fall,
seems distressed and enters as it were
the cave of darkness, for his stay!

(Bhāmaha, III.48)

Here we see the unextended metaphor of a gentlemanly subordinate officer eager to subject himself to a hard ritualistic discipline appropriate to a sad occasion like the demise of his chief. This figure of 'poetic fancy' is clearly communicated by the use of the word *iva* ('as it were'). The last two varieties are according to the classification of ancient authorities (i.e. Udbhata). Thus it has been said—

"Figures relating to sound or sense might co-exist with one another either in a single sentence or a part of a single sentence".

(*Kavyālaṅkārasaṅgraha*, V.ii)

The fourth variety of 'commixture' is instanced when the figures of speech are seen related to one another by the relation of 'the endowed and the endower'. E.g.:—

The long-eyed lady's tremulous looks
Are almost like blue lotuses waving in the wind!
Did she borrow them from the she-antelopes?
Or did the latter borrow them from her?

(Kālidāsa, *Kumārasambhava*, I.46)

Though there is a suggested simile here between her (Pārvatī's) sweet looks and those of she-antelopes, the simile is there only to assist the rise of another figure of speech, viz. 'poetic doubt' (*śasandeha*); since simile is thus a figure in the role of an endower (*anugrahaka*), it is subsidiary to the other figure. The ultimate significance of the verse is nothing but 'poetic doubt' since the figure is endowed or supported (by simile). This point has been well established by theorists:—

When figures of speech are found mutually assisting one another and cannot lay claims to any independent existence of their own, that too is an instance of 'commixture' itself.

(Udbhaṭa, *loc. cit.* V.13)

Hence our author says in the text:—

yadā alaṅkāro...

Thus the existence of *dhvani* has been disproved even in the fourth variety of *saṅkara-alaṅkāra*. It has been said that in the two varieties in-between (the first and the last), there is no scope for even imagining the possibility of any *dhvani*. In the first variety, however, (illustrated in the example *śaṭvadanā...*) there is such a possibility to some extent. Hence he anticipates this point and refutes it in the passage beginning with the words, *alaṅkāradhvaya...* etc.

samam

(Pre-eminence) is equal because both the figures (viz., the stated and the suggested) are equally poised as in a weighing balance. 'Well, in places where the suggested sense alone strikes us as predominant, what are we to do?' For instance,

Fools are but blind servants of tradition.

Never will love of virtue in them arise!

The moon-stone oozes only at moonrise,

Surely not on seeing any beloved's face!

"Indeed, the figure of speech, viz., *arthāntaranyāsa* or 'corroborative statement' is noticed here by the referential function of the words; but the figures *vyatireka* ('surpassing contrast') and *apahnuti* ('concealment') happen to be suggested figures, and hence they should be deemed predominant." With such a line of thought, the objector puts forward his opinion in the sentence beginning with *atha*.

Here is the reply to the objection:—

tadā so'pi...

This is not at all an instance of the figure *saṅkara* (commixture). On the other hand, this is only the second variety of *dhvani* known by the name *alaṅkāra-dhvani*. Whatever was observed in regard to the figure *pariyāyokta* earlier, applies to this context also *mutatis mutandis*.

Next the author states in general how the supposition of suggested sense in all varieties of *saṅkara* is to be countered in the sentence beginning with—

Api ca...

The initial word '*api*' should be construed with the word '*kvacit*' (= 'elsewhere') a little later in this sentence. So construed, the meaning becomes clear that the reference is to figures of speech other than

saṅkara as also to *saṅkara* in all its varieties. The kind of mixture indicated by the word *saṅkara* is an inseparable fusion or mingling, even like that of milk and water. How can there be any question of predominance in either of such constituents?

(The following is the classical definition of *Aprastuta-prasamsā* or 'Description of the Irrelevant'):—

Praise or description of something without any relevance to the matter on hand is termed 'Description of the Irrelevant'. And it is of three kinds. (Bhāmaha, *Kāvyaśaṅkāra*, III.29).

The gist is that the description of the irrelevant should be such that it is suggestive of what is relevant. Such a suggestion will be of three types:— 1) based on the relation of the general and particular, 2) based on the relation of a reason and a consequence, and 3) based on similitude. The author declares that, among these, so far as the first two types are concerned, both the relevant and the irrelevant will have equal prominence. This is stated in the sentence beginning with '*aprastuta*' and ending with '*prādhānyam*' in the text (of the *vr̥tti*). Again, in the first type, viz. 'suggestion based on the relation of the general and the particular,' there are two sub-varieties possible:— We have one sub-variety when the general irrelevant is stated in so many words, as in the following example:—

Oh, how callous is this worldly life!
And how wicked these impending ills!
Oh, fie upon the tragic ways of destiny,
Whose course, by nature, is crooked!

The irrelevant subject described here is a general one, viz., the unharpered freedom of destiny; it ends up in suggesting the state of a particular person in dire deprivation. Furthermore, since the particular is always comprehended under the general, the suggested particular has the same prominence as that of the stated universal. Such a simultaneous prominence of both the general and the particular need not at all be self-contradictory.

We get the second sub-variety of it when the irrelevant particular suggests the relevant general. For example:—

It is not strange at all that the fool
Took the water-drop on the lotus-leaf for a pearl!
Listen to an act of his now, much stranger!
As he picked it up, it vanished at his finger's tip,
And he cannot sleep since that day,
Anguished by the thought— 'where did it fly away?'

Here the relevant subject described is a general one, viz., the illusory

supposition of greatness in a wrong object. The irrelevant, however, is a particular, viz., the mistaken notion that the tiny water-drop is a precious pearl. And in such an example wherein both the general and the particular are equally having prominence, it has been said already that there is no opposition. Thus both the sub-varieties of the first type of this figure of speech have been examined in the text beginning with the words '*yadā tāvat*'. The author extends the application of this very principle to the other type of this figure, viz. suggestion based on the relation of the cause and the effect; and thus hints that it is also of two kinds. Sometimes, the irrelevant cause is openly stated in words and it suggests the relevant effect. For example, see the following verse:—

Those who delight in the prosperity of others,
And do not forsake them even in their distress,
They alone are kinsmen and they alone friends;
All the rest are but self-seekers.

Here the irrelevant reason, viz., the true nature of kinsmen and friends has been described in the form of a generous praise of the virtuous only to suggest the credibility of the speaker's own words which is the consequence relevant in the context. Thus in the comprehension of the consequence too, the comprehension of the reason becomes prominent as its life-endowing principle. Hence both the suggested and the suggester have indeed equal prominence.

Sometimes, however, the irrelevant consequence described ends up in suggesting the relevant reason. This is illustrated in the following citation from the (Prakrit poem) *Setubandha*:—

I now recall heaven deprived of the Pārijāta tree,
Hari's chest bereft of the beauty of the Kaustubha gem,
And Śiva's matted mass of hair without the crescent moon
Before the churning of the Milky ocean!

Here Jāmbavān is (apparently) describing irrelevant consequences like his remembrance of Lord Hari's chest bereft of the Kaustubha gem's beauty and so forth. His object is, however, only to suggest the relevant reasons or endowments that go to make for an ideal counsellor, such as tutelage under elderly statesmen, longevity, and practical experience in statecraft. Even in the comprehension of this relevant reason, the stated consequence itself serves as means. Hence, far from being unimportant, the consequence which is revitalized by the reason stated, lays claims (lit. 'raises its neck') to be reckoned important. Thus both the stated and the suggested senses possess an equal prominence.

After thus discussing the two-fold forms of the first type of commixture' of figures, the author proceeds to take up for discussion

the third type, viz., 'that based on similitude'. There too, one can distinguish two sub-varieties:— The first is that wherein poetic beauty arises from the irrelevant which is stated and the suggested sense is but subordinate to it. The following verse authored by my revered preceptor, Bhāṭṭendurāja, is an example of this (sub-variety):—

The man whose life was laid waste by your might,
and who raised you up in turn,
he on whose shoulders you have lain for long,
and who even gave offerings to you of yore;
By your act of snatching his life away,
With but a smile on your face, indeed,
You are playing the game of a ghoul,
and stationed at the head of persons grateful!

Though, in this example, one totally different in nature and utterly ungrateful is suggested because of similitude (with the ghoul), yet the stated idea of the ghoul itself constitutes the source of poetic beauty. This idea is not as impossible as the censure of an insentient object; nor is it without beauty. Hence it is clear that the stated idea itself is prominent here. If, on the other hand, the relevant subject-matter is suggested by means of a description of totally incoceivable characteristics associated with objects and the like, and becomes a source of poetic beauty, then it is nothing but *va-stu-dhvani*. The following verse of mine will serve as an example:—

O host of worldly objects! You forcibly take possession
Of the heart of man, and make it dance to your tune,
You hide your own heart in diverse ways and play with it as you please.
But man, mistakenly proud of his supposed sensibility great,
Calls you a dullard;
But I think his dullness is indeed worthy of praise,
Since it gets the honour of comparison with you!

The context to be imagined in respect of this verse is as follows:
There is a really great man who hides his greatness according to the dictum—

"a dispassionate saint too should behave outwardly like a worldly man";

though the entire array of ignorance has been dispelled by him with the light of his deep spiritual wisdom, he hides from the world his own enlightened soul and talks to worldly men all the time, making it appear that he is only an ignoramus. But the worldly men really take him for a fool and treat him with contempt. In such a contingency, the enlightened one's extraordinary behaviour comes into bold relief by

way of suggestion in this verse; and hence it should be deemed as the prominent meaning intended by the poet here. Objects like a pleasure-garden and moon-rise are looked down by the world with contempt as insentient and feelingless. But the assemblage of such objects can make the heart of a parted lover break with eager expectation and anguish; the same can overwhelm another's heart with the ecstasy of joy. Thus it makes the worldly men dance, as it pleases, to the tune of allurements it proffers. But no one does ever know how it really is! Contrariwise, it is very deep-natured, excessively ingenious, entirely free from insolence and extremely sportive. If such an all too quick-witted one is regarded by a person as stupid, unable to understand its mentioned abilities pointing to the contrary, it does in a way suggest that the person rates himself wrongly as one endowed with a judicious sensibility; and even this stupidity on his part, I think, is a compliment to him because it presupposes in its turn his similitude with you (in the matter of sagacity before his making this wrong supposition). The drift is this:— The worldly man has every reason for being supposed as a stupid being; but actually he is supposing himself to be a person with judicious sensibility for the very same reason. Hence when (foolishly) the worldly man calls the assemblage of worldly allurements as stupid, it also involves at the same time a valid reason for the supposition of stupidity on the part of the worldly speaker himself. But fallaciously, the opposite conclusion of sagacity is arrived at on what is really a ground for concluding stupidity. Since the sagacity of worldly allurements (personified) is well-known, (others) calling a worldly person stupid is tantamount to his praise, since it indirectly denotes his similarity with allurements; actually, the latter are well-known to be very clever and (though mistakenly, worldly man is said to be as stupid as allurements), it is supposed that before he yielded to allurements at least, man too was sagacious. The suggested idea is that worldly man is much worse than even stupid and insentient nature (which allures man)!

Hence the author observes:— *yadā...* etc.

itarathā tu

It is never the prominence of the suggested sense but something else which governs the determination of a poetic element as a specific *alaṅkāra*.

The word *ādi* (= 'etc.') in the verse presently summing up the discussion in the (*dvandva*) compound form "*samāsoktyādi*" is to include under this head of figures of speech which possibly admit a suggestive element, a number of other figures too like *vijastuti* (= 'veiled praise'). Now he starts giving an answer commonly applicable

to all such instances in the words—

radayaṁ atra...

The idea is—'How much is to be written needlessly under each and every word!'

The following is an example of 'veiled praise':—

Of what avail is gossip about other's homes?

Yet I am unable to remain silent;

Since gossiping is in the nature of southerners!

In every house and every shop,

In every city square and every drinking club,

Like a mad woman Your beloved is roving—

I mean your fame!

By the praise suggested here, the literally stated meaning itself is embellished. However, the following verse is cited as an example of 'veiled praise' by another commentator:—

O Lord! way back this earth was your grand-mother;

Later your mother she came to be!

Now she has become your wife to mother your sons

With the oceans as her golden girdle!

When you turn a hundred years full

She will be your daughter-in-law too!

Is this all proper in a royal house like yours,

Supposed to be expert in ethical lore?

Indeed, this appears vulgar to us, as it arouses extremely indecent associations. And after all, what is the 'praise' offered here? It is nothing more than this— "You have been king in a hereditary line of descent". And it is indeed inconspicuous.

Such simplistic 'veiled praise' is condemned in circles of aesthetes. Hence it should be ignored altogether.

Let us now take the figure of speech called *bhāva* defined (by Rudraṭa) as follows:—

When an emotion's reaction produced by a contingent circumstance goes to suggest, by some clue, the character's specific mental state as well as the connection between the mental state and the circumstance, then the figure of speech is termed '*bhāva* (lit. 'emotional intent')

—(Rudraṭa, VII.38)

Here too the emotional intent becomes a figure of speech only when the directly stated meaning is relatively more important. For, the conditions governing the occurrence of the figure are that the reactions due to an emotion such as speech and the like should be

variable in nature; yet the particular emotional intent involved should be inferable on the basis of a given clue. That over-all intent in the illustration given (by Rudraṭa) is— "I am ready for amorous dalliance with you," and it is this which constitutes the essence of the figure *bhāva*. The illustration under reference is (Rudraṭa, VII.41):—

Here I am, a woman youthful though weak,
 All alone in this dwelling!
 3 The master of the house has gone abroad.
 Whom, then, can you request for stay?
 My poor mother-in-law is both blind and deaf.
 Indeed, you are stupid, O traveller!

In this illustration, the suggested intent adds beauty to each and every aspect of the directly stated facts; and hence is regarded as an *alaṅkāra*. On the other hand, if it were to be relatively pre-eminent, then there would be no scope at all for any *alaṅkāra*, (since it would be a variety of *dhvani* only) as already observed. There is no need for harping upon it any more.

Yatra

That is to say—'in poetry'.

alaṅkāṭayāḥ

For the very reason that they are *alaṅkāras*, it follows that they are subordinate to the directly stated meaning.

pratibhā-mātre

In similes etc., the apprehension of that (suggested) sense may be indistinct or hazy (*mlīṣṭa*).

vācyārthānugame

That is when the suggested sense and directly stated senses have equal prominence, as in the figure, 'praise of the irrelevant' (*aprasūta-prasāṁsā*).

na pratīyate

When the prominence does not occur strikingly, i.e. when prominence has to be argued with effort, and yet it fails to carry conviction to the heart of the critic. An example of this is had in the comments made by another commentator on the verse— "*de ā pasia nivattasu*" (*supra*, under *Dhvanīyāloka-Kārikā*, I.4).

Thus it is established that in *four* circumstances, there will be no designation of *dhvani*, even though a suggested sense may be present:— 1) when it is unimportant, 2) when its comprehension is indistinct, 3) when it has a prominence equal to that of the directly stated sense and 4) when its prominence is not quite distinct.

It might be asked— 'Where, then, will it be positively *dhvani*?' The

author gives his answer thus:—

ratparāveva

This means— "free from the possibility of confusing it with any other *alaṅkāra*'s occurrence". The word '*saṅkara*' in the original text has this general sense only; and it would be wrong to take it in the sense of the *alaṅkāra* of that name, viz. 'commixture of figures'. Even the explanation that the figure '*saṅkara*' is implicative of other figures too would be a laboured one.

itasca

Not only because the two are dependent upon two mutually opposed relationships, viz. that of the denoted-denoter and suggested-suggester, but also because the two are themselves opposed to each other like an independent master and a dependent slave of his, there can never be any identity between the *alaṅkāras* and *dhvani*.

avayava

i.e. a part taken away from the whole and considered separately. That is why it is explained as *prthagbhūta* or 'a unit separated'. One might urge that such a separated unit may not be a whole, but a unit comprised within the totality might serve as a whole. Such an objection is refuted in the sentence—

apṛthagbhāve tu

Even in that case, it will not be one homogeneous aggregate (*samudāya*), since other components too which are heterogeneous will be present therein. Among the components going to form the aggregate, there is also the suggested sense. It is not of the nature of *alaṅkāra*, for the very reason that it is the dominant sense. And that which might be an *alaṅkāra* cannot be *dhvani* because of its subordinate status itself. Therefore it is declared:— "*na tu tattvameva*" ("can by no means be identity itself").

Another possible objection is:—"You have conferred the sovereign status of *dhvani* on what really is only a kind of *alaṅkāra*, and then declared it as the sole essence (of poetry)." This is answered in the next sentence:—

yatrāpi vā

"Not at all; we have not arbitrarily conferred any such high status to any of the *alaṅkāras* coming under the group, *samāsokti* and so on. For, even in their total absence, it can exist. It has been already shown in detail how it may be present even when the characteristics of *alaṅkāras* like *samāsokti* are completely non-existent through illustrations such as "*aitā ettha*" and "*kassa vā na*" (*vide-supra*, under *Dhvanikārikā*, I.4). Hence the author concludes:— "*na tanniṣṭhatvameva*" (*dhvani* is not

grounded on them exclusively).

vidvadupajña

This is a possessive compound qualifying 'speech'. It means 'that whose first enunciation has been made by the learned (grammarians). That is why the word does not take the neuter gender enjoined on a *tatpuruṣa* compound formed with the word *upajña* (lit. 'first propounded') according to Pāṇini's grammatical rule, '*upajñānopakramam...*' (II. iv. 11).

Śrūyamāṇeṣu

According to the theory that the last of the sounds coming in a series to the ear are heard, it has been said that the sounds heard are products of (previous) sounds. Indeed, they do possess a quality of resonance as that of a ringing bell; and they have been called here by the term *dhvani*. As observed by the revered Bhartṛhari:—

What is produced by the contact and separation of the organs of speech-production with the relevant places (within the mouth) is *sphoṭa* or (oral) 'sound'. Other sounds produced (echo-like) from these are termed *dhvani* by others (who hold that such sounds too are produced, as against those who hold that such succeeding sounds are suggested by the preceding ones).

(*Vākyapadīya*, II.102).

By the same token, even suggested sense which is resonant and comparable to the resonant vibration of a ringing bell comes to be designated by the term *dhvani*. Furthermore, even audible syllables, termed *nāda*, which are fully grasped only after the last of the syllables is heard and which suggest in their turn the *sphoṭa* (sound-gestalt) as a whole are called *dhvani* (by some grammarians). This, again, is supported by the text of the same revered author (i.e. Bhartṛhari):—

By means of impressions ineffable, as well as continuity of apprehensions, the sound-gestalt is revealed by *dhvani*. It is this sound-gestalt in which we grasp a word (as a totality) in its true form.

(*Ibid.*, I.83)

Thus it is clear that the term *dhvani* connotes both suggestive expression as well as suggestive sense.

Furthermore, even though the duration of uttered syllables is restricted, as noted by authorities in the field —

"However slight be the effort in the utterance of word, the listener's mind will either not catch any of the syllables thereof, or will catch all the syllables at once."

(Kumārila, *Ślokavārttika*, section on *sphoṭa*, 10)

even in the case of the restricted nature of syllables heard, it is seen that

on the speaker's part there is some further effort, over and above the effort required for their mere utterance, which results in differences of intensity in the sounds, viz., 'fast', 'slow' and so forth. As Bhartṛhari himself says:—

After the word-sound is revealed, differences in its intensity are brought about by *vaikṛta-dhvanis* or transformed evolutes of the initial or primary *dhvani* (i.e. *prākṛta-dhvani*). But the tota' unit of *śṛṅgāra* apprehended is never partitioned by them.

(*Vākyapadīya*, I.77)

Taking their (i.e. grammarians') lead, it is stated by us that the linguistic function over and above those of denotation, intended purport and secondary implication deserves the designation of *dhvani*. Thus all these four are termed *dhvani*. And the whole poem too, with which the above four are associated, comes to be termed *dhvani*. Therefore references to *dhvani* — sometimes as distinct from a poem, and at other times as identical with a poem — are both not without justification.

vācya-vācaka-sammiśraḥ..

This is a compound word with the intermediary word *sabita* elided. Hence the sense is that of the compound whole (*sammiśra*) constituted by the fusion of the denoted and the denotative elements. Though immediately after this compound word, there is no co-ordinating conjunction *ca*, its sense is intended by implication as in the well known usage '*gāmaśvaṁ puruṣam*' etc. (lit. the cow and the horse and the man). Hence it emerges that the meaning denoted is *dhvani*, and the word that denotes is *dhvani*; both possess the power of suggestion as they communicate *dhvani*. Further, the suggested sense is also *dhvani*, since we have the fusion therein of the ingredients of *rasa* such as determinants (*vibhāvas*), consequents (*anubhāvas*) etc. by the etymology that the compound of these (viz. *rasa*) is suggested.

Again, the term *śabda* itself can connote the linguistic function by the sense of the root *śabd* ('to produce linguistic sound') from which it is derived. And it is not of the nature of *abhidhā* or mere denotation, but a function which touches the very essence. Hence this verbal function is also termed *dhvani*.

Finally, the referent of what is called *kāvya* or poetry is also *dhvani*, in so far as it is a collocation or summation of all the four types of *dhvani* already explained. So it is that the *raison d'être* common to all these is furnished in the phrase:—

Vyañjakatva-rāmyād

Vyañjaka *tva* is the relation between the suggester and the suggested;

and this relation is found to govern uniformly or commonly all these different alternatives coming under the category of *dhvani*. Now the objection raised by some objectors in the beginning of the book that since the possible turns of speech are endless, *dhvani* cannot be anything more than a negligible detail among them, is taken up for refutation in the words—

na caivamvidhasya

This shows how vast the purview of *dhvani* is, with its chief varieties and sub-varieties to be set forth in the sequel. The chief varieties to be mentioned are two; viz., 1) *avivakṣitavācya* and 2) *vivakṣitānyaparavācya*. The sub-varieties of the first are: (i) *arthāntara-saṅkramitavācya* and (ii) *atyantatīraskṛta-vācya*; the sub-varieties of the second are:— (i) *asamlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya* and (ii) *samlakṣya-krama-vyaṅgya*; again, each of these sub-varieties also have their further sub-divisions.

mahāviśayasya

Thus the purview of *dhvani* comes to be very vast as it has to cover so many forms of illustrative units in poetry. Its treatment then is in no way comparable to a treatment of just *particular* figures of speech. The word *particular* brings out how very limited is the scope of individual figures; the word *just* emphasizes the absence of primacy in such a treatment of individual figures. It is because of this positive aesthetic appeal (*camatkāra*) of *dhvani* that the minds of men of taste are scented by it as it were; hence they have a worthy reason for exhibiting even physical reactions like 'closing of the eyes' and so on.

abhāvavādinah

All those who deny *dhvani*, even if they do not come under the three heads already noticed, should be construed as coming under this general description. The result of refuting all their objections is declared now by the author:

asti dhvaniḥ

Dhvani exists (beyond doubt).

The asseveration of (the identity of *dhvani* with) *bhāktatva* or secondary sense can be easily raised and refuted only against the background of literary examples; with this idea in mind, the author of the *ṛtti* sets himself to the task of recapitulating even here the matter constituting the next chapter, before answering the two pertinent charges against *dhvani*, viz., (i) its equivalence with secondary sense and (ii) its indefinability, though these deserved the first claim on his attention in the natural order of treatment expected:—

sa ca...

All the five senses of the term *dhvani* become severally applicable in

understanding these (*Bahuvrīhi* or compound) names given to the sub-varieties of *dhvani*, depending on the sense intended in each case. The relative pronouns, viz., 'by which', 'in which', 'from which', 'for which', and 'of which' may be easily understood respectively in the five senses under reference. Thus in the term *avivakṣitavācya-dhvani* the second member -*vācya* means 'primary meaning rendered subordinate', to make it applicable to '*dhvani*' which means 'suggestive sense' here. In the same way, the member -*vācya* will have to be interpreted to suit the other type of *dhvani* in question, viz. *vivakṣitānyapara-vācya-dhvani*, also.

Alternatively, these compounds may be understood as adjectival compounds (*karmadhāraya*) also. The formal analysis of the term *avivakṣita-vācya* would be that *vācya* which is unintended (literally) and at the same time expressive; and of the term *vivakṣitānyapara-vācya* would be— that which is intended literally and implying another sense too, as well as expressive. The primary sense may sometimes become unintended for reasons like incompatibility; but at other times, it might be compatible and hence also intended. Yet, it leads up to the ultimate suggested sense by virtue of its own beautiful efficacy. Thus, in this second variety, sense alone becomes primarily suggestive, whereas in the former, the word is primarily suggestive. At this stage, one might raise an objection that it is a glaring self-contradiction to regard one and the same meaning to be both intended and unintended. We should answer back with a query:- 'Where is any contradiction in our regarding as intended the very extension of the first meaning to imply the second alone?'

sāmānyena.

The purport is that even the triple subdivision of *dhvani* into *vastu*, *alanākāra* and *rasa* is subsumed under these two heads of *dhvani*.

It might be asked:— "What purpose is served by adding these two technical names at the back of the first technical name, *dhvani* (which is itself under dispute)?"

Here is our reply:

These two technical names serve to highlight the fact that both the impression of the listener brought about by the earlier noted three types of word-import, due to the functioning of convention, purport and implication (or Indication) and the speaker's intention act as contributories to each other during the operation of the suggestive function. In this way, the nature of *dhvani* itself has been vivified even by these very names (of its two types).

Suvarṇa-puṣpām...

Suvarṇa-puṣpā is that which blossoms gold manifold. Taken literally, the sentence as a whole becomes incongruent since the literal meaning is just impossible; so it comes to be called *avivakṣīa-vācya* or that whose primary meaning is unintended. As a consequence, the sentence first denotes the conventional meaning, indicates by its power of purport (*tātparya*) the word-order to be construed (*anvaya*), sets it aside as being incongruent, and by virtue of similarity, signifies the secondary sense, viz. one's attainment of all-round prosperity. The significance of this secondary word-function lies in the (suggested) admiration of the hero, the learned man and the dutiful servant. It is not openly stated, but concealed, even like the buxom breasts of a noble heroine, thereby attaining a high degree of preciousness, and comes to be suggested. Hence the word here is primarily suggestive, while the sense is but contributory to it; thus all in all, four verbal functions are involved in this type of *dhvani-kāvya* (viz. denotation, indication of purport, secondary implication and suggestion).

Śikhariṇi kva nu nāma...

The idea is that even holy mountains like *Śrī-parvata* famous as retreats for the unhindered attainment of the highest *siddhis* (or magical super-human powers) would not be productive of such a goodliness as this. Even thousands of celestial aeons would be no more than a limited period of time. One has not heard that any austerity like *Pancāgni* (penance practiced rigorously between five burning fires) can ever bestow such a good fortune. The word *tava* is an independent word and not compounded with *adhara-pāṭala*. Were it to be a part of the compound, the personal reference to the lady, viz. 'your', would not be conveyed to the reader independently or emphatically; 'what the parrot bites is a fruit red like *your* lower lip' is the emphasis intended by the poet. Therefore, the objection raised by some to the effect that "the poet has not written 'tvadadhara-pāṭalam', only because of the exigencies of metre" becomes pointless.

daśati

i.e. relishes the savour unstintedly all the time, and does not gulp it up like a glutton; hence the young parrot is acting as a relisher of good taste. Both these, i.e. the attainment of such a precious fruit, and the capacity for its unstinted relish are due to the benign influence of some holy asceticism. Even the acquisition of it in youth, which is the proper time for all enjoyment, is a further benignity conferred by the same asceticism forsooth. The suggested element herein is the disclosure of the stimulant conducive to the *rasa* of love, viz., the expertise of the

lover in composing his love-song to his beloved in a very covert fashion. Only three functions are involved here:— i) denotation, ii) purport and iii) suggestion. As there is no incongruity in understanding the referential meaning, there is no occasion for the intervention of indication as the third function in this example. Alternatively, if one were to admit that there is incongruity in understanding the referential meaning, since the imagined questions are all fortuitous and therefore incongruent, one might also allow Indication based on similarity to intervene as a function in the middle stage. Even then, its set purpose must be taken only as suggested, and that purposive part will constitute the fourth stage in the general understanding of the verse. The difference between the two illustrations in the text is only this:— In the former, exclusively Indication is the primary contributor in the suggestive process; while in the latter the primary contributors are Denotation and Purport; it is so because the suggested sense is grasped only through the agency of the sentence-meaning's beauty as a whole; hence it has been stated that Indication might have a negligible part to play therein too. But in the variety of *dhvani* called *asamlakṣya-kramavyanṣya* (lit. that *dhvani* wherein the temporal sequence between the stated and suggested senses is not noticeable), there is not even a glimmer of Indication; the sequential order being unnoticeable by its very nature. This will be further explained in the sequel. Thus in the second variety of *dhvani* too, there are just four linguistic functions. Hence the author restates '*bhāktamāhuh*', immediately in the wake of the two examples cited and refutes the view of the *bhāktavādins*.

The following is the gist of the matter:— Those who allege that *bhakti* itself is *dhvani* should be asked which one of the three following possibilities of identity (*tād rūpya*) they are espousing:— (1) identity between two synonyms; (2) identity between an object and its differentia (in a definition); e.g. that between earth and its differentia, viz., earthiness; and (3) identity imagined on account of a chance concomitance between two things, as for example that between a crow and the residence of a person named Devadatta. Among these the first one is refuted in the text, viz.,

I.14 *bhakti*ā *bibharti*

ukta-prakāra, the epithet of *dhvani*, means that *dhvani* should be taken in all its five senses already noted, viz., (1) word, (2) meaning, (3) linguistic function, (4) the suggested sense and (5) the whole poem, which is a whole comprising all the first four aspects.

In order to draw out the basic distinction in the very nature of the two (viz., *bhakti* and *dhvani*), the author describes the true nature of *dhvani*

in the sentence:—

vācya-vyatiriktasya arthasya...

Here, *tātpharyeṇa* means 'That intended as the final resting point'; it might also mean 'that intended as the final purport'; *prakāśanam* means 'suggestion'.

upacāra-mātram

upacāra is a synonym of terms like *guṇavṛtti* or secondary verbal usage, *lakṣaṇā* or Indication and *upacaraṇam* or figuratively eulogistic expression. The term *mātram* carries the following significance:—Even in usages wherein a fourth verbal function concerned with suggesting the hidden purpose exists, it is virtually as good as non-existent, since it comes to be ignored though possibly present, as a matter of fact over and above the third verbal function, viz., *lakṣaṇā* or Indication. Indeed, the very definition of a purpose is:—"that contemplating the attainment of which one proceeds to act." Even in such places, Indication is surely existing. How then can the functions of 'suggestion' and 'indication' become identical?

Now the author refutes the second possibility (outlined above) of *bhakti*:—

ativyāpteh...

'*asau*' or 'this' refers to *dhvani*. *tayā* 'by that' means 'by *bhakti*'.

One could urge at this stage as follows:— When 'suggestion' is necessarily involved in 'Indication', how can there be any scope for it in places outside the purview of 'suggestion'? The reply to the charge is given below:—

mahat sauṣṭhavam...

Logically, some kind of suggestion regarding purport might be present therein, but it is of no consequence since the purpose suggested is so meagre as to deserve indifference. The adjective *mahat* ('excessive') shows that the little charm that might be there as an effect of 'suggestion' is to be taken just as a *guṇa* or literary excellence (and not as literary essence); that is why it has been said (by Daṇḍin):—"The attribution of the property of one thing upon another thing is taken as a literary excellence by name '*samādhī*' or 'Imposition'." (*Kāvyaadarśa*, II. 261). If, then, there should be no significant purpose served, what is the justification for such a parlance? An answer to this question is furnished in the following:—

prasiddhyanurodha...

The parlance of poets is mostly governed by the traditional or conventional use of words by other poets preceding them.

We would offer here another interpretation too:— Besides conven-

tional currency, *prasiddhi* might also signify the unconcealed nature of the purpose in view. The purpose might be revealed on the surface itself (as in *bhakti*); but what is required in *dhvani* is its profound hiddenness, even as in the case of a precious treasure. By the secondary usage in the word *vadati*, the purpose conveyed is 'clear manifestation'. What loss to poetic charm would be there if one were to say it out openly in so many words? Conversely, what extra poetic charm can be felt even when it is indicated thus in a hidden fashion? It is with this intention that the author himself states in the sequel (I.15) that the term *dhvani* is applicable only to such instances which convey such charm as cannot be conveyed through any other words.

avarundhijai
means 'is embraced'.

punaruktam
means 'absence of usefulness', since 'reiteration' is literally impossible.

kupitāḥ prasannā avaruditavadanā vihasantyāḥ
yathā gṛhīṣṭastathā hr̥dayam haranti svairiṅyo nabilāḥ,

Here 'holding' (*grahana*) indicates acceptance; and 'capture' (*harana*) indicates the possibility of one's succumbing to the wiles (of wanton women).

'ajjāe', etc.

Even a soft stroke with a fresh creeper given by the man on his last wife's bosom became an unbearable blow on the heart to the co-wives who did not share with her that husband's love-making, for the very reason that it was soft (indicating love). That a soft stroke given to one person should become unbearable to another, though soft, is indeed amazing. The word 'given' indicates the fruition of love (so far as the last wife is concerned).

'*parārthe*', etc.

Although the word 'suffers' is quite compatible in its primary sense with the noble person indirectly praised, yet when construed with the sugarcane, the immediate referent, the very impossibility of its suffering any actual feeling becomes the cause, for (our understanding) its secondary sense of 'an object undergoing pain' which is tantamount to its 'becoming subjected to pressure'. The author anticipates the following objection:—

'There is in fact a purpose served in this example also. Why then should that purpose be not reckoned as suggested?' The author's answer to this is:— "*na caivamvidha...*" ('such instances are never reckoned as coming under the purview of *dhvani*'-*vṛtti*).

I.15 uktyantareṇa...

That is to say, 'by any function of word or meaning other than *dhvani*'. The word *śabda* (in the *kārikā*) should be understood in all its five senses).

dhvanyukterviṣayābhavet

In other words, 'will be denoted by the term '*dhvani*'.

udāhṛte

i.e. in the usages cited above, such as '*valati*'. So far, the author has demonstrated that the function of *dhvani* is not involved even in instances of Indication implying a purpose, when the said purpose is not worthy of regard. Now it is added that in instances where a purpose is basically absent, though a secondary usage is present, the question of *dhvani* does not even arise:—

I.16 *kim ca*

Words like *lāvanya* (lit. 'saltiness') which have gained currency in senses like 'attractiveness', quite remote from the literal sense, namely, 'saltiness', and, for that very reason of currency (*rādhī*), which do not stand in need of the fulfilment of the three conditions of *lakṣaṇa* (viz., incompatibility of primary sense, proximity with primary sense and an intended purpose for resorting to secondary usage) — this is according to the well-known dictum that "secondary usages current in specific senses are mostly as good as primary referential statements" — do not become worthy of the designation, "*dhvani*", even if they be used in senses other than their own. In other words, they will not be referred to as '*dhvani*'. The secondary usage of words is two-fold—i) based on qualitative similarity between two objects and ii) involving relation other than similarity between two objects. By the word *ādi* (in the *kārikā*) we should understand words like *ānulomya* (congruousness), *prātikūlya* (opposition) and *sabrahmacārin* (associate). Literally, a massage down the regular hair-line is *ānuloma*; and a stream flowing off the bank is *pratikūla*; one having the same teacher as another is *sabrahmacārin*; these are the primary senses of these three words. The other meanings of these current in usage are secondary and derivative only. No special purpose is involved in the secondary usages of these words; hence the nomenclature of *dhvani* does not befit them.

It might be urged that in examples like— "Shining in all youthful charm, my beloved paramour has come into my house", there is apprehension of suggested meaning from expressions like *lāvanya*; yes, it is true. But the suggested meaning apprehended therein is not due to the word *lāvanya*, but due to the suggestive power of the sentence understood as a whole. In the particular instance cited above, it is

suggested that the beloved's face itself is illumining a'l the directions. This discussion need not further detain us. Hence the author concludes—

prakāraṅtareṇa

That is to say, by way of suggestion alone, and not by the use of indicatory words like *lāvanya*. Thus there is no invariable concomitance between *bhakti* and *dhvani*. In case *bhakti* were to be the differentia of *dhvani*, then wherever *bhakti* is present, *dhvani* too would have to be present, a position which is indeed tainted by the fallacy of *Too Wide*. Even if we should accept this position for the sake of argument, still their difference cannot be altered:— 'Let us, for argument's sake, admit that *dhvani* is present wherever *bhakti* is found. Even then, the object towards which Indication directs itself is not the same as the one towards which suggestion comes to be directed. There can be no relation like that of an attribute and substantive between two entities whose scope or object of functioning is radically different. And a differentia is no more than a (distinctive) attribute. To explain further, Indication is a function concerned with a non-primary meaning, while suggestion is concerned only with the purpose or end in view. And it is not proper to hold that even that purpose or end can be conveyed by a second Indicatory power, since that situation does not have the conditions required for the functioning of Indication. This reasoning is implied in the author's concluding words, viz.—

api ca:—

17 **anukhyāṁ vṛttim...**

The 'primary function' referred to is *abhidhā* or the denotative power of words. 'Leaving aside' has the sense of 'giving up, i.e. terminating'. 'By the secondary function' means 'by the function of Indication'. 'The apprehension of sense' here has reference to the apprehension of only the secondary sense. In regard to the purposive end for the sake of which it is resorted to, another verbal power indeed must be admitted as responsible. Surely, it cannot, again, be Indication. For, the very definition of Indication is that it is a verbal power which functions only when the primary meaning of a word is stultified or hampered by the force of obstacles. There is no such obstacle present when a word is bringing about the apprehension of a speaker's purpose or end. If an obstacle should be present there too, to remedy which a secondary function is posited, then the second apprehension of the purpose too can have an obstacle to be remedied by a still another secondary function, and this leads to infinite regress. Hence it is impossible that this apprehension of purpose could be the result of an indicated

Indication. The word *darśana* in the original text has a causal significance. Thus—

kartavye

means 'is made or intended to be conveyed'.

amukhyatā

i.e. being hampered by the presence of an obstacle or conflicting circumstance.

duṣṭataiva

A word is used in a secondary sense only with a view to ensuring that the apprehension of the intended purpose is rendered easy. When the purpose meant to be conveyed (by the speaker) is the boy's extraordinary bravery in the example, 'the boy is a lion', in case that function too should become impeded, it is tantamount to saying that the intended purpose remains uncommunicated; what is the point then in resorting to such a secondary usage of the word? If one were to say that there too another purpose has to be envisaged, then all secondary usage would end up in envisaging purposes *ad infinitum*. Alternatively, if the secondary function operates unimpeded, then the function involved in conveying the purpose would *not* be Indication at all, because its governing conditions are not present there. Nor can one assume that there is no verbal power operating in the said example. Certainly, the power operating therein cannot be denotation, since there is no conventional meaning with which it is linked. The power therein which is other than denotation is itself suggestion.

na caivam

Nor is there any defect involved in such (suggestive) usage, since the intended purpose is conveyed quite unimpededly. Therefore, the fact of the matter is as follows:— Denotation itself, when forced by an impediment to lose the word's primary sense, i.e. when its fruitful operation is hindered, turns in another direction since its purpose is yet unfulfilled. That is why popular usage regards the understood sense as a non-primary sense. That is also why in the secondary function too, there is a specific association with a conventional sense in a non-primary fashion. Hence Indication is just a tail of Denotation.

tasmāt

indicates that the author is now concluding his argument. Since Indication is just an appendage of Denotation, how can it, depending as it does on the verbal function of primary denotation and meriting the designation of 'a secondary function' only,— both because it arises by abrogating denotation and because it is but a tail as it were of denotation— ever be a differentia of *dhvani* or suggestive function of a

word, in its two-fold aspect, viz. metaphorical and secondary usage? Indeed, the purview of the two are quite different and the alleged identity is impossible. This conclusion is stated with the preamble —
 tasmā:

i.e. Not only because of the fallacy of *Too Wide* already pointed out, but also because of the different purviews of the two incidentally set forth.

Having thus explained first the fallacy of *Too Wide* mentioned in the *kārikā*, viz., "atīvyāpterathā..." (I 17), now the author starts explaining the other fallacy of *Too Narrow*:—

avyāptirapyasya...

"asya" refers to the general statement equating *dhvani* with *guṇavṛtti* or secondary usage. In case *bhakti* were said to be found in every instance where *dhvani* is present, there would be no fallacy of *Too Narrow*. But that is not what the objector has said. Thus in the variety of *dhvani* known as *avivakṣita-vācya*, *bhakti* is indeed present in examples such as—

suvarṇapūṣpāṃ pṛthivīm (*supra.*)

But in other examples like—

śikharīṇi... (*supra.*)

where is *bhakti*?

The objector might attempt a defence of his stand in the following manner:— 'Indeed, the purview of *lakṣaṇā* embraces *gauṇī* also. A word might indicate a sense and then be put in apposition with it (assuming the same case-ending) as in *śiṃho vatuḥ* ('the boy is a lion!'). Or, the sense too might indicate another sense, in which case the indicator word is caused to be put in apposition with the word denoting the sense (so that the two come to have the same case-ending); or else, one might also say that both the word and sense together simultaneously indicate the second sense and come to be mixed up with another word and another sense. Thus whatever be our explanation (of secondary usage), the conclusion remains that the metaphorical (*gauṇa*) usage is quite distinct from *lakṣaṇika* or secondary usage in general. For, it has been rightly observed:—

"A distinctive word is used only in *gauṇa* usage; but not in *lakṣaṇā*."

Thus (though the distinctive word may be absent), the presence of the secondary verbal function is indeed there too; hence *lakṣaṇā* must be regarded as all-embracing, covering examples of *gauṇa* as well. And *lakṣaṇā*, again, is five-fold. To explain: the first variety is seen when there is some association (of the secondary sense) with the primary sense. The word '*dvirepha*' is an example of this. Here the primary sense of it is that which has a name with two 'ra' syllables in it. It denotes

the bee as its secondary sense because of its association with the word 'bhramara'. That sense of the bee is indicated secondarily by the word *dvirepha* only because of its association with the word *bhramara* as already explained. The second variety is based on proximity. The usage '*gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣaḥ*' ('There is a hamlet in the Ganges!') illustrates this. The third variety is based on invariable concomitance, which is also a close relation. This is illustrated in the usage: *yaṣṭiḥ praveśaya* ('Allow the lances to enter!'). The fourth variety is based on a relation of contrariness, as in the example of a person who talks of his enemy in the following way:— "Indeed, is there any way in which he has not favoured me?" The last variety is based on *kriyāyoga* or the relation of cause and effect, e.g., a person who is depriving one of his food, is spoken of as follows— "this man is taking away my life!" Indeed, by this five-fold *lakṣaṇā*, the entire secondary usage of the word is fully explained. Thus, even in such examples as '*vikharīni...*' when one concedes the presence of an incongruous element taking the form of a fortuitous query etc., *lakṣaṇā* based on similarity will be operative. The *dhvani* theorist might retort that he too has admitted the presence of *lakṣaṇā* there as occurring in between other functions. If so, why is it designated then as *vivakṣitānyapara* ('intended but denoting another')?

The answer is given to this question by clubbing the *vivakṣitānyapara* variety of *dhvani* with its other divisions (*tadbheda*). The chief division of *dhvani* postulated here is *asāmlakṣya-krama* (that wherein sequence remains uncognizable). Hence all its sub-divisions, viz., *rasa*, *bhāva*, *rasābhāsa*, *bhāvābhāsa*, *rasa-prasāda* and *bhāva-prasāda* come to be understood under the broad head *tadbheda*. In none of these can *lakṣaṇā* have any operative part. This may be illustrated in detail:— *kāvya* or poetry (by definition,) is descriptive of determinants (*vibhāva*) and consequents (*anubhāva*) (of *rasa* etc.); and this primary sense of *rasādi* does not even contain the possibility of any incongruity. How, then, can there be any scope for Indication there?

The objector might urge:— "Where is the need for incongruity? The essential nature of Indication is just this much as per the famous definition— viz., "Indication is the apprehension of a sense invariably associated with the primary meaning." Since in the present case, the primary senses of determinants, consequents etc. are invariably associated with *rasas* etc., the latter should be held as indicated; the determinants and consequents are nothing but causes and effects; the passing moods are nothing but their associates."

We refute this stand. If the above argument is valid, when a person understands smoke from hearing the word 'smoke' and then remem-

bers 'fire' (associated with smoke), this act, i.e., his remembering 'fire' also, would have to be taken as brought about by Indication. Further, his remembrance of 'overcoming cold' from 'fire' and so forth would all come under the scope of Indication. The meaning of the word 'smoke' would become endless at this rate.

Should the objector say— 'as the scope of the word 'smoke' is limited to its primary sense, all that endless meaning cannot be embraced by Indication,' then we come back to the first premiss, viz. the vital essence of indication is incongruity in the primary sense of a word. Once it is there, there cannot be anything like a limited primary meaning. Certainly, there is no incongruity of any kind in the delineation of determinants and consequents (of *rasādi:*) in poetry.

"Should that be so," the objector might yet argue— "as in the case of the remembrance of fire after understanding smoke, so also the apprehension of emotional states such as love follows the apprehension of the determinants, etc. So there would be no operation at all here of any verbal function".

This Mīmāṃsaka philosopher deserves to be put to a questioning. "Is it held by you that the apprehension of *rasa* is nothing but the apprehension of mental states as present in other individuals?" No sir, you should never commit this mistake. If this were all, it would be no more than an inference of mental states in persons belonging to our empirical world; how could there be any relish in it? Actually, the relish of *rasa* is what we regard as a supra-mundane experience of joy. Its vital essence lies in relishing the determinants etc. described in poetry. It should not be subjected to the sacrilege of being equated with remembrance, inference and so on. On the other hand, the truth is that a man with a cultivated sensibility, thanks to his conversance with empirical thought-processes like inferring the cause from the effect, apprehends determinants etc., in a way not at all detached; his way is one of complete self-surrender to his *sahṛdayatva* or responsiveness, also called by the alternate name *hṛdaya-saṁvāda* or 'consent of the heart'; as a result of this, his apprehension is seminally characterised by relish, in keeping with his *emführung* (*tanmayī bhavana*); and does not tread the insipid path of remembrance, inference and so forth, since the seedling of the would-be fullness of *rasa*-relish has already taken root in his heart. Nor is this relish a result of any other instrument of knowledge in the past; in which case only it could be remembered now. Nor is it now produced from any other instrument of knowledge known anywhere else, because in explaining supra-mundane experiences, perception etc. cannot have any relevance.

That is the reason why supra-mundane terms like 'determinant' are used in the context of *rasa* instead of current wordly terms like 'cause'. Our authority for this stand is Bharata himself who states—

The term *vibhāva* has the sense of that which is extraordinarily apprehended. (*Nāṭyaśāstra*, Ch. VI)

In the world of empirical usage, however, one talks of it only as a 'cause'; one never designates it as *vibhāva* or aesthetic determinant. In the same way, *anubhāva* (consequent) too is supra-mundane only. That is why it is stated (by Bharata):—

Since re-presentation by way of speech, limbs and skill makes the onlookers feel the emotions themselves after the manner of the actors, *anubhāva* is so designated. (*Ibid*)

anubhavana or 'co-feeling', is nothing but the rapport or *empfindung* of the onlooker with that of the spectator. In our empirical usage, it is only called by the common name 'effect' and is not termed any time as an aesthetic consequent (*anubhāva*).

It is indeed to emphasize the truth that 'another's state of mind is not intellectually cognized' that Bharata has not included the term *sthāyibhāva* in his aphorism about *rasa*; viz. —

vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād-rasa-niṣpattiḥ (*Ibid*).

'By the mingling of aesthetic antecedents, consequents and passing moods does *rasa* result.' Were he to include it (*sthāyibhāva*) also, it would have been a destructional missile. The transformation of a *sthāyin* (abiding mental state) into *rasa* stated by Bharata elsewhere can be explained in terms of propriety. For, relish arises only as beautified by the chastening influence of that (abiding) mental state whose appropriate manifestations are determinants and consequents. And also, abiding mental states like love are apprehended by way of observing determinants like the pleasure-grove and consequents like horripilation, at the stage of acquiring knowledge of the worldly emotions of persons as helpful instruments in attaining the goal of rapport (with characters depicted in literature). Though passing moods also are mental states, they are mentioned separately along with determinants and consequents in the aphorism, because they too come to be relished only as ancillaries of abiding mental states. Hence the arousal of the state of relish is nothing but the intensity of aesthetic experience which is attained by rendering inferior all empirical states of mind like joy produced by worldly causes such as union with kinsfolk described in a literary work. Thus this arousal of aesthetic relish is the same as suggestion; it cannot be any intellectual communication as in the case of the process involved when means of knowledge are

operating; nor can it be any kind of production as in the case of the activity of causal agents. If then it is neither intellectual communication, nor causal production, what else is it? Indeed, it is *rasa* which is supra-mundane.

But, the objector might again ask back—"Are the factors responsible for the arousal of aesthetic relish, viz. determinants, consequents, etc. communicative agents or productive causes?" We say that they are neither communicative agents nor productive causes; but they are only contributory factors for the arousal of aesthetic relish. "Is such a thing seen at all anywhere else in the world?" — the objector might ask. Our answer is that since it is not seen anywhere else, because of that reason precisely, *rasa* has been described as supra-mundane by us. One can also hit back with the counter-question—Where is even the relish of sweet juice seen elsewhere? for, surely, it is not there in jaggery, pepper, etc. which are its ingredients. Such posers are quite easy.

But, then, the objector might exclaim that *rasa* becomes devoid of validity attested by accepted instruments of knowledge. We would say—"All right, may it be so. What further difficulty is there?" Since both the goals (of literature), viz., delight and instruction are achieved through aesthetic relish itself, what else is there to be attained? Then, "is it conceded", the objector might argue, "that *rasa* is without any valid proof?" We reply—"No, not at all! Its proof lies in its being actually experienced by the relisher; and relishing is also a kind of valid knowledge. Further discussion on this is unnecessary."

There is also another reason why *rasa* happens to be supra-mundane:— Alliteration of delicate and harsh syllables is not useful in conveying any explicit meaning; but it is suggestive of *rasa* all the same. There is no room there for supposing the operation of Indication. The aesthetic relish therein is a resultant entirely of the relisher's tasting of the sound-aspect of the alliterative poem. Sensitive critics are seen, by and large, reading and relishing the same poem again and again. The maxim that "what is but a means to the end in view, comes to be rejected when its purpose is served, though it is first utilized" does not apply to literature whose end is delight. Hence literature which produces delight once is not rejected, (because its production of a second delight and so forth is also equally cherished by men of taste); thus it is true that even sound (in literature) has a suggestive power. That is why the time sequence between grasp of sound and meaning is unnoticeable.

A critic has observed that this position of ours would involve the defect of '*vākya-bheda*' or "one sentence virtually being taken as two." The criticism stems from a misunderstanding of our position. (Even

leaving aside literature), if we take only non-literary works into consideration, we find that a sentence uttered but once yields a meaning, because of conventional denotation; how could it be held as conveying two meanings simultaneously, since no remembrance is possible (on the hearer's part) of two opposite conventional imports at one and the same time? Conversely, if it be held that the two conventional imports are not mutually opposed, it would result only in a single sentence-meaning. If it should be posited that the two are conveyed sequentially, i.e., one after another, such a position would conflict with the accepted dictum that words and sentences cannot have powers that admit of any halt before the completion of meaning. In case it is thought that such a double meaning can be properly explained only by postulating that the sentence is repeated twice, (the first repetition explaining the rise of the first meaning and the second repetition of the same giving rise to the second meaning), even then, the defect already pointed out (viz., conflict with the dictum that words and sentences cannot have powers that admit of any halt before completion of meaning) would remain as forceful as before. To avoid it, if the objector should say that the second meaning conveyed is other than the one conveyed by the sentence with the aid of contributories like context, conventional denotation, etc., then it would upset the very basic principle underlying verbal usage in conventional senses. (Any statement could mean any thing one wants). Thus the contingency would arise that the Vedic injunction— "One desirous of heaven should celebrate the sacrifice called Agniṣṭoma" could be interpreted as meaning "one should eat dog's flesh" according to the whim of the interpreter. There would be no rule preventing such a whimsical interpretation. In such an instance too, there is no possibility of any uniform consistency, and the defect of 'Want of proof' would remain. Thus the defect of sentence, viz., 'two-in-one' would taint that statement also.

On the other hand, the actually described determinants etc. direct themselves towards the arousal of relish in the case of *rasa*; and hence there is no need for them to take the aid of means like conventional denotation, etc. This awareness is not like that of the one arising from one's hearing a scriptural injunction which involves impressions such as — "I am the person enjoined; I shall perform this ritual here and I have accomplished this ritualistic act enjoined." The whole procedure is future-oriented therein; and hence is mundane in its nature. On the other hand, in poetry, the awareness of relish aroused is completely present-oriented like a magic flower sprung forth from the relish of

determinants, etc.; it is not related to anything past or future. Therefore, aesthetic relish of *rasa* is at once distinct from mundane relish as well as bliss experienced by yogins.

Hence it is that even in examples like 'tikhariṇi' (*supra.*), men of taste will grasp the speaker's intent, viz., sweet flattery of his beloved, without considering things like incongruity in the primary sense, etc. That is the reason why our author has said in a general way that Indication will be absent in *dhvani* classed as *vivakṣitānyapara-vācya*. But, in order to educate even the hard-headed critics, we have said— "Let there be Indication all right; but what will you do, even if you are offended, in respect of *dhvani* classed as *alakṣya-krama*? If you are not offended really, we would make bold to say that the final resting-place is suggested sense even in *dhvani* of the *avivakṣita-vācya* type—e.g. *suvarṇapuspām...* which does not have to utilize the causal factors of Indication like incongruity of primary sense, etc." This discussion need not be prolonged any further.

The author concludes (his argument) now:—

I.18 tasmād bhaktiḥ

Another likely objection is this:— "Let not Indication and suggestion be identical in essence. Let not Indication be even the differentia of suggestion. But it can surely serve as an indicatory mark (*upalakṣaṇa*) at least of *dhvani* taking the form:

"Wherever *dhvani* exists, *bhakti* also exists".

This would substantiate our position that *dhvani* is indicated by the operation of *bhakti*.

Even this is not true in all instances. Even if it be true, for argument's sake, what is it that the objector has gained by such an argument? And what is it that we have lost? So the author adds—

I.19 kasyacit

The objector might argue like this:— In fact, *bhakti* or Indication has been expressly stated by ancient theorists. Intelligent readers will be able to understand by themselves *dhvani* in its several forms also by their knowledge of the operation of *bhakti*. Why should it be thus separately defined? Anticipating such an argument, the author states:—

yadi ca

The comprehensive principle underlying all *alanṅkāras* is indeed the relation of the denoter and the denoted. Once the nature of that denotation comes to be explained fully by grammarians and Mīmāṃsakas, where will be any scope left for the work of literary theorists to explain *alanṅkāras*? Similarly, once the logicians have proved that an effect is produced from a cause, what new aspect would be left for a

further explanation regarding causal agents like God or the knowers? Thus every philosophical activity (of definition) would become a sheer waste. So the text adds—

lakṣaṇa-karaṇa-vaiyarthya-prasaṅgaḥ

There may not be any new discovery made by us for the first time; what was already disclosed by earlier theorists is fully explained by us. Even if this were to be the truth, what harm is there? With this idea in mind the author observes—

kiṁ ca—lakṣaṇe'nyaiḥ...; prāgeva...

the word 'even before' in the text should be taken in conjunction with 'our present effort' implied in the context.

By thus refuting the three-fold theory of non-existence of *dhvani*, and also the theory of subsumption of *dhvani* under *bhakti*, it might be taken that the theory of indefinability is as good as refuted in passing. That is why no original *kārikā* is seen which expressly refutes this view. Though it is indirectly refuted already, the author in his *vṛtti*, however, directly sets forth that *prima facie* view and refutes it in order to complete the structural unity in argument of the work with the sentence, viz.—

ye'pi ...

In the way already explained, the *kārikā*, viz. "*yatrārthaḥ sabdo va ...*" (I.13) provides a general definition of *dhvani*. In the way to be explained in the sequel, a specific consideration of it in a classified manner will be accomplished in *kārikās* beginning with— "*arthāntare saṅkramitam*" (II. 1). The author in his *kārikās* of the first chapter has offered only a general definition of *dhvani*. In the second chapter he intends to offer the divisions as well as a specific definition of *dhvani*-types. But he alludes therein (II. 1) to the first two *dhvani*-types as if they were already mentioned earlier. Adhering to this (unsaid) intent of the *kārikā*-author, the *vṛtti*-author has expressly spoken of the two *dhvani*-types in this (first) chapter itself— '*sa ca dvividhaḥ ...*'

sarveṣāmeva

all entities, whether empirical or philosophical.

atiśayoktyā

by the hyperbole, as in the example—

"those syllables sweet arouse in my heart
something beyond my descriptive art!"

That is to say, by the description of *dhvani* as "indefinable", they might have implied the quintessential nature itself of *dhvani* in poetry by this hyperbole.

Amen.

There may indeed be light (*āloka*),
 Enriched also by 'moonlight' (*candrikā*);
 Yet will it shine without sight? (*Locana*)
 So has Abhinavagupta aright
 Provided his open eye-sight!

By whose revealing power afar,
 The whole universe stands ajar;
 To that Goddess of Intuition self-enshrined,
 I bow down in devotion consigned!

उदाहरणपथ सूची

(लोचनग्रन्थे)

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तान्यक्षराणि हृदये

तैस्तैरप्युपयाचतैः

तुल्योदयावसानतात्

दीवडि तेन्नु णाहि

दूरावर्षणमोहमन्त्रः

दे आ पसिअ णिवनसु

धर्यार्थकाममोक्षेषु

ध्वनिर्नामापरो योऽसौ

नखं नखाग्रेण

नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः

निरूढा लक्षणाः काश्चित्

निःश्वासान्ध इवादर्शः

नेयं विरोति शृङ्गारता

परस्परपवर्गण

पर्यायाक्तं यदन्येन

प्रतिषेध इवेष्टस्य

प्रत्ययैरनुपाख्यैः

प्रवातनीलोत्पल

प्राणा येन समर्पिताः

प्रार्थये प्रसीद

भा.व.वात हठात्

भो भोः किं किमकाण्ड एव

भिन्नरुचिर्हि लोकः

सम धार्मिक विस्रब्धं

मणिः शाणोल्लीढः

मदो जनयति प्रीतिं

मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वं

यत्रोक्ते गम्यतेऽन्योऽर्थः

यदि नामास्य कायस्य

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